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T^fTJUY  <L* 







Copyright,  1909,  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS. 
Printed  in  (he  United  States  of  America. 



CHART  I F«***i9a 

CHART  II 252 


CHART  IV 2?° 


CHART  VI 276 


CHART  IX 3°o 


CHART  XI                 3°6 


THIS    book  was  partially  completed  just    sub- 
sequent   to    the    signing    of   the    Portsmouth 
Treaty.     But  it  was  put  aside  in  order   to  allow 
sufficient  time  to  verify  or  disprove  its  hypotheses 
and  conclusions. 

In  all  but  inessential  details  it  remains  as  orig- 
inally written.  Succeeding  events  have  so  con- 
firmed the  beliefs  of  that  time  that  I  now  feel  justi- 
fied in  giving  the  book  to  the  public. 

H.  L. 

March,  1909. 






Hail! — The  Valor  of  Ignorance!! 

AFTER  careful  reading  of  the  manuscript,  we 
believe  that  when  it  is  given  publication  it 
will  greatly  interest  public  officials,  National  and 
State,  as  well  as  the  mass  of  intelligent  citizens  in 
private  life,  who  have  not  hitherto  had  arranged 
for  them  a  series  of  pictures  equal  in  importance 
to  the  collection  that  is  to  be  found  in  the  twenty- 
one  chapters  of  this  book. 

We  do  not  know  of  any  work  in  military  literature 
published  in  the  United  States  more  deserving  the 
attention  of  men  who  study  the  history  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Science  of  War  than  this — 
The  Valor  of  Ignorance.  And,  as  the  government  of 
the  United  States  is  "Of  the  people,  for  the  people, 
and  by  the  people,"  it  is  quite  in  order  to  invite 



citizens  who  control  in  military  matters  of  the  na- 
tion, as  they  do  in  other  important  national  affairs, 
to  "know  thyself." 

The  popular  belief  that  the  United  States  is  free 
of  opportunities  for  invasion  is  all  "tommy  rot," 
if  allowable  to  use  an  expression  that  we  think  more 
apt  for  our  purpose  than  elegant  in  style.  Briefly, 
and  to  the  point — no  nation  offers  more  numerous 
opportunities  for  invasion  by  a  foreign  nation  than 
does  the  United  States  whenever  cause  therefor  is 
sufficiently  great  to  induce  preparations  by  any 
other  nation  that  will  beat  aside  our  resistance  on 
the  sea.  The  world  is  a  grand  stage  whereon  are 
many  players.  In  the  game  of  cards  called  "poker," 
the  straight  flush,  headed  by  the  ace,  is  occasionally 
held  by  one  player.  It  wins.  In  the  course  of  time 
no  one  knows  when  or  how  soon,  the  family  of  na- 
tions may  get  to  playing  at  cards,  and  beyond  the 
sea,  perhaps,  will  be  found  a  "full  hand"  against  our 
three  "aces" — the  Navy,  Coast  fortifications,  and 
the  Militia. 

Our  mobile  Army  is  so  ridiculously  small  in  the 
World's  War  game  that  it  amounts  to  nothing  better 
than  a  discard!  What  will  the  Militia  do  under 
circumstances  when,  in  the  game  of  War,  as  in  the 
game  of  poker,  there  is  a  call  for  show  of  hands — the 
very  time  in  the  game  when  "  I.  O.  U."  will  not  have 
the  value  of  coin?  Rush  into  the  jaws  of  death? 
Let  all  who  believe  in  the  value  of  Militia  for  war 



turn  to  the  preface  you  have  chosen  for  Volume  II. 
We  quote  it  here,  to  save  the  trouble  of  doing  so : 

"Regular  troops  alone  are  equal  to  the  exigencies 
of  modern ^war,  as  well  for  defence  as  offence,  and 
when  a  substitute  is  attempted,  it  must  prove 
illusory  and  ruinous. 

"  No  Militia  will  ever  acquire  the  habits  necessary 
to  resist  a  regular  force.  The  firmness  requisite  for 
the  real  business  of  fighting  is  only  to  be  attained 
by  constant  course  of  discipline  and  service. 

"I  have  never  yet  been  a  witness  to  a  single  in- 
stance that  can  justify  a  different  opinion,  and  it  is 
most  earnestly  to  be  wished  that  the  liberties  of 
America  may  no  longer  be  trusted,  in  a  material 
degree,  to  so  precarious  a  defence. 


It  is  with  no  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  military 
enthusiasm  and  skin-deep  experience  which  the 
organized  Militia  of  the  country  has  that  we  quote 
this  passage  from  Washington,  for  every  little  effort 
helps.  But  who  does  not  know  that  the  sentiment 
for  cohesion  that  enables  the  Militia  organizations 
to  "  keep  in  the  swim  "  is  chiefly  the  social  sort  rather 
than  the  sterner  sentiment — duty  to  the  Nation? 
So,  as  Washington's  observation  had  reference  par- 
ticularly to  the  condition  of  soldiery  that  results 
from  a  levy  of  volunteers,  under  our  present  system 
of  raising  armies  for  war  purposes,  we  are  justified 



in  saying  that  his  words  are  as  true  to-day  as  when 
penned.  They  were  true  then  and  will  be  true  until 
the  time  when  the  author  of  the  sentiment  shall  be 
no  longer  affectionately  regarded  as  a  man  who 
would  not  deceive  his  countrymen;  as  one  who 
wisely  advised  of  future  dangers  out  of  his  great 
experience  and  his  true  appreciation  of  the  natures 
of  men. 

We  do  not  find  that  Washington  was  an  advocate 
of  coast-defence  fortifications  to  anything  like  the 
fad  of  to-day.  The  few  he  had  were  useful  then,  just 
as  the  many  we  have  now  are  useful,  to  divert  the 
enemy  to  wayside  landings — not  very  hard  to  find 
then,  nor  impossible  to  find  now. 

So  when  the  enemy  attempts  to  invade  the  United 
States  he  will  land,  for  such  is  the  power  of  nations 
now  for  the  offensive,  unless  the  Almighty  who  hath 
power  greater  than  he  to  control  the  waves  of  the 
sea  opposes  relentlessly  his  efforts;  and  when  that 
time  comes,  as  come  it  may,  nothing  short  of  mobile 
armies,  trained  to  discipline  in  service,  can  prevent 
an  enemy's  occupation  of  lines  of  supply  and,  as  a 
result  of  such  occupation,  quick  capitulation  of 
any  city  of  first  rank  in  the  United  States,  plus  its 
fortified  places;  this,  too,  the  fate  of  any  such  city 
in  the  world.  Why,  therefore,  divert  more  millions 
of  money  to  ineffectual  use  when  we  have  enough 
coast-defence  works  now  ?  Possibly  one  excuse  for 
further  construction  may  be,  as  was  said  by  a  military 
genius  interested  in  the  defence  of  his  country: 



"Coast-defence  fortifications  served  well  two  pur- 
poses : 

"r.  To  preserve,  and  make  progress  from  ex- 
perience, the  science  of  manufacturing  large  guns. 

"2.  For  testing  the  skill  of  military  engineers." 

When  we  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  it  is  a  mis- 
take to  rely  upon  untrained,  undisciplined  men  for 
serious  war  operations  (all  our  war  history  can  be 
cited  in  proof  that  it  is  so),  we  have  not  far  to  look 
and  find  what  seems  to  be  the  popular  reason  for 
such  reliance  since  the  Nation  has  become  a  grand 
factor  in  the  world.  It  is  because  the  Nation  is 
wonderfully  rich  in  natural  resources  and  artificially 
made  wealth — so  great  a  Crcesus  that  it  can  afford 
to  pay,  at  all  events  it  seems  willing  to  pay,  for  the 
extravagance  in  money  and  life  which  follows  on 
occasions  of  war  and  left-handed  business,  as  reg- 
ularly as  night  follows  day. 

The  popular  belief  in  our  country  that  money  is  the 
controlling  factor  in  war  needs  to  be  materially 
shocked  and  greatly  modified.  The  better  senti- 
ment would  be — and  it  is  a  national  harm  that  it  is 
not  so  now — all  men  and  women  in  love  with 
military  service,  obligatory  in  peace  and  war! 

The  shades  of  night  are  not  yet  so  dense  as  to  shut 
from  memory  the  recollection  that  certain  states, 
having  small  treasury  accounts  and  poor  credit, 
fought  near  to  bankruptcy  wealth  much  superior  to 
theirs.  Thus,  an  example  at  our  door  where  great 



wealth  was  no  scarecrow  to  men  of  courage  when 
long-standing  causes  (real  or  fancied)  for  war  arose. 

No  Hague  Conference  could  have  stopped  that 
conflict,  based,  as  it  was,  on  limitation  in  opposition 
to  expansion  of  the  rights  of  a  race. 

The  second  part  of  your  Book  I  treats  of  problems 
provocative  of  war  so  evidently  within  the  realm  of 
exalted  wisdom  for  correct  solution  that  the  citizen 
and  state  legislator  will  serve  his  country  best  by 
following  the  advice  of  statesmen  charged  with  that 
vision  which  comprehendeth  the  American  universe 
and  its  glory. 

The  best  way  to  determine  whether  an  apple  is 
sweet  or  sour  is  to  eat  it.  Only  thus  can  one  de- 
cide what  at  sight  is  a  doubtful  condition  of  the 

The  several  chapters  of  Book  I  we  regard  as  in 
the  category  of  "  gradual  approaches  "  to  obtain  view 
of  the  Apple  to  be  found  in  Book  II,  which  the 
reader  should  attentively  examine  and  determine 
the  flavor  of,  through  close  study  of  the  text  and 

It  is  quite  probable,  because  of  the  very  general 
indifference  throughout  the  country  for  things 
military,  which  serves  excellently  to  heighten  the 
ignorance  of  the  purpose  for  and  value  of  armies 
to  nations,  many  readers  will  find  the  apple  to  have 
a  neutral  flavor,  and  in  the  valor  of  their  ignorance 
will  answer  your  well -prepared  practical  demon- 



stration  of  our  actual  and  possible  military  situations 
in  their  usual  way:  "Just  let  'em  try  it  and  you'll  see 
what  we  can  do." 

The  statesmen  and  the  technically  informed 
will  more  likely  pass  in  review  one  of  Napoleon's 
maxims:  "The  frontiers  of  states  are  either  large 
rivers  or  chains  of  mountains  or  deserts.  Of  all 
these  obstacles  to  the  march  of  an  army,  the  most 
difficult  to  overcome  is  the  desert;  mountains  come 
next,  and  broad  rivers  occupy  the  third  place." 

We  can  think  of  nothing  better  suited  with  which 
to  end  this  letter  than  the  following  quotation  from 
a  page  of  your  book:  "Nations,  being  but  composite 
individuals,  all  that  which  moves  or  is  part  of  an 
individual,  in  a  larger  sense,  moves  or  is  part  of  a 

"To  free  a  nation  from  error  is  to  enlighten  the 
individual,  and  only  to  the  degree  that  the  individual 
will  be  receptive  of  truth  can  a  nation  be  free  from 
that  vanity  which  ends  with  national  ruin." 
Yours  truly, 

ADNA  R.  CHAFFEE,     . 
Lieutenant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Retired. 




U.  S.  A.,    RETIRED 

"  '"THE  Valor  of  Ignorance  "  is  the  striking  title 
1  of  a  most  remarkable  book  by  Homer  Lea. 
The  title,  however,  does  not  indicate  the  scope  of 
the  undertaking,  which  is  a  military  work  that  should 
be  carefully  read  by  every  intelligent  and  patriotic 
citizen  of  the  United  States. 

The  book  consists  of  two  parts — the  first  made  up 
of  philosophical  deductions,  founded  upon  the  un- 
changing elements  of  human  nature  as  established 
by  historical  precedent. 

Man  in  his  evolution  from  primitive  savagery  has 
followed  laws  as  immutable  as  the  law  of  gravitation. 
No  nation  has  long  been  permitted  to  enjoy  the 
blessings  of  peace,  unless  able  to  safeguard  such 
blessings  by  force  of  arms.  The  richer  a  nation  may 
be  in  material  resources,  the  more  likely  it  has  been 
to  fall  a  prize  to  a  more  militant  people.  The  con- 
tinuous enjoyment  of  peace  and  national  indepen- 



dence  has  always  cost  dear,  but  is  well  worth  the 

A  few  idealists  may  have  visions  that,  with  ad- 
vancing civilization,  war  and  its  dreadful  horrors 
will  cease.  Civilization  has  not  changed  human 
nature.  The  nature  of  man  makes  war  inevitable. 
Armed  strife  will  not  disappear  from  the  earth  until 
after  human  nature  changes.  Words  extolling 
peace  are  worthless  for  national  defence,  and  a  too 
clamorous  gospel  of  peace  may  paralyze  the  best 
efforts  to  meet  our  military  necessities. 

The  most  persistent  lovers  of  peace,  since  the  his- 
torical period,  have  been  the  Chinese.  China  is  now 
reaping  the  logical  reward  of  "peace  at  any  price." 
It  is  a  subject  nation,  its  destiny  controlled  by 
alien  Manchus,  and  its  fairest  possessions  ravished 
from  its  littoral. 

The  most  Christian  nations  of  Europe  have  for 
several  centuries,  in  Asia  and  Africa,  exacted  tribute 
as  mercilessly  as  did  the  robber  barons  of  the  Middle 

A  Century  of  Dishonor  shows  that  the  United 
States  have  seized  from  an  unwilling  people  nearly 
every  foot  of  their  soil. 

The  United  States,  within  ten  years,  have  ruth- 
lessly suppressed  in  the  Philippines  an  insurrection 
better  justified  than  was  our  Revolution  of  glorious 
memory.  This  insurrection  was  inspired,  from  the 
Philippine  point  of  view,  by  a  passionate  aspiration 
to  be  freed  from  the  domination  of  a  people  alien  in 



language,  customs,  and  religion;  yet  it  was  impos- 
sible for  the  United  States,  in  honor,  or  in  the  inter- 
ests of  humanity,  to  avoid  the  action  taken. 

The  second  part  of  Mr.  Lea's  book  consists  in 
making  a  logical  application  of  the  principles  de- 
duced in  the  first  part  to  the  United  States  under  its 
present  conditions.  If  the  data  published  by  Mr. 
Lea  be  correct,  and  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  to 
question  its  substantial  accuracy,  Germany  could, 
if  it  has  sea  supremacy  in  the  Atlantic,  land  within 
two  weeks  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  troops 
on  our  eastern  coast. 

Japan  now  has  sea  supremacy  in  the  Pacific.  In 
the  event  of  war,  that  supremacy  could  not  be 
challenged  until  after  we  had  constructed  a  suf- 
ficient fleet  of  colliers.  Japan  can  within  three 
months  land  on  the  Pacific  Coast  four  hundred 
thousand  troops,  and  seize,  with  only  insignificant 
resistance,  Seattle,  Portland,  San  Francisco,  and  Los 

A  barrier  of  mountains  and  deserts  makes  the 
defence  of  the  Pacific  Slope  an  easy  matter  against 
attack  from  the  East,  and  only  from  that  direction 
could  the  United  States  hope  to  recapture  its  lost 

Never  has  there  been  on  this  earth  so  rich  a  prize, 
now  so  helpless  to  defend  itself,  as  the  Philippine 
and  Hawaiian  Islands,  the  Panama  Canal,  Alaska, 
and  the  States  of  the  Pacific  coast. 

Mr.  Lea  has  lived  in  the  Orient  and  carefully 



studied  it.  He  sees  clearly  the  menace  of  the 
"Yellow  Peril,"  yet  it  is  less  than  sixty  years  since 
the  United  States  went  to  the  uncharted  shores  of 
Japan  with  an  olive  branch  in  one  hand  and  in  the 
other  a  naked  sword.  Then  was  removed  the  lid 
of  Pandora's  box  with  the  enthusiastic  approval  of 
the  American  people. 

It  is  very  remarkable  that  the  author  should 
have  so  just  a  conception  of  the  true  value  of  coast 
fortifications  in  the  general  defence  of  the  country. 
The  sole  function  of  such  fortifications  is  to  defend 
a  port  against  direct  naval  attack.  Against  an 
enemy  powerful  enough  to  land,  the  coast  fort 
has  no  defensive  value,  and  may  even  prove  an 
element  of  weakness,  as  did  Port  Arthur  to  Rus- 

Not  the  least  of  Mr.  Lea's  service  to  the  country 
is  in  his  republication  of  the  solemn  warnings  of 
George  Washington  against  the  employment  of 
militia  in  war.  Within  the  last  one  hundred  and 
twenty -five  years  disaster  and  humiliation  to  our 
arms  have  fully  confirmed  Washington's  judgment. 

The  system  of  organization  in  the  militia  is  the 
cancer  which  destroys  its  usefulness.  It  is  futile  to 
hope  the  militia  may  by  a  change  of  name  escape 
the  curse  of  its  inherent  inefficiency. 

Mr.  Lea  shows  clearly  that  we  are  confronted  by 
conditions  which  may  imperil  our  national  security, 
peace,  and  welfare.  No  candid  mind,  who  carefully 
reads  Mr.  Lea's  book,  can  draw  any  other  conclusion. 



It  is  to  be  hoped  this  book  may  arouse  a  public 
sentiment  throughout  the  country  which  will  lead 
to  a  full  and  serious  consideration  of  a  problem 
which  should  no  longer  be  ignored. 

J.  P.  STORY, 
Major-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Retired. 

BOOK    I 



" . .  .  As  a  principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  United  States  are  involved  .  ,  .  the  American 
continents  .  .  .  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered 
as  subject  for  future  colonization  by  any  European 
power.  .  .  .  We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the 
amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United  States 
and  those  powers  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any 
attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any 
portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace 
and  safety.  MONROE." 


THE  diversity  of  man's  beliefs  is  as  wide  as  the 
uncounted  millions  that  have  been  or  are  now 
cluttered  upon  earth;  enduring  no  longer  than  a 
second  of  time,  yet  in  that  brief  and  broken  moment 
doubting,  affirming,  denying.  It  is  this  unstable, 
widening  difference  in  the  viewpoint  of  man  that  has 
filled  the  world  with  so  much  contention  and  error; 
the  setting  up  and  tearing  down  of  so  many  transi- 
tory ideals,  the  making  of  fallible  laws,  constitutions, 
and  gods. 

Truth,  outside  of  the  exact  sciences,  can  only  be 
approximated.  The  degree  to  which  that  approxi- 
mation approaches  completeness  depends  upon  the 
exactitude  of  empirical  knowledge  and  freedom 
from  error  in  deductions,  which  means,  principally, 
a  freedom  from  antipathies  or  attachments. 

Under  such  limitations  we  are  to  write  this  book. 
So  the  reader,  for  the  time  being,  must  also  put 



aside  his  hates  and  desires,  since  that  which  we  are 
about  to  write  will  arouse  his  passions,  support  or 
rage  according  to  his  view-point.  If  he  is  not  equi- 
table his  prejudices  will  distort,  these  unwelcome 
truths  and  leave  undiscovered  the  fount  of  their 

A  man  who  wishes  to  be  just  or  seeks  after  per- 
fection has  no  immutable  sentiments  of  his  own, 
but  will  make,  as  far  as  possible,  the  mind  of  man- 
kind his  possession.  Calmly  he  looks  upon  the 
world;  upon  all  its  transitory  institutions,  and  his 
passions  are  aroused  in  no  manner.  He  preserves 
for  all  mankind  the  same  regard  and  consideration. 

The  just  perusal  of  any  work  demands  such  a  state 
of  mind,  and  requires  a  temporary  obliteration  of 
such  preconceived  ideas  as  have,  through  their  un- 
disturbed sway  over  his  mind,  become  prejudices  or 

In  this  book  many  conditions  may  be  met  that 
will  appear  impossible  or  unbelievable,  since  they  are 
contrary  to  what  has  heretofore  been  held  up  as 
perfection.  When  certain  beliefs,  though  false  or 
dangerous,  pass  to  the  stage  of  national  fetichism 
they  often  become  invulnerable  even  to  the  shafts 
of  truth  itself. 

Of  the  few  virtues  that  appertain  to  or  are  emana- 
tions of  mankind  in  the  aggregate,  patriotism  is  fore- 
most in  being  universally  impersonated  and  put  to  a 
wide  variety  of  uses ;  turned  to  all  degrees  of  roguery. 
When  it  becomes  a  national  fetich,  virtue  goes  out 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

of  it.  Under  its  borrowed  cloak  crimes  are  not  only 
committed,  but  nations  betrayed  and  given  over  to 
pillage;  hence  the  truth  of  the  old  statement,  that 
in  patriotism  rogues  find  their  final  refuge. 

Besides  being  the  subterfuge  of  rogues,  patriotism 
is  divisible  into  three  forms :  two  that  are  false  and 
— common;  one  that  is  true  and — rare.  The  com- 
monest of  the  accepted  forms,  also  the  most  errone- 
ous, is  to  be  found  in  uncompromising  and  general 
contempt  for  all  nations,  together  with  an  inveterate 
prejudice  against  some  one  of  them.  The  next  or- 
dinary and  false  form  shows  itself  in  vainglorious- 
ness,  whether  over  great  deeds  or  greater  crimes; 
the  condoning  of  national  faults  or  their  concealment 
by  the  exaltation  of  this  fetich  worship. 

True  patriotism  would  rot  away  if  its  exemplifica- 
tion lay  only  in  contempt  or  prejudice  toward  others. 

To  inspire  pride  it  is  not  necessary  to  arouse 

In  peace,  and  not  in  war,  is  the  time  to  judge  the 
worth  of  a  man's  or  a  nation's  patriotism.  Those 
who  are  indifferent  to  their  country's  welfare  in 
peace  will  be  of  no  use  to  it  in  time  of  war:  while 
those  who  make  it  a  practice  to  rob  the  public  ex- 
chequer of  its  virtues,  as  well  as  gold,  or  to  condone 
such  thievery,  are,  during  warfare,  so  delinquent  in 
patriotism  as  not  to  be  removed  from  the  sphere  of 
negative  treason. 

Patriotism  in  its  purity  is  a  political  virtue,  and 
as  such  is  the  antithesis  of  commercial  vanity.  To 


boast  of  a  nation's  wealth,  under  the  delusion  that  it 
is  patriotic,  is  to  commit  a  crime  against  patriotism. 

To  boast  does  not  liquidate  the  debt  of  duty. 

As  patriotism  does  not  hibernate  in  the  time  of 
peace,  it  is  by  no  means  difficult  to  discover  the  true 
patriot  from  the  false.  He  is  made  noticeable  by 
two  characteristics  causing  him  to  stand  out  from 
among  other  men.  And  though  he  may  be  humble 
and  unknown,  yet  these  two  virtues  make  him  pre- 
eminent even  among  those  who  are  vain  of  their 
honors  and  wealth. 

To  die  for  one's  country,  while  not  less  patriotic 
than  to  live  for  it,  is  by  no  means  as  beneficial.  But 
it  is  in  this  proposal  to  die  in  battle  that  cowards, 
rogues  and  treasonable  men  find  subterfuge  befitting 
their  evil  practices.  When,  in  peace,  men  postpone 
their  patriotic  activity  to  a  time  of  war,  their  pro- 
crastination is  only  indicative  of  their  worthlessness. 

As  it  is  impossible  after  death  to  distinguish  the 
coward  from  the  hero,  so  in  national  defeat  dis- 
tinctions cannot  be  made  as  to  the  cause  of  it.  The 
world  and  the  victor  take  no  note  of  post-bellum 
explanations.  For  a  nation  to  suffer  defeat  through 
unpreparedness  is,  to  all  practical  purposes,  as  bad 
as  though  it  were  through  cowardice  on  the  field. 
In  consequence,  the  man  who  opposes,  in  time  of 
peace,  suitable  preparations  for  war,  is  as  unpatriotic 
and  detrimental  to  the  nation  as  he  who  shirks  his 
duty  or  deserts  his  post  in  time  of  battle. 

To  those  who  have  within  themselves  the  spirit  of 



true  patriotism,  this  book  will  appeal  with  a  passion 
peculiarly  its  own,  for  it  is  not  other  than  an  emana- 
tion of  their  own  thoughts.  To  those  in  whom  it 
arouses  wrath  we  would  suggest  that  if  they  will  look 
to  the  origin  of  their  feelings  they  will  find  that  what 
they  have  heretofore  regarded  as  patriotism  is  not 
even  the  sham  of  it. 

The  third  matter  of  importance  that  the  reader 
should  bear  in  mind  as  he  makes  his  way  through 
this  book,  attendant  with  many  doubts  and  perhaps 
much  passion,  is  not  to  set  up  the  transitory  fabrica- 
tions of  man  against  conditions  that  are  eternal 
because  such  ephemeral  works  exist  in  his  time. 

National  existence  is  not  a  haphazard  passage  of 
a  people  from  an  unknown  beginning  to  an  unfore- 
seen end.  It  is  not  an  erratic  phantasm  of  dreams 
that  has  fallen  upon  the  sleeping  consciousness  of  a 
world;  but  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  part  of  life  itself, 
governed  by  the  same  immutable  laws. 

No  state  is  destroyed  except  through  those  avert- 
ible conditions  that  mankind  dreads  to  contemplate. 
Yet  nations  prefer  to  evade  and  perish  rather  than 
to  master  the  single  lesson  taught  by  the  washing- 
away  of  those  that  have  gone  down  before  them. 
In  their  indifference  and  in  the  valor  of  their  igno- 
rance they  depart,  together  with  their  monuments 
and  constitutions,  their  vanities  and  gods. 


IN  the  works  of  many  philosophers,  the  birth, 
growth  and  decay  of  nations  is  made  analogous 
to  the  life  history  of  individuals,  wherein  they  pass 
from  the  cradle  to  manhood,  expanding  in  intellect, 
accumulating  vigor  and  strength  until,  in  due  time, 
they  grow  old,  die  and  are  forgotten,  down  in  the 
deep,  vast  ossuary  of  time. 

This  similarity  in  the  lives  of  men  and  nations  is  in 
actuality  true,  although  it  should  not  be  precisely  so. 
As  the  body  of  man  is  made  up  of  volitionless  mole- 
cules allowing  the  natural  course  of  age,  disease  and 
decay  to  destroy  it,  the  body  politic  of  a  nation  is  an 
aggregation  of  rational  beings,  atoms  supposedly 
possessed  of  the  ability  to  reason,  and  who  should, 
if  they  are  obedient  to  laws  governing  national 
growth  and  deterioration,  prolong  the  existence  of 
a  nation  far  beyond  the  years  and  greatness  ordina- 
rily allotted  to  it. 

The  analogy,  however,  contains  this  melancholy 
truth:  that  only  so  long  as  a  man  or  nation  con- 
tinues to  grow  and  expand  do  they  nourish  the 
vitality  that  wards  off  disease  and  decay.  This 
continuous  growth  and  expansion  in  human  beings 



is  their  childhood,  youth  and  manhood;  the  gradual 
cessation  of  it,  old  age  or  disease;  its  stoppage — 
death.  But  among  nations,  though  the  progress  and 
consummation  are  identical,  we  take  but  little  note 
of  it  and  name  it  not  at  all. 

As  physical  vigor  constitutes  health  in  the  in- 
dividual, so  does  it  among  nations,  and  it  is  ex- 
emplified by  strength  among  them  as  in  mankind. 
A  brilliant  mind,  a  skilful  hand  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  health  or  duration  of  life  in  the  individual, 
so  neither  has  mental  brilliancy  compositely  taken, 
as  in  a  nation  of  scholars,  anything  to  do  with  the 
prolongation  of  national  existence. 

The  duration  of  life  in  an  individual  is  determined 
by  his  power  to  combat  against  disease,  age  and  his 
fellow-men,  resulting  in  the  gradual  elimination  of 
those  possessed  of  least  combative  power  and  the 
survival  of  those  in  whom  these  qualities  are  best 
conserved.  So  it  is  with  nations.  So  it  has  ever 
been  from  the  first  dawn,  when  protoplasmic  cells 
floated  about  in  a  pallid  ether  devouring  one  an- 
other, and  so  in  the  last  twilight  shall  these  same 
cells,  evoluted  even  beyond  what  man  now  conceives, 
pass  into  endless  night. 

The  beginnings  of  political  life  are  not  hidden  ab- 
solutely from  us,  and  though  there  is  no  exactitude 
in  our  knowledge,  we  are  nevertheless  cognizant  of 
the  fact  that  at  one  time,  when  primitive  man  lived 
in  continuous,  individual  strife,  there  occurred, 
somewhere  in  the  sombre  solitudes  of  a  preglacial 


forest,  what  has  proven  to  be  to  mankind  a  mo- 
mentous combat.  It  was  when  the  brawniest 
paleolithic  man  had  killed  or  subdued  all  those  who 
fought  and  roamed  in  his  immediate  thickets  that  he 
established  the  beginning  of  man's  domination  over 
man,  and  with  it  the  beginnings  of  social  order  and  its 
intervals  of  peace.  When  the  last  blow  of  his  crude 
axe  had  fallen  and  he  saw  about  him  the  dead  and 
submissive,  he  beheld  the  first  nation;  in  himself 
the  first  monarch;  in  his  stone  axe  the  first  law, 
and  by  means  of  it  the  primitive  process  by  which, 
through  all  succeeding  ages,  nations  were  to  be 
created  or  destroyed. 

Wars  —  Victory  —  a  nation.  Wars  —  Destruc- 
tion— dissolution.  Such  is  the  melancholy  epitome 
of  national  existence,  and  such  has  it  been  from  the 
beginning  of  human  association  until  to-day.  From 
the  time,  six  thousand  years  past,  when  the  wild 
highlander  rolled  down  from  the  mountains  of  Elam 
and  moulded  with  sword  and  brawn  the  Turanian 
shepherds  into  the  Chaldean  Empire,  until  within 
the  last  decade,  when  the  Samurai  of  Nippon  rose  out 
of  their  islands  in  the  Eastern  Sea  and  carved  for 
themselves  a  new  empire  on  the  Continent  of  Asia, 
there  has  been  no  cessation  nor  deviation  from  this 
inexorable  law  governing  the  formation  and  extinc- 
tion of  national  entities. 

All  kingdoms,  empires,  and  nations  that  have 
existed  on  this  earth  have  been  born  out  of  the 
womb  of  war  and  the  delivery  of  them  has  occurred 



in  the  pain  and  labor  of  battle.  So,  too,  have  these 
same  nations,  with  the  same  inevitable  certainty, 
perished  on  like  fields  amid  the  wreckage  and  cin- 
ders of  their  defenceless  possessions. 

As  physical  vigor  represents  the  strength  of  man 
in  his  struggle  for  existence,  in  the  same  sense 
military  vigor  constitutes  the  strength  of  nations: 
ideals,  laws  and  constitutions  are  but  temporary 
effulgences,  and  are  existent  only  so  long  as  this 
strength  remains  vital.  As  manhood  marks  the 
height  of  physical  vigor  among  mankind,  so  the 
militant  successes  of  a  nation  mark  the  zenith  of  its 
physical  greatness.  The  decline  of  physical  strength 
in  the  individual  is  significant  of  disease  or  old  age, 
culminating  in  death.  In  the  same  manner  deteri- 
oration of  military  strength  or  militant  capacity  in 
a  nation  marks  its  decline;  and,  if  there  comes  not  a 
national  renascence  of  it,  decay  will  set  in  and  the 
consummation  shall  not  be  other  than  that  sombre 
end  which  has  overtaken  the  innumerable  nations 
now  no  more,  but  who,  in  the  vanity  of  their  great- 
ness, could  conjecture  the  end  of  time  yet  not  the 
downfall  of  their  fragile  edifices. 

An  analysis  of  the  history  of  mankind  shows  that 
from  the  fifteenth  century  before  Christ  until  the 
present  time,  a  cycle  of  thirty-four  hundred  years, 
there  have  been  less  than  two  hundred  and  thirty- 
four  years  of  peace.  Nations  succeeded  one  another 
with  monotonous  similarity  in  their  rise,  decline  and 
fall.  One  and  all  of  them  were  builded  by  archi- 



tects  who  were  generals,  masons  who  were  soldiers, 
trowels  that  were  swords  and  out  of  stones  that  were 
the  ruins  of  decadent  states.  Their  periods  of  great- 
ness were  entirely  coincident  with  their  military 
prowess  and  with  the  expansion  consequent  upon  it. 

The  zenith  of  these  nations'  greatness  was  reached 
when  expansion  ceased.  As  there  is  no  stand-still 
in  the  life  of  an  individual,  so  neither  is  there  in  the 
life  of  a  nation.  National  existence  is  governed  by 
this  invariable  law:  that  the  boundaries  of  political 
units  are  never,  other  than  for  a  moment  of  time, 
stationary — they  must  either  expand  or  shrink. 
It  is  by  this  law  of  national  expansion  and  shrink- 
age that  we  mark  the  rise  and  decline  of  nations. 

Expansion  culminates,  or,  in  other  words,  nations 
begin  to  decline  with  the  subordination  of  national 
to  individual  supremacy.  When  the  debasement  of 
this  formative  capacity  of  empires  is  complete,  the 
state  is  given  over  to  devitalizing  elements — social 
and  economic  parasites.  It  is  in  these,  valorous  with 
fat  pride,  that  the  nation  takes  its  final  and  in- 
glorious departure,  as  did  its  predecessors,  forever 
from  mankind. 

The  hunt  for  old  empires  has  now  become  the  pas- 
time of  solitary  men  who  find  on  the  willow-fringed 
banks  of  rivers  only  a  mud  mound  and  a  silence; 
in  desert  sands,  a  mummy  and  a  pyramid;  by  the 
shores  of  seas,  a  temple  and  a  song.  The  shattered 
signs  of  kingdoms  are  but  few,  for  most  of  the  van- 
ished empires  have  in  their  departure  remitted  to 



posterity  neither  broken  marbles,  teopali,  Alhambras, 
nor  Druid  stones.  In  the  manner  of  nomads  they 
have  gone  away  and  left  no  sign  of  habitation  in  the 
sands  behind  them. 

Theorists,  in  contradiction  of  this  view,  with  un- 
conscious superficiality  bring  China  out  of  the  mists 
and  mystery  of  her  antiquity  and  present  her  as  a 
nation  created  and  enduring  in  endless  peace.  Such 
observations,  unfortunately,  only  betray  the  profun- 
dity of  their  ignorance.  The  law  of  national  ex- 
pansion or  shrinkage  has  governed  the  development 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  with  the  same  inexorable 
invariability  as  it  has  that  of  nations  in  the  West. 

Not  only  does  the  history  of  the  political  develop- 
ment of  China  resemble  the  history  of  the  remainder 
of  mankind,  but  has,  perhaps,  within  itself  the  sol- 
emn prophecy  of  the  world's  political  future.  China, 
from  the  obscure  hour  of  its  deep  antiquity  until 
modern  times,  has  worked  out  its  own  advancement 
and  civilization  in  no  way  benefited  by  other  civiliza- 
tions of  the  world.  Yet  China,  in  its  political  evo- 
lution and  expansion,  has  been  subject  to  all  those 
elements,  those  periods  of  physical  vigor  and  de- 
terioration, such  as  have  controlled  the  destinies  of 
the  separate  successive  nations  that  have  thundered 
so  loudly  in  the  Occident.  China,  like  every  great 
empire,  is  made  up  of  the  cleavage  and  multipli- 
cation of  political  units,  alternately  decadent  and 
renascent  through  the  unnumbered  years  of  its  ex- 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

When  the  brawling  Elamite  mountaineers  came 
down  from  their  high  places  and  founded  the 
Chaldean  Empire  on  the  plains  of  Mesopotamia, 
there  were,  in  what  is  now  the  Chinese  Empire,  a 
number  of  political  units  surrounded  on  the  north, 
south,  and  west  by  less  civilized  peoples.  The  state 
upon  which  the  present  empire  was  founded  was  a 
small  kingdom  on  the  loess  plains  of  Shensi.  From 
this  primitive  state  has  been  developed  the  vast 
empire  we  now  watch  crumbling  and  falling  away 
from  its  former  greatness  in  a  manner  wherein  time 
is  less  the  vandal  than  the  childish  vanity  of  man. 

The  cycles  of  decay  and  renascence  that  mark  the 
development  of  this  race  have,  in  cause  and  effect, 
been  homogeneous,  though  thousands  of  years  have 
separated  a  portion  of  them.  This  homogeneous 
expansion  can  be  compared  to  the  still  waters  of  a 
lake  where  a  cast  stone  causes  to  extend  outward 
in  widening  sphere  a  series  of  ripples  with  inter- 
vening spaces.  In  this  manner  has  been  marked  the 
evolution  of  the  Chinese  race  from  the  time  a  small 
splinter  of  them  was  cast  thither  by  the  hand  of 
Panku.  Each  ripple  marks  a  cycle  of  development, 
each  depression  a  period  of  decadence,  similar  in 
every  characteristic  except  their  widening  sphere. 

The  inexorable  law  of  combat  has  governed  in  all 
its  various  phases  the  development  of  the  Chinese 
Empire.  Its  political  evolution,  in  a  manner  no 
different  from  that  of  European  nations,  has  been 
through  the  battle-field.  The  edifice  of  its  greatness 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

has  been  builded  by  no  other  than  those  who  have 
fought  its  wars.  Of  the  twenty-five  dynasties  that 
have  ruled  over  China,  each  was  founded  by  a  soldier 
and  each  in  due  time  heard  from  surrounding  armies 
the  melancholy  taps  of  its  approaching  end. 

The  reasons  for  and  the  conditions  contributing  to 
the  long  continuance  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  while 
other  kingdoms  almost  as  great  have  survived  the 
erosion  of  time  but  a  generation  in  comparison  to 
the  ages  through  which  it  has  passed  and  grown 
great,  are  apparently  unknown  in  the  West.  The 
beliefs  ordinarily  expressed  have  nothing  whatever 
to  do  with  it.  They  are  fanciful,  speculative  or 
otherwise,  but  worthless.  The  Chinese  as  a  people, 
their  laws  or  customs,  have  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  preservation  of  their  nation  against  the  wearing 
away  by  time  or  that  wilfuller  element — man. 

The  preservation  of  the  Chinese  race  for  these 
thousands  of  years  has  been  due  solely  to  the  nat- 
ural environment  wherein  the  race  began  its  na- 
tional growth;  an  environment  ramparted  by  in- 
accessible mountains,  moated  by  uninhabitable 
deserts  or  seas  as  shipless  as  they  were  vast.  On 
the  north  and  northwest  are  the  deserts  of  Gobi 
and  Shamo;  beyond  these,  the  impenetrable  forests 
of  Siberia  and  steppes  where  rests  a  gloom  that  is 
white.  On  the  southwest  is  the  Roof  of  the  World 
and  the  blue-black  gorges  of  the  Himalayas.  On 
the  south,  jungles  and  the  Indian  Ocean.  On  the 
east  is  the  vast  and  lonely  Pacific,  a  purple  solitude 


through  which  only  a  few  years  ago  the  ships  of 
man  found  their  way. 

Until  the  nineteenth  century  China  was  as  secure 
in  her  isolation  as  if  illimitable  space  intervened  be- 
tween her  borders  and  the  nations  of  Europe.  To 
the  rest  of  mankind  China  was  only  the  mythical 
Kingdom  of  Cathay,  situated  somewhere  on  the 
jewelled  banks  of  Eastern  seas. 

The  Chinese,  therefore,  and  their  system  of  govern- 
ment have  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  preservation 
of  their  race.  Isolation  alone  has  been  responsible 
for  its  continuation  through  the  storms  of  more  than 
fifty  centuries.  Had  the  Celestial  Kingdom  been 
surrounded  by  other  powerful  nationalities,  as  were 
European  and  Central  Asian  Empires,  ancient  and 
modern,  it  would  have  gone  down  in  due  time  as 
they  did  and  now  be  but  a  memory  hidden  away  in 
the  old  tales  of  the  tribes  of  man. 

In  six  cycles  of  decadence  China  has  fallen  into 
such  sick  corruption  and  internal  desolation  that 
Xenophon's  Ten  Thousand  could  have  conquered 
the  whole  of  it.  But,  fortunately,  when  China  sank 
into  these  periods,  of  national  decay  there  were  none 
to  attack  her  but  the  elements,  her  own  hungers,  or 
the  Tartars  tending  their  herds  on  her  northern 
frontiers ;  a  wild,  snout-nosed  race  that  lived  without 
government  or  kings.  Yet  during  every  period  of 
decadence  and  dynastic  struggle  China  has  been 
subject  to  attack  by  these  frontier  nomads.  The 
greatest  task  incumbent  upon  succeeding  dynasties 



during  the  beginning  of  each  period  of  renascence 
was  to  drive  back  beyond  the  borders  of  the  empire 
the  yak-tail  banners  of  these  marauders. 

To  such  a  low  plane  of  self-defence  did  the  Chinese 
fall  in  the  fourth  and  fifth  cycles  of  decadence  that 
we  find  the  vast  empire  conquered  by  these  desert 
tribes.  And  it  is  in  relation  to  these  two  periods  of 
national  disintegration,  during  which  China  became 
a  subject  nation,  that  the  present  cycle  must  be 
considered,  since  conditions  are  basically  the  same. 
In  these  periods  of  decadence,  during  which  occurred 
the  destruction  of  the  Sung  Dynasty  and  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  Mongol  Dynasty  of  Yuen,  and 
later  the  dissolution  of  the  Ming  Dynasty  and  the 
enforcement  of  Manchu  sovereignty,  China  had  but 
to  protect  herself  from  the  squat  horsemen  that 
screamed  along  her  northern  frontiers.  To-day,  in  a 
period  of  national  depression  and  decay  that  is  in 
no  degree  removed  from  the  defencelessness  of  the 
fourth  and  fifth  cycles  of  disintegration,  this  race 
has  now  for  the  first  time  to  face  enemies,  not  alone 
on  her  northern  borders,  but  also  upon  the  east  and 
south  and  west,  nations  whose  morality  of  conquest 
is  no  different,  no  better  than  was  that  of  the  Mongol 
and  Manchu  tribes  who  made  her  ten  thousand  fields 
a  barren  tenure. 

The  Chinese  people — not  the  government  nor  the 
dynasty,  for  dynasties  and  governments  are  but  the 
playthings  or  temporary  utensils  of  races — have  now 
to  confront  the  most  critical  period  in  all  the  ages 


that  have  been  allotted  to  them  since  that  dim  morn- 
ing when  first  they  gathered  themselves  together  and 
Fuki  ruled  over  them  on  the  plains  of  Shensi. 

Shall  the  Chinese  as  a  nation  survive  this  old  in- 
ternal struggle  now  about  to  break  forth  and  enter 
into  the  seventh  cycle  of  their  evolution,  or  shall 
they  utter  themselves,  thunderously  but  with  finality, 
into  such  oblivion  as  awaits  the  decadent  nation? 
The  Chinese  people  were  in  former  times  propor- 
tionately manyfold  stronger  and  more  capable  of 
resisting  foreign  conquest  by  nomadic  hordes  than 
they  are  to-day  able  to  resist  the  European  or  Japan- 
ese powers  that  now  so  relentlessly  hang  upon  all  the 
borders  of  the  empire. 

Unless  there  rises  out  of  the  uttermost  depths  of 
her  bosom  the  militancy  of  another  Martial  Monk1 
the  still  hour  has  come  when  this  ancientest  kingdom 
shall  make  its  solemn  salutation  to  mankind,  in- 
different in  the  noisy  buzz  of  his  diurnal  flight. 

1  Hung-wu,  founder  of  the  Ming  Dynasty. 


THE  contemplation  of  empires  that  have  splut- 
tered and  flickered  out  on  this  windy  earth  is 
not  -without  value.  For  as  the  ancients  were  able, 
after  cycles  of  time,  to  predict  with  certainty  lunar 
eclipses  from  no  other  knowledge  than  the  inevita- 
bility of  their  recurrence,  so  we,  by  the  recurrence 
of  the  same  causes  and  effects,  the  same  beginnings 
and  ends,  are  able  to  understand  those  eternal  phases 
that  alternately  cast  their  glare  and  darkness  over 
the  orbit  wherein  nations  move. 

It  is  in  such  a  manner  that  we  now  come  to  con- 
sider the  American  commonwealth  towering  as  it 
does  so  mightily  among  nations  that  to  those  who 
compose  it  and  are  part  of  it  it  appears  a  pyramid 
amid  the  sand-dunes  of  time.  This  national  vanity 
is  justifiable  so  long  as  the  existence  of  the  na- 
tion's vastness,  its  grandeur,  and  the  part  it  has 
taken — as  great  as  any  other  state — in  the  evolution 
of  human  society  continues.  We  only  propose  to 
examine  into  the  valor  of  that  ignorance  now  en- 
deavoring to  destroy  the  true  basis  of  national  great- 
ness and  to  replace  it  with  a  superstructure  of  papier- 
mache",  not  unlike  a  Mardi-gras  creation,  around 



whose  gilded  and  painted  exterior  the  nation  is 
asked  to  dance  in  boastful  arrogance,  neither  be- 
holding nor  caring  at  all  for  the  sham  of  it  nor  its 

As  an  individual  can  form  no  conception  of  per- 
sonal death,  so  neither  can  nations.  While  individ- 
uals readily  realize  the  inevitability  of  death  in  the 
greatest  of  men  or  a  world  of  them,  they  cannot  com- 
prehend their  own  extinction,  though  their  hours  be 
ever  so  pitifully  few.  So  it  is  with  nations;  and 
though  the  most  insignificant  of  them  can  com- 
placently witness  the  death-throes  of  the  greatest  of 
world  empires,  they  are  utterly  unable  to  compre- 
hend the  possibility  of  a  similar  fate. 

The  American  commonwealth  stands  in  no  dif- 
ferent relation  to  time  and  the  forces  of  time  than 
any  other  nation  that  has  ever  existed.  The  same 
elements  brought  about  its  birth  and  the  same  causes 
will  prolong  or  shorten  its  existence  as  prolonged  or 
shortened  theirs.  Up  to  the  present  time  the  life 
history  of  this  republic  has  varied  only  in  the  slight- 
est degree  from  the  elemental  forces  that  brought  all 
other  nations  into  existence  and  governed  the  growth 
of  their  youth  and  manhood. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  recall  the  battle-fields  upon 
which  this  republic  was  born  or  the  subsequent 
wars  that  have  marked  its  growth  and  expansion, 
other  than  to  recall  the  invariability  of  that  universal 
law  governing  the  beginnings  and  rise  of  nations. 
This  country,  as  others  that  have  gone  before,  has 



been  built  up  from  the  spoils  of  combat  and  con- 
quest of  defenceless  tribes.  Its  expansion  has  been 
no  more  merciful  nor  merciless  than  the  expansion 
of  any  other  nation.  The  same  inexorable  law  of 
physical  strength  has  governed  it  as  all  others.  But 
its  conquests  have  been  over  nations  and  aborigines 
so  disproportionately  weak  and  incapable  of  wag- 
ing war  on  a  basis  of  equality  that  its  wars  have 
been  destructive  rather  than  inculcative  of  equita- 
ble military  conceptions.  The  very  ease  with  which 
this  commonwealth  has  expanded  is  responsible  for 
the  erroneous  beliefs  now  prevalent  concerning  the 
true  basis  of  its  future  greatness.  The  people  have 
come  to  look  upon  themselves  in  a  false  though 
heroic  manner,  and  upon  other  nations  with  the 
same  indifference  as  they  did  the  untutored  savage 
whose  sole  defences  were  the  solitudes  of  his  swamps 
and  forests  and  a  God  that  thundered  in  vain. 

This  republic  has  forgotten  that  during  the  last 
few  decades  its  relation  to  other  countries  has  been 
completely  altered,  not  only  because  the  ripple  of  its 
expansion  has,  by  a  law  of  national  growth,  reached 
out  to  other  portions  of  the  earth,  but  that  modern 
means  of  transportation  and  communication  have 
reduced  the  whole  world  into  a  greater  compactness 
than  were  the  United  States  in  1830.  To-day  it  takes 
less  time  to  reach  Washington  from  the  most  dis- 
tant nations  than  it  took  senators  from  their  respec- 
tive states  seventy  years  ago.  No  longer,  therefore, 
has  this  nation  to  carve  its  way  onward  to  further 



greatness  by  defeating  kingdoms  months  from  their 
base;  by  devouring  uncouth  republics  and  whole 
tribes  of  aborigines,  or  laying  bare  a  skeleton  that 
went  forth  to  battle  in  no  other  manner  than  did  the 
corpse  of  the  Cid  concealed  in  the  robes  of  royalty. 

The  time  of  this  nation's  youthful  achievements 
is  past.  Yet  proportionately  as  defenceless  as  were 
the  peoples  it  has  conquered  the  republic  goes  on, 
heedless  of  its  fate,  complacently  contemplating  the 
restless  shadow  of  vast  armed  forces  to  the  east  and 
west  of  it.  Only  perhaps  in  that  inevitable  hour 
when  this  bluster,  tragic  or  otherwise,  shall  end  will 
this  republic  understand  the  retribution  of  national 
vanity  and  become  cognizant  of  the  end  issuing  from 
the  fiat  of  that  inexorable  law,  a  law  that  never 
hesitates  nor  in  its  application  varies  or  is  found 

Why  mankind  remains  age  after  age  blind  to  this 
unchangeable  and  universal  ordinance  controlling 
the  destiny  of  nations  is  because  he  believes  that  in 
his  own  myopic  life  rests  the  raison  d'etre  of  national 
existence.  But  never  until  he  emerges  from  the 
petty  traffic,  from  the  hurrying  crowds  of  the  streets, 
and  ascends  those  heights  where  its  clamor  finds  no 
echo,  can  he  hope  to  see  the  endless  procession  of 
nations  as  they  move  onward  majestically,  tragically 
to  their  predestined  end.  On  the  thoroughfares  of  life 
he  sees  only  the  particles  that  constitute  his  country, 
not  the  nation  itself;  he  can  only  comprehend  their 
ambition,  their  momentary  struggle  for  gain,  and 



takes  no  note  of  nor  makes  any  effort  to  under- 
stand the  noble  or  melancholy  destiny  of  his  father- 
land as  a  whole.  This  is  hidden  from  him  in  the  dust 
and  pitiable  cries  that  reach,  as  he  believes  in  his 
self -exaltation,  to  the  ear  of  God;  but  do  not  in  fact 
struggle  upward  higher  than  the  roof-tops. 

In  considering  the  future  of  this  Republic  one  must 
do  so,  not  from  the  closets  of  its  politicians,  not  from 
its  alleyways  with  their  frenzied  crowds,  not  from 
theorists  nor  feminists,  for  these  are  but  the  feverish 
phantasms  and  sickly  disorders  of  national  life. 
It  must  be  regarded  from  the  heights  of  universal 
history  and  empirical  knowledge  which  appertains 
to  national  existence.  The  transitory  tribes  of  man 
are  not  for  themselves  worthy  of  momentary  con- 
sideration. They  can  only  be  considered  in  the  same 
light  as  are  organic  particles  constituting  the  body 
of  an  individual.  As  these  molecules  come  into 
existence  to  perform  their  predetermined  function, 
then  die  and  are  replaced  by  others,  endlessly  and 
without  cessation  until  the  body  itself  ceases  to  be, 
so  is  mankind  in  the  body-politic  of  a  nation,  and 
as  such  must  be  considered. 

The  future  life  of  this  Republic  has  not  only  been 
predetermined  by  the  primordial  laws  already  men- 
tioned, but  it  has  blazed  the  way  of  the  future  by  its 
acts  of  the  past.  This  irrepressible  expansion  will 
no  longer  bring  it  into  contact  with  inferior  nations, 
but  with  those  whose  expanding  capacity  and  mili- 
tary ability  are  far  in  excess  of  this  Republic.  We 



have  before  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  modern 
transportation  and  communication  has  reduced  the 
world  to  such  compactness  that  no  future  ripple  of 
national  growth  can  expand  without  breaking  against 
some  similar  ripple  emanating  from  another  nation. 
When  this  occurs,  it  is  war. 

If  this  Republic  is  to  achieve  the  greatness  and 
duration  its  founders  hoped  to  secure  for  it ;  if  it  is  to 
continue  to  spread  abroad  over  the  earth  the  prin- 
ciples of  its  constitutions  or  the  equity  of  its  laws 
and  the  hope  it  extends  to  the  betterment  of  the 
human  race,  then  it  must  realize  that  this  can  only 
be  done  by  possessing  an  ability  and  potentiality  to 
be  supreme  over  those  nations  whose  ambitions  and 
expansion  are  convergent.  Preparations  for  wars 
consequent  upon  the  growing  compactness  of  the 
world  and  increasing  convergence  of  all  the  world 
powers  must  go  on  ceaselessly  and  in  proportion  to 
the  increase  of  expansion  and  fulness  of  years. 

In  the  life  of  most  nations  the  era  of  decadence  has 
been  more  or  less  proportionate,  in  time,  to  that  of 
their  growth  and  the  consummation  of  their  great- 
ness. The  deterioration  of  the  military  forces  and 
the  consequent  destruction  of  the  militant  spirit 
has  been  concurrent  with  national  decay.  When 
this  deterioration  of  armies  and  militant  ideals  was 
complete,  the  nation  was  destroyed.  In  the  history 
of  no  country  other  than  this  Republic  do  we  find 
militant  deterioration  progressing  other  than  in  ac- 
cordance with  conditions  consonant  to  an  environ- 



ment  naturally  productive  of  militant  decay.  In  this 
nation,  however,  we  find  that  the  natural  disin- 
tegration of  militancy  is  artificially  increased,  not  only 
by  the  indifference  of  the  people  to  military  enter- 
prise, but  by  organized  efforts  to  destroy  not  only 
the  Republic's  armament,  but  its  militant  poten- 

High  or  low,  the  ambitions  of  the  heterogeneous 
masses  that  now  riot  and  revel  within  the  confines 
of  this  Republic  only  regard  it  in  a  parasitical  sense, 
as  a  land  to  batten  on  and  grow  big  in,  whose  re- 
sources are  not  to  be  developed  and  conserved  for 
the  furtherance  of  the  Republic's  greatness,  but  only 
to  satisfy  the  larval  greed  of  those  who  subsist  upon 
its  fatness. 

If  there  is  any  patriotism  worth  having  it  belongs 
alone  to  the  primitive  principles  of  the  Republic, 
to  the  militant  patriotism  of  those  who  in  simple, 
persistent  valor  laid  with  their  swords  the  founda- 
tion of  this  national  edifice  and  who  after  seven 
years  of  labor  cemented  with  their  own  blood  the 
thirteen  blocks  of  its  foundation.  The  continua- 
tion of  this  building,  and  the  endless  extension  of  the 
Republic,  the  maintenance  of  its  ideals  and  the  con- 
summation, in  a  world-wide  sense,  of  the  aspirations 
of  its  founders,  constitutes  the  only  pure  patriotism 
to  which  an  American  can  lay  claim  or,  in  defence  of, 
lay  down  his  life. 

What  we  have  said,  or  what  we  will  say,  as  regards 
commercialism  should  not  be  misunderstood.  If, 


in  the  development  of  the  industries  and  potential 
wealth  of  the  land,  industrialism  is  regarded  as  in- 
cidental to  national  progress  and  not  the  goal  of 
national  greatness,  then  it  is  in  its  proper  sphere. 
Industrialism  is  only  a  means  to  an  end  and  not  an 
end  in  itself.  As  the  human  body  is  nourished  by 
food,  so  is  a  nation  nourished  by  its  industries. 
Man  does  not  live  to  eat,  but  secures  food  that  his 
body  may  be  sustained  while  he  struggles  forward 
to  the  consummation  of  his  desires.  In  such  relation 
does  industrialism  stand  to  the  state.  It  is  sus- 
tenance, a  food  that  builds  up  the  nation  and  gives 
it  strength  to  preserve  its  ideals;  to  work  out  its 
career  among  the  other  nations  of  the  world;  to 
become  superior  to  them  or  to  go  down  before  them. 
Never  can  industrialism,  without  national  destruc- 
tion, be  taken  from  this  subordinate  place.  When 
a  man  has  no  aspirations,  no  object  to  attain  during 
life,  but  simply  lives  to  eat,  he  excites  our  loathing 
and  contempt.  So  when  a  country  makes  industrial- 
ism the  end  it  becomes  a  glutton  among  nations, 
vulgar,  swinish,  arrogant,  whose  kingdom  lasts  pro- 
portionately no  longer  than  life  remains  to  the  swine 
among  men.  It  is  this  purposeless  gluttony,  the 
outgrowth  of  national  industry,  that  is  commer- 
cialism. The  difference  between  national  industry 
and  commercialism  is  that  while  industry  is  the  labor 
of  a  people  to  supply  the  needs  of  mankind,  com- 
mercialism utilizes  this  industry  for  the  gratification 
of  individual  avarice.  Commercialism  might  be 



defined,  not  as  an  octopus  vulgaris,  which  is  self- 
existent,  but  as  a  parasite  of  the  genus  terrubia,  a 
fungoid  growth  that  is  the  product  of  industrial  de- 
generation. It  is  this  commercialism  that,  having 
seized  hold  of  the  American  people,  overshadows  and 
tends  to  destroy  not  only  the  aspirations  and  world- 
wide career  open  to  the  nation,  but  the  Republic. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  do  not  consider  military 
activity  as  something  in  itself.  It  is  a  condition  of 
national  life  in  the  same  sense  as  industrialism,  but 
with  this  difference:  though  military  development 
and  industrialism  are  both  factors  subordinate  to 
the  ultimate  aim  of  national  existence,  the  militant 
spirit  is  a  primordial  element  in  the  formative  process 
and  ultimate  consummation  of  the  nation's  existence ; 
while  industrialism,  in  its  normal  function,  is  na- 
tional alimentation,  and  the  only  other  part  it  ever 
plays  in  national  life  is  where,  by  degenerating  into 
commercialism,  it  brings  about  the  final  corruption 
of  the  state. 

Commercialism  is  only  a  protoplasmic  gormandiza- 
tion  and  retching  that  vanishes  utterly  when  the 
element  that  sustains  it  is  no  more.  Military  or 
national  development,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  only 
responsible  for  the  formation  of  all  nations  on  earth, 
but  for  their  consequent  evolution  and  the  peace  of 
mankind.  It  makes  that  which  is  dearest  to  man 
—his  life — no  dearer  than  principle  or  loyalty  for 
which  he  yields  it,  while  commercialism  sacrifices 
without  the  slightest  compunction  every  principle 



and  honor  to  gain  the  basest  and  paltriest  possession 
of  which  man  can  boast. 

Whenever  a  nation  becomes  excessively  opulent 
and  arrogant,  at  the  same  time  being  without  mili- 
tary power  to  defend  its  opulence  or  support  its 
arroganc2,  it  is  in  a  dangerous  position.  Whenever 
the  wealth  and  luxury  of  a  nation  stand  in  inverse 
ratio  to  its  military  strength,  the  hour  of  its  desola- 
tion, if  not  at  hand,  approaches.  When  the  opulence 
and  unmartial  qualities  of  one  nation  stand  in  inverse 
ratio  to  the  poverty  and  the  military  prowess  of  an- 
other, while  their  expansion  is  convergent,  then 
results  those  inevitable  wars  wherein  the  commercial 
nation  collapses  and  departs  from  the  activities  of 
mankind  forever. 


FAWS  governing  national  growth  are  as  simple 
I—*  as  they  are  immutable.  The  increasing  wisdom 
of  man  and  the  varying  conditions  of  his  political 
existence  give  but  an  altered  utterance  to  these 
changes.  The  political  boundaries  of  nations  con- 
tinue to  expand  only  as  their  military  capacity  is 
superior  to  the  countries  whose  interests  are  con- 
vergent or  whose  frontiers  are  in  common;  while 
nations  whose  ambitions  conflict  with  those  of 
stronger  powers  or  whose  frontiers  stand  in  the  way 
of  their  expansion  will,  as  in  former  ages,  be  over- 
come and  absorbed  by  them. 

The  political  frontiers  of  nations  are  never  other 
than  momentarily  quiescent;  shrinking  on  the  sides 
exposed  to  more  powerful  military  nations  and  ex- 
panding on  frontiers  where  they  come  in  contact 
with  weaker  states.  This  expansion  of  military 
powers  and  the  shrinkage  or  extinction  of  those  less 
capable  of  withstanding  them  is  determined  by  their 
hungers  and  ambitions,  by  the  supply  and  demand 
of  natural  resources  and  that  immeasurable,  theorem- 
less  ambition  of  man  as  a  nation. 

The  older  the  world  grows  and  the  more  compact 



it  becomes  through  man's  inventions,  the  more 
strenuous  and  continuous  becomes  this  struggle. 
No  longer  is  it  possible  for  any  Great  Power  to  expect 
the  expansion  of  its  geographical  area  at  the  expense 
of  aboriginal  tribes  or  petty  kingdoms  alone,  for  they 
have  now  fallen  within  the  sphere  of  some  greater 

It  was  the  recognition  of  these  ordinances  that  led 
Monroe  to  enunciate  his  doctrine  providing  for  the 
inviolability  of  the  Western  Continents.  By  re- 
moving them  from  the  sphere  of  European  expansion 
he  hoped  to  prevent  the  widening  boundaries  of 
these  militant  powers  from  coming  in  contact  with 
the  natural  growth  of  the  Republic.  No  doctrine 
proclaimed  by  any  statesman  of  this  nation  or  of  the 
Old  World  ever  portrayed  truer  insight  into  the 
nature  of  national  life. 

In  the  time  of  Monroe,  it  was  impossible  to  fore- 
see the  changes  mechanical  inventions  were  to  make 
in  the  political  development  of  the  world  after  his 
time.  While  human  nature  is  no  different  from 
what  it  was  then  and  will  remain  unaltered  eons 
yet  to  come,  this  world  has  been  whittled  down  to  a 
small  ball  and  time  has  been  scoffed  at.  No  longer, 
as  in  Monroe's  time,  does  a  vast  Atlantic  Ocean 
separate  this  continent  from  Europe.  Man's  in- 
genuity has  reduced  it  to  a  small  stream  across  which 
the  fleets  of  European  Powers  can  cross  in  less  time 
than  it  took  Monroe  to  post  from  Washington  to 
Boston.  No  longer  is  the  Pacific  hidden  in  the 



purple  solitudes  of  illimitable  vastness  nor  do  its 
waters  splash  on  toy  shores  of  porcelain  and  green 
tea.  The  smiling  mists  and  mysteries  of  these 
Oriental  lands  have  not  only  been  cleared  away,  but 
their  very  fields  have  been  ploughed  up  and  harrowed 
by  the  bayonets  of  Western  Nations.  In  their  lust 
for  the  Golden  Fleece  they  have  sown  over  them  the 
teeth  of  the  Twin  Sleeping  Dragons  from  which 
have  sprung  up  vast  and  terrible  armies,  warships 
as  swift  and  ruthless  as  the  swooping  Kite  that  is  the 
symbol  of  their  valor. 

Monroe  could  not  perceive  the  possibilities  of  such 
changes ;  and  while  his  doctrine  is  as  correct  in  prin- 
ciple as  when  enunciated  by  him,  it  has,  unprovided 
with  such  ordinances  as  would  make  it  effective, 
been  handed  down  to  the  present  age  nullified 
by  man's  new  means  of  transportation  and  the 
changed  military  as  well  as  political  conditions 
that  now  govern  international  intercourse.  But 
to  the  average  American,  as  to  Monroe,  the  At- 
lantic and  Pacific  are  still  such  vast  seas  that  no 
enemy  will  have  the  temerity  to  cross  them,  hence 
this  nation,  without  armies  and  without  navies  pro- 
portionate to  its  new  responsibilities  and  their 
concomitant  dangers,  hopes  to  remain  secure  and 
immune,  without  effort,  from  foreign  invasion.  It 
is  this  vanity,  which  can  be  called  the  Valor  of  Dis- 
tance, that  will  be  considered  in  this  chapter. 

In  a  military  or  naval  sense,  distance  is  not  meas- 
ured by  miles.  Napoleon  found  all  the  capitals  of 



Europe  closer  to  Paris  than  the  sea-coasts  of  England. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Boer  War,  the  English 
discovered  that  the  five  thousand  miles  from  Ports- 
mouth to  Cape  Town  were  shorter  than  a  few  hun- 
dred miles  from  Cape  Town  to  Pretoria. 

Distance  from  a  base  in  a  military  sense  is  meas- 
ured by  the  time,  ease  and  capacity  it  takes  to  move 
bodies  of  troops  and  munitions  to  a  secondary  base 
in  the  theatre  of  war  or  to  armies  in  the  field.  The 
space  lying  between  an  army  and  its  base,  instead  of 
being  measured  by  miles,  is  determined  by  the  speed 
of  the  means  of  transportation,  the  immunity  of  the 
lines  of  communication  from  attack,  and  the  number 
of  lines  converging  from  the  main  base  to  the  theatre 
of  war. 

Two  places  a  thousand  miles  apart,  but  connected 
by  a  railroad,  are  closer  together  than  two  places 
only  one  hundred  miles  apart  with  no  other  means  of 
communication  than  a  country  road.  The  sea, 
when  free  from  the  enemy's  warships,  offers  the  best 
means  of  communication,  not  only  on  account  of  the 
speed  of  modern  steamers  and  their  carrying  capacity, 
but  from  the  fact  that  their  lines  are  immutable  and 
can  be  as  numerous  as  are  the  ports  controlled  on 
the  enemy's  seaboard. 

Those  who  hold  to  the  belief  that  the  remoteness 
of  the  United  States  from  Europe  renders  it  in- 
accessible to  attack  point  to  Napoleon's  Moscow 
campaign  and  the  defeat  of  the  Russians  in  the 
Japanese  War  as  failures  resulting  from  the  con- 



duct  of  a  war  at  great  distances.  The  truth  is  that 
distance  in  these  two  distinct  campaigns  was  not 
responsible  for  the  disasters  consequent  upon  them. 
The  Moscow  campaign,  moreover,  has  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  modern  or  future  conditions  of  war- 
fare or  with  the  military  relation  Europe  now  bears 
to  the  United  States.  It  required  several  months  for 
troops  to  march  from  Paris  to  Moscow  or  for  supplies 
to  be  transported  over  this  distance ;  while  Washing- 
ton, New  York,  or  Boston  are  but  seven  days  distant 
from  the  capitals  of  Europe.  The  transport  by  sea 
of  Japanese  troops  to  America  would  involve  that 
nation  in  no  greater  difficulties  than  did  the  carry- 
ing of  them  to  Manchuria. 

The  campaigns  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  and  numerous  other  great  captains  were 
conducted  many  weeks  from  their  main  bases.  The 
campaigns  of  Napoleon  in  Italy,  Spain,  Austria,  and 
Germany  were  carried  on  in  the  heart  of  an  enemy's 
country,  many  weeks  and  in  some  instances  months, 
from  his  base.  In  the  war  with  Mexico  the  forces  of 
the  United  States  operated  several  months  from  their 
source  of  supplies,  while  in  the  Civil  War,  Union 
armies  conducted  campaigns  and  operated  many 
weeks  from  their  depots:  as  Grant  in  his  Vicksburg 
campaign;  Burnside  advancing  from  Louisville  to 
Knoxville ;  Sherman  in  his  march  from  Chattanooga 
to  Atlanta,  thence  to  the  north;  as  General  Banks' 
advance  in  Texas  and  Sherman's  march  across  the 
State  of  Mississippi.  The  Union  Army  in  New 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

Orleans  drew  its  supplies,  even  its  beef,  from  New 
York  City,  thirty-six  hundred  miles  away. 

The  significance  of  these  statements  belongs  to  the 
comparison  between  them  and  the  distances  that 
separate  the  United  States  from  European  bases  of 
operation,  which  in  no  instance  exceeds  ten  days. 

Grant,  in  the  state  of  Mississippi,  was  twenty  days 
marching  from  Brunes-burgh  to  Vicksburg.  To-day 
an  army  of  the  same  size  could  be  embarked  at 
Bremen,  carried  across  the  Atlantic  and  debarked 
on  the  seaboard  of  this  Republic  in  one  half  the 

When  in  1865  the  Fourth  Army  Corps  of  the  Union 
Army  was  transported  from  Carter's  Station  to 
Nashville,  three  hundred  and  seventy- three  miles, 
it  required  fourteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight  cars. 
An  army  corps  of  the  same  size,  together  with  all 
necessary  equipment,  could  be  transported  from 
Germany  to  the  United  States  on  five  steamers  of 
the  Hamburg  -  American  or  Norddeutscher  Lloyd. 
Twenty-five  of  these  steamers  could  transport  from 
Germany  to  the  American  sea-coast  seventy-five 
thousand  troops,  together  with  their  equipment,  in 
less  time  than  it  would  have  taken  Grant  to  march 
the  same  number  of  men  from  Washington  to 

Germany  can  transport  to  the  United  States  a 
quarter  of  a  million  soldiers  in  a  fortnight.1 

1  German  General  Staff. 


In  the  Virginia  campaign  of  1864,  the  supply  train 
for  General  Grant's  army  of  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  thousand  men  consisted  of  forty-eight  hundred 
wagons  drawn  by  some  twenty-five  thousand  mules 
and  horses.  This  train  transported  twenty  thousand 
tons  of  supplies.  The  entire  tonnage  could  be  trans- 
ported from  Europe  to  America  in  the  Deittschland, 
Amerika,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  or  any  other  one  vessel  of 
the  same  class  in  less  time  than  Grant's  train  could 
have  traversed  the  distance  from  the  southern  bank 
of  the  Rapidan  to  the  northern  bank  of  the  James, 
unhindered  by  the  vicissitudes  of  war  and  delays 
of  battle. 

Such  is  the  isolation  of  this  Republic,  a  condition 
that  does  not  exist.  The  only  isolation  of  which 
this  nation  can  afford  to  boast  is  that  rendered  by 
fleets  of  battleships  and  mobile  armies.  When  they 
do  not  exist  or  are  inferior  or  are  destroyed,  the 
defence  of  the  Republic  has  been  thrown  down. 

To  maintain  national  isolation  it  is  necessary  to 
possess  fleets  not  less  than  twice  the  size  of  any 
European  navy  and  a  standing  army  not  less  than 
one -half  the  size  of  the  largest  standing  army  in 
Europe  or  Asia.  At  the  present  time  England  alone 
can  array  against  the  American  navy  in  the  Atlantic 
fleets  three  times  greater,  while  at  the  same  time 
British  warships  will  be  ten  times  more  numerous  in 
the  Pacific.  Both  Germany  and  France  could  place 
in  the  Pacific  a  fleet  four  times  greater  than  the 
American  Pacific  squadrons  and  at  the  same  time 



maintain  a  sufficient  number  of  ships  in  the  Atlantic 
to  prohibit  the  departure  of  a  single  American 
battleship  from  their  Atlantic  stations.  This  can 
be  comprehended  more  clearly  by  considering  a 
state  of  war,  under  present  naval  and  military  condi- 
tions, between  any  one  of  these  powers  and  the  United 
States.  England,  France,  or  Germany  not  only 
possess  territory,  but  naval  stations,  docks,  and 
troops  in  the  Orient.  Initiating  a  war,  any  of  these 
nations  could  previously  mobilize  in  the  Pacific  a 
fleet  as  many  times  greater  than  the  American 
squadrons  as  would  insure  their  destruction.  The 
American  fleet  could  not  be  reinforced  from  the 
Atlantic  without  reducing  the  Atlantic  squadrons  to 
a  state  of  inutility  and  exposing  the  remainder  to 
destruction  by  an  overwhelming  attack  from  the 
enemy's  Atlantic  fleets.  Since  the  time  necessary 
to  reinforce  the  American  fleets  in  either  ocean  is  not 
less  than  four  months,  it  allows  the  enemy,  based 
only  six  days  distant  from  the  Atlantic  coast,  to 
seize  by  land  attack  the  American  harbors  and  naval 
bases  and  thus  prevent  the  return  of  the  American 
fleets  to  the  Atlantic  should  they  attempt  the  relief 
of  the  Pacific. 

With  the  destruction  of  the  American  Pacific 
fleet  the  Philippines,  Hawaii,  Samoa,  and  Alaska 
would  pass  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The  towns 
along  the  seaboard  of  the  Pacific  coast  would  be 
destroyed  and  the  American  flag  would  no  longer 
be  seen  loitering  over  the  wide  waters  of  this  sea. 



To  such  a  small  area  has  man's  ingenuity  pared 
down  this  once  vast  world  that  nations  can  now 
conduct  war  on  any  portion  of  it,  no  matter  how 
remote,  as  measured  by  miles,  the  theatre  of  combat 
may  be  from  their  base.  The  difficulties  of  trans- 
portation are  reduced  to  a  minimum.  Oceans  no 
longer  prevent  the  successful  invasion  of  distant 
lands,  but  on  the  other  hand  make  such  attack 

To  march  a  body  of  troops  two  hundred  and  fifty 
miles,  together  with  their  train  and  general  im- 
pedimenta, has  never  been  considered  in  warfare 
other  than  an  insignificant  undertaking.  But  Ger- 
many or  France  cr  England  can  land  a  similar  force 
on  the  American  shores  in  no  longer  time.  Japan 
could  land  an  army  in  California  in  less  time  than  a 
force  could  march  from  Los  Angeles  to  San  Francisco. 

Within  a  given  time  a  single  vessel  of  the  Mau- 
retania  or  Deutschland  class  could  transport  more 
troops  from  Europe  to  the  American  shores  than 
could  all  the  fleets  of  England  have  done  at  the  time 
of  the  Revolution  or  War  of  1812.  Vessels  of  this 
class  will  carry  a  brigade,  together  with  all  of  its 
equipment,  from  Europe  to  the  United  States  in  six 
days.  The  entire  merchant  marine  of  Germany  and 
Japan  can  be  converted  into  transports  immediately 
upon  declaration  of  war  and  land  within  a  month 
more  than  a  quarter  of  a  million  men  on  either 

Nations  lulled  into  somnolent  security  because  they 



are  separated  by  wide  expanses  of  water  from  the 
vast  armaments  of  these  Powers  will  find  that  their 
airy  bastions  of  space  will  fall  down  about  them  and 
their  resistance  will  be  measured  only  by  weeks  or 
months;  the  end  of  the  year  shall  see  their  battle 
flags  furled  and  laid  away  to  rot  dryly  in  ignominious 

A  knot  added  to  the  speed  of  a  transatlantic 
steamer  and  the  width  of  the  sea  grows  less  and  the 
armed  frontiers  of  Europe  brought  closer  to  these 
shores.  When  the  vessel's  size  or  carrying  capacity 
is  increased,  the  ocean  shrinks  again  and  the  armies 
of  distant  nations  draw  nearer. 

The  great  rampart  of  ocean  has  utterly  vanished, 
only  the  delusion  of  it  still  remains.  Its  illusionary 
defence  and  the  dreams  of  peace  born  out  of  it  must 
give  way  to  that  which  belongs  to  man  in  his  com- 
bats, the  blood  and  iron  of  military  preparation  pro- 
portionate to  the  dangers  and  difficulties  that  sur- 
round American  sovereignty  in  the  Western  Hemi- 

No  longer,  as  in  Monroe's  time,  does  the  passage 
of  the  seas  require  weeks  or  months.  No  longer  are 
the  ships  buffeted  about  by  unruly  winds,  nor 
drawn  hither  and  thither  by  uncharted  currents. 
Straight  and  unswerving  are  these  enormous  steel 
vessels  hurled  through  seas,  timed  as  accurately 
as  the  movement  of  the  constellations  overhead. 
No  longer  do  fragile  craft,  with  the  destiny  of  a 
nation  in  their  cargo  of  souls  and  shot,  drift  un- 



known,  unspoken,  over  an  abyss  of  stormy  seas. 
The  very  winds  that  once  shrieked  through  their 
broken  rigging  now  mutter  with  man's  speech  or 
scream  with  the  commands  of  monarchs  three 
thousand  miles  away. 

THIS  Republic  has  not  only  been  foremost  in  the 
utilization  of  scientific  discoveries,  but  from 
its  activities  have  come  the  most  important  of 
modern  inventions.  The  economic  phases  of  its 
career  have  been  altered;  its  social  and  political 
fabric  changed  through  the  advance  of  science  and 
general  knowledge.  But  in  its  military  system  there 
has  been  no  progress.  In  this  regard  the  altered 
conditions  of  human  society  and  international  re- 
lationship have  passed  over  the  nation  as  clouds 
hurrying  through  the  azure  heavens,  leaving  no 
deeper  imprint  upon  it  than  is  possible  from  the 
erosion  of  fleeting  shadows. 

The  modern  American's  conception  of  military 
efficiency  is  but  a  succession  of  heroics  culminating 
in  victory.  This  heroism  of  dreams,  this  valor  of 
the  rostrum,  is  based,  not  upon  the  real  history  of 
past  military  achievements,  but  upon  the  illusions 
of  them.  Like  bubbles  these  fragilest  of  militant 
deeds  are  tinctured  with  an  iridescence  that  does 
not  belong  to  them. 

This  nation,  denying  in  a  practical  manner  the 
fact  that  military  science  is  subject  to  change  and 



evolution,  as  all  other  phases  of  human  activity, 
still  clings  with  the  tenacity  of  evasion  to  the  laissez- 
faire  military  system  of  Colonial  days,  or  rather  to 
the  skeleton  of  it,  for  that  which  made  it  vigorous 
and  effective,  the  militancy  of  the  individual,  has 
now  all  but  departed,  naturally  and  in  accordance 
with  the  laws  that  govern  the  preservation  or  de- 
struction of  national  militancy  during  the  career  of 
a  state  and  the  evolution  of  its  society. 

As  the  social  and  industrial,  ethical  and  political 
organism  of  this  nation  becomes  more  and  more 
complex,  absorbing  or  diverting  the  activities  of  the 
people  from  national  to  individual  achievements, 
the  self-deception  of  the  people  as  regards  their  in- 
herent military  capacity  becomes  more  dominant 
and  unreasonable.  It  is  this  national  self-deception 
now  so  rampant  in  the  Republic  that  we  will  con- 
sider in  this  chapter  and  show  that  natural  laws 
govern,  as  they  do  all  other  forms  of  human  pro- 
gression, the  growth  and  decay  of  national  militancy. 

If  no  provision  is  made  by  a  nation  for  enforced 
military  service  among  its  inhabitants,  the  militant 
capacity  of  a  race  or  state  decreases  proportionately 
as  is  increased  the  complexity  of  its  social  organism 
and  the  diversity  of  its  economic  activities. 

The  self-deception  of  a  nation  concerning  its  true 
militant  strength  increases  at  the  same  ratio  as  its 
actual  militant  capacity  decreases. 

We  find  that  the  uttermost  limits  of  national 
self-beguilement,  in  relation  to  military  capacity,  are 
4  41 


reached  when  the  social,  political  and  economic 
phases  have  become  so  intangibly  complex  that  the 
ideals  of  the  people,  ceasing  to  be  national — have 
become  individual.  While  this  condition  is  the  an- 
tithesis of  militancy,  yet  we  discover  in  it — strange 
as  it  may  seem — the  maturity  of  military  conceit. 
At  this  stage  national  decomposition  sets  in  and 
patriotism  rots  serenely. 

The  first  and  most  difficult  task  of  statesmen  is 
the  preservation  of  the  national  or  militant  instinct 
intact  in  the  virtues  of  the  people.  However  dis- 
agreeable the  thought  may  be,  militancy  is  alone 
responsible  for  the  creation  of  every  state  and  the 
preservation  of  it  through  manifold  disasters.  Only 
when  this  militancy  deteriorates  is  the  state  doomed. 

By  the  formation  of  political  entities  the  evolution 
of  mankind  has  been  made  possible.  All  human 
progress,  together  with  individual  freedom,  has  been 
hewn  out  for  man  by  the  very  agencies  that  so  many 
to-day  labor  to  destroy,  agencies  that,  so  long  as 
man  gathers  himself  together  in  separate  states, 
will  never  cease  to  determine  the  greatness  of  a  race, 
or  by  the  lack  of  it  the  ushering  into  the  Infinite 
Past  of  a  whole  people  and  their  institutions. 

Military  strength  or  incapacity  is  never  constant, 
but  varies  almost  from  hour  to  hour  as  does  the 
thermometer  in  registering  the  heat  and  chills  of  the 
passing  hours.  It  is  relative  to  innumerable  condi- 
tions; not  more  of  man  with  his  hungers  and  loud 
noises  than  the  seas  and  rocks  and  the  winds  that 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

blow  over  them  and  the  unpanned  dust  that  hides 
in  their  clefts  and  fissures. 

The  heights  and  depths  of  theatres  of  war,  their 
topography  and  climate,  the  militancy  of  hostile 
peoples,  their  armaments  and  science,  as  well  as 
innumerable  other  conditions  that  enter  into  the 
transient  phases  of  human  conflict,  determine  the 
continuous  and  consistent  readjustment  of  military 
forces  in  numbers,  armament,  discipline,  tactics  and 
logistics;  conforming  concurrently  with  new  me- 
chanical inventions  and  scientific  discoveries  that 
each  year  alter  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  the  con- 
duct of  war.  A  nation  with  an  inflexible  military 
system,  determined  by  a  national  constitution  and 
controlled  by  civilian  politicians,  will  soon  end  by 
having  no  military  forces,  spirit  or  capacity. 

Warfare,  either  ancient  or  modern,  has  never 
been  nor  will  ever  be  mechanical.  There  is  no  such 
possibility  as  the  combat  of  instruments.  It  is  the 
soldier  that  brings  about  victory  or  defeat.  The 
knowledge  of  commanders  and  the  involuntary 
comprehension  and  obedience  to  orders  is  what  de- 
termines the  issue  of  battles.  An  army  controlled 
by  more  than  one  mind  is  as  many  times  useless 
as  are  numbered  the  minds  that  direct  it.  But 
what  mankind  does  not  take  cognizance  of  is  that, 
in  the  alteration  of  modes  of  combat  by  mechanical 
and  scientific  inventions,  there  must  be  a  psycho- 
logical readjustment  of  the  militant  spirit  of  the 
combatant.  As  the  instruments  of  warfare  become 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

more  intricate,  the  discipline  and  esprit  de  corps 
must  be  increased  accordingly.  Because  of  this 
fact  volunteer  forces  become  more  and  more  use- 
less as  the  science  of  warfare  progresses. 

The  causes  of  militant  degeneration  in  a  race  or 
nation  are  not  generally  understood.  In  primitive 
times  militancy  was  conditioned  by  necessity,  and  as 
this  necessity  passed  the  militancy  dependent  upon 
it  deteriorated.  This  necessity  might  return  to  the 
race  or  nation  at  any  subsequent  moment,  but 
militancy  could  not  return  simultaneously  with  it. 
Hence  it  is  that  nations  having  reached  such  military 
greatness  and  commanding  position  as  to  appear  to 
themselves  impregnable,  the  military  spirit  is  allow- 
ed to  degenerate.  When  this  decadence  reaches  a 
certain  point  the  nation,  regardless  of  its  wealth, 
area  and  population,  is  destroyed  by,  perhaps,  an 
insignificant  though  warlike  race. 

Laws  that  govern  the  militancy  of  a  people  are 
not  laws  of  man's  framing,  but  belong  to  the  primi- 
tive ordinances  of  Nature  and  govern  all  forms  of 
life  from  a  single  protozoa  awash  in  the  sea  to  the 
empires  of  man. 

We  divide  militancy  into  three  distinct  phases: 

(1)  The  militancy  of  the  struggle  to  survive. 

(2)  The  militancy  of  conquest. 

(3)  The  militancy  of  supremacy  or  preservation 
of  ownership. 

It  is  in  the  first,  the  struggle  to  survive,  that  the 
military  genius  of  a  people  reaches  its  height,  for  it 



is  that  militancy  which  is  common  to  all  forms  of 
life.  Moreover,  we  find  that  the  harder  the  struggle 
for  a  race  or  tribe  to  survive  in  its  combats  both  with 
man  and  the  elements,  the  more  highly  developed 
becomes  their  military  spirit.  It  is  because  of  this 
that  we  find  conquerors  rising  up  out  of  desolate 
wastes  or  rocky  islands. 

Success  in  the  struggle  for  survival  is  followed  by 
the  second  degree  of  militancy,  that  of  conquest, 
in  which  militancy  becomes  a  positive  instead  of  a 
negative  factor.  It  is  in  this  metamorphosis,  out 
of  this  red  chrysalis,  that  the  race  rises  upward  on 
the  pinions  of  an  eagle. 

In  the  third  stage  the  natural  militancy  of  a  na- 
tion declines.  This  going  to  pieces  is  hastened  by 
the  institution  of  new  ideals.  Commercialism  grows 
as  militancy  deteriorates,  since  it  is  in  itself  a  form 
of  strife,  though  a  debased  one — a  combat  that  is 
without  honor  or  heroism.  The  relegation  of  the 
militant  ideal  to  a  secondary  place  in  national  ac- 
tivity is  succeeded  by  accumulative  ignorance  con- 
cerning military  efficiency,  while  the  spirit  of  it — 
that  intuitive  perception  of  what  constitutes  mili- 
tancy— vanishes  utterly,  and  to  most  nations  that 
have  reached  this  dwelling-point  of  fraud  it  returns 
not  again  forever. 

Only  when  a  nation  endeavors  to  return  to  mili- 
tant ideals,  and  battles  for  self-preservation,  does 
it  realize  the  gulf  that  separates  it  from  such  a 
possibility.  Few  are  they  that  have  recrossed  this 



wide  abyss  of  their  neglect  and  scorn.  This  final 
period  of  militant  decay  is  succeeded  by  an  age  of 
subterfuge,  an  era  of  evasion,  that  ends  in  national 

In  attempting  to  determine  the  probability  of  an 
effective  national  uprising  to  repel  an  invasion  of  this 
Republic  by  a  foreign  Power  it  is  necessary  to  con- 
sider it  from  two  sources  only:  first,  by  an  examina- 
tion into  circumstances  analogous  to  this  probability 
as  they  have  existed  in  other  countries;  second,  by 
deductions  made  from  actual  conditions  existent 
in  this  nation. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  formation  of  national 
entities  until  the  present  time,  the  idea  of  popular 
uprisings  to  repulse  foreign  invaders  has  ever  been 
a  universal  conceit,  an  indelible  vanity  that  neither 
the  erosion  of  ages  has  erased  nor  the  deluges  of 
blood  issuing  from  them  have  washed  away.  Yet, 
while  there  exists  not  an  age  nor  a  nation  that  has 
not  resounded  with  the  triumphant  hoof-beats  of 
invading  armies,  the  truth  is  there  is  not  a  single 
instance  in  the  whole  military  history  of  the  world 
where  the  mobile  armies  of  a  warlike  race  have  been 
destroyed  or  defeated  by  the  popular  uprisings  of  a 
militantly  decadent  state.  Such  warring  multitudes 
have  been  but  the  wild  windstorms  of  human  beings 
that,  without  direction  or  intelligence,  have  passed 
by  in  no  long  period  of  time. 

In  the  wars  of  mankind,  popular  uprisings,  in  the 
full  meaning  of  the  phrase,  are  only  possible  to  a 



primitive  despotism.  The  more  diffused  national 
civilization  becomes  with  the  political  elevation  and 
liberty  of  the  individual,  the  less  probable  is  a  uni- 
fied resistance.  The  idea  of  repelling  invasion  has 
always  found  a  prominent  place  in  popular  super- 
stitions— the  myths  of  man's  credulity  and  vanity. 
Such  uprisings  were  possible  only  in  primitive  times, 
ceasing  with  the  establishment  of  armies  that  re- 
quired training  and  cohesion:  diminishing  propor- 
tionately as  science  entered  more  and  more  into  the 
conduct  of  war.  Modern  warfare  is  the  conversion 
of  the  nation's  potential  military  resources  into 
actual  power  and  its  consequent  utilization  in  a 
unified  and  predetermined  manner  by  men  more 
scientifically  trained  than  lawyers,  doctors  or  en- 

To  repel  an  invasion  of  this  nation  ideals  remote 
from  those  that  now  litter  and  ferment  abroad  over 
this  land  must  be  created.  The  soldier  spirit,  that 
spark,  illuminating  not  alone  the  abysses  wherein 
nations  move,  but  those  chambers  of  souls  ordinarily 
dark  and  forgotten,  must  be  struck.  This  requires 
not  months  but  years.  Whole  armies  of  men  must 
be  animated  to  this  by  discipline  and  exalted  by  the 
quest  of  idealistic  honor,  such  as  distinguishes  them 
from  those  enriched  by  trade  or  those  who  are  able 
to  purchase  with  gold  all  but  that  which  alone  is 
bought  by  blood. 

This  preparation  now  belongs  to  the  time  of  peace. 

Once  a  country  is  invaded  the  machinery  of  govern- 



ment,  which  determines  unity  of  effort,  is  thrown 
down  and  the  entire  arsenal  of  national  strength  is 
strewn  fragmentary  over  the  whole  land.  Like  the 
ignition  of  scattered  grains  of  loose  powder,  resistance 
is  reduced  to  a  sporadic  flaring-up,  a  sickly  sputter- 
ing of  small  flames  and  much  smoke,  sulphuric  and 

No  one  is  justified  in  saying  that  there  would  be 
no  defence  of  this  Republic  in  event  of  invasion: 
such  a  statement  would  be  manifestly  untrue.  But 
the  defence  would  be  no  greater  nor  worse  than 
that  heretofore  made  by  nations  heterogeneous  and 
opulent  as  this  Republic:  a  defence,  in  innumer- 
able instances,  Alamodian,  heroic,  even  Gracchian, 
but  in  the  end  proving  to  be  no  more  stable  than  a 
defence  of  tumble-weeds  and  loud  noises. 

Why  public  confidence  in  the  infallibility  of  volun- 
teer forces  still  survives  in  this  Republic  would  be  a 
military  enigma  were  it  not  known  that  such  is  the 
case  in  every  nation  where  man's  aspirations  are 
measured  by  the  ephemeral  and  immaterial. 

Volunteers  are  purely  a  mediaeval  institution, 
effective  only  in  those  ages  when  weapons  of  warfare 
differed  little  or  not  at  all  from  those  used  by  men 
during  times  of  peace:  when,  in  fact,  the  mechanism 
of  war  was  crude  and  the  science  of  it  was  no  science 
other  than  to  kill  or  be  killed  in  the  simplest  and 
most  natural  hand-to-hand  manner. 

The  weapons  used  in  American  wars  up  to  a  time 
subsequent  to  the  Civil  War  were  the  same  used 



during  peace  by  men  struggling  through  forests  or 
over  plains,  shooting,  hunting,  killing.  In  times  of 
war  these  men  were  formed  into  regiments  and  went 
on  hunting  and  killing,  but,  instead  of  fowls  and 
beasts,  they  hunted  their  fellow-men,  no  better 
armed  nor  trained,  nor  more  valorous  than  they. 
So  it  is  not  strange  to  hear  men  who  are  in  truth 
patriots  by  right  of  blood  and  deed  proclaim  that 
in  the  event  of  invasion  they  will  seize  from  their 
nooks  and  mantel-pieces  such  arms  as  hang  or  re- 
pose there  and  go  forth  to  the  slaughter  of  the  in- 
vader. We  doubt  not  that  such  would  be  their 
actions ;  but  how  far  would  they  go,  these  stern  and 
uncompromising  patriots  ?  The  nobility  of  patriot- 
ism will  not,  unfortunately,  increase  the  initial 
velocity  of  antiquated  weapons;  and  armaments 
change  so  rapidly  in  modern  times  that  a  soldier  of 
one  generation  is  more  or  less  worthless  in  a  war  of 
a  succeeding  period. 

Battles  are  no  longer  the  spectacular  heroics  of 
the  past.  The  army  of  to-day  and  to-morrow  is  a 
sombre,  gigantic  machine  devoid  of  all  melodramatic 
heroics,  but  in  itself  all-heroic,  silent  and  terrible: 
a  machine  that  requires  years  to  form  its  separate 
parts,  years  to  assemble  them  together,  and  other 
years  to  make  them  work  smoothly  and  irresistibly. 
Then,  when  it  is  set  in  motion,  naught  shall  stop  it 
but  a  similar  machine  stronger  and  better. 

Battles  are  now  fought,  won  or  lost  on  wide,  de- 
serted fields,  and  no  combatants  are  seen,  only  here 



and  there  small  blue  clouds  and  distant  noises  mark 
the  dumb  heroism  of  modern  armies.  Volunteers, 
patriotic,  heroic  as  the  mind  of  man  can  make  them, 
are  of  no  use  in  this  mile-away  war,  since  they  know 
nothing  of  its  science.  They  are  led  forward  into 
death  nullahs  by  officers  who  never  saw  an  army  in 
the  field,  and  whose  military  knowledge  is  only 
reminiscent  of  Bunker  Hill  and  the  Minute-men  of 
Concord.  Who  shall  blame  them  if  they  scamper 
off  on  all  fours  to  the  rear  when  the  pilfering  bullets, 
dropping  from  heaven  itself,  begin  to  loot  whole 
squads  and  companies  of  their  souls  ? 

It  is  the  hour  and  terror  of  helpless  death. 

The  time  of  volunteer  forces  has  forever  passed. 
Nations  that  expect  to  make  war  in  the  future  with 
hastily  raised  levies  of  volunteers  against  standing 
armies  are  doomed  to  disaster. 

It  is  natural  that  both  the  North  and  South  should 
preserve  out  of  the  four  years  of  battles  and  night- 
marches  only  that  which  is  heroic  and  noble.  But 
this  glamour  does  not  obscure  within  its  brilliancy 
some  dark  spots,  such  spots  as  men  love  not  to  dwell 
upon,  howsoever  beneficial  their  contemplation  may 
be.  So  the  most  valuable  lessons  taught  by  the  Civil 
War  have  been  buried  as  the  dead  were  buried  in 
graves  not  again  to  be  opened.  We  will  not  commit 
this  sacrilege,  though  it  were  for  the  good  and  just 
cause  of  tempering  down  the  crude,  fragile  valor  of 
this  nation. 

The  history  of  the  volunteer  in  the  Civil  War  ends 



as  soon  as  the  war  enters  upon  its  serious  phase; 
thence  come  enormous  bounties,  drafts,  conscripts, 
riots  and  incipient  rebellions.  We  will  only  make  two 
statements  as  regards  these  volunteers  in  the  Union 
Army,  but  in  these  rest  volumes  of  foreboding  facts. 
In  the  Union  Army  from  1861  to  1865  there  were 
more  officers  discharged  and  cashiered  for  dishonor 
and  incapacity  than  were  killed  on  the  field  of  battle ; 
more  discharged  "without  stated  reasons"  than  died 
during  that  time  from  disease.  In  other  words,  the 
casualties  of  dishonor  and  incapacity  among  officers 
during  these  years  were  greater  than  that  of  the 
battle-field  and  disease. 

Who  is  there  that  will  make  out  that  sad  roster  of 
the  unnamed  ten  thousand  dead  among  enlisted 
men  that  these  incompetent  officers  led  about  to  die  ? 
Yet  we  lay  no  blame  upon  their  shoulders.  Their 
crimes  were  the  crimes,  not  of  themselves,  but  of  the 
ignorance  and  worthlessness  of  the  military  system 
still  extant. 

Snatched  suddenly,  as  they  were,  out  of  the 
peaceful  round  of  civil  life,  with  its  orderless,  un- 
disciplined equality,  they  knew  nothing  concerning 
the  duties  that  devolve  upon  military  officers. 
Skilled  as  these  men  might  be  in  every  phase  of 
human  activity,  yet  they  knew  not  the  primary 
principles  of  the  endless  technique  that  belongs  to 
the  vast  science  of  war;  a  science  that  is  alone  the 
relentless  determinant,  not  only  in  the  creation  of 
nations,  but  the  length  of  their  duration,  their  great- 


ness  or  littleness  upon  earth,  and  in  the  hour  of  their 
desolation  to  be  the  inexorable  umpire  of  their 
unfit  ness. 

An  army  possesses  a  heart  and  brain  as  does  every 
other  living  organism.  This  heart  and  brain  of  an 
army  is  made  up  of  the  officers  composing  it,  while 
the  soul  of  it  is  the  spirit  that  inspires  them.  The 
worth  of  an  army  must  be  measured  primarily  by  the 
character  of  this  soul.  In  volunteer  armies  it  is 
little  more  than  embryonic,  and  in  its  absence  armies 
are  but  mobs.  It  is  immaterial  how  numerous  they 
may  be,  how  vast  their  armament,  or  how  perfect 
their  utensils  of  war,  these  things  shall  avail  them 
not  at  all. 

The  soul  of  the  soldier  can  only  be  developed  by 
discipline,  by  honor  and  martial  deeds.  It  cannot 
be  constructed  to  order  or  dressed  up  with  false 
shoulders  in  twenty -four  days  by  uniforming  a 
civilian  volunteer  or  by  commissioning  and  spurring 
him  with  purchased  valor  or  the  transient  glory  of 
loud -mouthed  multitudes.  The  creation  of  this 
martial  soul  necessitates  year  after  year  of  sternest 
labor  and  toil  that  callouses  not  alone  the  hands  and 
wrings  sweat  from  the  brow,  but  also  callouses  the 
weakness  inherent  in  man  and  wrings  sweat  from 
his  heart.  It  is  moulded  by  Regulusian  discipline, 
and  lives  are  thrown  carelessly  away,  mechanically, 
almost  irrationally.  In  the  lessons  of  these  years 
they  learn  that  in  warfare  a  relentless  absorption 
of  individuality  must  supervene,  an  annihilation  of 



all  personality.  Only  then  can  they  reach  that 
pinnacle  of  human  greatness,  to  seek  glory  in  death. 

The  second  fact  that  it  is  our  duty  to  record  in 
determining  the  efficiency  of  American  volunteers 
as  well  as  the  valor  and  loyalty  of  those  who,  we  are 
assured,  would  rise  en  masse  against  invading  armies, 
causes  us  again  to  revert  to  the  records  of  the  Civil 
War,  wherein  we  find  that  from  1861  to  1865  there 
were  nearly  two  hundred  thousand  deserters  from  the 
Union  Army — one-fifth  the  size  of  the  army  at  the 
close  of  the  war.  One  man  out  of  every  twelve  who 
enlisted  was  a  deserter.  The  Union  Army  lost  near- 
ly four  times  as  many  men  from  desertion  as  were 
killed  on  the  field.  To  this  melancholy  intelligence, 
annotations  or  commentaries  would  be  superfluous. 
But  it  will  be  well  for  the  people  of  this  Republic 
to  think  of  the  solemn  portent  of  these  facts  when 
the  braggart  spirit  steals  upon  them,  when  imaginary 
hosts  of  unarmed  patriots  rise  up  and  destroy  this 
mighty  and  sadly  turbulent  world. 

When  science  entered  into  warfare,  volunteers 
made  their  exit.  They  become  soldiers  only  after 
they  cease  to  be  volunteers,  at  the  end  of  the  second 
or  third  year;  while  militia  are  made  into  soldiers 
only  after  they  have  had  their  minds  freed  from  the 
tangled  skein  of  false  notions,  which  takes  a  year 
longer  than  a  raw  recruit. 

To  hit  a  bull's-eye  in  a  shooting-gallery  or  a  quail 
on  the  wing  does  not  constitute  military  marks- 
manship. The  hunter  of  animals  who  kills  at  two 



and  three  hundred  yards  has  no  relationship  to  the 
hunter  of  men  who  kills  at  ranges  exceeding  a  thou- 
sand yards.  The  former  is  practice,  the  latter 
science.  The  military  marksman  must  be  able  to 
calculate  distance  under  varying  atmospheric  and 
topographical  conditions.  At  a  range  exceeding  a 
thousand  yards  he  must  make  calculations  for 
temperature,  wind  and  humidity.  If  his  rifle  has 
an  initial  velocity  of  two  thousand  feet,  and  the 
wind  is  blowing  a  dozen  miles  an  hour,  he  must  allow 
a  deviation  of  eighteen  feet  for  the  bullet.  For 
every  degree  of  temperature  he  must  allow  one  inch 
deviation;  and  fourteen  inches  for  every  fifteen 
degrees  of  humidity.  But  marksmanship  alone 
does  not  constitute,  in  any  degree  whatsoever,  a 
soldier,  and  it  can  be  said  that  it  affects  in  no  manner 
the  issue  of  modern  battles,  if  the  other  primary 
elements  that  go  to  make  up  an  efficient  and  power- 
ful army  are  absent. 

Rifle,  pistol  and  all  other  similar  civilian  associa- 
tions are  not  only  negatively  but  positively  harm- 
ful to  the  nation,  inasmuch  as  they  produce  an 
erroneous  conception  of  the  knowledge  and  duties 
necessary  to  a  modern  soldier.  After  three  years' 
service  in  a  regular  army  not  more  than  twenty- 
five  per  cent,  of  the  men  can  be  qualified  as  military 
marksmen.  To  believe  that  the  scatter-gun  marks- 
manship of  civil  life  is  a  factor  in  warfare  is  not  other 
than  a  yellow-flamed  ignis  fatuus,  starting  up  out  of 
the  Dismal  Swamp  of  ignorance  and  national  vanity. 



Before  the  final  hour  is  tolled  over  this  careless  and 
somnolent  nation  it  should  realize  that  in  the  per- 
formance of  military  duty  there  must  be  no  sub- 
stitution of  the  immaterial  for  that  which  is  essential; 
no  evasion  of  responsibility  nor  subterfuge. 

A  vast  population  and  great  numbers  of  civilian 
marksmen  can  be  counted  as  assets  in  the  com- 
bative potentiality  of  a  nation  as  are  coal  and  iron 
ore  in  the  depths  of  its  mountains,  but  they  are,  per 
se,  worthless  until  put  to  effective  use.  This 
Republic,  drunk  only  with  the  vanity  of  its  resources, 
will  not  differentiate  between  them  and  actual 
power.  Japan,  with  infinitely  less  resources,  is 
militarily  forty  times  more  powerful.  Germany, 
France  or  Japan  can  each  mobilize  in  one  month 
more  troops,  scientifically  trained  by  educated 
officers,  than  this  Republic  could  gather  together  in 
three  years.  In  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  Ger- 
many mobilized  in  the  field,  ready  for  battle,  over 
half  a  million  soldiers,  more  than  one  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  horses  and  twelve  hundred  pieces  of 
artillery  in  five  days.  The  United  States  could  not 
mobilize  for  active  service  a  similar  force  in  three 
years.  A  modern  war  will  seldom  endure  longer 
than  this. 

Not  only  has  this  nation  no  army,  but  it  has  no 
military  system.  It  has  neither  arms  nor  equip- 
ment. No  preparation  for  war  is  made.  No  or- 
ganization, no  staffs,  no  plans  for  feeding,  supplying 
or  transporting  forces;  while  the  militancy  of  the 



nation  has  been  washed  away  in  the  most  transient 
and  fouling  of  summer  floods. 

The  spirit  of  militancy  is  born  in  a  man,  but  a 
soldier  is  made.  Not,  however,  machine-made,  nor 
hand-made,  nor  tailor-made,  nor  put  together  in 
twenty-four  hours.  A  soldier  cannot  be  created  by 
a  formula  of  speech  nor  by  the  vanity  of  valor.  It 
takes  not  less  than  a  dozen  men  six-and-thirty  long 
months  to  hammer  and  temper  him  into  the  image 
of  his  maker  and  fit  him  for  the  performance  of  his 

A  man  who  enlists  in  an  army  has  the  right  to 
demand  that  those  who  are  his  leaders  shall  know 
to  the  fullest  extent  the  duties  appertaining  to  their 
office.  Lives  unnumbered  are  placed  in  their  hands, 
but  they  are  offered  upon  the  altar  of  their  country 
and  not  to  satisfy  the  vanity  of  individuals ;  they  are 
in  the  field  to  fight  the  enemy,  not  disease:  if  they 
must  perish,  let  it  be  by  the  kindly  singing  bullets 
and  not  by  the  ignorance  of  their  commanders. 

In  civil  life  a  butcher  is  not  called  upon  to  exercise 
the  skill  of  an  oculist  nor  to  remove  a  cataract  from 
the  dulled  eye;  barbers  do  not  perform  the  opera- 
tion of  laparotomy;  nor  farmers  navigate  sea-going 
vessels,  nor  stone-masons  try  cases  at  the  bar,  nor 
sailors  determine  the  value  of  mines,  nor  clerks  per- 
form the  functions  of  civil-engineers.  Yet,  in  the 
time  of  war  in  this  Republic,  these  same  men,  to- 
gether with  all  other  varieties  of  humanity,  go  forth 
in  the  capacity  of  volunteer  officers  to  be  learned  by 



the  end  of  one-and-thirty  days  in  the  most  varied  of 
all  sciences,  the  science  of  war. 

The  most  promiscuous  murderer  in  the  world  is 
an  ignorant  military  officer.  He  slaughters  his  men 
by  bullets,  by  disease,  by  neglect;  he  starves  them, 
he  makes  cowards  of  them  and  deserters  and  crimi- 
nals. The  dead  are  hecatombs  of  his  ignorance ;  the 
survivors,  melancholy  spectres  of  his  incompetence. 



BELIEF  in  the  potency  of  gold  is  not  new;  it  is 
as  old  as  the  Jews  and  prevails  wherever  wealth 
constitutes  power  in  civil  life  and  forms  the  highest 
consummation  of  individual  effort.  In  any  nation 
where  wealth  is  the  source  of  political  power,  the 
criterion  of  rank  and  the  mark  of  social  eminence, 
it  becomes  impossible  for  the  people  not  to  see  in 
it  also  a  complete  source  of  military  strength. 
People  that  can  turn  patriotism  into  cash  and  their 
gods  into  profit  could  not  believe  otherwise. 

A  nation  that  is  rich,  vain,  and  at  the  same  time 
unprotected,  provokes  wars  and  hastens  its  own 
ruin.  This  is  a  law  so  old  and  invariable  that  man 
thinks  no  more  of  it  than  he  does  of  the  forces  of 
gravity,  the  tides  of  the  sea  or  the  inevitability  of 
death.  Neither  does  he  realize  that  a  nation  never 
becomes  opulent  that  it  does  not  become  arrogant, 
nor  opulent  and  arrogant  that  it  does  not  become  de- 
fenceless. And  no  nation,  as  we  have  heretofore 
stated,  ever  becomes  defenceless  that  it  does  not 
sooner  or  later  suffer  the  penalty  of  its  deterioration. 
Opulence,  instead  of  being  a  foundation  of  national 
strength,  is  liable  to  be  the  most  potent  factor  in  its 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

destruction.  Instead  of  adding  power  to  a  nation, 
'  it  simply  increases  the  responsibility  of  its  rulers 
and  necessitates  a  greater  diligence  for  defence. 
National  opulence  is  a  source  of  danger  instead  of 
power,  for  the  arrogance  that  comes  of  it  is  only 
Hebraic,  hence  trade,  ducats,  and  mortgages  are 
regarded  as  far  greater  assets  and  sources  of  power 
than  armies  or  navies.  It  produces  national  ef- 
feminacy and  effeteness,  hence  there  spring  up  whole 
tribes  of  theorists,  feminists  and,  in  fact,  all  the 
necrophagan  of  opulent  decadence.  When  wealth 
forms  the  criterion  of  all  human  ambitions,  justice, 
emoluments,  nay,  of  worth  itself,  then  corruption 
sets  in  and  patriotism  departs. 

To  reason  analogically  is  oftentimes  erroneous. 
In  fact,  it  can  be  said  that  analogy  is  a  source  of  in- 
numerable misconceptions,  and  whoever  makes  de- 
ductions or  attempts  to  construct  universal  axioms 
solely  from  analogical  reasoning  will  sooner  or  later 
land  in  a  quagmire  of  untruthfulness.  Analogy  can 
only  form  true  and  irrefutable  conclusions  when  it 
deals  with  identical  causes  producing  under  various 
and  widely  divergent  conditions  the  same  results. 
Thus,  it  is  possible  to  state,  more  or  less  accurately, 
that  a  volcano  upheaves  its  ashes  and  molten  lava 
in  a  more  or  less  constant  and  identical  manner, 
whether  in  Italy  or  Java,  in  ancient  or  modern  times. 
These  volcanic  causes  and  effects,  identical  at  all 
times,  though  occurring  under  widely  separated 
geographical  or  chronological  conditions,  differ  little 



from  the  periodical  eruptions  of  the  elemental  scoria 
of  mankind. 

But  only  so  long  as  the  elemental  characteristics 
of  mankind  form  in  themselves  the  basis  of  analogical 
reasoning  can  analogy  be  considered  reliable  or  a 
source  of  truth  when  dealing  with  man,  his  institu- 
tions or  customs.  Each  succeeding  age  regards 
itself  as  infinitely  wiser  than  the  age  that  has  pre- 
ceded, though  in  fact  it  may  be  a  dark  and  villainous 
affair,  as  were  the  Middle  Ages,  and  even  recent  times, 
in  comparison  to  the  antique  Greek  and  Roman, 
Indian  and  Chinese  civilizations.  Each  succeeding 
religion,  likewise,  regards  the  efforts  of  its  pred- 
ecessor as  futile,  and  that  it  alone  hath  the  ear  of 
God.  Each  age  regards  its  customs  alone  sensible, 
and  those  that  have  gone  before  ridiculous;  its 
morality  more  pure,  its  equity  more  perfect,  and  so 
on,  ad  infinitum,  through  the  whole  list  of  transient 
vanities  that  are  as  mutable  as  though  written  on 
fluxing  sands  that  the  veriest  froth  waves,  rolling  in 
from  the  illimitable  oceans  of  time,  toss  into  con- 
fusion and  nothingness. 

Only  in  the  ever-recurring  tracing  on  the  sands 
and  obliteration  thereof  do  we  discern  human  char- 
acteristics that  are  immutable;  characteristics  that 
bring  about  the  formation  of  the  human  race  into 
political  entities,  and  in  due  time  their  inevitable 
dissolution.  These  characteristics  are  of  them- 
selves the  elemental  instincts  of  the  human  race, 
instincts  that  as  a  whole  are  but  momentarily  affect- 



ed  by  the  transient  caprices  of  theories  or  morals, 
styles  or  religions.  It  is  in  these  ever-recurring 
forces  innate  in  mankind  that  we  alone  reason 
analogically  concerning  the  present  and  the  future; 
not  so  much  from  the  sand-dunes  of  the  past  as  from 
the  inevitable  tides  that  form  and  shatter  them. 

So  while,  within  the  brevity  of  this  work,  it  is  im- 
possible to  take  up  each  nation  and  deal  minutely 
with  the  causes  of  its  formation,  its  decay  and 
melancholy  end,  the  reader  can  determine  for  him- 
self, with  no  great  amount  of  exertion,  the  exact 
part  and  proportion  wealth  has  contributed  to  their 
strength  and  duration,  or  to  what  degree  it  has 
undermined  their  foundations  and  rotted  the  great 
beams  of  their  edifices. 

Unlike  theories  and  moral  codes,  religions  and 
customs,  the  part  wealth  has  played  in  national 
existence  has  never  been  sporadic  nor  transient,  nor 
the  political  exudence  of  a  single  period  or  race,  nor 
varied  one  jot  in  any  age  on  any  portion  of  earth 
nor  among  any  people.  Its  effect  has  been  in- 
variable, whether  applied  to  the  Empire  of  the  Pha- 
raohs or  to  Korea,  to  China  or  Rome,  to  India  or 
Spain;  and  likewise,  with  the  same  inevitability  will 
it  lay  its  heavy  hand  upon  this  nation.  The  law  of 
its  application  is  inexorable. 

The  wealth  of  a  nation,  as  a  factor  in  warfare, 
possesses  certain  potential  but  entirely  subordinate 
capabilities,  which  appear  in  themselves  as  actual 
conquering  forces  of  warfare,  though  the  truth  is 



otherwise.  War  between  wealth  and  militant  energy 
has  but  one  end,  the  old  doom  of  the  Purple  Persian. 
Such  a  conflict  is  only  a  contest  between  the  hollow 
panoply  of  warfare  and  an  actual  combatant;  the 
plumed  cadaver  of  a  Cid  against  a  live  Moor;  thunder 
and  smoke  on  one  side,  lightning  and  fire  on  the 
other.  The  Battle  of  Issus,  the  Sack  of  Rome, 
Marengo,  Sedan,  Liaou  Yang — such  are  the  endless 
epitaphs  of  gold  against  steel,  corpulence  against 
muscle,  pomposity  against  discipline. 

Not  unlike  Midas,  nations  succumbing  to  the 
excess  of  gold  soon  come  to  beg  deliverance  from  it. 
But  not  unto  them  is  it  given  that  they  may  turn  to 
the  waters  of  Pactolus  for  the  washing  away  of  it. 
The  cleansing  of  their  folly  belongs  only  to  those 
streams  that  drain  down  from  the  hearts  of  nations. 

Wealth  in  the  time  of  war,  no  matter  how  limit- 
less, can  do  no  more  than  provide  arms  and  muni- 
tions, pay  the  salaries  of  soldiers,  provide  their 
subsistence,  clothing  and  transportation.  Gold  illim- 
itable cannot  buy  them  valor,  nor  self-sacrifice,  nor 
endurance,  nor  discipline  nor  military  knowledge. 
Gold-purchased  heroism  is  a  conception  only  possible 
to  a  nation  sunk  in  the  lowest  depths  of  commer- 
cialism. In  fact,  no  heroic  action  has  ever,  in  all 
the  turbulency  of  the  human  race,  been  conceived 
and  executed  with  ducats  before  and  behind  it. 
Gold  may  harness  men  for  war,  but  it  has  never  been 
able  to  make  them  conquer  when  opposed  to  those 
whose  discipline  has  been  kneaded  into  the  marrow 



of  their  bones  and  the  inner  chambers  of  their 

The  expense  of  conducting  a  war  is  not,  simul- 
taneously, the  same  with  any  two  nations,  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  the  price  of  armaments  may 
be  identical  to  all  of  them.  War  expenditures  are 
in  proportion  to  the  wealth  of  the  nation  itself. 
The  cost  of  a  war  carried  on  by  England  or  this 
Republic  is  manifold  greater  than  if  waged  by  any 
other  nation.  Should  the  United  States  to-day  be 
obliged  to  place  in  the  field  the  same  number  of 
men,  for  the  same  length  of  time,  under  the  same 
conditions,  as  did  the  Japanese  in  their  war  with 
Russia,  the  salaries  alone  would  nearly  equal  the 
entire  war  expense  of  the  Japanese;  while  the  total 
expense  would  equal  a  sum  as  proportionately 
greater  as  is  the  wealth  of  this  Republic  greater  than 
that  of  Japan,  plus  its  concomitant  corruption. 

In  the  Civil  War  of  the  United  States,  nearly  two 
hundred  millions  were  alone  expended  in  bounties. 
Taking  into  consideration  the  increased  values  now 
prevailing  in  this  country  as  compared  to  the  values 
of  that  period,  bounties  would,  under  this  head,  be 
treble,  or  alone  equalling  the  entire  expenditure  of 
Japan  in  the  war  with  Russia.  In  addition  to  this, 
the  non- American  population  at  that  time  was  com- 
paratively insignificant,  hence  patriotism  stood  in 
proportionately  high  ratio,  while  to-day  the  hetero- 
geneity of  population  is  over  fifty  per  cent.  How 
much  gold,  therefore,  would  now  be  required  to  en- 



list  these  people  into  the  pain  and  sacrifice  of  war — 
to  coax  them  from  their  rich  labors  to  die  for  a  land 
they  regard  only  as  the  wide,  fat  fields  of  the  harvest 

The  cost  of  prosecuting  a  war  is  not  only  propor- 
tionate to  the  wealth  of  the  nation,  but  the  actual 
maintenance  of  the  individual  soldier  stands  in  ratio 
to  the  cost  of  living  and  rate  of  wages.  The  wage 
of  a  stone-mason,  which  is  high  or  low  according  to 
the  opulence  or  the  frugality  of  a  nation,  is  in  the 
United  States  from  four  to  five  dollars  a  day;  in 
Japan,  forty-five  cents ;  in  Europe,  about  ninety  cents, 
and  other  labor  in  like  proportion.  The  high  cost  of 
living  that  prevails  in  an  opulent  nation  not  only 
necessitates  high  wages,  but  this  in  turn  brings  about 
an  increase,  perhaps  proportionate,  perhaps  excessive 
as  inflated  by  trusts,  in  the  price  of  all  materials, 
foodstuffs,  and  munitions  used  in  war  as  well  as  in 

Thus,  European  nations  in  time  of  peace  maintain 
armies  from  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  to 
five  hundred  thousand  men  and  officers,  together 
with  reserves  of  regulars  varying  from  two  to  five 
million,  with  a  proportionate  number  of  horses  and 
guns,  for  the  same  money  that  the  United  States  is 
obliged  to  expend  to  maintain  fifty  thousand  troops 
with  no  reserve  of  regulars.  Japan  could  support  a 
standing  peace  army  exceeding  one  million  men  for 
the  same  amount  of  money  this  Republic  now  spends 
on  fifty  thousand.  This  proportion,  which  exists 



in  time  of  peace,  becomes  even  more  excessive  in 
time  of  war;  for  whenever  war  involves  a  country 
there  exists  in  all  preparation  an  extravagance  that 
is  also  proportionate  to  the  wealth  of  the  nation. 

During  the  last  few  years  of  peace,  from  1901  to 
1907,  the  United  States  Government  has  expended 
on  the  army  and  navy  over  fourteen  hundred  million 
dollars :  a  sum  exceeding  the  combined  cost  to  Japan 
of  the  Chinese  War  and  the  Russian  War,  as  well 
as  the  entire  maintenance  of  her  forces  during  the 
intervening  years  of  peace.  Yet  to-day  the  United 
States  possesses  no  army,  while  the  navy  is  only  one- 
half  the  size  it  should  be  to  defend  its  shores. 

Poverty  never  begets  extravagance,  and  frugality 
is  never  the  offspring  of  wealth.  Poverty  is  pro- 
ductive of  every  human  exertion,  while  wealth  is  the 
parent  of  every  form  of  corruption.  The  richer  a 
nation  is  in  time  of  peace,  the  poorer  it  is  in  time  of 

Corruption  exists  in  direct  ratio  to  the  wealth  of  a 
nation,  or,  if  the  nation  is  in  a  decadent  state,  as 
India,  China,  and  Spain,  it  is  extant  in  vaster  pro- 
portions. Though  the  wealth  of  a  nation  may  de- 
cline, corruption  remains  constant  in  ratio  to  the 
maximum  wealth  of  the  past. 

A  nation  can  become  so  rich  that  its  wealth  will 
bankrupt  it  in  a  war  with  a  country  poor  but  frugal 
and  warlike. 

Excessive  national  wealth  is  responsible  for  an- 
other factor  that  even  in  itself  is  productive  of  utter 



incapacity  to  execute  warlike  measures  or  even  to 
prevent  the  collapse  of  a  nation  in  war — the  ener- 
vation through  luxury,  feminism,  theorism,  or  the 
decay  of  martial  inclination  and  military  capacity. 
This  sooner  or  later  begins  to  show  itself  in  every 
phase  of  life,  from  National  Assemblies  to  Debating 
Societies,  Communism,  Idealism,  Universalism,  and 
innumerable  other  bright,  fantastic  tapestries  that 
the  ingenuity  of  man  weaves  through  woof  and  warp 
of  human  hopes  and  their  follies. 

Wealth  is  a  factor  in  the  naval  and  military 
strength  of  a  nation  only  so  long  as  it  is  regarded 
in  its  true  and  subordinate  capacity :  to  build  battle- 
ships, but  not  to  fight  them;  to  buy  arms,  not  valor; 
to  manufacture  powder,  not  patriotism.  But  when 
wealth  becomes  so  paramount  in  a  nation's  life  that 
it  forms  the  chief  ambition  of  individual  efforts,  then 
the  factors  that  constitute  military  strength  fall 

The  only  poverty  from  which  a  nation  suffers 
in  war  is  poverty  resulting  from  the  excesses  of 

Only  so  long  as  national  wealth  remains  entirely 
subordinate  to  public  honors  and  aspirations  can  it 
be  utilized  to  increase  the  greatness  of  a  nation; 
and  only  so  long  as  the  chivalry  and  virtue  of  a 
people  are  held  aloof  from  it  can  the  country  be  con- 
sidered as  either  free  or  rich.  When  wealth,  how- 
ever, becomes  the  master,  no  words  can  fitly  de- 
scribe the  poverty  of  the  state. 



The  contemplation  of  the  inutility  of  wealth  to 
defend  itself  is  not  without  bitterness,  hence  it  is 
that  man  and  whole  nations  of  men  shrink  from  the 
knowledge  of  its  impotency.  The  sad  sophistry 
of  commercialism  points  to  vast  cities  adorned  by 
every  accessory  of  luxury  and  art,  to  factories,  crafts 
and  sciences  innumerable;  to  education,  the  hum  of 
industry,  millionaires,  constitution  and  statistics  as 
illustrative  of  the  power  and  resources  of  riches. 
How,  therefore,  for  in  such  manner  do  men  reason, 
can  any  nation  or  body  or  men  lacking  in  these 
capabilities,  these  apparently  illimitable  potential- 
ities of  civilization  and  power,  contemplate  other 
than  annihilation  in  war? 

How  pitiable  is  all  this!  Yet  it  has  ever  been 
that  man  wilfully  hides,  not  alone  from  those  whom 
they  would  deceive,  but  from  themselves,  the  fact 
that  the  forces  of  war  are  not  identical  with  those  of 
peace.  What  is  necessary  to  one  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  other.  The  genius  of  battle  has  no  more 
to  do  with  that  of  peace  than  have  the  tides  of  the 
sea  to  do  with  the  building  of  the  sand-dunes  they 
wash  away;  or  lightning  with  the  growth  of  the  cen- 
tury-old oak  that  it  blasts  forever  in  a  second  of 

Commercial  acumen  is  necessary  to  accumulate 
wealth,  but  that  capacity  possesses  not  the  slightest 
ability  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  its  edifices  or 
accumulations.  Nay,  more,  wealth  so  benumbs 
man's  ability  to  comprehend  its  limitations  that, 



unless  both  combatants  are  simultaneously  suf- 
fering from  the  same  green  sickness  of  this  mis- 
conception, it  is  self-destructive  and  its  riches  only 
add  to  the  splendor  of  its  sarcophagus. 

Who  were  there  among  the  marble  cities  of  Greece, 
or  within  the  purple  empires  of  Darius,  Egypt  or 
India,  with  their  wealth,  scholars,  merchants, 
theorists,  commerce  and  gold -studded  soldiery, 
that  could  conceive  of  a  beardless  youth  coming 
down  from  the  wild  highlands  of  Epirus,  from  the 
bleak  hillsides  of  Macedonia,  to  conquer,  not  one, 
but  all  of  them? 

Who,  in  the  luxurious  kingdoms  of  Asia,  feared 
the  skin-robed  Hun;  who,  in  Rome,  dreaded  the 
canine-toothed  Goths  and  Vandals  whose  wealth 
did  not  exceed  the  skins  that  clothed  them  or  the 
spear-heads  and  swords  in  their  hands;  whose  rev- 
enues were  no  more  than  the  leaves  of  forest  trees, 
the  thunder  of  heaven,  the  flints  of  earth  ? 

Who,  some  thirteen  centuries  ago,  could  surmise 
that  a  melancholy  epileptic  would  find  in  the  rocks 
and  sands  and  wandering  tribes  of  Arabia  a  force  to 
grind  into  small  dust  the  most  powerful  empires,  in 
the  world;  and  from  India  to  France  destroy  gov- 
ernments, alter  laws,  customs  and  religions?  Yet 
these  things  happened,  and  the  fragile  edifices  of 
wealth  crumbled  in  a  day,  and  through  his  roaring 
funnel  balance  sheets  of  trade  vanished  like  so  much 
waste  paper. 

Who,  in  the  fabulously  rich  empires  of  China, 



India,  Persia  and  the  whole  Asian  world,  as  well  as 
that  of  Europe,  contemplated  the  issuance  of  the 
Scourge  of  God  from  the  semi-mythical  depths  of 
Tartary?  Yet  this  also  came  about  one  sombre 
day  when,  on  the  desolate  banks  of  the  Orkhan, 
Genghis  gathered  together  his  cow-tail  banners  from 
the  nine  desolate  wastes  of  Shamo  and  swooped 
down  upon  the  world.  His  numbers  were  fewer 
than  the  cities  he  razed ;  while  his  revenues  were  but 
his  genius,  his  horsemen's  valor  and  the  milk  of  his 
desert  mares. 

A  century  ago,  Europe  watched  complacently  the 
self -devastation  of  France.  The  monarchy  had 
been  murdered;  the  nobility  guillotined;  commerce 
ruined;  manufactures  destroyed;  the  country-side 
was  a  tangled  thicket  presided  over  by  a  half -starved 
and  tattered  people.  The  wealth  of  the  nation  had 
gone  up  in  the  bonfire  of  the  Republic.  Suddenly,  a 
little  sallow  man  took  hold  of  these  famished  peo- 
ple, this  nation  devoid  of  commerce,  manufactures 
or  revenues,  and  with  its  poverty  conquered  the 
whole  of  incredulous  Europe. 

Only  a  few  years  since,  on  some  mountainous  isl- 
ands, a  people  little  known  fought  among  them- 
selves with  weapons  as  primitive  as  those  of  the  siege 
of  Troy.  Their  entire  revenues  were  less  than  an 
American  city,  the  cultivable  land  of  the  whole 
empire  less  than  one-half  the  area  of  Illinois.  Sud- 
denly they  also  rose  up,  and,  with  the  perennial 
power  of  poverty,  in  less  than  one  decade  disem- 



bowelled  the  two  vainest  and  vastest  empires  on 
earth,  causing  the  whole  world  to  whisper  in  old  and 
stale  wonder  at  this  New  Sun  that  rose,  with  the 
suddenness  of  an  unknown  comet,  out  of  the  Eastern 

In  these  widely  separated  incidents  of  history  we 
perceive  how  futile  it  is  to  consider  wealth  in  the 
remotest  degree  a  factor  of  military  prowess.  Every 
age  with  its  diversity  of  weapons,  every  sociological 
and  ethnological  phase  of  humanity,  whether  in  the 
Orient  or  the  Occident,  past  or  present,  proves  the 
invariability  of  these  conclusions.  The  truth  of 
this  lies  in  the  fact  that  wealth,  no  matter  how  vast, 
can  never  supply  a  nation  with  what  constitutes  the 
true  material  of  warfare.  All  the  riches  of  the 
world  cannot  supply  national  unity  nor  that  per- 
severance which  is  unappalled  by  disaster.  Yet 
unity  of  action  and  fearlessness  of  purpose  has  never, 
nor  ever  will,  be  lacking  in  whatever  resources  are 
necessary  to  carry  on  their  conquests. 

In  a  nation  ruled  by  opulence,  men  and  the  souls 
of  men  are  not  only  the  valets  of  wealth,  but  the 
nation  itself  is  obsequious  to  it.  The  government 
pursues  its  course  through  a  labyrinthine  way: 
the  interests  of  countless  individuals  are  paramount 
to  those  of  state,  and  national  ambition  ceases  to 
exist.  The  commonwealth  in  protecting  individual 
interests  resorts  to  expedients  that  are  as  temporary 
as  the  lives  of  those  who  make  them.  Yet  to  these 
transitory  acts  the  integrity  of  national  greatness  is 



sacrificed.  When  war  falls  upon  such  a  nation  it 
becomes  disunited.  In  the  same  myriad-minded 
manner  that  it  carried  on  the  mercantile  projects  of 
peace  it  attempts  the  conduct  of  a  war;  then  dis- 
integration, disaster  and  destruction  ensue. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  a  military  power  where  in- 
dividuals are  considered  only  as  instruments  of  its 
greatness,  the  dreadful  intentness  of  its  aims  knows 
no  discouragement,  the  straightforwardness  of  its 
progress  no  hesitation,  the  terribleness  of  its  energy 
no  fatigue.  Neither  property  nor  mankind  disturb 
its  calculations.  It  is  systematic,  simple  in  design, 
relentless  in  prosecution.  Theories  of  finance  carry 
with  them  no  awe;  revenues  and  commerce  it  takes 
as  it  finds  them;  millionaires  and  economists  strike 
no  terror  to  its  heart,  for  the  excise  and  stamp  duties 
it  levies  are  not  on  material  resources,  but  on  the 
souls  and  passions  and  ambitions  of  men.  These 
resources  are  exhaustless,  and  so  long  as  nations  con- 
ceal these  facts  from  themselves,  so  long  must  they 
suffer  and  be  vanquished  and  die. 


IN  the  history  and  biography  of  national  life,  from 
remote  periods  to  the  present  era,  there  are  cer- 
tain immutable  elements  that  are  characteristic  of  the 
life  of  political  entities,  regardless  of  their  smallness 
or  greatness,  their  barbarity  or  civilization;  and 
while  the  means  and  manner  of  both  the  birth  and 
dissolution  of  them  change  with  every  age,  the 
formative  processes  are  the  same  and  the  causes  of 
deterioration  identical. 

In  states  and  nations,  as  in  all  other  phases  of  life 
wherein  man.  desires  to  act  as  a  reformative  agent, 
he  invariably  attaches  his  own  transitory  and  change- 
ful characteristics  to  elemental  forces,  forces  that  are 
immutable  to  all  but  endless  eons  of  time.  The 
judgments  of  men  are  formed  not  from  facts  as  they 
are,  but  as  they  wish  them  to  be.  They  root  through 
tons  of  good  wheat  to  find  three  pieces  of  chaff,  if 
the  chaff  lends  weight  to  their  belief  and  argument. 
It  is  not  that  they  want  others  to  know  the  truth, 
but  to  have  them  believe  as  they  do.  Beyond  this 
they  do  not  care.  The  conceit  of  man  ordinarily 
forms  his  criterion  of  truth.  His  judgment  is  con- 
temporaneously governed  by  the  most  trivial  ex- 



tenors ;  a  live  militia  general  is  infinitely  greater  than 
a  dead  Caesar,  and  the  dictum  of  a  complacent  bour- 
geois in  frock-coat  and  top-hat  is  not  to  be  gainsaid. 

Elemental  forces  from  which  are  derived  all  the 
acts  of  man  are  few  in  number  and  are  only  im- 
perceptibly altered  through  long  periods  of  time. 
While  climatic  and  topographical  conditions,  de- 
grees and  kinds  of  civilization,  laws,  customs  and 
innumerable  other  local  and  transitory  phases  of  life 
may  give  infinitely  varied  expressions  to  the  por- 
trayal of  these  forces,  the  tendency  of  mankind  is  to 
base  his  judgments  on  the  most  trivial  of  their  ex- 
pressions and  regard  them  as  fundamental,  though 
they  are  no  more  enduring  than  the  plumage  of  a 
summer  or  the  roosting  -  place  of  a  few  seasons. 
Nevertheless,  the  elemental  characteristics  of  the 
human  race  are  considered  changed  and  the  em- 
pirical knowledge  of  ages  passes  as  naught. 

Mankind  will  probably  never  realize  how  useless 
is  his  antlike  diligence  and  labor  to  fill  up  with  his 
formulas  and  ordinances  the  fissures  of  this  world. 
Yet  his  conceit  is  such  that  he  lays  on  to  this  task 
with  the  utmost  nonchalance,  as  if  it  were  the  most 
petty  of  affairs.  As  he  indifferently  commanded 
the  sun  to  stand  awhile  upon  Gibeon,  so  again  he 
would  set  nature  at  naught  by  the  application  of  his 
formulas  to  those  forces  governing  the  rise  and  fall 
of  the  tides  of  nations,  that  they  may  be  checked  and 
tideless  as  the  Dead  Sea,  and  so  remain  through  eons 
yet  to  come. 

6  73 


The  utmost  that  man  can  do  individually  or  na- 
tionally is  to  exist  in  obedience  to  the  laws  that 
govern  him.  To  live  as  free  as  possible  from  pain, 
to  better  his  condition  and  to  postpone  the  inevi- 
table hour  of  final  dissolution.  To  exist  thus,  in- 
dividually or  as  a  nation,  man  must  ceaselessly  en- 
deavor, not  to  thwart,  but  to  comprehend  and  live 
in  accordance  with  those  laws  that  know  not  of  him 
nor  his  vain  progeny. 

It  is  through  empirical  knowledge  alone  that  man 
is  able  to  ascertain  what  laws  do  or  do  not  regulate 
his  activities.  Inventors  do  not  invent;  they  only 
apply  in  a  new  manner  laws  and  forces  that  have 
existed  from  the  beginning  of  time.  Chemists  do 
not  create;  they  only  make  known  the  presence  of 
elements  and  conditions  existent  already  in  nature. 
Thus  it  is  that  sophists  and  theorists  and  all  that 
category  have  not  left  to  mankind,  throughout  the 
ages  of  the  human  race,  one  single  substantial  legacy, 
and  for  no  other  reason  than  that  they  try  to  invent 
out  of  airy  nothings  that  which  the  laws  and  forces 
governing  the  world  deny;  or  labor  to  create,  out  of 
the  nebulosity  of  their  own  sick  brains,  elements  un- 
known to  nature.  As  far  as  the  world  is  concerned 
they  might  as  well  be  a  louse  on  the  back  of  a  wild 
duck  as  it  wings  its  way  through  the  stormy  night. 

It  is  in  relationship  to  these  forces  that  govern  the 
formation,  duration,  and  dissolution  of  political 
entities,  that  International  Arbitration  and  Dis- 
armament are  to  be  considered.  Not  that  they  them- 



selves  are  worth  even  a  passing  word,  but  for  the 
fact  of  the  mischief  that  their  illusive  ideas  are  ca- 
pable of  bringing  about,  especially  in  this  Republic, 
where  education  is  so  prevalent,  while  knowledge 
and  capacity  to  discern  between  what  is  true  and 
what  is  superficial  is  proportionately  absent.  No 
people  are  so  visionary  and  none  hang  more  persist- 
ently onto  the  coat-tails  of  false  gods  as  those  who 
have  enough  education  to  read  but  not  enough 
learning  to  be  able  to  distinguish  between  what  is 
false  and  what  is  true.  It  is  on  account  of  the 
prevalency  of  this  smattering  of  education  in  the 
United  States  that  every  ism  has  its  followers,  every 
form  of  religious  dementia  its  sanctuary  and  apostles, 
every  visionary  his  devotees;  and  it  matters  in  no 
way  from  what  depths  of  absurdity  they  may  come 
up,  they  have  their  adherents.  Usually  these  delu- 
sions are  harmful  only  to  the  individual,  and  as  such 
are  not  worthy  of  concern,  but  when  the  hallucina- 
tion is  apt  to  become  so  widespread  as  to  affect  the 
welfare  of  the  nation,  then  it  is  time  to  point  out 
the  mockery  of  their  hopes  and  the  quicksands  into 
which  their  aspirations  have  led  them.  In  this 
class  of  visionaries  we  place  International  Arbi- 
trationists  and  Disarmamentists,  who  are  so  per- 
sistently striving  through  subservient  politicians, 
through  feminism,  clericalism,  sophism  and  other 
such  toilers  to  drag  this  already  much  deluded  Re- 
public into  that  Brobdingnagian  swamp  from  whose 
deadly  gases  there  is  no  escape. 



It  has  been  shown,  in  the  fore  part  of  this  work, 
how  irrevocably  national  entities,  in  their  birth, 
activities  and  death,  are  controlled  by  the  same  laws 
that  govern  all  life,  plant,  animal  or  national;  the 
Law  of  Struggle,  the  Law  of  Survival.  These  laws, 
so  universal  as  regards  life  and  time,  so  unalterable 
in  causation  and  consummation,  are  only  variable 
in  the  duration  of  national  existence  as  the  knowl- 
edge of  and  obedience  to  them  is  proportionately  true 
or  false.  Plans  to  thwart  them,  to  short-cut  them, 
to  circumvent,  to  cozen,  to  deny,  to  scorn  and 
violate  is  folly  such  as  man's  conceit  alone  makes 
possible.  Never  has  this  been  tried — and  man  is 
ever  at  it — but  what  the  end  has  been  gangrenous 
and  fatal. 

In  theory  International  Arbitration  denies  the 
inexorability  of  natural  laws  and  would  substitute 
for  them  the  veriest  Cagliostroic  formulas,  or  would, 
with  the  vanity  of  Canute,  sit  down  on  the  ocean- 
side  of  life  and  command  the  ebb  and  flow  of  its 
tides  to  cease. 

The  idea  of  International  Arbitration  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  natural  laws  that  govern  the  existence  of 
political  entities  arises  not  only  from  a  denial  of  their 
fiats  and  an  ignorance  of  their  application,  but  from 
a  total  misconception  of  war,  its  causes  and  its 

All  nations  experience  at  one  time  or  another  the 
same  internal  phases  of  fiery  activity  or  a  smoulder- 
ing-out of  it,  and  though  no  two  of  them  may  ever 



be  subjected  simultaneously  to  this  internal  rum- 
bling and  tendency  to  belch  forth  masses  of  mankind 
with  their  residue  of  scoria  and  trail  of  cinders,  never- 
theless war  will  result  whenever  such  causative  con- 
ditions occur  within  the  body  politic  of  a  single 
state.  The  source  or  origin  of  war  must  always  be 
searched  for,  not  in  disputes  between  states,  but 
deep  down  in  the  bowels  of  one  or  all  of  them.  There 
alone  will  be  heard  those  bruised  noises,  political, 
industrial  or  revolutionary,  sooner  or  later  to  end 
in  that  eruption  of  mankind  called — war. 

International  Arbitration  not  only  does  not  dif- 
ferentiate between  the  source  or  origin  of  all  wars 
and  their  precipitating  causes,  but  ever  miscon- 
strues the  latter  to  be  the  sulphurous  smoke  of 
quarrels  and  disputes  that  flutter  about  between 
the  crater-tops  and  heaven. 

War  is  not  the  result  of  disputes  per  se.  Inter- 
national disagreements  are,  on  the  other  hand, 
themselves  the  result  of  the  primordial  conditions 
that  sooner  or  later  cause  war.  Disputes  or  dis- 
agreements between  nations,  instead  of  being  the 
source  or  cause  of  war,  are  nothing  more  nor  less 
than  the  first  manifestations  of  approaching  combat, 
or  are  the  preliminaries  thereto.  To  remove  them 
by  arbitration,  or  any  other  means,  is  at  best  but 

The  possibility  of  settling  international  disputes 
is  proportionately  great  or  small  as  is  distant  or  at 
hand  the  hour  for  ushering  in  a  successive  period 



of  national  expansion  on  the  part  of  one  or  the 
other  nation:  a  crisis  or  crucial  moment  in  their 
evolution  such  as  is  marked  by  war.  Sometimes 
disputes  may  arise  when  the  time  of  war  is  so  far 
away  that  they  hardly  cause  a  passing  notice  and 
give  no  thought  to  the  need  of  arbitration.  At 
other  times  disputes  between  two  or  more  powers 
may  take  place  so  near  the  outbreak  of  war  that 
they  merge  imperceptibly  into  that  inevitable  hour 
when  it  is  declared — hence,  in  history,  are  considered 
the  cause  of  it. 

The  sources  of  war  are  basic,  not  ephemeral.  They 
are  not  the  passing  of  cyclonic  storms  of  human 
passion,  but  are  the  ever-recurring  manifestations, 
violent  as  they  may  appear  to  be,  of  national  evolu- 
tion. They  mark,  in  the  life  of  political  entities,  the 
successive  periods  of  their  greatness  or  vicissitudes. 

Nations  in  their  nature  are  transitory;  the  laws 
that  govern  them  everlasting.  What  laws  man 
wishes  for  his  own  regulation  he  may  change  and 
shift  from  day  to  day  as  he  pleases;  but  to  those 
decrees  issuing  from  nature,  illimitable  and  eternal, 
he  must  bow  down.  The  laws  of  man  are  only  the 
expedients  of  a  day,  illusive,  fleeting,  transitory; 
those  of  nature  predetermined,  imperishable.  Yet 
International  Arbitration  means  nothing  more  nor 
less  than  the  reversal  of  these  conditions:  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  ephemeral  for  the  everlasting  and 
the  erratic  phantasms  of  human  hope  for  the  majes- 
tic grandeur  of  unchangeable  law. 



International  Arbitration  deals,  and  only  can 
deal,  with  effects  or  causes  of  war.  It  can  never 
touch,  even  remotely,  the  primordial  elements  that 
bring  it  about.  Hence  it  is  that  International 
Arbitration  is  only  brought  into  action  when  the 
results  of  the  causes  of  war  are  being  felt  by  the 
nations  involved.  Disputes  may  take  place  be- 
tween two  nations,  but  not  be  derivable  from  those 
inherent  causes  that  terminate  in  warfare,  and  will, 
as  is  customary,  with  much  smoke  and  noise  pass 
away  of  their  own  accord. 

It  is  upon  these  ephemeral  controversies  that 
International  Arbitration  bases  the  premises  of  its 
raison  d'etre  and  its  policy  of  universal  quietude  by 
unrestricted  loquacity.  With  quixotic  valor  they 
lay  on  most  industriously,  and  charge  not  wind- 
mills, nay,  only  the  terrifying  shadows  that  thresh 
themselves  about  upon  earth. 

If  we  admit  the  cause  of  warfare  to  be  the  result — 
as  Arbitrationists  wish  us  to  believe — of  the  second- 
ary effects  of  elementary  conditions,  and  concede 
the  events  that  usher  in  a  war,  or  occur  just  prior 
to  its  commencement,  to  be  the  cause  thereof,  then 
we  find  that  International  Arbitration  is  involved 
in  even  greater  impossibilities.  Investigation  shows 
that  whenever  two  nations  have  become  engaged  in 
warfare  they  have  been  for  decades,  and  perhaps 
centuries,  advancing  on  converging  lines  of  self- 
interest  and  aggrandizement.  When  the  contact 
takes  place,  the  struggle  for  supremacy,  or  even 



survival,  is  at  hand.  As  these  lines  approach  one 
another,  difficulties  due  to  increasing  proximity 
of  interests  arise  between  the  countries  and  result 
in  disagreements,  the  seriousness  and  frequency  of 
which  stand  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  distance  at 
which  they  take  place  from  the  point  of  contact. 
When  these  lines  meet,  war  ensues.  This  inevitable 
hour  is  approximately  fixed  and  determined  by  the 
angles  of  convergence  plus  the  sum  of  the  relative 
speed  by  which  the  nations  are  moving  along  their 
respective  lines.  Thus  it  is  that,  when  the  angle  of 
convergence  of  both  or  even  one  of  the  nations  is 
acute  and  the  speed  or  progress  along  one  or  both 
of  the  converging  lines  correspondingly  great,  war 
results  in  a  few  years  or  decades.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  angles  of  convergence  are  obtuse  and  the 
speed  correspondingly  slow,  centuries  may  pass 
before  the  nations  are  involved  in  a  struggle  for 
domination  or  survival. 

No  two  nations  or  tribes  of  men  move  on  parallel 
lines,  though  they  may  for  centuries  have  the  ap- 
pearance of  so  doing.  Circumstances  and  condi- 
tions, changing  from  age  to  age,  or  from  decade  to 
decade,  alter  imperceptibly  the  angle  of  the  line  and 
accelerate  or  retard  the  speed  of  the  advancing 
power.  When  a  nation  enters  into  a  decadent  state 
and  ceases  to  advance  along  any  line,  but  in  de- 
terioration recedes  along  the  line  it  has  formerly 
traversed,  the  convergence  of  surrounding  nations 
at  once  becomes  acute  and  their  speed  accelerated 



proportionately  and  in  direct  ratio  to  the  increasing 
defencelessness  of  the  decadent  country. 

As  these  converging  lines  of  advancement  have 
their  beginnings  in  the  body-politic  of  a  single  state, 
so  within  the  body-politic  of  the  nation  itself  is 
determined  the  angle  of  convergence  and  their  rate 
of  speed.  The  people,  their  wants  and  their  needs, 
the  various  phases  of  their  internal  political  economy 
or  decay,  the  ascendency  of  militancy  or  commercial- 
ism, the  centralization  or  decentralization  of  their 
government,  as  well  as  innumerable  other  factors, 
determine  these  angles'  convergence  and  the  speed 
by  which  nations  thunder  or  creep  toward  the  goal 
of  their  ideals  and  the  summit  of  their  greatness. 

Arbitration,  to  do  away  with  war,  must  prevent 
the  contact  of  these  converging  lines  along  which 
all  nations  ever  have  and  ever  will  continue  to  move. 
Shall  they,  then,  with  their  colossal  lever  —  not 
unlike  the  hypothetical  lever  of  Archimedes — pry 
these  lines  of  national  advancement  into  a  state  of 
parallelism  by  placing  their  fulcrum  at  the  angle 
of  their  source  or  not  far  distant  from  the  point  of 
contact,  somewhere  in  fact  between  the  first  em- 
broilment and  the  final  outburst  that  culminates  in 
war?  Arbitration,  denying  the  elementary  origin 
and  purpose  of  combat,  declares  that  its  prevention 
can  take  place  at  the  latter  point  and  always  in 
the  angle  of  contact.  With  their  great  lever  they 
would,  at  the  last  moment,  prevent  these  lines  from 
meeting,  and  by  no  other  means  than  attempting 



the  cessation  of  extraneous  disagreements  and  in- 
ternational troubles  that  the  proximity  of  converg- 
ing national  interests  bring  about. 

It  is  apparent  that  even  if  it  were  possible  to  pry 
apart  or  block  the  converging  paths  of  national  in- 
terests, such  success  would  be  less  than  temporary, 
and  not  more  than  procrastination.  By  settling 
disputes — in  themselves  more  or  less  trivial — that 
arise  between  states  and  increase  in  intensity  and 
frequency  as  nations  draw  toward  a  common  point, 
they  do  not  stop  the  advance  of  a  nation  nor  their 
evolution,  nor  have  they  anything  to  do  with  the 
raison  d'etre  of  national  progress. 

War  is  but  a  composite  exemplification  of  the 
struggle  of  man  upward:  the  multiplication  of  his 
individual  efforts  into  one,  and  the  aspirations  of 
his  diurnal  strife  turned  toward  a  greater  and 
nobler  end,  not  of  himself  but  of  his  race.  War 
cannot  be  averted  by  mollifying  those  extraneous 
embroilments  that  take  place  as  nations  in  their 
advancement  converge  upon  a  common  objective — 
an  objective  that  is  necessary  to  the  future  growth 
of  both  of  them  or  to  the  duration  of  their  existence 
as  a  dominant  political  entity.  This  objective  may 
be  political,  geographical,  commercial  or  ethical; 
but,  whatever  it  is,  once  its  acquisition  or  control  is 
deemed  necessary  by  more  than  one  nation,  then  do 
they  converge  upon  it,  and  those  international  dis- 
agreements that  eventually  take  place  are  only  the 
manifestations  of  the  approach  of  their  conflicting 



interests.  But  so  vain  is  man  and  so  blind  is  he  in 
his  vanity  that  he  refuses  to  believe,  until  it  is  too 
late,  that  these  disputes  are  the  premonitory  growls 
of  an  approaching  struggle. 

So  it  has  been  left  to  this  age  and  to  arbitration  to 
discover  that  it  is  only  necessary  to  mollify  these 
growls.  It  does  not  matter  if  the  causes  that  give 
vent  to  them  continue  to  exist,  and  the  fangs  that 
are  wetted  and  drooling  with  human  passion  draw 
nearer.  The  growls  have  been  stilled,  and  sign- 
boards admonishing  peace  have  been  tacked  up 
along  the  roads  of  nations! 

Yet  we  are  unable  to  deny  this  primitive  and 
eminently  self-satisfying  philosophy  of  arbitration. 
It  is  based  on  the  credulous  timidity  of  man,  which 
causes  him  to  tremble  more  at  thunder  than  light- 
ning ;  more  at  the  smoke  as  it  rolls  out  of  the  windows 
than  the  fire;  more  at  the  fall  of  volcanic  dust  that 
obscures  the  heavens  than  the  molten  lava  seething 
within  the  crater.  If  these  resultant  terrors  can 
be  done  away  with,  even  though  it  is  temporary, 
mankind  should  not  be  troubled  at  the  causes  there- 
of and  burrow  down  into  the  cavernous  depths  where 
they  abide. 

We  do  not  dispute  these  things,  for  we  recognize 
only  too  \vell  that  the  labors  of  arbitration  are  but 
human  and  inspired  by  human  hope.  They  are  the 
expedients  of  a  single  day.  Temporarily,  they  care 
naught  for  laws  that  are  changeless  and  which  are 
in  no  manner  cognizant  of  them.  Transitory  and 



fleeting,  momentary  and  full  of  faith,  they  do  not 
seek  to  comprehend  in  any  manner  the  immutable. 

Nevertheless,  paradoxical  as  it  may  appear,  while 
man  cannot  arbitrate  peace  into  the  world,  he  can 
lengthen  the  periods  of  peace  by  preparation  for 
war:  by  recognizing  and  acting  in  accordance  with 
those  invariable  laws  that  govern  not  a  portion  of 
the  human  race,  but  the  whole  of  it;  not  applicable 
only  for  yesterday  and  to-day,  but  for  all  time,  for- 
ever unto  the  end;  by  being  cognizant  of  the  fact 
that  the  control  of  such  laws  over  nations  differs 
from  that  over  individuals  and  even  lower  forms 
of  animal  life  only  in  duration  of  time  and  manner 
of  application. 

Arbitration  denies,  however,  the  orderly  sequence 
that  follows  and  is  part  of  the  application  of  natural 
laws.  Besides  being  vain  even  beyond  the  vanity 
of  man,  it  is  arbitrary  in  due  proportion  as  the  name 
implies.  Not  only  would  it  substitute  its  dictum  for 
laws  not  of  man's  making,  but  would  controvert  the 
application  of  laws  man  himself  has  been  forced  to 
make  and  uphold  and  recognize  the  necessity  of  their 

Arbitration  is  a  denial  of  the  application  of  dynamic 
force  in  the  control  of  human  affairs  as  they  stand  in 
relation  to  one  another  internationally:  that  when- 
ever those  difficulties — mentioned  herein  as  rising 
out  of  the  increasing  proximation  of  their  several  in- 
terests— shall  be  settled  by  formula,  then  the  final 
outburst,  resulting  from  a  direct  contact  of  these 



converging  lines,  may  be  settled  in  a  similar  manner. 
In  failing  to  comprehend  that  the  origin  of  war  is 
in  the  evolution  of  a  political  entity,  and  not  the 
result  of  it,  Arbitrationists  fail  to  differentiate  be- 
tween the  disputes  and  disagreements  that  take 
place  afar  from  the  point  of  contact  and  near  to  it. 
They  fail  to  understand  that  in  a  republic,  or  in  any 
government  where  the  popular  voice  is  listened  to, 
the  nearer  these  disputes  take  place  to  the  point  of 
contact  the  less  do  they  come  within  the  sphere  and 
control  of  statesmen,  and  the  less  are  they  subject 
to  reason,  either  in  the  abstract  or  in  the  practical. 
When  these  disputes  arise  within  the  acute  angle 
of  convergence  they  take  on  a  new  phase  wherein  all 
the  passions  that  actuate  individuals  in  stress  or 
anger  dominate  the  actions  of  the  state. 

The  morality  of  any  nation  whose  people  have 
electoral  rights  is  no  greater  than  the  morality  of  its 
people.  No  republic  can  be  free  from  any  of  the 
motives,  passions,  ambitions,  hate  or  delinquencies 
to  which  the  majority  of  its  people  are  subject. 
And  the  ability  to  substitute  arbitration  without 
the  use  of  dynamic  force  in  dealing  with  interna- 
tional affairs  must  first  be  substituted  in  the  nation 
itself  for  all  laws  whose  enforcement  depends  upon 

Whenever  the  time  comes  that  nations  are  not 
obliged  to  enforce  their  own  laws  with  a  power 
superior  to  that  of  individuals  and  communities, 
then  and  then  only  can  they  hope  to  substitute  In- 


ternational  Arbitration  for  the  power  of  armies.  But 
from  whence  and  when  will  that  devoutly  wished- 
for  day  come  wherein  states  may  discard  the  use 
of  power  in  enforcing  justice  and  in  exacting  obe- 
dience to  their  laws?  When  will  that  Golden  Age 
be  ushered  in  upon  this  unhappy  earth,  and  ar- 
bitration between  individuals  substituted  for  law 
and  dynamic  force  in  which  it  originates  and  ends  ? 
When  will  laws  made  by  man  for  the  government  of 
man,  together  with  his  courts,  his  penal  institutions, 
be  put  aside  and  voluntary  arbitration  between  man 
and  man  take  their  place  ? 

Only  when  arbitration  is  able  to  unravel  the 
tangled  skein  of  crime  and  hypocrisy  among  in- 
dividuals can  it  be  extended  to  communities  and 
nations.  Thence  will  International  Arbitration  come 
of  its  own  accord  as  the  natural  outgrowth  of 
national  evolution  through  the  individual.  As  na- 
tions are  only  man  in  the  aggregate,  they  are  the 
aggregate  of  his  crimes  and  deception  and  de- 
pravity, and  so  long  as  these  constitute  the  basis 
of  individual  impulse,  so  long  will  they  control  the 
acts  of  nations. 

When,  therefore,  the  merchant  arbitrates  with  the 
customer  he  is  about  to  cheat ;  when  trusts  arbitrate 
with  the  people  they  are  about  to  fleece;  when  the 
bulls  and  bears  arbitrate  with  the  lambs  they  are 
about  to  shear;  when  the  thief  arbitrates  with  the 
man  he  is  about  to  rob,  or  the  murderer  with  his 
victim,  and  so  on  throughout  the  category  of  crime, 



then  will  communities  be  able  to  dispense  with  laws, 
and  international  thievery  and  deception,  shearing 
and  murder,  resort  to  arbitration.  But  crimes  of 
individuals — hence  nations — stand  in  inverse  ratio 
to  the  power  of  the  state  to  enforce  law.  Thus  in 
1906  in  the  United  States  there  were  one  hundred 
and  eighteen  murders  to  each  million  of  population; 
in  England  less  than  nine,  in  Germany  less  than 

All  law  presupposes  the  exercise  of  force  in  its 
execution;  hence  we  find  that  crime  increases  pro- 
portionately as  this  power  deteriorates. 

So  completely  do  Arbitrationists  misconstrue  the 
application  of  force  by  a  nation  in  dealing  with  other 
states  that  they  do  not  differentiate  between  the 
means  and  the  power  itself. 


IT  is  strange  a  belief  should  prevail  that  standing 
armies  are  a  menace  to  the  world's  quietude, 
while  it  has  only  been  due  to  the  formation  of 
permanent  military  forces  that  intervals  of  peace 
have  been  lengthened.  This  misconception  of  mod- 
ern peace  is  responsible  for  the  theory  of  national 

To  attribute  to  the  utensils  of  combat  the  cause 
of  war  is  the  same  as  saying  that  man  is  not  re- 
sponsible for  his  good  deeds  nor  guilty  of  his  crimes ; 
that  he  has  no  self-initiative  and  is  only  the  will-less 
creature  of  some  inanimate  instruments  that  happen 
to  be  in  his  possession. 

Modern  civilization  began  with  the  invention  of 
gunpowder.  As  these  black  grains  were  scattered 
about,  not  other  than  as  tiny  acorns  over  the  earth, 
there  sprang  up  oaks  of  national  strength  in  the 
form  of  armaments  under  which,  protected  from  the 
vicissitudes  and  storms  that  previously  assailed 
national  life  as  well  as  individual  existence,  the  arts 
and  sciences  of  mankind  flourished. 
.  Prior  to  the  introduction  of  gunpowder  into 
Europe  no  large  standing  armies  existed  and  no 



practical  peace.  All  men  were  considered  soldiers, 
and,  excepting  the  priesthood,  held  themselves  ready 
at  all  times  to  respond  to  their  leaders'  call.  In- 
stead of  a  small  fraction  of  the  male  population  be- 
ing on  war  footing,  the  whole  nation  was  so  con- 
stituted ;  instead  of  being  the  profession  of  a  few  men, 
it  was  the  business  of  them  all.  Each  possessed 
weapons  inexpensive  and  requiring  little  or  no  skill 
in  their  use,  so  that  not  only  were  they  ready  for 
combat  at  any  time,  but  so  long  as  military  duties 
were  shared  by  all,  instead  of  by  a  small  portion  of 
the  nation,  the  avocations  of  peace  were  of  secondary 
importance  and  that  of  war  primary,  not  to  a  few, 
but  to  the  entire  population. 

No  continuity  marked  the  pursuit  of  peaceful 
industry,  for  men  were,  at  all  times,  liable  to  be 
dragged  away  from  their  occupations  to  that  of  war. 
There  was  no  certainty  in  the  duration  of  their 
labors,  no  stability  nor  permanence  nor  incentive. 
Consequently  nations  could  not  develop  their  re- 
sources, or  the  skill  or  the  intellectuality  of  their 
people,  or  the  arts  and  sciences  that  come  of  them. 

The  invention  of  gunpowder  and  weapons  for  its 
use  necessitated  the  organization  by  the  state  of  per- 
manent armies,  since  the  weapons  required  were  not 
only  too  expensive  for  the  people  to  purchase  indi- 
vidually, but  their  use  demanded  a  skill  that  was 
not  only  the  result  of  personal  knowledge,  but  col- 
lective training.  When,  therefore,  nations  were 
obliged  to  provide  weapons  for  their  troops  and  to 
»  89 


assemble  them  together  for  training,  they  created  a 
separate  institution.  No  longer  could  they  assemble 
raw  levies  at  a  day's  notice  and  hurry  them  into 
combat.  The  entire  people,  except  those  especially 
employed  in  the  profession  of  arms,  now  turned 
their  attention  to  the  occupations  of  peace  with  the 
assurance  that  there  was  ever  ready  a  fraction  of 
the  population  especially  trained  for  their  pro- 
tection. Industries  and  the  products  of  their  skill 
and  genius  now  thrived  with  new  vigor.  Diligently 
they  went  about  their  work,  no  longer  perturbed 
with  the  thought  of  being  dragged  out  in  the  middle 
of  the  night  or  from  their  half-completed  labor  to 
march  and  fight  and  starve  or  to  die  from  the  in- 
numerable diseases  that  afflicted  their  unorganized 
hordes.  Once  again  orderly  civilization  and  prog- 
ress came  to  man. 

So,  in  due  time,  all  nations  changed,  and  most 
happily,  from  a  condition  of  disarmament  and  na- 
tional militia  to  armament  and  conscription.  For- 
ever and  gladly  should  they  pay  the  expense  of  it, 
for  the  returns  are  the  civilization  and  advancement 
of  mankind.  Only  by  such  means  can  men  pursue 
with  continuity  and  cumulative  returns  industries 
that  bring  them  not  only  wealth,  but  happiness  and 
wisdom,  individually  and  collectively,  over  and 
above  all  that  which  they  are  called  upon  to  pay. 

In  the  history  of  nations  it  will  be  found  that  the 
growth  of  their  higher  civilization  is  subsequent  to 
the  utilization  of  permanent  armaments,  a  complete 



segregation  of  the  militant  forces  from  the  in- 

Disarmament  of  standing  armies  means  the  arma- 
ment of  the  whole  nation.  Instead  of  training  to  a 
high  degree  of  efficiency  an  insignificant  fraction  of 
the  people  to  protect  the  whole,  the  entire  male 
population  is  called  upon  to  defend  no  greater  in- 
terests. The  number  of  men  required  to  undertake 
successfully  any  military  enterprise  stands  in  inverse 
ratio  to  the  skill  and  efficiency  of  their  training. 
A  most  insignificant  people  can,  by  a  high  degree  of 
military  capacity,  force  the  entire  male  population 
of  a  vast  non-militant  country  into  the  field  and  then 
destroy  them. 

Means  of  self  -  protection,  advancement  in  all 
phases  of  life,  or  domination  are  comparative.  So 
in  nations,  armaments  are  great  or  small,  effective 
or  worthless  as  they  stand  in  relation  to  the  arma- 
ments of  other  states  with  whom  their  interests 
come  in  contact. 

The  first  introduction  of  gunpowder  caused  a 
complete  segregation  of  the  military  forces  from 
ordinary  civil  life  and  necessitated  standing  armies, 
but,  as  the  manufacture  of  these  new  weapons  grew 
apace,  they  became  cheaper,  commoner,  and  event- 
ually found  their  way  into  each  household.  For  a 
considerable  period  there  again  existed  very  little 
difference  between  weapons  of  chase  and  warfare,  so 
that,  especially  in  new  countries  where  the  struggle 
against  aborigines  and  wild  beasts  was  constant, 


there  was  a  return,  in  a  certain  degree,  to  that  state 
of  universal  militarism  or  dependence  upon  the 
entire  male  population  to  carry  on  war,  instead  of 
standing  armaments  proportionate  to  the  need  of 
the  time. 

The  Napoleonic  wars  were  followed  by  two  phases 
of  national  activity  that  lengthened  the  periods  of 
peace  between  nations  and  reduced  the  number  of 
wars.  First,  the  introduction  by  Schornhorst  of 
conscription  in  times  of  peace.  Second,  the  ab- 
sorption and  unification  into  large  political  entities 
of  smaller  states,  as  the  unification  of  Germany, 
Italy,  and  the  Austrian  Empire;  the  supremacy  of 
the  Federal  power  in  the  United  States;  and  the 
absorption  into  the  British  Empire  of  innumerable 
petty  potentates  and  decadent  principalities. 

The  amalgamation  of  small  states  into  great  po- 
litical entities  is  the  reason  for  the  diminution  in 
number  and  frequency  of  wars,  a  lessening  of  inter- 
national conflict  that  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
so-called  increasing  morality  of  man.  International 
wars  can  only  be  proportionate  to  the  number  of 
separate  political  entities  into  which  mankind  is 
divided.  As  this  absorption  goes  on  by  the  might 
of  the  strongest  state,  so  wars,  while  concurrent  with 
this  unification,  will  in  the  end  diminish.  There- 
fore, as  nations  grow  less  in  number  the  greater  must 
be  their  armaments.  Wars  will  diminish  numerical- 
ly, but  the  effects  will  be  proportionately  greater. 

Modern  science  has,  with  its  inventions,  brought 



about  another  cycle  in  warfare,  new  as  regards 
means,  but  not  in  cause  and  effect.  The  invention 
of  modern  military  instruments  and  mechanical 
contrivances  has  produced  the  same  condition,  in 
relation  to  the  nation  as  a  whole,  as  existed  some 
hundreds  of  years  ago  just  subsequent  to  the  inven- 
tion of  gunpowder — i.  e.,  a  complete  segregation  of 
the  military  from  civil  life,  doing  away  with  mili- 
tarism, its  dangers  and  evils. 

As  the  single  introduction  of  gunpowder  into 
warfare  caused  nations  to  establish  permanent  forces 
of  men  trained  in  its  uses,  so  each  new  science,  as 
it  is  introduced  into  war,  requires  more  and  more 
special  training  on  the  part  of  officers  and  men  in 
the  army.  The  more  science  enters  into  warfare, 
the  more  perfect  must  be  the  training  of  the  men 
who  handle  the  machine  of  combat — the  army. 

Therefore,  it  will  be  found  that  in  proportion  to 
the  complexity  of  the  sciences  and  mechanical  in- 
ventions employed  in  war,  the  longer  and  more  per- 
fect must  be  the  training  and  construction  of  na- 
tional armaments.  So,  instead  of  the  disarmament 
of  nations  becoming  possible  through  increased 
civilization,  it  becomes  more  and  more  impossible 
as  science  increases  the  number  of  inventions,  not 
only  of  those  appertaining  directly  to  war,  but  in 
all  other  phases  of  human  activity.  To  the  science 
of  war  belongs,  or  is  utilized  in  one  way  or  another, 
every  science  and  invention  of  mankind.  It  is 
the  utilization  of  them  for  the  purpose  of  war  that 



will  constitute  the  strength  of  nations  in  the  future. 
Therefore,  armies  must  have  long  and  minute  train- 
ing in  those  sciences  that  are  in  warfare  interde- 
pendent. They  must  act  harmoniously  or  the  result 
will  be  a  chaotic  condition  wherein  the  ignorant 
application  of  a  single  part  will  cause  the  inefficiency 
of  the  whole.  This  knowledge  can  be  acquired  by 
the  nation  in  but  one  way — the  unification  of  the 
sciences  appertaining  to  war  and  by  a  knowledge  of 
their  practical  application.  It,  therefore,  can  be 
considered  an  axiom,  that  as  the  complexity  of 
science  and  mechanical  invention  increases  and 
enters  more  fully  into  the  conduct  of  war,  the  less 
difference  which  exists  between  the  peace  and  war 
armaments  of  a  nation,  the  greater  will  be  its  chances 
of  success. 

Science  to-day  has  reached  that  point  in  the  con- 
duct of  war  wherein  the  use  of  volunteers  or  militia 
as  against  regular  troops  has  become  impossible. 
And  the  time  is  not  far  distant  when  nations  will 
be  forced  to  increase  the  size  of  their  standing  armies, 
constituting  them  only  of  long-serviced  men,  and  do 
away  with  those  ex -regular,  short  -  serviced  troops 
that  now  constitute  their  reserves. 

The  use  by  a  nation  of  reserves  against  regular 
troops  in  the  future  will  only  end  in  defeat,  the 
dangers  of  which  increase  proportionately  each 
year,  while  the  use  of  volunteers  and  militia  drawn 
from  civil  life  means  complete  annihilation  to  what- 
ever nation  attempts  their  use. 



As  the  weakest  link  in  a  chain  determines  the 
strength  of  the  chain,  so  the  efficiency  and  size  of 
the  armament  of  a  single  great  power  determines 
the  proportionate  size  and  efficiency  of  all  other 
nations,  according  to  the  part  they  do  or  expect  to 
play  in  the  affairs  of  the  world.  Thus,  to  urge  the 
reduction  of  the  armament  of  one's  country  while 
that  of  other  powers  increases  or  remains  stationary, 
invites  the  destruction  of  the  government  and  the 
subordination  of  the  fatherland.  The  need  of 
armaments  must  not  only  be  proportionate  to  the 
importance  of  the  state  in  the  comity  of  nations  and 
increase  proportionately,  but  the  difference  between 
the  peace  and  war  footing  must  diminish  as  civiliza- 
tion with  its  science  and  inventions  progresses. 
The  demands  of  the  future  will  be,  not  for  less  but 
for  greater  armament  in  all  dominant  powers. 

It  has  been  shown  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  work 
how  man's  inventive  genius  in  the  means  of  trans- 
portation and  communication  has  reduced  the  size 
of  the  world  to  less  than  the  size  of  the  United  States 
two  generations  ago.  No  longer,  therefore,  can 
nations  consider  themselves  safe  behind  their  moats 
of  space.  The  peoples  of  the  whole  world  are  now 
elbowed  together  with  all  their  racial  antipathies 
and  convergent  ambitions  to  struggle  and  war  in  a 
theatre  of  action  no  greater  than  that  in  which 
European  nations  only  a  few  years  ago  sweated  and 
strove  for  supremacy.  On  the  one  hand,  while  the 
causes  of  war  have  diminished  by  the  elimination  and 



unification  of  innumerable  smaller  nations,  on  the 
other  the  shrinkage  of  the  world  by  man's  inventions 
has  brought  the  remaining  nations,  different  not 
only  in  race,  but  in  civilization,  ideals  and  purposes, 
so  closely  together  and  with  so  little  hope  of  amalga- 
mation that  we  cannot  say  that  the  possibilities  of 
war  have  in  the  sum  total  decreased.  The  peace  of 
the  future  must  be,  as  in  the  past,  an  armed  peace. 

There  is  one  element  we  have  not  yet  considered 
in  relation  to  disarmament,  viz.,  the  so-called  eco- 
nomic— the  eventual  impoverishment  of  nations  by 
the  burden  of  armament  and  diversion  of  a  large 
proportion  of  the  population  into  the  class  of  non- 

It  seems  most  pitiable  that  men  will,  in  their 
fruitless  endeavor  to  find  support  for  their  argu- 
ments, reduce  the  sublime  to  the  ridiculous,  so  that 
by  getting  it  down  to  their  level  they  can  better 
demolish  that  which,  in  its  original  form,  is  beyond 
them.  In  this  manner  of  attack  calculators  excel 
all  others.  They  have  succeeded  in  reducing  the 
evolution  of  nations  to  dollars  and  cents;  the  sum 
totals  of  which  are  cataclysms  or  Utopias  according 
to  the  object  they  have  in  view.  Thus  these  econo- 
mists, piling  up  the  figures  of  yearly  budgets,  crying 
abroad  that  nations  are  impoverishing  themselves  by 
the  burden  of  their  armaments,  would  have  us  regard 
a  nation  in  the  same  light  as  a  spendthrift  individual 
who  scatters  his  wealth  until  poverty  is  upon  him. 

It  was  thought  many  years  ago  that  Adam  Smith 



had  put  an  effective  quietus  on  this  kind  of  reasoning, 
though  evidently  it  will  not  down,  but,  not  unlike 
Banquo's  ghost,  seems  doomed  to  haunt  a  certain 
species  of  pretenders  even  unto  the  end. 

The  truth  is,  if  the  amount  of  money  expended  by 
a  nation  on  its  army  were  increased  a  thousandfold, 
the  wealth  of  the  nation  would  not  be  diminished 
one  iota,  nor  would  it  be  impoverished  one  cent. 
Budgets  are  but  the  sums  total  of  the  symbols  of 
wealth.  Whether  they  are  great  or  small,  the 
wealth  of  the  nation  varies  not  one  potato.  An 
individual  measures  his  wealth  by  coinage,  but  a 
nation  only  by  that  which  coinage  represents.  As  a 
man  squanders  his  money,  he  becomes  impoverished ; 
but  it  is  only  when  the  resources  and  means  of  pro- 
ducing that  which  money  represents  is  destroyed  or 
diminished  that  the  wealth  of  a  nation  is  lessened. 
The  armament  of  a  nation,  instead  of  being  indica- 
tive of  its  impoverishment,  is  rather  an  indication  of 
its  capacity.  In  a  single  soldier  is  represented  the 
various  gradations  of  its  wealth;  instead  of  being 
prophetic  of  its  destruction,  he  stands  in  no  other 
relation  than  its  protector. 

The  wealth  of  a  nation,  what  it  produces,  is  de- 
pendent on  the  natural  resources  of  its  territorial 
possessions,  on  the  intelligence  of  its  people,  the 
means  they  employ,  and,  lastly,  the  size  of  the  pop- 
ulation. Thus  the  wealth  of  France  with  thirty- 
eight  million  people  is  infinitely  greater  than  that  of 
India  with  two  hundred  million. 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

It  is  in  consideration  of  these  facts,  wherein  the 
statement  that  national  armaments  impoverish  na- 
tions by  withdrawing  a  large  number  of  men  from 
its  productive  energy,  becomes  preposterous.  Under 
the  ordinary  definition  given  by  Disarmamentists 
two-thirds  of  the  world's  population  can  be  classed 
as  non-producers. 

The  German  Empire  possesses  the  greatest  arma- 
ment of  any  nation  proportionate  to  its  population  ; 
yet  the  entire  army — considered  as  non-producers — 
consists  of  only  1.17  per  cent,  of  the  population, 
the  other  98.83  per  cent,  carrying  on  their  custom- 
ary vocations.  While  1.17  per  cent,  of  Germany's 
population  is  in  military  service,  man's  inventive 
genius  during  the  last  generation  has  increased  the 
productive  energy  of  the  remaining  portion  of  the 
population  more  than  a  thousand  per  cent.  It  is 
on  account  of  this  increasing  productivity  of  man, 
due  to  the  use  of  mechanical  inventions,  that  nations 
will  suffer  in  the  future,  not  from  under  but  over 
developed  industrialism. 

The  law  of  diminishing  returns  applies  only  to 
the  natural  resources  of  the  territorial  possessions 
of  a  nation.  These  possessions  are  great  or  small, 
permanent  or  temporary,  capable  of  systematic  ex- 
ploitation or  a  surface  rummaging,  in  ratio  to  the 
strength  or  weakness  of  the  nation.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  law  of  productive  energy  increases  in  geo- 
metrical ratio  to  the  increase  of  civilization.  The 
task  in  the  future  will  not  be  to  find  men  to  exploit 



the  natural  resources  of  a  country,  but  natural  re- 
sources for  the  utilization  of  their  inventions  and 
labor-saving  devices.  The  number  of  men  a  state 
can  withdraw  from  productive  occupations  is  pro- 
portionate to  the  intelligence  of  the  remainder  in 
their  utilization  of  mechanical  inventions  and  the 
diminishing  of  natural  resources. 

A  law  of  national  progress  might  be  stated  as 
follows:  A  nation,  in  order  to  preserve  an  equilib- 
rium between  over-industrial  production  and  under- 
political  development,  should  withdraw  from  indus- 
trial occupations  for  military  purposes  a  proportion 
of  the  male  population  that  is  (i)  not  greater  than 
what  labor-saving  inventions  can,  by  being  sub- 
stituted therefor,  more  than  replace  the  productive 
energy  lost  by  the  withdrawal  of  men  from  indus- 
trial production;  (2)  the  number  of  men  so  with- 
drawn not  to  be  more  nor  less  than  that  number 
which  is  deemed  imperative  to  acquire  or  to  hold 
whatever  additional  natural  resources  are  neces- 
sary for  the  increasing  productive  energy  of  the 

In  other  words,  while  the  productive  energy  of  a 
nation  increases  in  geometrical  ratio  to  the  increase 
of  civilization,  the  resources  of  the  country  diminish 
in  inverse  ratio  to  the  increase  of  both  population 
and  productive  energy.  So  the  nation  destined  to 
survive  above  all  others  and  to  absorb  them  will  be 
the  sovereign  country  that  maintains  this  equilib- 
rium. Natural  resources,  therefore,  that  come  with 



territorial  possessions  are  to  be  in  the  future  the 
first  requisite  of  national  greatness. 

In  the  first  portion  of  this  work  is  enunciated  the 
law  that  the  boundaries  of  nations  are  never,  other 
than  momentarily,  at  rest;  and  that  there  are  two 
phases  to  this  state  of  agitation,  expansion  or  shrink- 
age. Expansion  of  a  nation's  boundaries  is  indica- 
tive, not  only  of  its  external  growth,  but  of  the 
virility  of  its  internal  constitution;  the  shrinkage 
of  its  boundaries,  the  external  exemplification  of  its 
internal  decay.  Both  growth  and  decay  have  their 
origin,  not  along  the  rims  of  national  boundaries, 
but  within  the  very  heart  of  the  state  itself,  and  are 
governed  by  those  laws  to  which  we  have  just  given 
expression.  These  laws  are  not  and  could  not  be 
new,  for  they  are  of  man  and  are  as  old  as  the  rise 
and  fall  of  the  first  nations.  Modern  conditions  of 
life  can  in  no  manner  affect  them.  The  primitive- 
ness  of  this  truth  and  its  material  proof  is  the  rise 
of  the  German  and  Japanese  empires.  A  few  dec- 
ades ago  Japan  was  almost  a  myth  and  the  Ger- 
man Empire  only  a  geographical  possibility.  To-day 
they  are  considered  equal,  and  in  many  respects 
superior,  in  strength  and  greatness  to  the  other 
powers  of  the  world,  and  for  no  other  reason  than 
that  they  have  not  become  top-heavy  with  indus- 
trialism, but  have,  from  Bismarck's  time  until  the 
present,  recognized  the  immutability  of  these  laws 
and  have  maintained  and  are  continually  preparing 
to  maintain  in  the  future  the  equilibrium  between 



their  industrial  expansion  and  political  develop- 
ment. Should  Germany  on  the  one  hand  and  Japan 
on  the  other  continue  to  adhere  rigorously  to  these 
laws,  resisting  the  deteriorating  influence  of  in- 
dustrialism, feminism,  and  political  quackery,  they 
will,  in  due  time,  by  the  erosive  action  of  these  ele- 
ments on  other  nations,  divide  the  world  between 

Economic  disarmamentists  propose  that  all  na- 
tions mutually  exploit  the  resources  of  the  world 
in  harmonious  and  equal  division,  for  by  so  doing 
armies  would  be  disposed  of  and  more  men  added  to 
the  productive  energy  of  mankind.  We  have 
heretofore  shown  the  impossibility  of  this  proposal 
in  that  political  entities  are  not  other  than  collec- 
tions of  individuals,  and  their  governments  only  the 
expression  of  their  ideals.  Changes  in  government 
for  good  or  bad  originate  in  the  people.  What  the 
people  are,  so  is  the  state,  together  with  all  their 
passions,  wants,  hates  and  struggles ;  and  whatever 
their  ideals  are,  they  are  exemplified  in  the  conduct 
of  the  government.  When,  therefore,  individuals 
voluntarily  do  away  with  ideas  of  possession,  so  that 
complete  socialism  and  harmonious  anarchy  prevail, 
then  only  will  it  be  possible  for  such  ideals  to  be 
extended  to  the  conduct  of  international  affairs  so 
that  the  nations  of  the  world  may  dwell  peacefully 
and  happily  together  in  a  condition  of  international 


HPHE  military  preparation  of  a  nation  must  be 
1  determined  by  its  relationship  to  the  balance 
of  the  world  geographically,  politically  and  racially. 
If  the  United  States  were  geographically  situated 
in  a  sphere  of  its  own,  removed  from  the  pathway 
of  foreign  expansion  and  economic  interests,  its 
foreign  policy  non  -  assertive  and  ductile  to  the 
demands  of  other  nations,  the  attitude  of  the  pop- 
ulace politically  and  sociologically  so  constituted 
that  they  would  not  involve  the  government  in 
disputes  and  entanglements  with  the  people  of  other 
powers,  then  armies  and  navies  for  the  Republic 
might  be  dispensed  with.  Otherwise,  its  armament 
and  military  preparation  must  be  proportionately 
as  great  as  the  above  hypotheses  are  categorically 

Geographically,  the  territorial  possessions  of  a 
nation  are  provocative  of  war  when  they  possess  a 
positive  valuation  to  other  nations  under  three 
separate  heads — commercial,  strategic  and  racial. 

The  territorial  dominions  of  the  United  States  are 
not  only  those  possessions  governed  by  its  laws,  but 
that  vast  region  of  Mexico,  the  West  Indies,  Central 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

and  South  America,  which,  as  far  as  being  causative 
of  war,  are  as  much  under  the  political  sovereignty 
of  the  United  States  as  are  the  states  of  the  Union. 
The  preservation  of  the  Constitution  is  not  more 
vital  than  the  inviolability  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

It  is,  however,  necessary  in  considering  these 
questions  not  to  regard  the  world  in  the  old  sense 
of  distance  by  area  or  miles,  but  only  in  the  modem 
sense  of  distance  by  time.  Not  many  years  ago  it 
took  six  months  to  cross  from  New  York  to  Califor- 
nia ;  at  present  it  requires  four  days ;  consequently, 
to  the  people  in  all  their  practical  activities  the  size 
of  the  United  States  is  less  than  one-fortieth  what 
it  was  fifty  years  ago.  The  world,  on  account  of 
modern  means  of  communication,  is  more  compact, 
as  far  as  the  intercourse  and  conflict  of  man  is  con- 
cerned, than  were  the  dominions  of  Caesar  or  the 
kingdoms  over  which  Napoleon  cast  his  shadow. 

The  possessions  of  the  United  States,  therefore, 
owing  to  this  shrinkage  of  the  world,  concern  the 
great  powers  geographically,  strategically  and  polit- 
ically in  as  vital  a  sense  as  did  those  territories  con- 
cern Caesar  that  finally  constituted  his  dominions, 
or  the  kingdoms  of  Europe  that  made  up  Napoleon's 
empires,  or  the  states  that  constitute  this  Union; 
hence,  we  must  consider  them  in  such  light  and  in 
no  manner  removed  from  their  spheres  of  activity, 
whether  it  is  commercial,  political  or  military. 

Europe,  having  within  its  borders  the  greatest 
nations  of  the  world  and  nearly  a  quarter  of  its 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

population,  consists  of  less  than  one- twelfth  of  the 
world's  land.  Japan,  greater  in  population  than  the 
United  Kingdom,  possesses  only  one-two-hundred- 
and-fiftieth  part  of  the  earth's  surface;  while  the 
suzerainty  of  the  United  States  extends  over  one- 

Of  the  world's  territory  that  comes  under  the 
political  jurisdiction  of  the  Republic,  two-thirds  is 
covered  by  Mexico,  Central  and  South  America, 
capable  of  supporting  three  times  as  many  empires 
as  now  divide  Europe.  This  vast  and  fabulously 
rich  continent,  practically  uninhabited,  lies  midway 
between  Europe  and  Asia  and  is  less  distant  from 
Europe  than  Poland  was  from  France  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  nineteenth  century,  while  the  people 
of  Japan  and  China  can  reach  its  western  seaboard 
in  less  time  than  it  took  travellers  not  many  years 
ago  to  pass  from  Prussia  to  Portugal. 

In,  however,  considering  the  exploitation  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  by  the  crowded  populations 
overflowing  from  Europe  on  the  East  and  Asia  on 
the  West,  innumerable  modern  factors  not  only 
hasten  but  increase  beyond  computation  the  need 
by  nations  of  virgin  territory.  Not  only  is  the 
knowledge  of  the  wealth  of  every  portion  of  the 
world  now  common  to  all  of  mankind  through  the 
rapidity  and  universality  of  intercommunication, 
but  improvements  in  the  arts  and  sciences  extend 
more  or  less  over  the  entire  world,  resulting  in  a 
common  demand  by  all  nations  for  the  primitive 



materials  that  enter  into  the  fabrication  of  modern 
arts  and  sciences. 

Accompanying  the  augmented  needs  of  civilized 
man  for  the  almost  limitless  necessities  and  luxuries 
that  modern  science  has  created,  but  have  never- 
theless their  origin  in  natural  resources,  is  the  de- 
mand for  unexploited  territory.  This  is  not  in  pro- 
portion to  the  increase  of  the  population,  but  is  due 
to  that  intense  cumulative  demand  brought  about 
by  science  and  invention,  both  in  consumption  and 
in  the  means  of  exploitation.  Formerly,  the  in- 
creased production  of  necessities  and  luxuries  was 
dependent  more  directly  upon  the  increase  of  popula- 
tion. That  condition  no  longer  exists.  The  in- 
crease of  production  due  to  increase  of  population  is 
insignificant  when  compared  to  that  due  to  science 
and  invention.  The  very  machines  that  the  in- 
genuity of  man  has  contrived  have  become  in  them- 
selves monstrous  consumers.  The  inanimate  has 
been  given  teeth  and  bowels  and  a  hunger  that 
knoweth  not  satiety.  Man,  in  order  to  meet  this 
ever-increasing  thousandfold-by-day  consumption  of 
the  world's  resources,  has  turned  to  science  and  in- 
vention to  improve  the  efficiency  and  augment  the 
capacity  of  exploitation. 

While,  therefore,  the  resources  of  the  world  are 
governed  in  their  exploitation  by  the  law  of  diminish- 
ing returns,  and  the  population  of  mankind  goes 
on  increasing  by  the  law  of  nature,  there  is  no  law 
of  nature  nor  of  man  that  regulates  the  increase  and 

8  10$ 


consumption  of  the  devouring,  tireless  machines  by 
which  man  now  furrows  and  devastates  the  earth 
in  quest  of  those  things  that  whole  nations  to-day 
and  to-morrow  demand.  There  is  no  end  to  this 
universal  thievery,  and  the  earth  continues  to  be 
rooted  and  drilled  and  sucked.  Day  is  not  time 
enough,  and  night  glares  and  resounds  with  mon- 
strous throbbing.  Pathways  of  cinders  mark  its 
surface  and  mountains  of  tailings  rise  upon  it.  Man 
and  nations  of  men  go  on  struggling  even  more 
madly  and  deliriously  to  gain  new  lands  whither 
their  engines  may  whistle  and  scream  in  Franken- 
stein delight  as  they  claw  and  rend  and  prod  the 
virgin  earth. 

How  unreasonable  is  it,  therefore,  to  expect  that 
the  combined  nations  of  Europe,  with  all  their 
military  strength,  shall  remain  restricted  to  one- 
twelfth  of  this  world's  land,  burrowed  into  and  hewn 
over  for  the  last  thousand  years,  while  this  Republic, 
without  armies,  shall  maintain  dominion  over  one- 
half  the  unexploited  lands  of  the  world!  Or  that 
Japan,  possessed  of  two-thirds  the  population  of 
this  nation  and  a  military  organization  fifty-fold 
greater,  shall  continue  to  exist  on  her  rocky  isles 
that  are,  inclusive  of  Korea,  but  one-two-hundred- 
and-fiftieth  of  the  earth's  lands,  while  an  undefended 
one-half  lies  under  the  guns  of  her  battleships! 

What  prevents  the  occupation  of  this  vast  and 
rich  continent  by  powers  having  military  capacity? 
The  defensive  ability  of  the  Latin  republics  is,  pro- 



portionately,  no  greater  against  European  or  future 
Asiatic  military  aggression  than  was  the  defensive 
capacity  of  the  aborigines  against  the  first  European 
conquerors.  Ordinarily,  it  is  believed  that  the  dic- 
tum of  this  Republic,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  has  been 
responsible  for  their  immunity  against  foreign 
aggression.  Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth. 

There  have  been  five  separate  causes  productive 
of  Mexican,  Central  and  South  American  exemp- 
tion from  foreign  conquest: 

(r)  Inadequacy  of  transportation  and  communi- 

(2)  Adjustment  of  European  political  conditions. 

(3)  Duration   of   the   pre-inventive   or   non-me- 
chanical period. 

(4)  A  correspondingly  low  demand  for  natural 

(5)  The  seclusion  of  the  Oriental  races. 

One  by  one  we  have  seen  these  sources  of  im- 
munity vanish  and  antithetic  conditions  imper- 
ceptibly take  their  place,  increasing  each  year  in 
cumulative  intensity.  Herein  lies  the  inevitability 
of  war  between  this  Republic  and  European  as  well 
as  Asiatic  nations,  or  a  complete  repudiation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Jn  the  history  of  mankind  never 
before  has  one  nation  attempted  to  support  so  com- 
prehensive a  doctrine  as  to  extend  its  political 
suzerainty  over  two  continents  comprising  a  fourth 
of  the  habitable  earth  and  one -half  of  its  unex- 
ploited  wealth,  in  direct  defiance  of  the  whole  world, 



and  without  the  slightest  semblance  of  military 
power,  nor  possessing  any  right  to  regulate  the 
domestic  or  foreign  policy  of  numerous  and  irre- 
sponsible political  entities  that  simmer  and  sweat 
within  two-thirds  of  its  suzerainty. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  Promethean  in  concep- 
tion, but  not  so  in  execution.  It  was  proclaimed  in 
order  to  avoid  wars;  now  it  invites  them.  This 
great  statesman  fully  realized  the  inevitable  con- 
clusions of  his  doctrine  though  he  could  not  com- 
prehend that,  in  the  vital  hour  of  its  need,  the 
militant  power  necessary  to  its  enforcement  would 
all  but  have  vanished  in  a  quagmire  of  sophistry. 

The  Republic  was  at  that  time  separated  by  vast 
oceans  from  European  nations,  across  which  small 
wooden  craft  struggled  over  their  unmapped  cur- 
rents, and  against  winds  that  blew  down  from  the 
mysterious  regions  of  an  unknown  world.  Had 
Monroe  been  able  to  foresee  that  science  and  in- 
vention would,  in  a  few  generations,  bring  both 
continents  within  less  distance  of  Europe  than, 
during  his  life,  separated  Virginia  from  New  Eng- 
land, that  the  armies  of  five  European  nations 
would  exceed  the  population  of  the  thirteen  colonies, 
and  that  beyond  the  Western,  mystic  ocean  would 
suddenly  emerge  out  of  impenetrable  mists  even 
greater  empires  to  struggle  and  war  for  the  pos- 
sessions encompassed  by  his  proclamation,  how 
much  more  insistent  would  he  have  been  upon  the 
strict  and  inviolable  maintenance  of  it!  How  care- 



ful  would  he  have  been  to  command  the  augmenta- 
tion of  military  force  proportionate  to  the  increasing 
probability  of  its  violation. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  if  not  supported  by  naval 
and  military  power  sufficient  to  enforce  its  observ- 
ance by  all  nations,  singly  and  in  coalition,  becomes 
a  factor  more  provocative  of  war  than  any  other 
national  policy  ever  attempted  in  modern  or  ancient 
times.  Yet  it  is  given  to  us,  in  this  swift-ebbing 
age,  to  witness  the  sad  spectacle  of  this  great 
national  doctrine  slowly  but  surely  vanishing  in 
a  slough  of  national  self-beguilement,  an  all-encom- 
passing mud-puddle  of  mediocrity.  Societies,  relig- 
ions, unions,  business  men  and  politicians,  on  the 
one  hand,  spare  no  effort  to  debase  every  militant 
instinct  and  military  efficiency  or  preparation  neces- 
sary for  its  enforcement,  while,  on  the  other,  they 
demand  that  the  Chief  Executive  shall  assert  to  the 
entire  world  this  Republic's  intention  to  maintain, 
by  the  force  of  arms  if  necessary,  this  most  warlike 
and  encompassing  policy  ever  enunciated  by  man 
or  nation. 

The  Old  World  smiles  at  this  childish  credulity 
as  it  goes  calmly  on  ploughing  the  fields  of  the  world 
with  its  fire-breathing,  brazen  teams,  sowing  the 
teeth  of  dragons,  reaping  the  harvest  of  warriors, 
and  in  due  time  to  gain  by  this  husbandry  the 
golden  fleece  of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

The  possessions  that  come  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  are  not,  however,  the  only 



territories  under  the  political  sovereignty  of  this 
Republic  that  are  geographically  so  located  as  to 
be  considered  provocative  of  war.  We  divide  these 
foreign  possessions  into  three  groups:  (i)  the  Carib- 
bean Sea;  (2)  the  Central  Pacific;  (3)  the  Asiatic. 
While  these  islands  are  not  a  source  of  war  com- 
mercially, they  are  strategically.  The  value  of  all 
possessions  is  as  much  determined  by  the  control 
of  the  intervening  lines  of  communication  as  by 
their  intrinsic  wealth.  The  oceans,  constituting 
seventy- three  per  cent,  of  the  globe,  are  the  main 
lines  of  trade  between  nations,  and  to  the  extent 
that  these  ways  of  commerce  are  controlled  does  a 
a  nation  or  group  of  nations,  so  commanding  them, 
possess  the  wealth  of  the  world.  If  the  United 
States  controlled  the  ways  from  Europe  and  Asia 
to  this  hemisphere,  neither  Europe  nor  Asia  could 
gain  possessions  in  North  or  South  America.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  are  con- 
trolled by  the  European  and  Asiatic  nations,  re- 
spectively, then  the  United  States  is  powerless  not 
only  to  enforce  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  to  protect 
its  insular  possessions  or  the  commerce  of  the 

In  order  for  a  nation  or  coalition  of  nations  to 
gain  control  over  lines  of  communication,  whether 
on  land  or  sea,  it  is  first  necessary  to  secure  points 
of  vantage;  in  other  words,  territorial  possessions 
for  strategic  purposes  only.  Napoleon  declared  the 
intent  of  war  to  be  a  struggle  for  position.  All  great 



wars  are  preceded  by  these  conflicts.  The  possession 
by  a  nation  of  highly  strategic  points  is,  unless  de- 
fended beyond  a  question  of  doubt,  even  more 
provocative  of  war  than  territories  sought  after  on 
account  of  their  intrinsic  wealth.  The  possession  of 
strategic  positions  determines  to  a  greater  extent 
than  any  other  factor  the  issue  of  an  international 
conflict.  Hence,  there  must  come  in  due  time  those 
inevitable  struggles  for  position  which  will  precede 
all  wars  for  conquest  of  the  unexploited  territories 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere  by  the  nations  of 
Europe  and  Asia. 

In  the  Atlantic,  the  future  theatre  of  war  in 
which  to  secure  strategic  position  will  be  the  Carib- 
bean Sea.  No  one  locality  in  or  bordering  on  the 
Atlantic  possesses  such  strategic  possibilities  as  does 
the  control  of  this  sea.  Whatever  powers  gain  un- 
disputed command  over  it  will  gain  supremacy 
over  one-half  the  Western  Hemisphere.  We  divide 
its  strategic  possibilities  under  four  heads: 

(1)  The   command   of   the    Panama   Canal   and 
Central  America. 

(2)  The  command  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  of  Mexico. 

(3)  The  command  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard  from 
Cape  Hatteras  to  Key  West. 

(4)  The  command  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard  of 
South  America. 

The  control  of  the  Panama  Canal  is  the  most  im- 
portant factor  of  these  four  divisions,  since  it  belongs 



only  to  the  nation  that  militarily  commands  its  ap- 
proaches; who  builds  it  is  immaterial.  Should  any 
nation  expend  in  the  same  period  of  time  an  equiv- 
alent amount  of  money  on  battleships  as  is  being 
expended  by  the  United  States  in  the  canal's  con- 
struction, not  only  would  Panama  become  its 
property,  but  in  addition  all  those  possessions  that 
centre  and  are  dependent  on  the  control  of  the 
Caribbean  Sea;  viz.,  the  southern  half  of  the  Western 

With  the  exception  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  no 
undertaking  since  the  formation  of  this  Republic  is 
more  fraught  with  possibilities  of  warfare,  or  calls 
for  greater  military  and  naval  expansion  than  the 
building  of  the  Panama  Canal.  Unless  the  United 
States  is  willing  to  increase  the  military  and  naval 
strength  proportionate  to  the  dangers  that  at  once 
become  existent  with  its  completion,  it  is  a  mistake 
to  proceed  with  its  construction. 

The  Isthmian  Canal,  by  reducing  the  distance 
from  Europe  to  the  Western  seaboard  of  North  and 
South  America,  makes  probable  what  is  now  im- 
possible— the  commercial  and  military  invasion  of 
the  Eastern  Pacific  by  Europe.  In  other  words,  it 
centres  the  attention  of  the  world  to  five  hundred 
feet  of  waterway. 

For  a  European  fleet  to  reach  San  Francisco  or 
Valparaiso  via  the  Panama  Canal,  the  distance  is 
only  three-eighths  greater  than  for  an  American  fleet 
steaming  from  New  York  harbor.  While  hereto- 



fore  the  Western  seaboards  were  completely  re- 
moved from  the  sphere  of  European  naval  activities, 
that  condition  no  longer  exists  on  the  completion 
of  the  canal. 

The  eventual  control  of  the  Panama  Canal  is  fore- 
told by  the  history  of  the  Suez,  which,  diminishing 
the  distance  between  Europe  and  the  Orient  to  one 
half,  became  the  main  channel  of  communication 
between  the  West  and  the  East.  Built  by  France, 
it  soon  passed  into  English  possession.  The  con- 
trol of  the  Suez  by  England  resulted  from  her 
masterful  position  in  the  Mediterranean  and  the 
Red  Sea  —  the  strategic  possessions  of  Gibraltar, 
Malta,  Egypt  and  Aden.  That  France  built  the 
canal  determined  in  no  way  its  final  ownership. 
The  possessions  of  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Cyprus,  Egypt 
and  Aden,  together  with  a  navy  maintained  on  a 
basis  of  being  equal  to  the  navies  of  any  possible 
coalition,  determined  to  whom,  in  time  of  war,  the 
canal  would  belong.  Great  Britain  not  only  con- 
trols, by  means  of  it,  the  Oriental  trade,  but  domi- 
nates the  political  relationship  that  Europe  bears  to 
Asia.  What  has  brought  about  English  commercial 
supremacy  throughout  the  world  has  been,  not 
alone  the  supremacy  of  the  English  navy,  but  the 
possession  of  strategic  bases.  The  existence  of  a 
great  navy  is  entirely  dependent  on  the  ownership 
of  strategic  positions  in  different  quarters  of  the 
globe  and  maintained  by  force. 

The  Panama  Canal  is  as  important  to  the  world 

THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

as  the  Suez,  and  not  less  so  to  European  nations 
than  to  the  American  republics.  The  control  of 
it  is  as  vital  to  the  nation  that  desires  to  command 
the  commercial  as  well  as  political  destiny  of  the 
Eastern  Pacific  as  the  Suez  is  to  England  in  the 
control  of  Asiatic  hegemony. 

The  Caribbean  Sea  corresponds  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and  its  islands  and  neighboring  coasts  to 
Gibraltar,  Malta,  Cyprus,  Crete  and  Egypt.  In 
the  Pacific,  Hawaii  corresponds  to  Aden.  At  the 
present  time  the  United  States,  England,  France, 
as  well  as  the  Netherlands — which  in  the  future  can 
be  considered  as  German — have  possessions  in  or 
adjacent  to  the  Caribbean  Sea;  i.  e.,  a  basis  of  mili- 
tary expansion  and  control.  Nations  possessing 
territory  adjacent  to  the  canal  must  be  considered 
as  factors  in  determining  its  future  ownership. 

The  United  States,  at  the  present  time,  is  strateg- 
ically superior  in  the  Caribbean  to  all  the  rest  of 
the  world,  not  only  on  account  of  the  adjacency  of 
its  mainland,  but  the  possession  of  the  Canal  Zone, 
Puerto  Rico,  Cuba  and  Hawaii,  which  gives  it 
strategic  possibilities  that  should  make  it  the  un- 
disputed arbiter  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  But 
the  strategic  positions  now  held  by  this  Republic, 
completely  naked  of  defence,  have  for  the  future 
only  one  significance — that  of  wars  for  their  pos- 

The  command  of  the  Caribbean  Sea  by  a  Eu- 
ropean nation  would  not  only  control  the  Panama 



Canal,  the  Western  seaboard  of  North  and  South 
America,  the  Atlantic  seaboard  from  Cape  Hat- 
teras  to  Cape  Horn,  but  it  would  separate  the 
United  States  from  the  southern  continent  and 
nullify  completely  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  These  are 
the  inducements  to  tempt  European  nations,  singly 
or  in  coalition,  to  secure  command  of  the  Caribbean 
Sea,  which,  as  we  look  into  the  future,  is  the  second 
most  important  strategic  sphere  on  the  globe. 

The  Pacific  insular  possessions  of  the  United 
States  are  also  geographically  so  situated  that  they 
are  as  necessary  for  the  command  of  the  Pacific  as 
are  the  islands  of  the  Caribbean  Sea  for  the  com- 
mand of  the  southern  portion  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  Whatever  nation  possesses  them  con- 
trols the  Pacific,  upon  whose  seaboard  dwell  one 
half  of  the  human  race. 

The  consideration  of  the  inevitable  struggle  for 
the  dominion  of  the  Pacific  we  have  left  to  the  con- 
cluding chapters  of  this  work,  where,  in  detail, 
will  be  shown  the  fallacies  of  this  nation's  military 
system,  the  falsity  of  the  glamour  that  surrounds 
it,  the  primitiveness  of  its  conception,  its  inherent 
elements  of  deterioration  and  incapacity  to  engage 
in  successful  warfare  with  a  great  power. 


WHILE  the  sources  of  war  have  their  origin  deep 
down  in  that  primitive  struggle  of  nations  and 
races  to  survive,  to  conquer  and  be  supreme,  the 
precipitating  causes  of  international  conflicts  are 
found  generally  in  the  unreasoning  vanity,  acts 
and  passions  of  the  diverse  tribes  of  man,  as  they 
strive  along  in  that  old  and  endless  struggle  which 
is  Life. 

The  previous  chapter  dealt  with  the  sources  of 
international  strife  into  which  this  Republic  will, 
sooner  or  later,  be  plunged.  In  this  chapter  we  will 
consider  the  causes  that  hasten  and  will  precipitate 
these  wars — a  consideration  of  the  diverse  peoples 
that  come  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  United  States. 

We  divide  these  people  into  two  classes: 

(r)  The  inhabitants  of  the  nation's  insular  pos- 
sessions and  the  Latin  republics  encompassed  by 
the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

(2)  The  heterogeneity  of  the  electoral  populace 
of  the  Union,  constituting  the  government  of  the 
nation  by  and  for  them. 

Homogeneity  of  race  has  been  recognized  as  an 
invariable  principle  in  determining  the  stability  of 



national  institutions.  The  formation  and  execution 
of  national  ideals  are  possible  only  as  this  principle 
remains  inviolable.  The  theorem  and  corollary  gov- 
erning, in  this  relation,  the  condition  of  national 
existence  can  be  stated  as  follow: 

(r)  The  vitality  of  national  life,  being  depend- 
ent upon  the  harmony  of  its  component  parts,  is 
capable  of  resisting  temporal  erosion  in  proportion 
to  its  racial  homogeneity. 

(2)  The  deterioration  of  a  political  entity,  sub- 
ject to  the  diversity  of  its  constituent  elements,  is 
slow  or  rapid  in  proportion  to  the  fractional  facets  of 
its  racial  heterogeneity. 

To  these  laws,  in  the  past,  there  has  been  no 
variation,  and  that  modification  due  to  greater 
assimilativeness  on  account  of  the  universality  and 
rapidity  of  intercommunication  is  so  remote  that 
it  cannot  be  considered;  for  at  the  present  time  it 
acts  only  in  the  closer  cementation  of  peoples  of 
common  ancestry,  and  defines  even  more  sharply 
the  lines  between  races. 

When  a  nation  is  composed  of  different  peoples, 
its  comparative  stability  can  be  said  to  be  great  or 
fragile  as  its  government  is  in  the  hands  of  one 
dominant  race  or  is  diffused  proportionately  through 
the  various  racial  and  political  elements  that  com- 
pose it. 

Political  history  shows  us  again  that  only  so  long 
as  the  political  and  military  power  of  a  heterogene- 
ous nation  remains  in  the  hands  of  a  single  element 



does  it  endure.  As  this  power  gradually  slips  away 
on  account  of  the  deterioration  of  the  dominant 
race  and  becomes  diffused  throughout  the  nation, 
political  dissension  and  territorial  disintegration 
begins.  Anciently,  this  was  true  of  the  Chaldean, 
Egyptian,  Persian,  Indian,  Macedonian,  Roman, 
the  Mongol  empires,  and  all  other  nations  composed 
of  variant  racial  elements.  At  the  present  time 
similar  conditions  are  existent  in  a  number  of  great 
nations  scattered  abroad  over  the  world.  The  true 
significance  of  the  break-up  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
is  not  other  than  the  final  passage  of  the  Manchus 
and  a  natural  reversion  of  the  empire,  if  not  de- 
stroyed in  the  dissolution  of  the  dominant  race,  to 
the  control  of  a  single  homogeneous  people.  For 
three  centuries  the  Manchus  have  maintained  them- 
selves by  retaining  all  political  and  military  power 
over  the  entire  Chinese  race.  This  they  are  now 
about  to  abdicate,  and,  with  the  relinquishment  of 
their  political  prerogatives  heretofore  guarded  so 
zealously,  the  empire  will  pass  over  into  the  keep- 
ing of  a  more  virile  people.  Soon  shall  the  world 
witness  their  melancholy,  and  perhaps  tragic,  exit 
from  the  Palace  of  the  Dragon  and  their  vanishing 
through  the  sombre  portals  of  the  half-shadowed 
tombs  that  await  them  in  the  Valley  of  Liaoho. 

In  the  racial  dissimilarity  of  the  Austrian  and 
Turkish  empires  are  to  be  found  similar  sources  of 
political  weakness  and  eventual  dissolution.  In 
Russia  the  ruling  and  racially  homogeneous  portions 



of  the  empire,  having  lost  their  autocratic  rights, 
the  nation  is  being  given  over  to  a  babble  of  ele- 
ments struggling  for  political  supremacy,  and  the 
Russian  policy  of  world -empire  has,  for  the  time 
being,  come  to  an  end. 

The  Marquis  of  Salisbury,  in  a  few  words,  enun- 
ciated the  future  of  the  British  Empire; 

"There  have  been  great  colonial  and  maritime 
powers,  four  or  five,  but  they  have  always  fallen. 
...  If  we  ever  allow  our  defences  at  sea  to  fall  to 
such  a  point  of  inefficiency  that  it  is  as  easy,  or  nearly 
as  easy,  to  cross  the  sea  as  it  is  to  cross  a  land  fron- 
tier, our  great  empire,  stretching  to  the  ends  of  the 
earth,  supported  by  maritime  force  in  every  part  of 
it,  will  come  clattering  to  the  ground  when  a  blow 
at  the  metropolis  of  England  is  struck." 

In  other  words,  when  the  power  of  the  British 
Empire  ceases  to  emanate  in  all  its  absolutism  from 
the  gloom  of  a  London  street,  then  will  it  and  all 
its  greatness  fall  away. 

Under  the  wide,  fitful  shadow  of  the  American 
flag  is  found  a  heterogeneity  of  mankind  racially, 
politically,  religiously  and  geographically  more  di- 
vergent than  has  heretofore  ever  come  under  the 
political  jurisdiction  of  a  single  nation;  and  in  the 
sense  of  being  provocative  of  war,  a  source  of  tur- 
moil and  struggle,  there  has  seldom  existed  one  more 
resonant  with  the  alarums  of  future  combat. 

It  is  not  always  necessary  to  consider  the  racial 
elements  involved,  for  that  sinks  into  comparative 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

insignificance  when  the  political  looseness  govern- 
ing this  heterogeneity  of  mankind  is  considered; 
the  vast  geographical  area  over  which  a  portion  of 
these  elements,  as  distinct  racial  and  political  en- 
tities, are  scattered ;  the  manner  in  which  they  have 
come  to  be  subordinate  or  subject  to  the  decrees 
of  the  Republic;  or  that  other  heterogeneity, 
through  which,  by  the  electoral  franchise,  is  diffused 
the  political  and  military  integrity  of  this  nation. 

In  considering  the  people  of  the  insular  posses- 
sions of -the  United  States  as  causative  of  war,  they 
must  be  so  regarded  in  three  different  lights: 

(1)  The  manner  of  their  subordination;   whether 
voluntary  or  due   to   the  physical  might  of  this 

(2)  Their  racial  character;   whether  it  is  similar 
to  and  assimilative  by  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  or  whether  it  is  similar  to  and  assimilative 
by  a  power  other  than  this  nation. 

(3)  The  geographical  location  of  these  racially 
different  possessions  as  regards  their  worth  to  other 

The  Philippines,  Puerto  Rico,  and  in  a  sense  Cuba, 
can  be  considered  as  conquered  nations  over  whom 
the  sovereignty  of  this  Republic  was  extended  in 
principle  no  different  from  that  of  Spain.  The  in- 
habitants of  these  countries  opposed  by  force  the 
dominion  of  Spain,  and  sacrificed  thousands  of  their 
people  that  they  in  the  end  might  become  politically 
independent  states.  The  spirit  that  "actuated  their 



struggles  against  Spain  has  not  been  lessened  by  a 
transfer  of  dominion.  As,  in  the  Philippines,  each 
family  paid  its  toll  of  blood  to  Spanish  dominion, 
so  have  they  to  American  conquest.  The  heroisms 
of  the  Spanish  War,  and  the  tales  of  valor  such  as 
speed  from  threshold  to  threshold,  have  now  been 
replaced  by  those  newer  acts  of  self-sacrifice  that 
tell  of  combats  with  the  soldiery  of  this  Republic. 

While  time  mollifies  the  spirit  of  conquerors  or 
erodes  it  into  small  dust,  the  spirit — which  is  hate — 
of  the  conquered  endures  on,  apparently  without 
end.  As  the  inhabitants  of  these  islands,  both  in 
the  East  and  West,  were  continually  in  revolt 
against  Spanish  domination,  so  will  they  be  against 
this  nation  whenever  the  military  power  over  them 
is  withdrawn  or  deteriorates.  Moreover,  by  educa- 
tion, the  United  States  is  increasing  the  compre- 
hension of  their  subjugation  and  combative  ability. 
Nothing  is  more  erroneous  than  the  belief  that  pa- 
triotism to  an  alien  conqueror  is  evolved  out  of 
general  education.  The  education  of  the  masses, 
under  such  conditions,  only  develops  and  gives  ex- 
pression to  instincts  and  propensities  already  exist- 
ent. Not  unlike  Pandora's  box  does  it  open  to  the 
hungry  nature  of  conquered  man  new  diseases  of 
vanity,  new  epidemics  of  unrest,  new  fevers  of 

As  these  peoples  forced  Spain  into  war  with  the 
United  States  to  gain  their  ends,  they  will  not  hesi- 
tate to  involve  this  nation  in  war,  if  by  so  doing  its 
9  121 

THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

military  efficiency  will  be  destroyed  or  crippled  to 
the  extent  of  making  possible  a  successful  war  of 
independence,  the  right  of  which  this  country  must 
concede,  since  it  owes  its  own  origin  as  a  sovereign 
state  to  such  procedure. 

That  hatred  of  Americans  exists  in  these  islands 
is  disputed  by  none  but  politicians.  The  expendi- 
tures of  the  United  States  to  improve  the  education 
of  the  people  and  the  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment have  in  no  way  diminished  the  spirit  of  revolt. 
Whatever  wounds  have  been  closed  have  been  by 
scarification.  The  hatred  of  the  conquered  is  the 
most  enduring  of  all  human  passions,  and  it  must 
never  be  forgotten  by  a  conquering  nation  that, 
whatever  they  get  by  force,  by  force  they  must  con- 
tinue to  hold. 

The  impossibility  of  the  American  people  assimi- 
lating the  inhabitants  of  these  foreign  possessions 
is  apparent. 

(1)  Distinct  racial  differences. 

(2)  The  number  of  Americans  who  will  live  per- 
manently in  the  possessions  will  be  so  insignificant 
that  their  presence  racially  will  have  no  effect  upon 
the  inhabitants.     But  on  the  other  hand,  they,  being 
numerically  so  inferior  and  unfitted  by  nature  to 
withstand  the  erosive  action  of  the  climatic  condi- 
tions, will  soon  vanish  in  the  gloom  of  tropic  depths, 
whither  the  marsh-lights  of  their  fancied  superiority 
led  and  abandoned  them. 

Assimilation  of  races  is  governed  by  the  same 



natural  law  that  determines  the  assimilation  of  all 
forms  of  animal  life.  The  characteristics  belonging 
to  a  race  numerically  predominant  and  physically 
fittest  to  the  environment  will  dominate  completely 
a  race  alien  to  the  land  and  climate  and  numerically 

The  government  of  foreign  possessions  and  con- 
quered lands  is  an  old  task  of  mankind,  and  the 
empirical  knowledge  concerning  it,  co-extensive  with 
antiquity,  permits  us  to  form  more  or  less  positive 
conclusions  as  to  the  means  that  make  it  possible 
or  circumscribe  the  bounds  beyond  which  the  am- 
bitions of  man  must  not  go.  Knowledge  gained 
through  the  devastation  of  so  many  lands  and  the 
going  down  of  so  many  great  empires  should  deter- 
mine the  policy  of  the  United  States  in  its  relation- 
ship to  that  vast  one-fourth  of  the  world  over  which 
it  has  tossed  with  careless  boldness  the  thirteen 
folds  of  its  flag. 

However  confident  one  may  feel  of  a  greater  future 
for  this  Imperial  Republic,  it  is  only  possible  to  be- 
lieve in  its  triumphs  if  it  prepares  for  them ;  if  not, 
then  must  one  look  forward  to  the  washing-away  of 
all  that  was  destined  to  be  great  in  it. 

The  difference  between  the  political  heterogeneity 
of  empires  and  that  of  population  is  as  wide  as  is 
their  capacity  to  provoke  war  and  their  incapacity 
to  wage  it.  A  nation  that  is  made  up  of  various 
minor  peoples  of  distinct  racial  characteristics  is 
exposed  to  the  probabilities  of  war  in  proportion  to 



the  number  of  nationalities  that,  constituting  its 
suzerainty,  possess  political  franchise  and  voice  in 
its  government.  Nevertheless,  such  a  nation  might 
endure  indefinitely,  provided  that  the  military  forces 
are  always  proportionate  to  the  possibilities  of  war, 
and  the  governmental  and  military  powers  securely 
held  within  the  hands  of  a  homogeneous  people. 
When,  however,  the  exercise  of  government  and  the 
command  of  national  resources  passes  into  the  con- 
trol of  heterogeneous  elements,  the  possibilities  of 
national  dissolution  are  correspondingly  increased. 

There  are,  within  maritime  countries,  two  latent 
elements  of  decay:  the  racial  heterogeneity  of  its 
component  states,  and  a  heterogeneous  admixture 
of  the  ruling  people.  This  latter  condition  is  al- 
ways the  resultant  of  the  former.  It  is  the  first  of 
that  sickness  which  has  not  only  dissipated  national 
aspirations,  but  has  been  instrumental  in  the  dissolu- 
tion of  dynasties  and  nations,  whether  republics  or 
kingdoms.  Of  the  tribes  of  man  that  have,  in  this 
manner,  made  their  final  melancholy  trek  across 
those  illimitable  steppes  they  traverse  but  once, 
they  have  left  behind,  at  the  most,  but  a  crumbling 
tumulus  of  statutes  and  human  decrees,  by  which 
they  sought  to  nullify  the  simple  yet  imperishable 
laws  of  nature. 

A  nation  may  be  kept  intact  only  so  long  as  the 
ruling  element  remains  homogeneous.  When,  how- 
ever, the  political  and  military  power  passes  from 
it  to  racial  elements  that  are  dissimilar,  and  political- 



ly  as  well  as  numerically  constitute  the  main  por- 
tion of  the  country,  then  the  ideal  of  national 
supremacy  is  lost  in  the  endless  controversies  of 
internal  legislation  and  petty  ambitions. 

In  the  previous  chapter  is  shown  how  the  depend- 
encies of  this  Republic,  covering  one-fourth  of  the 
earth,  and  bound  together  only  by  the  fragilest  of 
chains,  are  each  provocative,  to  a  greater  or  lesser 
degree,  of  war  with  the  expanding  nations  of  Europe 
and  Asia.  In  this  chapter  will  be  considered  the 
people  who  now  rule  this  one-quarter  of  the  globe, 
showing  not  only  their  incapacity  to  control  de- 
pendencies, but  the  difficulty  of  controlling  them- 
selves; and  that  the  wider  this  power  becomes  the 
greater  are  the  probabilities  of  war. 

While  racial  similarity  is  recognized  as  the  primi- 
tive basis  of  all  national  security,  it  is  by  no  means 
as  essential  in  an  autocratic  form  of  government  as 
in  a  republic,  inasmuch  as  in  an  autocracy  the  ruling 
power,  however  small  it  may  be,  is  generally  kept 
free  from  admixture  with  other  elements.  But  in 
a  republic  all  participate  in  the  government,  and 
it  is  only  a  question  of  numerical  superiority  for  an 
element  alien  in  race,  alien  in  aspiration,  and  alien 
to  the  spirit  of  the  government  to  completely  sup- 
plant the  race  that  founded  the  republic,  together 
with  their  ideals  and  ambitions. 

This  Republic,  together  with  its  declarations,  its 
statutes  and  constitutions,  was  founded  by  men  not 
only  alike  in  race,  but  in  ideals  and  intentions. 



Until  the  time  of  the  Civil  War  the  American  could 
be  considered  a  homogeneous  people.  But  the  stat- 
utes and  declarations  made  at  that  time  for  con- 
serving the  national  ideals  were  only  fitted  to  con- 
trol and  direct  the  growth  and  course  of  the  nation 
so  long  as  it  remained  a  country  one  in  race  and 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War  the  foreign  non- 
Anglo-Saxon  element  in  this  country  was  less  than 
one- twelfth  of  the  population.  In  1900  this  homo- 
geneity of  population  had  declined  to  less  than 
seven-twelfths.  Since  that  time  this  declination  of 
primitive  Americanism  has  gone  on  at  even  greater 

Not  alone,  however,  must  the  admixture  of  alien 
races  inhabiting  the  states  of  the  Union  be  con- 
sidered as  provocative  of  war  because  they  exceed 
the  Anglo-Saxon  race  in  numbers,  but  rather  be- 
cause of  their  peculiar  geographical  distribution. 
In  a  number  of  Southern  States  the  negro  out- 
numbers the  white  inhabitants,  while  in  most  of 
the  other  states  in  the  South  they  exceed  one-third 
the  population.  Of  these  negroes  forty-four  per 
cent,  are  wholly  illiterate.  In  the  Northern  States 
ninety-four  per  cent  of  the  European  immigrants 
become  domiciled,  and  at  the  present  time  there  are 
in  this  country  over  thirty  million  persons  of  foreign 

In  the  great  cities  of  the  world  are  to  be  found, 
more  or  less  entire,  those  factors  that  determine  the 



course  and  eventual  end  of  nations  within  whose 
boundaries  they  are  placed.  From  such  cities,  in 
proportion  to  their  size,  emanate  determinate  factors 
in  the  good  and  evil  of  nations.  Especially  is  this 
so  in  republics,  where  the  government  is  dependent 
upon  the  will  of  majorities.  In  cities  such  as  Boston, 
Buffalo,  Chicago,  Hartford,  Cleveland,  Milwaukee 
and  San  Francisco  over  a  third  of  the  population  is 
foreign-born;  while  in  other  cities,  as  Lowell,  Fall 
River  and  New  York,  over  half  the  population  are 
foreigners.  The  racial  character  of  these  popula- 
tions not  Anglo-Saxon  is  exemplified  in  New  York, 
where  it  is  approximately  divided  as  follows :  three- 
quarters  of  a  million  German,  more  than  a  quarter 
of  a  million  Russian,  nearly  half  a  million  Italian, 
as  well  as  half  a  million  Poles,  Austrians,  and  Hun- 
garians, while  another  quarter  of  a  million  is  made 
up  of  other  nationalities.  Each  month  the  foreign 
population  of  these  cities  increases,  and  so  rapidly 
that  in  a  few  years  the  Anglo-Saxon  American  will 
stand  in  inverse  ratio  to  what  he  does  now.  In  due 
time  the  strategic  positions  of  this  Republic,  polit- 
ical, moral  and  social,  will  be  in  the  hands  of  those 
who  know  in  no  manner  the  truth  of  human  equality, 
nor  the  spirit  of  those  who  made  it  possible  in  seven 
thin  and  ragged  years,  years  that  tried  not  alone 
the  hearts  of  men,  but  the  souls  of  them. 

If  there  is  any  such  thing  as  patriotism,  then  a 
naturalized  citizen  is  an  anomaly.  What  fidelity  can 
be  attributed  to  a  man  who  not  only  forswears  the 



land  of  his  birth,  but  that  of  his  forefathers,  their 
dust  and  their  deeds  ?  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  is 
not  an  apostate  in  this  act  of  naturalization,  then 
he  is  a  liar.  But  by  neither  one  nor  the  other  con- 
dition is  it  possible  to  expect  from  him  other  than 
that  which  impelled  his  immigration  to  this  Repub- 
lic— the  betterment  of  his  personal  condition.  He 
not  only  cannot  share  in  national  ideals,  but  he 
cannot  comprehend  them.  If  national  ideals  are 
capable  of  being  aroused  in  him,  then  they  must  be 
for  his  native  country.  Patriotism,  as  ordinarily 
understood,  does  not  permit  the  forswearing  of  one's 
nationality  and  the  adoption  of  another  with  a  con- 
comitant display  of  greater  virtue  in  adopted  than 
in  native  patriotism.  It  is  not  possible  that  a  Slav 
will  be  a  better  American  than  Slav,  or  that  an 
Italian  possesses  more  virtues  in  America  than  in 

American  nationalization  is  not  a  racial  anti- 

The  hereditary  instincts  of  unnumbered  genera- 
tions are  not  erased  from  the  fibre  of  men  by  the 
word  of  an  official. 

The  application  of  American  institutions  to  the 
control  of  the  lower  elements  of  Europeans  who 
constitute  the  vast  majority  of  immigrants  has 
proven  to  be  productive  of  crime  rather  than  civic 
virtues,  while  the  liberty  given  them  is  but  a  Pan- 
dorean  gift  of  winged  felonies. 

Crime  is  an  index  to  national  character,  as  well  as 


individual,  and  it  is  by  this  index  that  we  make 
note  of  the  character  of  the  naturalized  citizen  as 
well  as  the  citizen  born  of  foreign  parents.  By  this 
same  index  of  crime,  expanding  in  direct  ratio  to 
increasing  heterogeneity  of  population,  do  we  find 
greater  incompatibility  existing  between  their  in- 
herent character  or  propensities  and  American  in- 
stitutions. With  the  increase  of  individual  crime 
is  an  expansion  of  national  lawlessness  that  tends 
externally  to  international  warfare,  and  internally 
to  eventual  dissolution  or  the  introduction  of  a 
strongly  centralized  form  of  government,  monar- 
chial,  autocratic,  or  what  not,  but  that  the  homo- 
geneous element  shall  rule,  and  shall  with  its  great 
iron  ladle  alone  stir  this  potpourri  of  mankind  and 
skim  off  the  scum  that  rises  from  it. 

In  considering  the  probabilities  of  war  due  to 
mixed  populations,  it  must  be  understood  that  the 
morality  of  a  nation,  especially  a  republic,  is  not 
that  morality  expressed  in  its  constitutions,  its 
statutes,  or  declarations,  but  is,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  composite  morality  of  the  major  portion  of  the 
population  which,  as  it  becomes  more  immoral  and 
criminal,  hastens  onward  to  those  vaster  excesses 
of  unrestraint  that  are  wars. 

Beginning  with  the  increase  of  European  immi- 
gration, about  fifty  years  ago,  crime  has  become 
more  multitudinous  and  rampant.  Prior  to  the 
Civil  War  there  were  only  twenty-nine  prisoners  to 
every  hundred  thousand  of  the  population.  From 



the  time  of  the  war  up  to  the  present,  crime  has  in- 
creased more  than  five  hundred  per  cent.,  while  there 
has  been  considerably  less  than  two  hundred  per 
cent,  increase  in  population.  That  this  is  due  to  the 
relationship  existing  between  the  immigrant  and 
American  institutions  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
they  are  less  criminal  in  their  own  countries  than  in 
the  United  States. 

In  1906  there  were  in  England  to  each  million  of 
the  population  eight  murders  committed,  in  Ger- 
many four,  in  the  United  States  one  hundred  and 
eighteen.  The  average  number  of  murders  during 
each  of  the  last  twenty  years  was  thirty  times  greater 
than  the  total  number  of  men  killed  on  the  field  dur- 
ing the  Spanish-American  War.  The  annual  number 
of  soldiers  slain  in  the  Civil  War  was  but  slightly  in 
excess  of  persons  now  murdered  each  year  in  these 
times  of  peace,  in  this  land,  not  of  liberty,  but  of  li- 
cense. The  cost  of  crime  in  the  United  States  annual- 
ly exceeds  the  entire  expenditure  made  necessary  by 
any  of  the  American  wars  other  than  the  Rebellion. 

The  distribution  of  criminality  in  this  Republic, 
according  to  nationality,  is  approximately  as  fol- 
lows: twenty-four  per  cent,  of  the  prisoners  are 
born  of  native  white  parents,  while  seventy-six  per 
cent,  are  either  foreigners,  born  of  foreign  parents, 
or  negroes.  The  criminality  of  natives  born  of 
foreign  parents  exceeds  that  of  the  foreign  -  born, 
while  the  foreign-born  criminals  exceed  those  born 
of  native  parents  in  ratio  of  56.81  to  43.19.  In 

1 10 


this  Republic  the  Germans  exceed  all  other  for- 
eigners in  criminality,  while  in  their  native  land, 
under  a  form  of  government  suited  to  them,  crime 
is  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

Denial  of  obedience  to  law  may  occur  collectively 
as  well  as  individually,  if  tendency  to  crime  in  the 
individual  is  prevalent.  When  the  refusal  to  obey 
the  law  comes  from  an  individual,  it  is  a  felony  of 
some  sort.  When  it  occurs  collectively,  by  a  section 
of  a  nation  as  against  the  whole,  it  is  rebellion; 
when  it  occurs  collectively  against  international  law 
and  usage,  it  is  war.  The  origin  of  a  collective  re- 
fusal of  a  nation  to  obey  international  law  is  very 
little  removed,  if  at  all,  from  the  breaking  of  a  local 
law  by  an  individual,  which  is  called  a  crime.  It 
can  be  justly  said  that  the  criminality  of  a  nation 
is  a  true  index  as  to  proportionate  probabilities  of 
war  having  cause  in  the  acts  and  passions  of  peo- 
ple; and  in  ratio  to  the  progression  or  retrogression 
of  crime  in  a  people,  may  war — as  far  as  the  people 
are  productive  of  it — draw  near  or  recede.' 

Tendencies  toward  crime  individually,  as  well  as 
nationally,  increase  in  greater  ratio  when  the  hetero- 
geneity of  a  country  is  of  a  lower  moral  status  than 
the  original  population  of  the  nation  and  exceeds 
it  in  numbers.  Not  only  is  it  physiologically  im- 
possible for  a  superior  portion  of  mankind  to  assimi- 
late the  inferior  without  the  concomitant  loss  of 
superiority,  but  in  this  Republic  there  is,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  deterioration  by  intermarriage,  the  in- 


fection  of  social  contact,  the  erosive  effect  of  in- 
ferior morals,  a  bastard  patriotism,  and  finally  the 
giving  over  into  the  hands  of  foreigners,  in  no  man- 
ner imbued  with  the  true  spirit  of  American  insti- 
tutions, the  preservation  of  those  primitive  rights 
upon  which  the  great  but  fragile  edifice  of  this  Re- 
public was  builded. 

We  have  already  shown  that  ninety-four  per  cent, 
of  the  European  immigrants  settle  in  those  very 
states,  the  Eastern  and  Northern,  where  is  held  the 
balance  of  political  power,  and  that  in  most  of  the 
great  cities  from  New  York  to  San  Francisco  the 
foreign  population  varies  from  one-third  to  over 
one-half.  Should  the  present  rate  of  immigration 
continue,  it  is  only  a  question  of  a  few  years  when 
the  voting  majorities  in  all  great  cities  will  be 
foreign.  The  character  of  the  present  immigration 
is  not  rural;  to  them  the  meanest  tenement  in  a 
city  is  preferable  to  the  fairest  field  in  the  world. 

Prior  to  the  influx  of  European  immigrants  im- 
mediately preceding  the  Civil  War,  the  ratio  of  ur- 
ban to  the  total  population  was  only  twelve  per 
cent.;  in  1900  it  had  increased  to  over  thirty-one 
per  cent.  In  a  few  years  it  will  exceed  fifty  per 
cent.,  and  will  be  in  an  electoral  sense  foreign. 

Republics,  governed  by  the  divine  right  of  ma- 
jorities, that  illegitimate  offspring  of  the  divine 
right  of  kings,  are  controlled,  not  by  rural  districts 
nor  sparsely  settled  states,  but  by  centres  of  popu- 
lation, where  radiate  not  alone  political  predomi- 



nance,  but  the  moral  and  social  tendencies  of  the 
nation.  Thus  New  York  City,  with  one-half  of  its 
population  foreign,  not  only  in  birth,  but  foreign 
in  their  appreciation  of  American  institutions,  has 
more  representatives  in  Congress  than  nine  West- 
ern states. 

The  status  of  morals  in  rural  districts  has  no 
effect  whatsoever  on  urban  populations,  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  morality  of  a  city,  whether  high 
or  low,  is,  within  the  radius  of  its  influence,  the 
determining  factor  as  regards  general  morality  of 
that  section  of  the  nation. 

We  have  pointed  out  four  salient  conditions  aris- 
ing from  heterogeneity  of  population  in  this  Repub- 
lic that  tend  to  phases  of  human  activity  other 
than  those  of  peace. 

(1)  The  precipitating  causes  of  all  future  wars 
rests  with  the  people. 

(2)  In    direct    ratio    to    the    criminality    of   the 
populace  are  to  be  found  concomitant  probabilities 
of  war. 

(3)  This  Republic  exceeds  all  other  civilized  na- 
tions in  crime. 

(4)  Most  of  this  criminality  arises  from  its  hete- 
rogeneous population,  which  is  increasing  and  con- 
fining itself  to  cities,  the  strategic  points  morally, 
socially,  and  politically  of  the  Republic. 

Were  there  no  other  probabilities  of  war  than 
those  arising  from  the  variant  racial  classes  that 
make  up  the  Republic,  that  alone  should  suffice  to 


keep  this  country  prepared  instead  of  denying  its 
possibilities.  Through  the  excessive  criminality  of 
any  nation  there  will  always  exist  concomitant  vio- 
lation of  the  rights  and  privileges  of  other  countries 
as  guaranteed  to  them  by  the  usage  of  international 
law,  and  which  must,  in  due  time,  culminate  in 


TJERETOFORE,  in  various  phases,  have  been 
11  considered  probabilities  of  future  wars  that 
should  be  sufficient  at  least  to  turn  the  attention 
of  this  Republic  to  preparation  for  them  rather 
than  to  continue  in  its  present  course  of  not  only 
indifference,  but  active  antagonism  to  any  better- 
ment of  its  military  inefficiency. 

In  the  last  few  decades  the  wearing  down  of  this 
never  over-large  world  into  the  communicable  con- 
fines of  what,  three  generations  ago,  would  not  have 
been  considered  a  great  state,  has  gone  on  without 
cessation.  The  shrivelling  up  of  the  political  sphere 
of  man  has  its  corollary  in  the  expansion  of  its  com- 
ponent parts — the  nations  that  constitute  it.  Man 
has  now  caught  up  to  Time  in  its  flight.  Distance 
is  no  longer  distance  whole  and  vast,  for  it  has  been 
so  pared  down  that  only  the  shavings  of  it  are  left 
in  the  workshops  of  man.  There  are  no  longer 
oceans  nor  deserts  nor  abysses  behind  and  beyond 
which  nations  of  men  can  live  secure.  Upon  this 
hour-encompassed  world,  dwindling  down  each  dec- 
ade, must  nations  wrestle  interminably. 

In  Europe  there  is  no  expansion  eastward;    in 


Asia  there  is  no  westward  course  of  empire.  West 
must  the  peoples  of  Europe  go,  and  eastward  those 
of  Asia,  until  in  this  hemisphere,  on  American  con- 
tinents, these  two  tides,  inundating  all  before  them, 
shall  meet  and  struggle  and  subside.  To  prevent 
this  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  framed,  exclusion  laws 
enacted,  new  insular  territory  appropriated.  Then 
— somnolent  with  the  opiate  of  transitory  power — 
this  nation  passes  into  the  wild  delirium  of  those 
dreams  where  chimeras  give  chase  to  phantoms. 

In  conjunction  with  the  heterogeneity  and  con- 
comitant criminality  of  those  who  would  rule  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  we  will  consider  probabilities 
of  war  from  a  source  that  is  fraught  with  more 
dangers  than  any  heretofore  examined — the  con- 
trol of  the  government  by  the  populace. 

In  consideration  of  the  relationship  that  popular 
control  of  government  bears  to  the  causes  of  war, 
the  character  of  the  populace  is  more  or  less  im- 
material; the  essential  point  to  be  considered  is  the 
degree  of  control  the  populace  has  over  the  central 
government.  As  the  populace  becomes  more  ab- 
solute in  the  control  of  governmental  affairs,  the 
chances  of  war  increase  accordingly;  and  to  the 
degree  that  it  is  racially  heterogeneous  the  prob- 
abilities of  international  strife  are  augmented. 

In  proportion  to  the  greatness  of  the  sphere  over 
which  a  government  by  the  people  extends  its  sway 
is  to  be  found  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  dan- 
gers of  war.  And  when,  in  .addition,  the  political 



and  territorial  expansion  of  such  a  nation  comes  in 
contact  with  similar  expansion  of  any  oligarchic  or 
autocratic  form  of  government,  the  result  is  con- 
tention; in  defeat,  dissolution  or  reversion  to  a 
similar  form  of  monarchy.  As  is  increased  or  de- 
creased the  number  of  individuals  who  direct  the 
affairs  of  a  nation,  so  is  altered  the  wisdom  of  its 
acts,  its  stability  and  power  of  survival.  Five  wise 
men  can  better  direct,  and  to  superior  greatness, 
the  destiny  of  a  nation  than  can  fifty  million  of 
men  possessed  of  similar  wisdom.  But,  as  the 
number  of  individuals  who  are  in  control  of  national 
affairs  increases,  there  is  a  concomitant  decrease  of 
intelligence,  until  finally  the  whole  nation  is  flounder- 
ing about  in  the  wide,  shallow  slough  of  mediocrity. 
Out  of  this  there  is  no  relief  until  that  which  is 
mud  shall  subside,  and  that  which  is  clear  shall 
again  reflect  the  iridescence  of  not  common — but 
superior — sense. 

It  is  unfortunately  true  that  with  increasing  popu  - 
lar  control  of  governmental  affairs,  such  as  marks 
the  evolution  of  this  nation,  there  is  not,  and  never 
will  be,  a  proportionate  increase  in  the  intelligence 
of  the  masses  to  the  point  that  they  will  be  able  to 
comprehend  the  complex  obligations  that  constitute 
the  international  rights  and  duties  of  governments. 
Even  if  the  wisdom  of  the  masses  should  rise  to  im- 
probable heights,  there  would  be  no  diminution  in 
the  improbabilities  of  just  observance  of  the  rights 
of  foreign  nations. 


The  success  of  negotiations  between  nations,  as 
among  individuals,  is  in  proportion  to  the  number 
of  negotiators,  interests  and  prejudices  involved. 
When  the  government  of  a  country  is  the  govern- 
ment of  the  masses,  the  number  of  negotiators  is 
increased  to  the  whole  nation,  and  involves  not  only 
their  mediocrity,  but  unending  self-interests  and 
prejudices.  It  was  this  perversion  of  government 
that  confirmed  John  Hay  in  the  belief  that  this 
Republic  would  not  again  be  able  to  make  an  im- 
portant treaty. 

By  treaties  international  affairs  are  governed,  and 
inability  to  make  such  stipulations  is  only  another 
way  of  stating  the  impossibility  of  observing  treaties 
already  made.  Of  the  failure  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  observe  the  rights  and  privileges 
due  other  nations,  we  have  had  many  and  melan- 
choly instances. 

The  mind  of  a  nation  in  dispute  is  its  mob-mind, 
credulous  and  savage.  It  is  primitive,  hence  brutal. 
It  is  feminine,  hence  without  reason.  It  is  instinc- 
tive to  the  degree  of  an  animal,  and  is  cognizant  only 
of  its  own  impulses  and  desires.  It  is  full  of  hates 
and  frivolities.  While  the  mind  of  an  individual  is 
more  or  less  constructive,  the  mob-mind  is  intelli- 
gent only  in  devastation.  Reason  roams  sullenly 
in  the  dim  labyrinths  of  its  brain:  a  Minotaur  to 
whom  the  world  ever  and  endlessly  yields  up  its 
tribute;  seven  Youths  that  are  Empires;  seven 
Maidens  that  are  Progress.  Mob-minds  can  be 



active  only  in  a  destructive  sense.  As  the  sum 
total  of  the  collective  efforts  of  man  under  individual 
direction  constitutes  the  upbuilding  of  a  nation, 
so  the  sum  total  of  their  collective  acts  uncontrolled 
is  marked  by  ruin.  Whenever  the  mob-mind  rules, 
mankind  shudders.  Its  voice  is  the  evil  banshee 
of  nations. 

To  the  divine  right  of  majorities  should  be  added 
the  will  of  constituents — a  condition  that  aborts 
nationalism  and  benumbs  where  it  would  rule.  In 
Republics  every  office  down  to  the  pettiest  of  magis- 
trates is  supposedly  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
populace.  But  in  actuality  politicians  are  sub- 
servient to  it  only  in  its  wrath,  hence  they  abet  a 
popular  demand  for  war,  instead  of  opposing  it. 
The  will  of  constituents  has  resulted  in  a  continual 
struggle  to  localize  the  efforts .  of  government  by 
the  paramount  interests  of  sectional  legislation. 
Whatever  may  be  the  foreign  policy  of  the  national 
government,  that  policy  must  be  sacrificed  if  it  in- 
terferes with  their  self-interests. 

As  the  government  of  a  nation  passes  under 
popular  control,  its  energies  and  progress  are  more 
and  more  consumed  in  the  contention  of  internal 
affairs,  while  the  nation  as  a  whole  drifts  along 
among  Scyllas  and  shoals  innumerable.  It  is  in  this 
drifting  that  the  tempests  of  war  are  encountered. 
A  nation  to  withstand  the  tides  and  storms  of  ero- 
sive time  must  progress  internationally ;  its  internal 
affairs  made  subordinate  to  its  foreign  policy,  and 



controlled  to  conform  with  its  needs  and  vicissi- 
tudes. In  republics,  however,  the  reverse  of  these 
conditions  exists,  so  that  the  nation  as  a  derelict 
drifts  along  toward  the  Great  Port  whither  others 
have  also  drifted,  a  port  without  shores  or  tempests. 

When  the  inhabitants  of  one  nation  are  prejudiced 
against  the  people  and  institutions  of  others,  they 
designate  this  prejudice  patriotism;  but  when  such 
foreign  antipathy  is  not  brought  in  active  use  this 
kind  of  patriotism  hibernates,  and  the  nation  gives 
itself  over  to  sectional  prejudices,  which  are  strong 
or  weak  in  proportion  to  the  strength  or  weakness 
of  the  central  government.  When  the  national 
government  becomes  subordinate  to  delegates  rep- 
resenting the  will  of  constituencies,  then  the  nation 
becomes  more  or  less  incoherent.  The  will  of  con- 
stituencies, or  the  mob-minds  of  them,  has  three 
salient  characteristics:  it  is  selfish,  with  a  selfish- 
ness that  never  rises  above  the  flattest  mediocrity; 
improvident,  with  an  improvidence  of  children; 
inflammable  as  tinder,  its  conflagrations  are  war; 
its  embers,  rebellions;  while  over  the  cinders,  over 
the  ash  and  slag  of  its  going  out,  other  nations  pass 
or  flare  up. 

As  the  government  of  a  nation  passes  under  the 
control  of  the  populace,  it  passes,  to  a  certain  degree, 
beyond  the  pale  of  peaceful  association  with  other 
nations.  It  enters  into  a  condition  of  arrogant  un- 
rest, an  isolation,  insolent  and  impatient  as  to  the 
rights  of  others.  Out  of  these  demeanors  come  wars. 



An  electoral  populace  is  at  its  best  a  gigantic 
creation,  loud  like  a  demagogue,  with  the  head  of 
a  tradesman,  and  given  over  to  as  much  self-decep- 
tion as  a  woman.  It  is  charitable  to  those  who 
tickle  its  vanity,  brutal  to  those  it  hates,  unrelent- 
ing to  those  it  has  condemned.  Without  capacity 
to  reason,  it  has  intuition,  but  like  a  child  delights  to 
be  humbugged.  It  has  laughter  but  no  tears,  and 
this  is  the  brute  of  it. 

Peaceful  international  relationship  not  only  de- 
mands the  highest  intelligence  and  justice  on  the 
part  of  arbitrators,  but  a  complete  subjection  by 
the  people  to  their  decision.  When,  however,  gov- 
ernments are  under  popular  control,  this  condition 
is  reversed;  the  negotiators  become  only  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  real  arbitrators,  the  populace; 
mediocre  in  intelligence,  violent  and  quick  in  tem- 
per, submissive  to  none  but  themselves.  Should  the 
negotiator  acting  for  them  yield  in  any  degree  their 
most  extreme  demands,  he  would  at  once  be  cast 
aside.  Consequently  the  negotiator,  knowing  that 
the  slightest  variation  from  the  wishes  of  the  popu- 
lace would  mean  his  condemnation,  acts  only  in 
accordance  with  popular  feeling.  He  is  but  a  creat- 
ure of  their  making,  and  the  tenure  of  his  greatness 
endures  only  so  long  as  he  pleases  them. 

It  was  this  phase  of  popular  control  that  led  the 
late  Secretary  of  State  to  make  the  sombre  prophecy 
that  never  again  could  this  Republic,  under  its 
present  form  of  government,  conclude  an  important 



treaty.  In  other  words,  this  nation's  future  is  to 
be  rather  of  war  than  of  peace.  Since  it  has  reached 
that  point  wherein  it  is  impossible  for  it  to  make 
treaties  with  other  powers,  it  has  fallen  to  that 
degree  of  incoherence  that  it  will  violate  treaties 
already  in  force.  The  reply  to  such  violation  is 

The  difficulty  of  making  treaties,  or  respecting 
those  already  made,  increases  with  the  increase  of 
popular  control  over  the  conduct  of  national  gov- 

In  this  Republic  almost  every  phase  of  inter- 
national relationship,  in  which  are  concerned  the 
rights  and  privileges  of  foreign  nations,  is  indiffer- 
ently regarded  or  directly  violated  with  legislative 
acts,  by  powerful  political  sections  or  classes  when- 
ever it  is  to  their  interests  or  appeals  to  their  passions. 

The  political  history  of  the  United  States  betrays 
the  difficulties,  not  only  of  inaugurating,  but  con- 
tinuing, just  and  friendly  relations  with  foreign 
nations;  while  its  diplomatic  records  lay  bare  the 
inability  of  the  national  government  to  constrain 
sectional  or  class  legislation,  though  contrary  to  the 
stipulations  of  existing  treaties.  This  arbitrary  in- 
difference to  international  obligations,  and  their  in- 
creasing violation  by  sections  and  classes,  cannot 
be  attributed  to  ignorance.  The  unlettered  savage, 
hidden  away  amid  the  wild  thickets  of  the  world, 
has  been  known  to  keep  his  unrecorded  obligations 
inviolate  from  generation  to  generation.  There 



were  no  laws  to  bind  him  but  the  law  of  the  torrent 
before  his  wigwam,  the  law  of  the  winds  overhead, 
the  law  of  the  illimitable  forests  about  him;  yet 
out  of  this  he  evolved  the  very  spirit  of  human 
obligation  that  this  great  Republic  is  coming  to 
know  not  of.  Its  disregard  for  such  pacts  is  not 
only  increasing,  but  its  violations  are,  in  many 
instances,  unworthy  of  the  nation's  potential  great- 

The  violation  of  treaties,  and  the  increasing  in- 
capacity to  maintain  friendly  relationship  with  for- 
eign countries,  have  their  origin  in  the  popular  con- 
trol of  the  national  government:  (i)  by  the  political 
power  of  sections  and  classes  •  (2)  by  the  subordina- 
tion of  legislators  to  the  will  of  these  sections  and 
classes,  or  to  such  corporate  interests  as  may  control 
their  election.  As  foreign  nations  are  without  votes 
or  lobbyists,  their  demands  are  of  little  or  no  im- 
portance to  the  average  politician.  This  subser- 
viency of  politicians  to  the  will  of  their  constituencies 
makes  possible  anti-foreign  legislation.  Yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  this  subserviency  is  a  natural  but  un- 
reasonable outgrowth  of  governmental  control  by 
the  populace,  and  as  it  is  augmented  the  subser- 
viency of  politicians  will  increase,  and  will  be  followed 
by  a  concomitant  increase  in  legislative  acts  orig- 
inating in  prejudice  and  arrogance  or  utter  con- 
tempt for  the  rights  of  other  nationalities. 

The  intelligence  of  a  national  legislator  or  ne- 
gotiator in  a  nation  controlled  by  the  populace 


cannot,  in  the  execution  of  his  duties,  rise  above 
the  average  intelligence  of  his  constituents.  If  it 
does,  he  is  in  conflict  with  them,  and  the  tenure  of 
his  office  is  at  an  end.  It  is  useless  for  a  politician 
to  possess,  in  such  a  nation,  superior  intelligence, 
for  he  can  make  use  of  it  only  to  the  degree  that 
his  constituency  can  comprehend.  By  this  fact  it 
is  possible  to  account  for  the  mediocrity  of  the 
average  American  politician  and  the  refusal  of  the 
more  intelligent  citizens  to  enter  into  the  conduct 
of  the  affairs  of  the  Republic. 

When  diplomacy  is  unable  to  settle  such  differ- 
ences as  continually  arise  among  nations,  their  set- 
tlement is  relegated  to  the  sphere  of  physical  might. 
Whatever  lessens  the  efficiency  of  diplomatic  action 
increases  the  probabilities  of  war.  And  whenever 
there  exists  constitutional  restriction  on  the  freedom 
of  diplomatic  action,  as  is  the  case  in  a  government 
by  the  populace,  the  possibilities  of  war  are  increased 
accordingly.  It  is  only  by  just  and  comprehensive 
recognition  of  this  weakness,  and  a  corresponding  in- 
crease in  the  armament  and  military  efficiency  of 
the  nation,  that  the  probabilities  of  war  can  be 

In  a  government  where  the  spoils  of  office  belong 
to  the  political  victor,  the  consular  service  has  been 
relegated  to  awarding  the  cheaper  class  of  politi- 
cians for  their  past  services.  This  policy  of  placing 
transitory  ignorance  in  positions  where  wide  range 
of  knowledge  and  long  training  is  necessary  will 



become  more  apparent  as  the  world  grows  smaller 
and  the  Republic's  relationship  to  foreign  countries 
becomes  more  intimate  and  complex.  As  the  in- 
ternal growth  of  all  nations  forces  them  to  external 
expansion,  and  their  national  needs  and  ambitions 
come  in  vital  conflict  with  those  of  the  United 
States,  the  dangers  of  international  war — as  pre- 
cipitated by  the  ignorance  of  the  politician  diplomat 
— become  apparent. 

As  the  difficulties  of  settling  international  con- 
troversies increase  with  the  augmentation  of  ne- 
gotiators and  interests  involved,  the  inability  of  the 
negotiators  is  increased  in  proportion  to  the  in- 
terest the  people  take  in  the  controversy.  If  this 
is  very  great,  and  moves  the  passions  of  the  popu- 
lace, then  the  individual  intelligence  of  the  ne- 
gotiators, or  their  superior  knowledge  of  the  facts, 
or  their  higher  sense  of  justice  will  avail  them  not 
at  all.  They  become  subservient  to  the  populace 
as  soon  as  its  angers  begin  to  brood  sullenly  over 
the  land.  Whatever  intelligence  and  capacity  the 
negotiators  may  personally  possess,  they  are  sub- 
ordinate to  the  prejudices  and  hate  of  the  mob- 
mind.  Consequently,  in  the  adjustment  of  inter- 
national controversies,  wisdom  may  be  opposed 
by  arrogance,  justice  by  prejudice  to  the  extent 
that  should  the  negotiators,  representing  a  govern- 
ment of  the  populace,  grant  the  just  claims  of  the 
other  nations,  or  yield  even  the  extreme  demands 
of  their  own  country,  they  will  be  bitterly  arraigned 



by  the  masses  that  have  made  no  effort  to  under- 
stand the  true  merits  of  the  controversy  or  to  con- 
sider any  arguments  except  their  own. 

The  diplomatic  history  of  this  Republic  shows 
the  fixed  indisposition  of  the  masses  to  view  foreign 
relations  except  in  subordination  to  their  own 
sectional  or  class  interests;  hence  the  difficulty  of 
a  republic,  in  moments  of  stress,  adjusting  peace- 
ably international  disputes  when  they  affect  the 
vital  interests  or  passions  of  the  masses. 




"Regular  troops  alone  are  equal  to  the  exigences 
of  modern  war,  as  well  for  defence  as  offence,  and 
when  a  substitute  is  attempted  it  must  prove  illusory 
and  ruinous.  No  militia  will  ever  acquire  the  habits 
necessary  to  resist  a  regular  force.  .  .  .  The  firmness 
requisite  for  the  real  business  of  fighting  is  only  to 
be  attained  by  a  constant  course  of  discipline  and 
service.  I  have  never  yet  been  witness  to  a  single 
instance  that  can  justify  a  different  opinion,  and  it 
is  most  earnestly  to  be  wished  that  the  liberties  of 
America  may  no  longer  be  trusted,  in  any  material 
degree,  to  so  precarious  a  dependence" 


WE  now  pass,  in  this  portion  of  our  work,  from 
the  exposition  of  conditions  to  the  demon- 
stration of  them,  to  the  facts  and  bitterness  of 
which  they  are  made.  We  pass  from  the  contem- 
plation of  war  to  the  combat  itself. 

The  battlefield — that  old  and  harrowed  field — 
whereon  this  Republic  has  so  often  labored,  and  is 
destined  yet  through  undetermined  time  to  furrow, 
we  have  heretofore  regarded  from  those  high  places 
where  life  is  viewed,  not  in  its  drift  and  struggle  of 
particles,  but  in  the  aggregate,  as  a  river  is  perceived 
from  a  mountain-top. 

We  are  now,  however,  about  to  transfer  to  the  ac- 
tivities of  actual  war  the  conditions  we  have  consid- 
ered and  the  principles  we  have  enunciated,  in  order  to 
determine  whether  or  not  our  deductions  have  been  er- 
roneous and  our  ideas  speculative,  nebulous  and  vain. 

What  has  been  written  we  realize  does  not  readily 
find  agreement.  The  average  citizen  holds — and 
fast  onto  them  —  quite  the  opposite  beliefs.  His 
opinions,  being  not  other  than  human,  are  not  im- 
partial. In  proportion  as  facts  or  errors  have  been 
pleasing  to  him  have  they  secured  firm  and  unmo- 
lested lodgment  in  his  mind.  None  are  free  from  this 



unfortunate  credulity,  and  it  is  only  by  great  effort 
that  man  can  become  incredulous  to  soothing  fancies 
and  believe  in  the  truth  of  that  which  is  painful. 

We  also  became  conscious  of  the  fact,  after  writ- 
ing the  first  portion  of  this  work,  that  while  the 
truth  of  it  could  not  be  gainsaid,  the  good  we  hoped 
it  might  do  was  liable  to  be  nullified  by  that  nega- 
tive form  of  unbelief  so  inherent  in  the  nature  of 
man — his  reliance  on  chance.  Nations,  as  indi- 
viduals, lay  on  the  red  or  black,  and,  with  the  old, 
old  credulity  of  luck,  await  serenely  the  shuffling  of 
the  thumbed  and  fateful  pack. 

While  the  past  of  this  Republic  may  appear  to 
have  been  under  the  ever-watchful  and  unwinking 
eye  of  Fortune,  investigation  shows  us  that  the  most 
ordinary,  and  by  no  means  unnatural,  conditions 
have  been  responsible  for  its  welfare.  And  while 
we  would  not  say  that  Fortune  has  deserted  this 
great  Tower  of  Babel,  yet  another  god  hath  spoken — 
the  old  and  material  god  that  takes  no  note  of  the 
dust  towers  builded  to-day;  on  the  morrow  pulled 
down  and — laughed  at. 

While  the  probabilities  of  an  international  war 
at  the  present  time  tend  more  to  a  struggle  with 
Japan  than  any  other  country,  the  chances  of  war 
are  equally  possible  with  other  powers,  and  are 
existent  in  a  modified  form  with  still  other  nations. 
At  any  time  an  unforeseen  incident,  affecting  the  pre- 
cipitating causes  of  war,  may  again  transfer  the  imme- 
diate zone  of  danger  from  the  Pacific  to  the  Atlantic. 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

The  political  responsibilities  that  this  Republic 
has  so  unconcernedly  assumed  in  establishing  its 
suzerainty  over  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  a 
tentative  dominion  over  the  Pacific  are  so  vast  and 
so  intimately  affect  the  nations  of  the  world  in  their 
struggle  for  the  potentialities  of  power  that  it  is 
impossible  to  foretell  whence  shall  come  not  alone 
alarums  of  war,  but  war  itself.  The  smoke  of  un- 
numbered arsenals  now  hangs  heavily  on  the  four 
horizons  of  this  nation,  and  the  clangor  of  strange 
anvils  enters  even  into  the  very  heart  of  it. 

In  a  war  with  Japan,  the  conflict  itself  and  the 
results  ensuing  from  such  a  struggle,  we  but  ex- 
emplify what  will  happen,  different  only  in  time 
and  place,  when  this  Republic  undertakes  to  stop 
the  expansion  of  European  and  Asian  empires,  and 
attempts,  without  adequate  naval  and  military 
power,  to  preserve  intact  to  itself  the  Pacific  and 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  calling  halt  to  the  migra- 
tion of  kingdoms  and  that  hunger-trek  made  from 
time  to  time  by  the  races  of  man. 

Japan  must  overcome  difficulties  such  as  would 
not  exist  in  a  war  with  Germany  or  other  European 
powers.  From  Hamburg  to  the  Atlantic  coast  is 
six  days;  from  Japan  to  California,  seventeen.  But 
when  Germany  lands  her  forces  on  the  Atlantic 
coast  they  are  within  a  few  days'  march  of  the 
political  and  financial  centres  of  the  Republic,  while 
Japan  is  removed  by  immeasurable  distance  from 
them.  By  these  means  we  give  to  the  United 


States  military  advantages  that  would  be  impos- 
sible in  a  war  with  such  a  power  as  Germany;  so 
that  we  are  exaggerating,  not  the  capacity  of  Japan 
to  make  war,  but  the  capacity  of  the  United  States 
to  defend  itself.  If  the  probabilities  of  victory 
should  rest  with  the  Asian  kingdom,  it  will  be  under- 
stood how  ineffectual  would  be  the  efforts  of  this 
Republic  against  a  European  power. 

A  war  with  Japan  demonstrates  the  truth  of  the 
statement  that  no  one  can  foretell  from  age  to  age, 
or  even  from  decade  to  decade,  in  what  quarter  of 
the  world  will  rise  up  a  great  military  nation.  This 
Minerva  birth  of  militant  power  has  always  been 
to  mankind  an  enigma,  a  dread,  but  never  as  yet  a 
lesson.  By  these  things  he  never  profits.  He  for- 
gets when  he  should  remember,  and  scorns  where 
he  should  inquire.  So  from  time  to  time  do  war- 
ring, conquering  tribes  burst  upon  the  incredulous 
world;  sometimes  from  rocky  places;  sometimes 
out  of  wreckage;  down  from  the  alcoves  of  God, 
or  up  from  abysses,  they  thunder  and  destroy. 

So  it  has  come  about  that  on  islands,  beautiful  in 
their  poverty,  terrible  in  their  serenity,  brews  and  rum- 
bles another  such  tempest  as  has  heretofore  swept  over 
the  abodes  of  kingdoms  that  have  thought  naught  of 

To  the  over-industrial  development  of  the  United 
States  we  have  the  corresponding  political  growth 
of  Japan;  to  the  under-political  development  of  the 
Republic,  there  is  to  be  found  in  Japan  a  production 



of  wealth  unequal  to  its  political  growth.  The 
quotient  of  this  equation  has  been,  throughout  the 
entire  career  of  the  human  race,  war. 

The  American  people,  and  not  Japan,  are  respon- 
sible for  this  approaching  conflict.  In  sacrificing 
the  national  ideal  to  that  of  the  individual  the  ex- 
pansion of  this  nation  has  been  determined  by  his 
wants.  All  national  growth,  following  in  the  wake 
of  individual  desires,  has  been  industrial,  while  po- 
litical development,  together  with  its  concomitant 
military  and  naval  expansion,  has  been  relegated 
to  secondary  consideration.  Man  becoming  para- 
mount over  the  nation,  legislation  has,  accordingly, 
been  directed  to  the  end  most  advantageous  to  his 
personal  interests,  while  that  of  the  nation,  per  se, 
in  its  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  has  been  re- 
garded as  of  minor  importance.  Man,  his  welfare 
and  ambitions,  taking  precedence  over  that  of  the 
Republic,  has  caused  the  national  legislature  to 
occupy  itself  with  internal  and  petty  plunderings, 
sectional  and  class  legislation.  The  true  significance 
of  the  Republic's  position  in  the  world  has  been  put 
aside.  It  is  this  neglect  that  invites  war  and  turns 
into  loot  the  nation's  treasure,  the  high  spires  of  its 
gods,  and  the  spangled  panoply  of  its  greatness. 

Due  to  science  and  invention,  international  re- 
lationship, heretofore  existent,  has  been  completely 
revolutionized,  and  those  lands  and  nations  once 
without  the  sphere  of  conquest  are  wholly  within  it. 
Conquest,  moreover,  has  ceased  to  be  an  imperial 

THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

progress  wherein  monarchs  were  wont  to  display 
their  greatness  and  crime  and  generosity.  It  has 
now  become  the  conquest  of  peoples  to  gain  such 
means  of  wealth  as  are  yet  unlooted  in  the  vaults 
of  nature.  In  this  conquest  there  is  little  glory; 
nay,  naught  is  displayed  but  relentless,  nightless 
theft  to  appease,  not  the  vanity  of  kings,  but  the 
hunger  of  multitudes. 

The  under-political  development  of  China,  and 
her  failure  to  comprehend  the  revolution  that 
modern  science  brought  into  international  affairs 
within  the  last  two  decades,  has  laid  open  the  em- 
pire to  dismemberment.  And  when  it  is  said  that 
the  realization  of  this  change  is  scarcely  better  com- 
prehended by  the  populace  of  the  United  States 
than  by  the  people  of  China,  it  is  stating  only  one 
of  those  melancholy  truisms  that  have  been  uttered 
heretofore  by  American  statesmen. 

Vessels  crossing  the  Atlantic  in  four  and  a  half 
days,  carrying  several  thousand  persons  and  some 
thirty  thousand  tons  of  freight,  are  regarded  only 
in  an  economic  aspect,  whereas  the  political  and 
military  significance  is  so  infinitely  greater  that  na- 
tions will  vanish  or  grow  great  because  of  it.  The 
Western  Hemisphere  has  in  this  manner  alone  been 
brought  within  the  demesne  of  Europe,  while  their 
armies  of  millions  are  now  closer  to  the  city  of 
Washington  than  are  the  small  and  scattered  forces 
of  the  United  States. 

The  error  of  the  subordination  of  national  great- 

ness  to  the  material  gains  of  the  individual,  con- 
comitant with  the  assumption  of  world-wide  power, 
with  all  the  dangers  and  disasters  it  involves,  has 
already  been  made  clear.  Now  we  are  brought  face 
to  face  with  the  actualities  of  a  great  war,  in  a  study 
of  which  will  be  shown  the  logical  consummation  of 
this  Republic's  neglect. 

In  the  consideration  of  a  war  between  Japan  and 
the  United  States  we  will  make  no  assumptions,  but 
will  deal  only  with  actualities.  Moreover,  we  will 
not  arbitrarily  assume  that  this  war  will  take  place, 
but  will,  on  the  other  hand,  examine  carefully  into 
the  chances  of  peace  and  weigh  them  against  the 
probabilities  of  war.  Likewise,  before  entering 
upon  the  study  of  the  war  itself,  we  will  examine 
into  its  precipitating  causes  as  well  as  its  primordial 
sources,  the  armaments  of  the  two  nations,  and  their 
military  potentiality.  To  chance,  to  patriotism, 
to  prejudice,  to  hope,  we  leave  nothing.  Upon  the 
airy  tapestry  of  our  desires  we  weave  no  bright 
threads  to  fade  as  they  are  woven. 

We  have  written  this  work  with  a  full  knowledge 
of  its  bitterness.  But  we  have  done  so  because  the 
time  is  now  at  hand  when  this  nation  must  emerge 
from  its  policy  of  subterfuge.  The  national  evasion 
of  this  Republic's  international  responsibilities  must 
cease,  as  its  isolation  ceased  when  science  winged 
the  larvae  of  man. 


THERE  are  certain  conditions  that  tend  to  the 
preservation  of  peace,  just  as  there  are  other 
phases  of  national  life  productive  of  war.  While 
the  sources  and  causes  of  international  conflicts 
might  belong  to  conditions  both  basic  and  necessary 
for  the  future  development  and  existence  of  nations, 
yet  there  may  be  peace  factors  that  more  than 
counterbalance  the  provocations  to  war.  Condi- 
tions that  prevent  war,  while  numerous  and  pe- 
culiar to  each  combination  of  combatants,  can  be 
determined  more  or  less  accurately,  and  their  poten- 
tiality measured  against  that  of  the  causes  of  inter- 
national conflict. 

In  a  general  sense,  wars  between  nations  are  de- 
termined by  certain  principles  already  considered 
in  the  first  part  of  this  work.1  In  some  instances, 
however,  conditions  demanding  peace  intervene. 
These  peace  factors  have  a  relative  value  to  the 
causes  of  war,  and  their  potentiality  must  be  con- 
sidered in  two  more  or  less  distinct  phases:  first, 
the  possibility  of  the  prevention  of  war;  second,  the 

1  See  Book  I,  chap,  vii,  pp.  79-81. 

THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

probability  of  postponing  the  struggle  to  some  in- 
definite period  in  the  future. 

Conditions  potential  enough  to  prevent  war  be- 
tween two  racially  different  nations,  as  Japan  and 
the  United  States,  can  only  exist  when  the  causes 
of  war,  in  either  nation,  are  less  imperative  than  the 
necessities  of  peace.  Nations  do  not  plunge  into 
warfare  without  some  comprehension  of  the  possi- 
bilities of  victory  as  weighed  against,  not  only  the 
disasters  to  be  endured  through  defeat,  but  such 
losses  as  are  incurred  on  account  of  the  war  per  se. 

We  have  shown  that  wars  between  great  nations 
are  resultant,  not  of  passions,  but  of  economic  or 
political  convergence.  Man  may,  by  his  passions, 
increase,  or  by  forbearance  decrease  this  conver- 
gence, but  he  cannot  do  away  with  war. 

Before  taking  up  the  causes  of  war  that  now  or 
in  the  future  may  exist  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States,  we  will  consider  whether  or  not  the 
necessities  and  tendencies  for  peace  between  these 
two  powers  are  great  or  insignificant,  and  whether 
conditions  that  make  for  peace  predominate  over 
those  that  tend  to  war. 

Two  general  phases  of  international  relationship 
may  exist  between  nations  so  as  to  modify  hostile 
competition  and  lessen  the  probabilities  of  war. 

(1)  Racial  relationship,  with  concomitant  similari- 
ties in  religion,  ethical  and  sociological  conditions. 

(2)  Economic  interdependence. 

Racially,    there   exists   no   relationship   between 


the  people  of  Japan  and  of  the  United  States.  And 
the  perverse  reluctance  of  man  to  forget  his  own 
tribal  gods  and  fetiches  postpones  to  such  a  remote 
time  the  assimilation  of  these  two  nations  that  it 
cannot  now  be  considered.  The  ethical  and  sociolog- 
ical conditions  extant  in  Japan,  while  antithetic  to 
those  existent  in  the  United  States,  are  nevertheless 
the  product  of  two  thousand  years  of  Japanese 
development .  To  remake  the  Japanese  racial  charac- 
ter in  order  to  conform  with  that  of  the  Occident 
would  require,  even  were  it  possible,  a  longer  period 
of  time  than  we  can  conceive.  Such  a  racial  change 
in  Japan  can  no  more  take  place  than  could  the  West 
alter  its  civilization  to  conform  with  that  of  the 
Orient.  Both  civilizations  will,  in  due  time,  by 
natural  but  slow  process,  become  so  modified  that 
it  will  be  difficult  to  distinguish  the  outward  forms 
of  one  from  the  other;  but  racial  distinctions  and 
antipathies  will  continue  to  remain  even  unto  an 
unknown  time. 

A  great  race  is  like  a  rock  in  the  wash  of  the  sea, 
whereon,  as  birds  of  passage,  transient  civilizations 
momentarily  pause  in  their  flight  ere  they  go  on 
down  into  the  dim  twilight  of  a  departed  day.  It 
is  only  the  Undefined  Sea,  or  the  storms  that  come 
out  of  it,  that  batter,  incrustate,  erode,  festoon, 
then  swallow  up  this  race-rock  that  seems  in  the 
eye  of  man  made  to  endure  forever. 

No  national  ideals  could  be  more  antithetic  than 
are  the  ethical  and  civic  ideals  of  Japan  to  those 



existent  in  this  Republic.  One  nation  is  a  militant 
paternalism,  where  aught  that  belongs  to  man  is 
first  for  the  use  of  the  state;  the  other  an  individ- 
ualistic emporium  where  aught  that  belongs  to  man 
is  for  sale.  In  one  is  the  complete  subordination 
of  the  individual,  in  the  other  his  supremacy. 

When  national  religions  differ,  racial  difference 
creates  antagonism.  Thus  the  Japanese,  with  their 
sword-girded  gods  and  militant  bonzes,  are  heathen 
in  the  eyes  of  this  Republic,  heathen  in  all  the  con- 
temptuous, naked  inferiority  that  that  term  in  a 
Christian  nation  implies.  This  feeling  will  never 
decrease  except  with  the  deterioration  of  Christian- 
ity, since  such  a  decadence  is,  as  far  as  the  Japanese 
are  concerned,  more  probable  than  the  Christiani- 
zation  of  their  country. 

The  ethical,  sociological,  or  religious  conditions 
as  existent  in  Japan  and  this  Republic  have  noth- 
ing in  common,  nor  are  their  ways  convergent  or 
even  parallel.  Neither  now  nor  at  any  time  in  the 
distant  future  will  these  nations  coalesce  to  the 
extent  that  the  sociological  or  religious  phases  of 
their  national  life  will  have  a  deterrent  effect  on 
war,  or  will  alter  in  any  way,  other  than  to  accent- 
uate their  racial  ambitions,  their  perverse  activities, 
their  hates  and  their  cries. 

The  only  conditions  that  may  have  the  power  of 
preserving  peace  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  or  at  least  retarding  hostilities,  are  to  be 
found  in  the  political  relationship  that  these  two 



nations  bear  to  the  world,  and  the  economic  inter- 
dependence they  have  with  each  other. 

Political  conditions  that  have,  in  an  international 
sense,  a  restraining  influence  upon  the  ambitions 
of  a  nation,  and  are  instrumental  in  the  prevention 
of  war,  are  determined  by  the  effect  that  such  a 
war  would  have  on  these  interests. 

In  a  struggle  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States  for  the  supremacy  of  the  Pacific,  all  nations 
have  more  or  less  interest  in  the  outcome,  but  the 
interests  of  Japan  and  this  Republic  are  so  para- 
mount that  the  aggregate  interests  of  the  remainder 
of  the  world  are  less  than  the  interests  of  these  two 
nations.  This  condition  of  affairs  has  been  brought 
about  by  Japan  on  three  momentous  occasions : 

(1)  The  elimination  of  China  as  a  Pacific  power 
by  the  war  of  1894. 

(2)  The    elimination    of    Russia    as    a    possible 
Pacific  power  by  the  war  of  1904. 

(3)  The   elimination  of  Great   Britain  and   the 
balance  of  Europe  by  the  ten-year  Offensive  and 
Defensive  Alliance  of  1905. 

The  interests  of  European  nations  in  the  Pacific 
are  only  tentative.  Conditions  that  are  vital  to 
their  welfare  are  in  Europe,  or  in  those  continents 
upon  whose  shores  the  same  sea  breaks. 

The  centralization  of  power  in  the  Pacific  is  im- 
possible to  any  nation  other  than  China,  Japan  or 
the  United  States,  since  such  power  would  be  with- 
out and  far  removed  from  the  geographical,  political, 



and  military  interests  of  any  nation  other  than  these 
three.  But  China,  while  geographically  a  Pacific 
empire,  cannot  be  taken  into  consideration  as  a 
possible  claimant  for  suzerainty  over  the  Pacific, 
not  only  on  account  of  her  defeat  by  Japan,  but 
because  of  the  weakness  and  decentralization  of  the 
present  system  of  government. 

At  present,  and  for  some  time  to  come,  there  are 
only  two  powers,  Japan  and  this  Republic,  that 
can,  with  geographical  and  political  conditions 
favorable,  enter  into  a  war  for  the  supremacy  of  the 
Pacific.  Japan's  interest  and  inherent  advantage 
in  this  struggle  is  due  to  the  fact  that  her  entire 
empire  is  not  only  in  this  ocean,  but  in  the  strategic 
centre  of  it.1 

A  second  political  condition  that  oftentimes  re- 
strains nations  from  entering  into  international  war 
is  when  the  strength  of  hostile  states,  on  more  than 
one  frontier,  exceeds  the  quotient  of  military  power 
remaining  from  such  forces  as  are  necessary  to  suc- 
cessfully prosecute  a  war  determined  upon.  If 
Japan  became  involved  in  war  with  the  United 
States  to  the  extent  that  her  entire  naval  and  mili- 
tary forces  were  engaged,  what  would  prevent 
Russia  or  China,  or  both  in  coalition,  from  attempt- 
ing to  recover  their  kingdoms  lost,  and  their  pres- 
tige— now  so  small  in  the  eyes  of  the  world? 

It  was  the  realization  of  this  fact  that  led  Japan- 

1  See  Chart  I. 


ese  statesmen,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Russian  War, 
to  enter  into  an  Offensive  and  Defensive  Alliance 
with  the  greatest  of  world  powers  for  a  period  of 
ten  years.1  By  this  alliance  the  undefended  fron- 
tiers of  Japan  in  northern  Asia  are  without  danger 
of  attack.  She  is  free  to  divert  her  entire  military 
forces  upon  any  war  that  she  may  deem  necessary 
to  her  especial  interests  and  security.  By  the  terms 
of  this  treaty,  war-coalitions  are  impossible  on  the 
part  of  this  Republic  without  forcing  Great  Britain 
into  the  field  as  Japan's  ally. 

Politically  there  are  no  conditions  that  can  restrain 
Japan  from  entering  into  war  with  this  nation. 
Strong  in  faith  and  in  the  Red  Sun  of  her  destiny, 
Japan  began  more  than  two  decades  ago  her  pre- 
determined march  to  the  Empire  of  the  Pacific.  One 
nation  after  another,  by  one  means  and  another,  she 
has  removed  them  from  her  way.  Nothing  now  re- 
mains but  the  overthrow  of  this  Republic's  power 
in  the  Pacific — and  nothing,  as  far  as  political  re- 
strictions are  concerned,  prevents  her  from  entering 
upon  this  conquest:  a  war  that  shall  bring  greater 
glory  to  her  samurai  than  they  have  gained  here- 
tofore, and  new  satrapies,  more  vast  than  any  now 
within  her  realm,  shall  be  given  over  to  her  princes 
and  daimios. 

There  remains  to  be  considered  but  one  phase  of 
international  relationship  that  has  within  itself  the 

1  Appendix,  Table  I. 


possibilities  of  preventing  war,  or  at  least  prolonging 
the  present  period  of  peace:  the  economic  inter- 
dependence of  these  two  nations  and  their  freedom 
from  commercial  competition  in  markets  common  to 

The  belief  most  often  expressed  in  this  Republic 
concerning  the  impossibility  of  war  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States  is  based  on  a  fanciful  and 
erroneous  conception  of  the  economic  interdepend- 
ency  of  these  two  nations.  This  belief  has  come 
about  through  a  misconception  on  the  part  of  the 
public  as  to  the  real  significance  of  international 
trade  and  the  laws  that  govern  it.  Because  of  this 
misconception  commercialism  has  taken  unto  itself 
the  habiliments  of  uncrowned  monarchy — a  power 
that  would  scowl  down  from  the  alcove  of  kings. 

In  considering  the  supremacy  of  trade  over  in- 
ternational relationship,  and  especially  its  dominion 
over  the  destinies  of  Japan  and  the  United  States,  we 
will  do  so  by  an  examination  into  a  paper  on  this 
subject  by  Baron  Kaneko,  a  Privy-Councillor  to  the 
Emperor  of  Japan.1 

This  paper,  by  such  an  eminent  economist,  en- 
deavoring to  show  that  the  economic  interdepend- 
ency  of  Japan  and  this  Republic  is  such  as  to  pro- 
hibit the  possibility  of  war,  contains  most  of  the 
arguments  devoted  to  the  exposition  of  this  belief. 
Hence,  we  feel  that  a  consideration  of  Baron  Ka- 

1  North  American  Review,  March,  1907. 


neko's  statements  will  tend  to  show  clearly  the 
wisdom  or  deception  of  such  ideas. 

Baron  Kaneko  lays  down  the  hypothesis  that  the 
American  people  are  so  dependent  upon  Japanese 
goods,  and  the  Japanese  so  dependent  upon  Ameri- 
can merchandise,  that  war  is  impossible,  since  both 
nations,  being  deprived  of  these  necessaries  of  life, 
will  come  to  a  plainly  foreseen  and  miserable 

This  premise  is  not  original  with  Baron  Kaneko. 
Writing  on  this  subject  for  an  American  magazine, 
he  has  only  endeavored  to  exemplify  the  argu- 
ments of  American  economists  and  calculators. 
Were  we  not  convinced  of  his  sincerity,  we  might 
have  been  led  to  believe  that,  as  he  assembled  these 
arguments  together,  he  viewed  them  with  that 
sarcastic  nonchalance  that  has  within  itself  a  signifi- 
cance entirely  its  own. 

"So  I  can  fairly  state,"  continues  the  Baron,  with 
that  complacency  peculiarly  characteristic  of  econo- 
mists, "that  no  lady  in  the  United  States  can  get  a 
silk  dress  if  we  stop  the  export  of  silk  to  that  coun- 
try, and  that  the  average  American  citizen  cannot 
drink  tea  if  our  tea  is  excluded  from  America.  So 
much  for  the  dependence  of  the  American  people 
on  Japanese  products." 

This  remarkable  statement  is  followed  by  a  list 
of  American  commodities  consumed  in  Japan,  viz., 
flour,  cotton,  tobacco,  and  petroleum.  He  concludes 
the  list  with  the  enunciation  of  the  startling  formula 



that  "the  Japanese  cannot  live  a  single  hour  without 
American  supplies." 

In  order  to  show  to  what  degree  these  conclusions 
are  erroneous,  we  need  but  to  examine  one  of  them, 
since  all  are  based  on  the  same  hypothesis. 

In  modern  wars,  the  interchange  of  commodities 
still  remains  governed  by  the  law  of  supply  and  de- 
mand, much  in  the  same  manner  as  in  peace,  owing 
to  the  diversity  of  trade  routes  and  complexity  of 
international  exchange.  This  condition  of  affairs 
is  only  affected  by  the  destruction  of  the  means  of 
production  or  the  relative  impoverishment  of  the 
consumers  or  the  naval  command  of  the  routes  of 
trade  emanating  from  the  exporting  country. 

Nations  do  not  stop  their  own  exports  in  the  time 
of  war,  as  Baron  Kaneko  would  lead  us  to  believe. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  essentially  a  part  of  national 
endeavor  to  protect  by  every  means  possible  their 
avenues  of  trade.  If  Japanese  silks  were  not  ex- 
ported from  Japan  during  a  conflict,  it  would  not  be 
through  their  decrees. 

If,  in  a  war  between  these  two  nations,  the  trans- 
Pacific  commerce  did,  temporarily,  cease  to  exist 
and  at  the  same  time  there  continued,  in  both  na- 
tions, a  demand  for  their  respective  commodities, 
the  interchange  would  go  on  as  before,  differing  only 
in  the  route  and  means  of  transference.  Neutral 
vessels  via  the  Suez  would  continue  the  trade  tem- 
porarily lost  to  the  Pacific.  This  would  modify  the 
interchange  of  Japanese  and  American  goods  only 



in  time  and  expense  of  transshipment  in  European 
ports.  Whatever  this  additional  cost  of  transpor- 
tation might  be,  it  would  only  be  equivalent  to  a 
raise  in  price  of  the  merchandise,  affecting  the  con- 
sumers in  the  manner  of  an  ad  valorem  tariff,  but 
would  make  little  or  no  difference  to  the  government 
or  people  of  either  nation. 

Japanese  tea  or  silk  is  not  so  essential  to  America 
that  without  them  the  Americans  can  have  neither 
tea  nor  silks.  The  relative  value  of  these  com- 
modities that  Japan  annually  exports  to  the  United 
States  is,  to  the  world's  total  production  of  silk  or 
tea,  so  insignificant  that  the  entire  failure  of  the 
Japanese  product  would  make  but  little  difference 
to  the  consumers  of  such  articles  in  the  United 

The  merchandise  of  individual  and  national  con- 
sumption has,  in  these  modern  times,  become  so 
general  to  the  whole  of  mankind  that  the  world 
has  become  one  vast  emporium,  and  what  in  the 
time  of  war  cannot  be  gotten  directly  from  a  nation 
can  be  secured  indirectly  through  transshipments 
and  devious  routes  of  neutral  trade.  The  delusion 
that  the  inter-commerce  relationship  between  two 
nations  is  destroyed  by  war,  and  that  economic  inter- 
dependence is  such  that  it  prohibits  war,  should  be 
put  aside  in  the  same  manner  as  mankind  has  here- 
tofore laid  away  some  of  his  most  cherished  notions. 

Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  is  no  more  dependent 
upon  American  products  than  is  this  Republic  de- 



pendent  on  Japanese  tea  and  silks.  So  long  as 
Japan  controls  the  trade  routes  to  Europe,  her  im- 
ports will  differ  from  what  they  are  now  only  as 
the  demands  of  her  people  for  these  commodities 
increase  or  decrease.  Whatever  American  commod- 
ities Japan  needs  she  will  get  in  war  as  in  peace. 

It  will  be  shown  later  on  that  the  United  States 
can  never,  under  its  present  system  of  military  and 
naval  constraint,  have  any  appreciable  effect  on 
the  trade  routes  west  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 
Nor  can  any  nation,  except  by  blockade,  affect  trade 
on  neutral  bottoms.  Baron  Kaneko's  statement 
that  "the  Japanese  cannot  live  a  single  hour  with- 
out American  supplies"  is  no  more  true  than  his 
statement  that  "the  average  American  citizen  can- 
not drink  tea  if  Japanese  tea  is  excluded  from 

The  second  and  last  consideration  of  the  economic 
prevention  or  postponement  of  this  international 
conflict  is  the  freedom  from  commercial  competition 
in  markets  common  to  both  Japan  and  the  United 
States.  In  regard  to  this  phase  of  commercial  re- 
lationship existing  between  nations,  Baron  Kaneko 
observes :"....  In  the  twentieth  century  it  is  the 
increase  and  expansion  of  international  commerce 
that  guides  the  policy  of  nations.  .  .  .  All  nations 
are  looking  for  new  markets  for  their  industries, 
and  the  only  market  now  remaining  which  can  be 
exploited  with  benefit  is  the  continent  of  Asia." 

American  and  Japanese  partnership  in  the  ex- 


ploitation  of  the  Asian  continent  could  be  possible 
under  the  reverse  of  existent  conditions,  wherein 
the  opportunities  of  commercial  exploitation  in 
Asia  and  the  Pacific  were  less  than  the  interchange 
of  commodities  between  the  United  States  and  Japan. 
But  it  is  in  the  control  and  exploitation  of  those  vast 
empires  whose  swagging  godowns  burden  the  shores 
of  the  Pacific  that  are  to  be  found  the  riches  of  the 

"European  thought,  European  commerce,  and 
European  enterprise,  although  actually  gaining  in 
force,  and  European  connections,  although  becom- 
ing more  and  more  intimate,  will  nevertheless  rel- 
atively sink  in  importance  in  the  future,  while  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  its  shores,  its  islands,  and  adjacent 
territories  will  become  the  chief  theatre  of  human 
events  and  activities  in  the  world's  great  hereafter." 1 

Among  nations,  coalitions  in  a  military  sense  are 
possible,  since  such  combinations  are  brought  about 
by  governments,  but  in  the  struggle  for  commercial 
supremacy  there  can  be  no  such  alliances ;  this  war- 
fare is  the  endless  conflict  of  multitudinous  man, 
the  tribal  swarms  of  them  and  their  spawn. 

Neither  to  Japan  nor  to  the  United  States  is  the 
trade  now  going  on  between  them  worthy  of  con- 
servation. Their  efforts  are  directed  to  that  van- 
tage-point where  one  of  them  can  swing  the  nine- 
knotted  knout  and  drive  to  new  wants  nations 

1  William  H.  Seward. 


that  now  sit  on  their  heels  and  dream  in  the  endless 
Orient  dusk. 

Baron  Kaneko  states  that  the  United  States  and 
Japan  stand,  geographically,  in  the  most  advan- 
tageous position  to  garner  the  fruit  of  the  Pacific 
and  Asiatic  trade,  but  he  conceals  the  fact  that  they 
are  so  favorably  situated  that,  as  European  nations 
are  isolated  from  this  trade  dominion,  the  rivalry 
between  them  will  increase  proportionately  until 
the  commercial  struggle  for  supremacy  merges  im- 
perceptibly into  that  of  political  control,  based  on 
military  prowess.  It  would  be  difficult  to  find  in 
history  an  example  more  perfectly  exemplifying  the 
manner  in  which  the  struggle  for  commercial  su- 
premacy involves  the  competitors  in  warfare. 

In  the  national  fabric  of  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  in  their  international  and  human  relation- 
ship, conditions  potential  of  peace  are  not  to  be 
found.  In  their  racially  different  characters,  no 
harmonious  similarity  exists,  only  divergent  and  in- 
compatible ideals;  in  their  international  politics, 
no  restraining  influence  that  might,  at  least,  post- 
pone into  the  indefinite  future  the  probabilities  of 
war.  All  political  restraints  have  been  removed; 
one  after  another  pulled  down  and  thrown  aside  by 
the  relentless,  predetermined  policy  of  Japan.  In 
their  economic  relationship  conditions  that  might 
tend  to  the  prevention  of  wrar  not  only  do  not  exist, 
but  in  this  economic  struggle  is  to  be  found  the  near 
source  of  the  approaching  conflict. 
«  169 


IN  the  first  part  of  this  work  we   differentiated 
between     precipitating     causes    and    primordial 
sources  of  international  war.     We  will  now  con- 
sider them  relative  to  a  conflict  between  Japan  and 
the  United  States. 

While  the  sources  of  this  approaching  war  are  to 
be  found  in  the  expansion  and  imperial  ambitions 
of  Japan,  the  causes  of  it,  nevertheless,  have  their 
origin  in  the  acts  of  this  nation.  In  this  chapter, 
will  be  considered  these  causes,  originating  as  they 
do  in  this  Republic,  before  taking  up  the  sources  of 
the  struggle  belonging  to  the  destiny  of  Japan. 

It  has  heretofore  been  shown  that  international 
strife  results  from  a  natural  convergent  expansion 
of  two  or  more  nations,  bringing  about  in  due  time 
the  inevitable  contact  of  interests  that  culminates 
in  a  struggle  for  supremacy  of  one  over  the  other. 
These  angles  of  national  convergence  are  seldom 
equal,  as  in  the  approaching  war  for  the  command 
of  the  Pacific.  The  angle  of  Japan's  convergence 
is  as  much  more  acute  than  the  American  as  their 
interests  are  more  vital  in  the  struggle  for  possession 
of  this  vast  Empire  of  Waters. 



The  sources  of  war— as  in  this  case — are  existent 
for  many  decades  before  nations  are  cognizant  of 
them,  though  their  sullen  growl  falls,  from  time  to 
time,  ominously  upon  the  heedless  ear  of  their 
multitudes.  Twenty  years  ago  Japan  recognized  the 
inevitability  of  war  for  the  suzerainty  of  the  Pacific. 
It  was  this  prescience  that  caused  the  Mikado  five 
years  later  to  voice  solitarily  his  objections  to  the 
United  States  establishing  dominion  over  the  Ha- 
waiian Islands. 

Only  when  the  interests  of  these  two  nations  be- 
gan to  converge  did  the  probabilities  of  war  become 
apparent.  The  acuteness  of  the  angles  of  this  con- 
vergence was  increased:  first,  by  the  further  ac- 
quisition of  Pacific  possessions  by  this  Republic, 
thereby  endangering  not  only  Japan's  commercial 
hegemony  in  the  Orient,  but  her  opportunity  to 
become  the  Overlord  of  Asia;  secondly,  by  Japan's 
success  over  China  and  Russia,  with  their  consequent 
elimination  from  any  immediate  future  struggle  for 
power  in  the  Pacific. 

Since  the  Russian  War,  Japan  has  directed  her 
undivided  attention  to  that  conflict  which — should 
it  end  in  victory — will  give  half  the  world  over  to 
the  imperious  barony  of  her  daimios  and  samurai. 
Baron  Kaneko,  in  his  paper  heretofore  quoted,  notes 
these  ambitions  concerning  the  Pacific. 

"The  United  States,"  he  writes,  "occupies  almost 
two-thirds  of  the  whole  coast  of  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
while  the  remaining  one-third  is  held  by  Japan.  .  .  . 



Therefore,  these  two  nations  need  have  no  fear  of 
any  rival." 

In  actuality  this  Republic  does  not  possess  two- 
thirds  of  the  Pacific  littoral,  nor  Japan  the  remaining 
one-third.  Baron  Kaneko  does  not  consider  Brit- 
ish Columbia,  Mexico,  Central  and  South  America, 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  the  East  Indies,  Siam,  Co- 
chin China,  the  Chinese  Empire,  nor  Siberia:  these 
nations  have  no  right  of  sovereignty  in  the  Pacific 
if  the  United  States  possesses  a  military  and  naval 
command  of  two-thirds  of  it  and  Japan  the  other 

But  this  nation  does  not  undertake  the  military 
effort  necessary  to  carry  out  this  policy,  and  Japan, 
perceiving  its  indifference,  as  exemplified  in  the 
Pacific  defences,  the  complete  lack  of  an  army,  and 
the  division  of  the  naval  forces  into  two  widely 
separated  oceans,  has  gone  calmly  about  in  her 
preparations  for  that  war  which  will  make  the 
empire  sovereign  over  that  two -thirds  of  the 
Pacific  she  does  not  now  claim  to  possess. 

The  suddenness  with  which  the  precipitating 
causes  of  war  break  upon  public  consciousness  al- 
most invariably  hides  the  true  reasons  —  in  all 
probability  extant  many  years  prior — that  tend  to 
bring  on  the  conflict;  hence  it  happens — as  is  the 
case  with  this  Republic — that  nations  go  rushing 
blindly  along  acutely  converging  lines  to  that  point 
of  contact  —  which  is  war.  Whenever  a  nation 
fails  or  scorns  to  differentiate  between  the  sources 



and  causes  of  war,  it  enters  into  the  conflict  unpre- 
pared. But  those  nations  whose  affairs  of  state  are 
carried  on  by  men  fully  cognizant  of  the  difference 
between  the  trivial  and  the  immutable  are  not  only 
always  prepared  for  battle,  but  they  determine  the 
time  and  place  of  the  conflict;  which,  more  often  than 
otherwise,  is  an  assurance  of  success. 

Subsequent  to  her  victory  over  Russia,  Japan  laid 
upon  herself  that  labor,  burdened  with  immeasur- 
able grandeur,  of  encompassing  the  Pacific  and  be- 
coming the  Shogun  of  half  the  human  race.  Her 
preparations  for  war  prior  to  her  conflict  with  Russia 
were  insignificant  with  what  have  gone  on  subsequent 
to  that  war;  now  equalling  in  military  and  naval 
preparation  alone  over  one-half  the  entire  revenues 
of  the  empire. 

This  Republic  and  Japan  are  approaching,  careless 
on  the  one  hand  and  predetermined  on  the  other, 
that  point  of  contact  which  is  war. 

It  sometimes  happens  that  both  the  primordial 
sources  and  the  precipitating  causes  of  war  originate 
within  one  nation.  When  this  is  the  case,  that  na- 
tion must  bear  the  odium  of  preconceived,  if  not  in- 
excusable, conquest.  History  is  clangorous  with 
wars  of  this  kind.  But  at  the  present  time  the 
necessity  of  conquest,  affecting  in  varying  propor- 
tion all  great  nations,  has  brought  about  such  condi- 
tions that  conquest,  per  se,  cannot  be  entered  into. 
In  order  to  pursue  this  policy  there  has  been  in- 
troduced into  world  policies  an  era  of  subterfuge, 


an  Age  of  Preconceived  Provocative.  The  tenta- 
tive dismemberment  of  China  is  an  example  of  this. 

Japan,  to  establish  herself  in  the  sympathies  of 
the  world,  rather  than  incur  their  jealous  antago- 
nism by  bringing  on  a  war  that  has  for  its  ultimate 
object  the  sovereignty  of  the  Pacific,  must  shape 
her  affairs  so  that  the  precipitating  causes  of  the 
conflict  shall  originate  in  this  Republic.  These 
causes  do  exist,  and,  fortunately  for  Japan,  through 
no  agency  of  her  statesmen  nor  people;  because  of 
them  the  Hawk  of  her  Valor  shall  scream  and  dart 
over  seas  and  lands  now  unknown  to  it ;  new  guests 
shall  go  into  the  Spirit -Invoking  Temple  of  Sho- 
konsha,  and  the  prayers  of  a  nation  shall  find  their 
way  to  the  Sacred  Hillsides  of  Kudan. 

While  war  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 
originates,  and  primarily  belongs  to  the  natural  ex- 
pansion of  the  Japanese  Empire,  the  responsibility 
for  its  causes  will  fall  upon  this  nation,  by  violation 
of  those  rights,  privileges  and  immunities  hereto- 
fore granted  Japan  by  treaty  stipulations.  From 
this  relationship,  as  it  now  exists,  and  which  will 
remain  until  war  ensues,  we  have  in  these  two 
nations  antithetic  conditions  wherein  one  is  not 
only  the  corollary  of  the  other,  but  is  subservient 
and  controllable. 

Inasmuch  as  the  primordia^  sources  of  future  con- 
flict have  their  origin  in  Japan's  predetermined  in- 
tention to  become  supreme  in  the  Pacific,  her  prog- 
ress toward  warfare  is  orderly  and  her  preparations 


consistent.  Not  only  can  Japan  postpone  or  cause 
a  precipitation  of  hostilities,  according  to  the  im- 
perfection or  completion  of  her  preparations,  but 
she  can  select  her  successive  theatres  of  action,  as 
they  suit  her  general  plan  for  the  conduct  of  the 
war.  Every  move  is  planned,  every  emergency 
taken  into  consideration;  the  American  armament 
and  preparation,  or  lack  of  it,  are  in  all  its  phases 
tabulated ;  the  topography  of  the  country  surveyed, 
climatic  conditions  noted,  depths  of  streams,  heights 
of  mountains,  food  supplies,  means  of  transporta- 
tion and  subsistence  belonging  to  each  section  of 
possible  spheres  of  military  activity  have  been  care- 
fully investigated  and  preparations  made  accord- 
ingly. In  this  manner,  years  before  war  is  de- 
clared, the  most  insignificant  details  and  possibili- 
ties of  hypothetical  campaigns  and  battles  have 
been  so  worked  out,  and  all  exigencies  so  minutely 
taken  into  consideration,  that  the  war  itself,  when 
once  begun,  proceeds  with  invincible  orderliness  to 
a  predetermined  end. 

In  such  a  manner  Germany  overthrew  the  French 
Empire  in  less  than  two  months ;  while  the  irresisti- 
bleness  with  which  Japan  converged  her  widely- 
separated  armies  to  the  ultimate  defeat  of  Russia 
was  carried  on  by  plans  so  completely  prearranged 
that  in  the  entire  war  Russia  gained  not  a  single 

It  is  in  this  manner  that  Japan  prepares,  not  for 
war  with  this  nation,  but  for  victory  over  it.  In 


response  to  these  manifest  preparations  the  United 
States  has  done  nothing  other  than  go  on  denying 
the  possibilities  of  war,  while  it  continues  to  pile  up, 
one  groaning  on  top  of  the  other,  new  provocations 
for  this  very  conflict  over  which  it  has  no  control. 
Now  and  then  some  one  rises  up  against  this  general 
sophistry  that  is  leading  the  country  into  a  dismal 
bog  of  national  subterfuge,  but  it  is  seldom  more 
than  a  sputtering  in  the  deadliest  of  marsh  gases,  a 
momentary  glimmering  of  truth  that  soon  vanishes 
into  that  old  gloom  out  of  which  it  cannot  again 

Nothing  can  better  serve  the  interests  of  Japan, 
or  any  other  nation  under  similar  conditions,  than 
the  present  characteristic  indifference  of  this  Re- 
public to  dangers  threatening  it.  Not  only  indif- 
ferent to  military  preparation,  but  likewise  making 
no  effort  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  acts  and  legis- 
lation that  will  serve  as  casus  belli  whenever  Japan 
has  determined  that  conditions  are  favorable  for 
beginning  the  conflict.  Moodily  and  at  any  time 
the  Mikado  may  make  known  from  his  moated 
Castle  of  Yeddo  his  ultimatum  of  the  wrongs  and 
indignities  laid  upon  his  people. 

In  the  first  part  of  this  work  we  showed  numerous 
general  causes  that  will  eventually  precipitate  this 
Republic  in  a  series  of  wars.  In  addition,  there  are 
special  causes  logically  derived  from  conditions  that 
are  alone  relative  to  the  Orient  and  Japan.  To 
deal  with  all  these  elements  in  detail  is  unnecessary. 


An  exposition  of  one  of  them,  in  its  various  phases, 
will  show  the  manner  in  which  the  precipitating 
causes  of  this  war  are  inherent  in  the  political  fabric 
of  the  Republic,  and  in  the  overt  acts  of  a  portion 
of  the  people,  as  well  as  in  that  fatal  nonchalance — 
itself  an  invitation  to  war — with  which  the  entire 
nation  regards  the  approach  of  that  inevitable  day 
when  the  pencilled  hopes  of  peace  and  its  paper 
prayers  are  cast  upon  the  winds  and  the  sea  groans 
with  the  burden  of  conflict. 

In  considering  the  facts  of  which  we  are  now 
about  to  take  note,  the  reader  must  put  aside  his 
nationality,  together  with  what  he  considers  the 
rights  of  American  people,  in  part  or  as  a  whole,  and 
look  upon  these  conditions  -as  would  a  Samurai 
opportunist  to  whom  they  appear  only  in  the  double 
light  as  being  derogatory  to  his  country's  honor,  and 
potential  with  the  possibilities  of  a  war  for  which 
his  empire  now  prepares  or  dreams  of  when  the 
drooping  eyelid  of  night  stills  the  clangor  of  its  arse- 
nals and  the  brooding  care  of  its  council-chambers. 

Where  there  is  racial  non-assimilability  there  is 
apt  to  be  friction,  but  few  realize  that  political  non- 
assimilability  in  a  nation  where  the  political  power 
rests  in  the  hands  of  the  masses  is  a  source  of  greater 
friction  than  that  coming  from  racial  differences. 
Racial  unlikeness  does  not  produce  inequality,  but 
when  a  people  are  deprived  of  political  franchise, 
together  with  its  rights  and  privileges,  which  are 
granted  to  all  others  among  whom  they  dwell,  they 



are  at  once  branded  as  inferior.  This  arbitrary  de- 
termination by  one  class  of  the  inferiority  of  another 
establishes  that  anomalous  condition — caste  in  a 
Republic.  The  creation  of  an  inferior  caste  by 
political  disfranchisement  soon  permeates,  by  that 
osmose  peculiar  to  man,  every  phase  of  daily  exist- 
ence. Those  who  are  disfranchised  are  treated  by 
the  populace,  not  alone  with  social  unconcern,  but 
indignities.  Municipalities  direct  restrictive  or- 
dinances against  them  so  that  they  become  the 
natural  prey,  not  only  of  the  lawless  element,  but 
the  police.  Their  status  being  already  fixed  by 
public  opinion,  their  voice  in  protesting  against  in- 
dignities may,  in  the  beginning,  be  vehement,  but 
their  protestations  soon  die  away  in  hoarse  and 
broken  whispers. 

They  cannot  appeal  to  the  courts  where  their 
case  may  be  determined  by  a  jury,  for  the  jury,  being 
of  the  people,  has  already  decided  that  as  heathen 
they  cannot  be  believed  under  oath.  It  has  come 
to  pass  on  the  Pacific  coast  that  the  word  of  one 
Occidental  is  considered  more  worthy  of  credence 
than  the  oaths  of  an  entire  colony  of  Orientals. 
They  have  ceased  to  look  for  justice  in  cases  de- 
termined by  juries. 

State  legislation  further  deprives  them  of  many 
civil  rights  enjoyed  by  all  other  residents.  They 
are  segregated  and  participate  in  none  of  the  ac- 
tivities common  to  other  aliens.  In  some  portions 
of  the  country  their  presence  is  not  tolerated,  ancj 


they  are  stoned  and  driven  out  as  though  unclean. 
They  become  as  racial  lepers  whose  residence  in  a 
locality  is  permitted  only  by  such  isolation  as  the 
citizens  and  European  aliens  consider  necessary. 
In  this  manner  Orientals  are  not  alone  subject  to 
individual  mistreatment,  but  to  that  of  mobs.  The 
motives,  moreover,  that  actuate  mob-lawlessness  are 
identical  with  the  spirit  that  directs  municipal  or- 
dinances against  them,  the  legislation  of  the  state 
and  the  injustice  of  the  judiciary. 

We  are  making  no  comments  concerning  the  right 
of  a  portion  of  the  American  people  to  do  these  things. 
We  are  alone  establishing  conditions  that  do  exist, 
and  in  consequence  are  provocative  of  a  legitimate 
casus  belli  on  the  part  of  the  nation  whose  people 
have  thus  been  treated,  in  variance  with  the  rights 
and  immunities  granted  them  by  existing  treaties. 

In  a  republic,  where  the  political  power  resides 
in  the  populace,  embroilments  between  a  disfran- 
chised class  and  those  who  possess  the  right  do  not 
originate  in  the  former,  but  grow  out  of  that 
tyranny  which  an  empowered  populace  invariably 
directs  against  those  whom  they  have  ordained  as 

The  rights  of  a  class  in  a  republic  are  determined 
quantitatively  by  the  number  of  their  votes,  and 
qualitatively  by  the  political  acumen  of  their  leaders. 
When,  however,  a  class  or  race  finds  itself  in  a  re- 
public without  political  franchise,  then  as  a  race  or 
class  its  rights  are  ground  into  broken  dust.  Over 


them  the  populace  lifts  its  threatening,  relentless 
hand.  Politicians,  from  ward-heelers  to  congress- 
men, from  mayors  to  governors,  from  police  judges 
to  supreme  justices,  are  indifferent  to  the  rights  and 
justice  due  such  aliens.  They  have  come  out  of  the 
populace  that  rules  in  this  manner,  and  the  pointing 
shadow  of  the  people's  forefinger  marks  their  narrow 

What  we  have  here  expressed  are  not  hypothetical 
considerations,  but  a  statement  of  facts  that  have 
for  more  than  two  decades  piled  up  their  mis- 
demeanors against  Orientals  in  the  western  portion 
of  this  Republic.  What  has  occurred  to  the  Chinese 
will — as  is  now  being  done — be  directed  against  the 
Japanese,  but  with  this  difference:  the  oppressive 
acts  will  be  as  much  more  violent  as  is  lacking  that 
submission  characteristic  of  the  Chinese.  To  ex- 
pect the  Japanese  to  submit  to  indignities  is  to  be 
pitifully  incomprehensive  of  their  national  character. 
And  the  American  people  should  realize  that  it  is 
this  cumulative  memoranda  of  wrongs  that  they 
must,  on  some  certain,  sombre  day,  make  answer 
to  in  a  manner  we  will  dwell  upon  presently. 

The  recognition  of  the  fact  by  Japan  that  so  long 
as  Japanese  resident  in  this  nation  were  denied 
electoral  rights  they  would  suffer  indignities  and  in- 
justice led  the  Imperial  Government  to  demand 
those  rights  of  naturalization  granted  the  aliens  of 
other  countries.  In  addition,  Japan  has  demanded 
— as  existing  treaties  give  her  the  unquestioned  right 

1 80 


to  do — that  her  people  be  accorded  the  same  rights, 
privileges  and  immunities  granted  the  subjects  of 
European  nations.  These  demands  give  rise  to  the 
consideration  of  four  separate  conditions: 

(1)  The  attitude  of  the  people  of  the   Pacific 
States  toward  the  Federal  Government  if  the  Japan- 
ese are  granted  these  demands. 

(2)  Their  attitude  toward  the  Japanese}  to  what 
degree  their  antipathy  and  belligerency  may  be 
aroused  against  them. 

(3)  If  the  Federal  Government,  acquiescing  to  the 
West,  refuses  to  grant  the  Japanese  demands,  local 
injustice  and  additional  restrictions  will,  taking  on 
new  vigor,  be  directed  against  them  throughout 
the  states  of  the  Pacific  coast. 

(4)  Japan,  recognizing  the  fact  that  in  a  republic 
domestic  legislation   takes  precedence  over  ques- 
tions involving  foreign  nations,  will  not  make  a 
positive  demand  for  the  fulfilment  of  these  obliga- 
tions until  prepared  for  war.     She  can  thus  deter- 
mine the  outbreak  of  the  war  by  the  conservation 
of  her  demands  until  conditions  are  favorable  to 
her  for  the  commencement  of  hostilities. 

The  relationship  that  exists  between  the  states 
and  the  Federal  Government  is  such  that,  while  the 
Federal  Government  makes  treaties,  and  is  held 
responsible  by  foreign  nations  for  the  inviolability 
of  their  stipulations,  it  has  but  little  power  to  en- 
force these  foreign  agreements  when  their  violation 
— as  is  almost  invariably  the  case — occurs  within 



the  jurisdiction  of  state  laws.  On  account  of  this 
anomalous  condition,  offenders  against  the  rights 
of  foreigners,  if  the  popular  opinion  of  the  state  is 
with  them — as  is  the  case  on  the  Pacific  coast  in 
overt  acts  against  the  Japanese— are  not  only  im- 
mune, but  receive  the  approbation  of  their  fellow- 

Anti-Japanese  sentiment  may  have  been  dormant 
prior  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Russian  War,  but 
since  then  it  has  openly  manifested  itself,  and  is  not 
restricted,  as  may  be  supposed,  to  union-labor  or 
socialistic  elements,  but  permeates  the  entire  social 
and  political  fabric  of  the  West.1 

In  the  wild  gorges  of  Siskiyou,  on  moss-grown 
boulders,  and  half  effaced  by  the  lichens  of  two 
decades,  can  even  now  be  deciphered  this  legend: 
"The  Chinese  must  go.  Vote  for  O'Donnell."  We 
have  seen  it  on  the  red-wood  shacks  of  Mendocino; 
on  the  outhouses  of  cities  and  towns ;  on  the  board 
fences  in  the  Valley  of  the  Santa  Clara,  and  from 
there  to  the  Mojave  Desert.  Even  by  the  border 
of  Death  Valley,  in  the  dreariest  of  solitudes,  the 
West  stencilled  the  epitome  of  its  racial  hatred,  a 
hatred  that  was  taken  up  and  put  into  public  ordi- 
nances—  into  the  statute-books  of  the  state,  and 
finally,  finding  its  way  to  Washington,  violated 
under  political  pressure  such  treaty  stipulations  as 
existed  between  the  United  States  and  China. 

1  Appendix,  Table  II. 


This  racial  antagonism  has  now  been  extended  to 
the  Japanese,  and,  indifferent  to  the  rights  and 
immunities  guaranteed  them  by  treaty,  the  people 
of  the  West  are  proceeding  with  the  same  sullen 
contempt  of  consequences  as,  two  decades  ago,  they 
moved  against  the  Chinese.1 

Strangely  oblivious  to  the  militant  character  of 
the  Japanese,  to  the  vast  military  and  naval  power 
in  their  hands,  to  the  spirit  of  conquest  in  their 
bosoms,  to  their  predetermined  struggle  with  the 
Republic  for  sovereignty  over  the  Pacific,  a  portion 
of  the  American  people  go  on  indifferently,  each 
day  adding  new  provocations  to  precipitate  a  con- 
flict, and  yet  with  the  utmost  unconcern  make  no 
preparations  for  it.  This  indifference  and  lack  of 
preparation  has  as  much  to  do  with  hastening  the 
conflict  as  has  the  positive  circumscription  of  Japan- 
ese rights.  When  Japan  presents  the  memoranda 
of  her  wrongs  to  the  world  and  declares  war,  the 
world  will  regard  Japan's  position  as  not  only  law- 
ful, but  justly  taken.  They  also  have  their  people  in 
this  Republic,  and  each  year  piles  up  in  the  archives 
of  their  State  Departments  the  grim  protests  of  their 

The  indiscriminate  violation  in  different  sections 
of  the  United  States  of  the  rights  of  aliens,  and  the 
inability  of  the  Federal  Government  to  protect 
them,  is  a  matter  of  as  vital  concern  to  those  nations 

1  Appendix,  Table  III. 


whose  subjects  dwell  in  this  Republic  as  a  similar 
condition  in  China,  where  all  nations,  including  the 
United  States,  have  made  war  because  of  this  very 
failure  on  the  part  of  China  to  preserve  inviolate 
such  rights  and  immunities  as  are  specified  in  the 
stipulations  of  existent  treaties. 

Japan,  by  making  the  cause  of  war  the  violation 
of  treaty  rights,  shoulders  the  complaint  of  the 
world;  and  in  giving  battle  to  enforce  the  common 
riglits  of  the  Old  World  in  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
Japan,  and  not  the  United  States,  will  receive  the 
world's  approbation  and  sympathy. 


THE  incomparable  tranquillity  with  which  man- 
kind views  his  own  immediate  achievements  is 
only  equalled  by  the  disdain  with  which  he  views 
the  successes  or  failures  of  the  human  race  in  other 
ages.  Yet  there  is  no  difference  in  these  old  and 
new  works,  except  in  the  manner  and  place  of  their 
doing.  It  is  only  his  vanity  that  prevents  him 
from  making  use  of  the  accumulative  empirical 
knowledge  that  races  have  left  in  their  flight,  here 
and  there  on  this  great  Guano  Rock,  fertilized  with 
their  failures  and  fat  with  their  dead. 

As  we  look  backward  through  thirty  dim  cen- 
turies, we  see  that  there  existed  in  the  Mediterranean 
conditions  that  at  the  present  time  have  come  up 
again  to  be  determined  in  the  Pacific  Ocean.  In  the 
same  manner  as  China  and  Japan  maintained  their 
exclusion  from  contact  with  Western  nations,  so  had 
there  existed  in  Egypt  this  same  system  of  isolation 
until  overthrown  by  Psammetichus. 

Psammetichus  was  the  predecessor  of  Perry. 

As  China  and  Japan  have  been,  and  in  a  measure 
still  are,  vast,  dim  regions  of  mysteries,  so  to  the 
ancients  was  the  Valley  of  the  Nile. 
13  185 


In  this  analogy,  however,  there  is  a  difference,  a 
differentiation  that  has  its  own  terrors.  The  Greeks 
endeavored  to  understand  the  riddle  of  Egypt;  the 
West  scorns  the  inquiry  of  the  East. 

What  shall  the  Occident  find  in  Asia — a  slave- 
mart,  or  a  master?  Unanswered  doubts  do  not 
alone  belong  to  the  Sphinx;  nay,  they  are  part  of 
Time,  and  their  apparent  unsolvableness  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  riddles  of  the  future  have  all  been 
answered  and  written  down  by  the  works  of  the 

The  opening  of  the  Egyptian  ports  thirty  centuries 
ago  gave  to  Europe  on  the  one  hand  its  greatest  in- 
tellectual impulse,  but  on  the  other  it  demonstrated 
to  Egypt  that,  if  she  would  continue  to  exist  she 
must  become  a  maritime  power  greater  than  the 
nation  that  forced  the  passage  of  her  ports  or  any 
other  that  might  rise  on  the  shores  of  the  Medi- 
terranean. As  Egypt  had  for  so  many  ages  rec- 
ognized the  principle  of  quietude  that  is  inherent 
in  national  isolation,  so  she  became  at  once  cognizant 
of  that  other  great  principle  determining  national 
existence :  that  once  the  barriers  are  broken  all  future 
greatness  depends  upon  militant  and  maritime 
supremacy  among  those  countries  into  whose  affairs 
and  ambitions  the  nation  may  be  suddenly  plunged. 
The  difficulty  in  the  way  of  Egypt  becoming  a 
naval  power  was  a  lack  of  timber,  since  there  grew 
not  enough  in  Egypt  for  those  little  barks  that  car- 
ried the  dead  across  the  Lakes  of  Osiris.  Egypt  was 



obliged  to  go  into  wars  of  foreign  conquest,  not  with 
one  state,  but  with  all  bordering  on  the  Mediterra- 
nean, for  possession  of  that  which  she  lacked  and 
upon  which  depended  the  continuance  of  her 

Now,  though  several  tens  of  centuries  have  made 
their  predetermined  passage,  we  find  another  nation, 
which  is  Japan,  facing  the  same  old  problem  that 
lay  upon  Egypt  those  years  past.  As  the  supremacy 
of  the  Mediterranean  was  necessary  to  whatever 
nation  was  to  be  supreme  upon  its  shores,  so  to 
Japan  is  the  control  of  the  Pacific  not  alone  vital 
to  her  mastery  among  nations,  but  to  her  existence. 

While  Egyptian  power  in  the  Mediterranean  de- 
pended upon  material,  Japanese  dominion  in  the 
Pacific  is  consequent  upon  the  possession  of  such 
naval  bases  as  will  in  the  future  prevent  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  Pacific  naval  power  by  any  other 
nation.  In  other  words,  Japan  must  enunciate  in 
new  form  the  oldest  of  all  international  doctrines — 
commonly  known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine — and 
control  unto  herself  the  Pacific. 

The  dissolution  of  Egyptian  naval  supremacy  was 
followed  by  the  desolation  of  the  Valley  of  the  Nile ; 
and,  though  now  twenty-nine  centuries  have  passed, 
never  again  has  Egypt  regained  her  independence, 
never  again  has  Egypt  smiled. 

It  is  this  fate  that  Japan  intends  to  avoid. 

The  study  of  maritime  supremacy,  ancient  or 
modern,  shows  vividly  among  certain  salient  charac- 


teristics  that  the  size  of  the  nation  is  an  immaterial 
factor.  The  smallest  powers  have,  by  superior 
naval  and  military  force,  held  in  check  the  greatest 
of  nations. 

At  one  time  Tyre,  a  single  city,  so  dominated 
the  Mediterranean  that  no  other  country,  notwith- 
standing its  wealth  and  greatness  of  empire,  could 
develop  power  or  commerce  upon  it.  In  a  thirteen- 
years  war  this  city  held  off  from  her  rock  the 
Babylonian  Empire.  It  was  only  when  every  head 
was  bald  and  every  shoulder  peeled  that  Tyre  fell, 
and  so  terrible  was  her  going  down  that  it  is  said  the 
very  islands  of  those  seas  were  troubled  at  her 

It  is  this  singular  and  undue  power  that  naval  and 
military  supremacy  gives  to  a  nation  possessing  it 
that  has  confirmed  Japan's  determination  to  become 
the  Shogun  of  the  Pacific. 

The  greatness  of  Japan  will  depend  upon  naval 
strength.  Such  power,  in  modern  times,  depends 
primarily  upon  possession  of  widely  extended  and 
militarily  protected  naval  bases  controlling  routes  of 
trade.  It  might  be  considered  as  axiomatic  that 
the  worth,  or  even  the  possibility  of  the  existence, 
of  naval  power  is  proportionate  to  the  number  and 
strategic  importance  of  its  bases. 

While  Japan  cannot  expect  the  immediate  con- 
quest on  land,  other  than  the  sea-bordering  prov- 
inces, of  such  vast  countries  as  China,  India,  and  the 
Americas,  yet,  if  she  is  once  secure  in  the  possession 



of  certain  naval  bases  in  the  Pacific,  she  will  be  able 
to  dominate  these  and  other  nations;  and,  so  long 
as  her  naval  and  military  efficiency  do  not  deteri- 
orate, their  wealth  and  populations  shall  count  as 

As  the  supremacy  of  the  Mediterranean  affected 
only  those  nations  dwelling  and  brawling  on  its 
shores,  and  while  the  control  of  the  Atlantic  covers 
only  a  larger  portion  of  mankind,  the  mastery  of  the 
Pacific  will  concern  the  entire  world,  for  upon  its 
waters  the  divided  portions  of  the  races  of  man  have 
met.  The  Pacific  Ocean  consists  of  over  thirty- 
four  per  cent,  of  the  world's  surface,  and  not  only  do 
more  than  one-half  of  the  human  race  rest  some- 
where about  upon  its  littoral,  but  two-thirds  of  the 
undeveloped  resources  of  the  earth  are  in  the  lands 
upon  whose  shores  its  waters  break. 

It  is  this  vast  combination  of  mankind  and  un- 
squandered  riches  that  determine  the  true  signifi- 
cance of  the  Pacific.  Whether  the  world  in  the  future 
is  to  be  dominated,  politically,  militarily,  or  indus- 
trially by  any  one  nation,  or  a  coalition  of  them,  in 
the  dominion  of  the  Pacific  shall  it  be  determined. 

Japan,  militarily  supreme  in  the  Pacific,  becomes 
industrially  the  controlling  factor  in  Asia.  And  in 
due  time,  with  the  mastery  of  the  major  portion  of 
the  undeveloped  wealth  of  the  earth,  Asiatic  mili- 
tancy and  industrialism  shall  reign  supreme  in  this 
world  and  the  Mikado  shall  become  the  Mikado  of 



When  we  contrast  the  everlasting  and  huge  travail 
of  sectional  and  class  legislation  that  now  absorbs 
the  energies  of  this  Republic  with  the  aims  and 
progress  of  Japan,  we  are  overcome  with  shame  and 
bitterness.  On  the  one  hand,  a  ragout  of  politicians, 
on  the  other,  the  grandeur  of  national  ambition 
moving  irresistibly  to  a  predetermined  end. 

As  we  look  back  over  the  entire  history  of  man 
since  he  has  been  gathering  himself  together  in 
separate  political  entities,  we  can  find  no  condition 
analogous  with  opportunities  for  world  supremacy 
as  now  lie  before  the  bushido  of  Japan.  The  states- 
men of  this  Asian  Tyre  have  become  cognizant  of  this, 
and  even  so  have  the  masses  in  that  dim,  uncertain 
way  masses  comprehend,  hence  has  come  about  the 
expansion  of  that  mystical  word — bushido.  To  this 
ambition  of  Japan  there  shall  be  no  end — and  rightly 
there  should  not  be — until  her  islands  have  been 
razed  as  bare  as  rocks  upon  which  fishermen  spread 
their  nets,  or  until  the  Japanese  become  the  samurai 
of  the  human  race  and  the  remainder  of  man  shall 
toil  and  trade  for  them  and  their  greatness. 

There  is  no  more  complete  surety  to  world-wide 
supremacy  for  Japan  than  for  the  nations  of  the 
Occident  to  allow  the  present  progressive  deteriora- 
tion of  active  militancy  to  continue  without  check 
or  end.  If  Japan  continues  in  the  opposite  course, 
and  holds  the  bushido  of  her  people  aloof  from  the 
contamination  of  feminism  and  commercialism, 
the  spirit  of  her  samurai  unsullied  in  the  Temple  of 



the  Forty  Ronins,  then  shall  the  rest  of  mankind 
play  Atlas  to  the  Islands  of  the  Eastern  Sea. 

As  maritime  mastery  of  ancient  nations  depended 
upon  the  possession  of  provinces  supplying  material 
for  naval  construction,  in  modern  times  the  posses- 
sion of  military  and  naval  bases  bears  the  same 
relation  to  the  control  of  the  sea.  The  power  of 
nations  in  a  comparative  sense  should  be  appor- 
tioned to  the  number  and  security  of  such  bases. 

The  future  of  Japan  depends  basically  upon  the 
possession  of  a  sufficient  number  of  such  positions, 
so  distributed  in  the  Pacific  that  they  command 
all  trade  routes  to  and  from  the  East  and  West. 
Failure  to  secure  these  will,  in  time,  relegate  her 
to  the  environs  of  her  rocky  islands,  and,  like  Egypt, 
though  twenty-nine  dim  centuries  shall  pass,  she 
shall  rise  up  not  again  forever. 

Fifteen  years  ago  Japan  eliminated  China  from 
the  Pacific ;  four  years  ago  she  crushed  for  all  time 
the  power  of  Russia  in  this  same  ocean.  Her  pres- 
ent strategic  position  on  the  north  Asian  coast  gives 
her  complete  control  of  it  and  all  the  trade  routes 
that  diverge  from  its  shores.  The  island  of  Hok- 
kaido commands  the  sea  of  Okhotsk  and  the  north- 
ern Siberian  littoral;  the  island  of  Nippon  com- 
mands the  Sea  of  Japan,  southern  Russia  littoral 
and  the  Amur;  Port  Arthur  commands  the  Gulf  of 
Pechili,  the  sea-coasts  of  Pechili,  Manchuria,  and 
Shantung,  the  Laiho,  Peiho  and  Yalu  rivers;  the 
island  of  Kinshu  and  Korea  command  the  Yellow 



Sea  and  the  Chinese  coast  as  far  south  as  the  mouth 
of  the  Yangtze,  while  the  islands  of  Kinshu  and 
Formosa  hold  dominion  from  the  Yangtze  to  the 
southern  borders  of  the  province  of  Fokien.1 

Japan  is  now  supreme,  in  a  military  and  naval 
sense,  on  the  Asian  coast  north  of  Hong -Kong. 
China  has  been  eliminated  from  these  seas,  as  has 
Russia.  And  by  Japan's  alliance  with  Great  Brit- 
ain, the  elimination  of  British  power  in  the  Pacific, 
as  we  will  hereafter  show,  has  been  accomplished 
subtly;  even  with  the  smile  of  Buddha  has  this  been 
done.  There  now  remains  but  one  power  for  Japan 
to  put  aside  in  order  to  make  her  supreme  in  the 
Pacific,  with  all  which  we  have  shown  that  term 

That  nation  is  the  United  States. 

As  has  been  heretofore  stated,  Japan's  future  de- 
pends upon  secure  and  widely  distributed  naval 
bases  so  strategically  placed  that  they  give  her 
command  over  all  routes  of  trade  in  the  Pacific. 
Japan's  next  war  will  be  a  war  for  position,  con- 
cerning which  we  have  already  commented  upon 
in  a  previous  chapter.2 

Fortunate  is  it  for  Japan  that  this  Republic  not 
only  possesses  the  very  positions  essential  to  Japan's 
security  in  the  Pacific,  but  is  sovereign  over  such 
territories  as,  under  the  dominion  of  Japan,  will 
make  her  wholly  and  without  doubt  the  Shogun  of 

1  Chart  I.  2  Book  I,  chap,  ix,  pp.  104-1 1 5. 



the  Great  Still  Sea.  But,  more  than  that,  Japan 
would,  at  the  same  time,  eliminate  the  only  rival 
she  needs  to  fear  in  her  struggle  for  supremacy, 
political  or  industrial,  over  the  vast  littoral  of  the 
Pacific.  Should  this  Republic  share  the  fate  of 
China  and  Russia,  then  no  nation  or  coalition  of 
nations — as  will  hereafter  be  shown — can  destroy 
Japan's  supremacy,  so  long  as  her  samurai  do  not 
wither  away  or  bloom  into  feminism,  and,  like  the 
Agave  Americana,  perish  in  florescence. 

As  has  been  shown  (Chart  I),  the  present  stra- 
tegic positions  of  Japan  are,  though  relegated  to  the 
Asian  coast,  absolute  in  the  command  of  those 
seas.  By  consulting  the  chart  of  the  Pacific  it  will 
be  seen  that  Japan  cannot  strengthen  her  position 
nor  lay  foundation  for  future  supremacy  by  war 
with  any  country  other  than  this  Republic.  The 
value  the  Pacific  possessions  of  this  nation  bear  to 
Japan  is  that  they  determine  her  possible  suprem- 
acy of  Pacific  littoral.  These  territories  consist  of 
Alaska  in  the  North  Pacific,  Hawaii  in  the  Central, 
Samoa  in  the  South,  and  the  Philippines  in  the  East. 

To  show  graphically  the  strategic  importance  of 
these  places,  we  have  on  the  chart  *  circumscribed 
circles  about  them  with  approximate  radii  equal 
to  two  and  a  half  to  three  days'  steaming  at 
seventeen  knots  an  hour.  The  circumference  of 
these  circles,  hence  their  value,  is  increased  with 

'  Chart  I. 



the  speed  of  warships  or  the  number  of  hours  dis- 
tant from  a  naval  base  that  a  commander  is  justified 
in  giving  battle.  The  sphere  of  naval  supremacy, 
as  circumscribed  by  these  circles,  is  not  fixed,  but 
is  constantly  expanding,  concurrently  with  the  in- 
creasing speed  of  warships.  As  each  ripple  wells 
outward  their  value  is  enhanced.  Their  ultimate 
extent  or  power  cannot  be  computed,  for  it  is  cor- 
relative to  the  progress  of  invention  as  applied  to 
naval  warfare. 

In  order  to  show  how  irresistible  are  the  incentives 
that  force  Japan  to  the  acquisition  of  this  Republic's 
insular  possessions,  we  will  consider  her  position 
as  a  Pacific  and  World  Power  augmented  by 
sovereignty  over  those  territories,  singly  and  as  a 
whole.  These  possessions  have  two  valuations  to 
Japan — their  intrinsic  wealth,  and  the  value  of  their 
strategic  position.  However  rich  they  may  be  in 
natural  resources,  their  strategic  worth  is  infinitely 

Intrinsically,  the  Philippines  and  Ladrones  would 
more  than  double  the  territorial  extent  of  Japan,  as 
well  as  the  empire's  natural  resources.  This  valua- 
tion, however  great  in  itself,  is  insignificant  in  com- 
parison to  the  strategic  worth  that  these  islands 
possess  for  Japan  in  their  dominion  over  Asia  and 
Asiatic  hegemony. 

We  have  shown  that  Japanese  domination  over 
the  Asian  coast,  from  the  Sea  of  Okhotsk  to  the 
Formosan  Strait,  is  absolute.  The  Philippine  Isl- 



ands  bear  the  same  strategic  relationship  to  the 
Southern  Asian  coast  as  the  Japanese  islands  do 
to  the  Northern,  with  the  exception  that  the  Philip- 
pines have  the  additional  strategic  value  of  com- 
manding all  ship -routes  from  Europe  to  the  Far 
East.  Their  possession  is  more  essential  to  Japan 
than  either  Korea  or  Manchuria.  Without  the 
Philippines,  Japan's  dominion  in  Asian  seas  will 
be  no  more  than  tentative,  and  her  eventual  domi- 
nation or  destruction  will  depend  upon  who  holds 
these  islands. 

The  Philippines  command  the  Asian  coast  from 
the  Formosan  Strait  to  Cape  Camao;  the  whole  of 
Southern  China,  together  with  the  Tsing-Kiang, 
the  Min  and  West  rivers;  the  Gulf  of  Tong-King; 
the  whole  of  French  Indo-China,  together  with  the 
China  Sea,  and  the  Sungoi  and  Me -Kong  rivers. 
On  the  south,  these  islands  command  the  entire 
East  Indies,  the  Macassar  and  Malacca  passages. 
Within  the  sphere  of  Philippine  naval  bases  can  be 
included  the  Gulf  and  Kingdom  of  Siam,  the  Malay 
Peninsula,  Singapore,  Strait  of  Malacca,  Carimata 
and  Sunda. 

The  Philippines  are  only  three  days'  steaming 
from  the  main  naval  bases  in  Japan,  hence  Japanese 
bases  in  the  Philippines  would  be  but  a  continua- 
tion of  her  naval  stations,  and  would  allow  Japan 
to  concentrate  in  Philippine  waters  her  entire  navy 
within  a  comparatively  few  hours — lessening  in  time 
as  naval  invention  progresses. 


With  the  Philippines  in  possession  of  Japan,  the 
dominion  of  European  powers  in  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  seas  ends,  and  ends  forever.  By  the  time 
England's  alliance  with  Japan  ceases,  her  fortresses 
in  the  Far  East  will  possess  for  her  no  value  other 
than  what  affection  may  still  hold  for  ruins  and 
ambitions  that  are  no  more.  Each  of  these  Southern 
straits  will  become  a  Strait  of  Tsu-Shima — if  there 
are  Rojestvenskys  to  steam  thither. 

Sovereignty  over  the  Philippines  is  not  only  im- 
perative to  Japan  in  her  overlordship  of  Asia  and 
the  Pacific,  but  is  essential  to  the  very  preservation 
of  her  national  existence.  The  Philippines,  in  the 
possession  of  a  great  power,  forms  on  her  most 
vulnerable  flank  a  point  of  attack  that  is  more  dan- 
gerous than  would  be  Korea  in  the  hands  of  the 
same  power. 

Possessed  of  the  Philippines,  Japan  would  com- 
plete her  chain  of  island  fortresses  from  the  penin- 
sula of  Kamchatka  to  the  Indian  Ocean,  by  which 
she  would  bind  in  Asia  from  the  West.  With  her 
castles  put  up  on  the  mountain-tops  of  these  seas, 
races  of  man  could  bay  in  vain. 

The  channel  of  Balintang  is  the  Rubicon  of  Japan. 

The  relationship  the  Philippines  bears  to  the  East- 
ern Pacific  is  similarly  held  by  Samoa  in  relation  to 
the  Southern  Pacific.  The  harbor  of  Pago-Pago, 
on  the  island  of  Tutuila,  is  the  most  valuable  an- 
chorage in  the  South  Pacific,  and  is  equal  if  not 
superior  to  any  in  the  entire  ocean.  This  harbor 



can  hold  twice  the  entire  navy  of  Japan,  and  is  so 
surrounded  by  towering  bluffs  that  it  cannot  be 
reached  by  shell-fire  from  the  outside,  while  the  en- 
trance is  so  narrow  that  two  battleships  cannot 
enter  at  the  same  time.  In  such  a  manner  has 
Panku,  in  chiselling  out  this  world  for  the  wilful 
tribes  of  man,  hereon  cut  the  perfectest  of  harbors 
in  the  most  strategic  position  in  the  South  Pacific, 
a  position  that  can  be  made  to  determine  the  event- 
ual sovereignty  over  Oceania,  Australia,  and  New 
Zealand;  and  in  possession  of  Japan  would,  in  cor- 
relation with  her  other  positions,  constitute  the 
pivot  of  naval  supremacy  in  the  Antipodes. 

As  the  control  of  the  South  Pacific  is  determined 
by  a  proper  naval  utilization  of  Pago-Pago,  so  is 
the  naval  dominion  of  the  North  Pacific  determined 
by  the  possession  of  Alaska,  and  the  strategic  posi- 
tions of  the  harbors  on  the  peninsula.  As  far  as 
this  Republic  is  concerned,  Alaska  is  as  insular  as 
the  Philippines,  and  sovereignty  over  it  is  deter- 
mined by  the  same  factors. 

To  Japan,  the  intrinsic  value  of  Alaska  is  greater 
than  any  other  American  possession.  Not  alone 
would  the  territorial  extent  of  the  empire  be  trebled, 
but  trebled  with  almost  inexhaustible  wealth.  Fish- 
eries, iron,  coal,  timber,  copper  and  gold  in  such 
abundance  that  the  crowded  coolies  of  that  nation 
could  scarce  indent  or  scratch  the  lid  of  this  treas- 
ure— by  which  nature  has  redeemed  its  inhospitable 



shores.  But  if,  with  a  single  exception,  Alaska  were 
as  barren  as  the  sea-gnawed  rocks  upon  which  the 
walrus  lolls  in  the  cold  sunlight  of  the  inner  Arctic, 
it  would  even  then  possess  a  determinate  condition, 
outside  of  its  strategic  value,  in  the  sovereignty  of 
the  Pacific. 

A  navy  without  adequate  bases  is  almost  as  use- 
less as  a  navy  without  guns  or  sailors,  but  a  fleet 
without  coal  needs  neither  bases  nor  guns  nor  men; 
hence  the  command  of  coal-fields  on  or  adjacent  to 
the  seas  of  naval  strife  does  now,  and  in  the  future 
more  so,  determine  the  outcome  of  maritime  strug- 
gles. We  therefore  establish  this  fact,  that  in  the 
approaching  combat  for  the  dominion  of  the  Pacific 
the  control  of  the  Alaskan  coal-fields  will  be  eventu- 
ally necessary  to  the  victor,  and  without  them  com- 
plete supremacy  cannot  be  maintained. 

As  in  ancient  times  the  possession  of  timber-bear- 
ing provinces  was  essential  to  naval  supremacy,  so 
the  command  of  bordering  coal-fields  is  imperative 
to  the  nation  that  would  extend  its  dominion  over 
the  Pacific.  Whether  in  the  Eastern  or  Western 
Hemisphere,  the  entire  littoral  of  the  Pacific,  with 
the  exception  of  Japan,  North  China,  and  Alaska, 
is  lacking  in  coal  of  good  quality.  As  we  have  here- 
tofore shown,  Japan  commands,  so  far  as  maritime 
use  is  concerned,  the  coal-fields  of  North  China  and 
Manchuria.  With  Alaska  in  her  possession  she  will 
control  the  coal  supply  of  the  Pacific  to  the  extent, 
and  so  strategically  placed,  that  it  will  be  impossible 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

for  any  other  power  to  carry  on  naval  or  military 
enterprises  against  her. 

The  harbors  along  the  Alaskan  peninsula,  where 
vast  deposits  of  Welsh  coal  are  eroding  in  the  wash 
of  the  sea,  and  where  the  winters  are  so  modu- 
lated by  the  Japan  Current  as  to  be  no  severer 
than  in  New  York  harbor,  are  three  degrees  nearer 
Japan  than  are  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  command 
the  entire  ocean  west  of  the  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
fifth  degree  of  longitude  and  north  of  the  fortieth 
degree  parallel. 

Had  Russia  not  sold  Alaska,  her  dreams  for  the 
conquest  of  Asia  might  have  been  realized  and  the 
battle  of  Tsu-Shima  never  fought. 

Hawaii,  in  conjunction  with  the  strategic  posi- 
tions heretofore  described,  can  be  considered  the 
most  important  position  in  the  Pacific.  Not  only 
would  it  be  impossible  for  any  nation  to  hope  for 
sovereignty  over  the  Pacific  without  being  in  pos- 
session of  these  islands,  but  no  power  could  under- 
take without  them  any  continuous  naval  operations 
or  maritime  expansion.  Their  great  value  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  they  are  situated  almost  in  the 
centre  of  the  Pacific,  and  that  the  ports  nearest  to 
them  are  distant  over  two  thousand  miles.  They 
sever  the  North  Pacific  from  the  South,  the  East 
from  the  West.  In  this  segmentation  lies  their 

The  desert  and  the  sea  are  in  themselves  the 



barrenest  of  tenures,  but  while  one  has  oases,  in  the 
other  are  islands,  and  when  the  caravans  of  man, 
whether  by  camel  or  ship,  start  across  their  wastes, 
these  oases  and  islands  determine  the  way  of  their 

The  value  of  such  a  position  is  not  due  to  its  own 
productivity,  but  to  the  wealth  of  all  the  nations 
whose  trade  routes  pass  its  turreted  shores. 

Nearly  fifteen  years  ago  the  value  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  and  the  necessity  of  their  possession  to  any 
nation  who  would  be  sovereign  over  the  Pacific,  was 
recognized  by  Japan.  When  this  Republic  annexed 
the  islands  at  that  time,  Japan  alone  protested  and 
notified  the  American  Government  that  she  would 
not  then,  nor  at  any  time  in  the  future,  acquiesce 
in  the  control  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  by  this 

Years  have  now  passed,  but  the  protest  of  Japan 
has  never  been  withdrawn,  nor  have  preparations 
ever  ceased  to  bring  about  in  due  time  its  enforce- 
ment. This  Republic  may  forget,  or  after  its  con- 
quests sleep,  but  in  that  Silent  Pentagon1  where 
rests  together  the  sceptre  of  the  Mikado  and  the 
sword  of  the  samurai  there  is  no  forgetfulness,  and 
in  their  slumbers — dreams. 

However  great  may  be  the  singular  value  of  each 
of  the  American  Pacific  possessions  to  the  future 
development  of  Japan,  it  is  in  the  strategic  relation- 

1  The  Genro,  or  Five  Elder  Statesmen. 


ship  each  bears  to  the  other,  and  their  relation  in 
the  aggregate  to  Japanese  maritime  power,  that  is 
to  be  found  their  greatest  value — not  the  price  of 
one,  but  a  dozen  wars. 

The  primary  laws  governing  naval  supremacy  in 
an  ocean  surrounded,  but  not  divided,  by  continents 
may  be  formulated  as  follows: 

(i)  The  number  of  naval  bases  must  be  increased 
in  a  proportionate  ratio  to  the  increase  of  the  navy. 

(2) The  efficiency  of  the  navy  is  lessened  whenever 
the  number  and  capacity  of  naval  bases  is  less  than 
required  by  such  fleets  as  conditions  of  warfare 
may  force  to  base  on  them. 

(3)  The  possession  of  too  few  or  not  widely  spaced 
bases  means  the  restriction  of  naval  activity  to  a 
defined  and  perhaps  unimportant  portion  of  the 
theatre  of  war,  as  well  as  periods  of  complete  in- 
activity consequent  upon  undue  concentration. 

(4)  The  efficiency  of  the  navy  is  correspondingly 
weakened  where  there  are,   within  such  strategic 
triangles  as  are  formed  by  two,  three,  or  more  of  its 
bases,  fortified  positions  belonging  to  the  enemy. 

While  the  converse  of  some  of  the  above  conditions 
may  qualitatively  determine  success  in  maritime 
warfare,  there  are  certain  positive  factors  that  in- 
crease the  value  of  these  conditions : 

(i)  Success  in  naval  warfare,  as  on  land,  is  largely 
controlled  by  the  number  and  directness  of  its  lines 
of  communication  to  widespread  and  divergent 

14  201 


(2)  The   greatest    possible   number   of   strategic 
triangles  formed  by  these  divergent  bases,  in  which 
one  of  the  vertices  rests  on  the  nation's  main  naval 
base    while  the  subordinate   bases  constitute  the 
vertices  of  more  than  one  strategic  triangle,  inde- 
pendent of  or  in  conjunction  with  the  main  naval 

(3)  The  value  of  these  strategic  triangles,  outside 
of  their  homogeneity  and  number,   is  determined 
by  the  location  and  number  of  the  enemy's  bases; 
whether  or  not  they  exceed  or  are  less  in  number 
and  are  within   or  without  these   strategic  trian- 

In  land  warfare  strategic  positions  held  in  the 
beginning  of  hostilities  often  determine  its  eventual 
conclusion.  In  maritime  war  this  condition  is  even 
more  significant,  inasmuch  as  without  a  certain  num- 
ber of  these  positions  war  cannot  be  begun.  In 
proportion  to  their  number,  defence  and  strategic 
value  can  maritime  supremacy  be  proportionately 
determined  prior  to  hostilities. 

The  value  of  a  series  of  naval  and  military  bases 
in  such  an  ocean  as  the  Pacific  is  determined  by 
three  positive  conditions: 

(1)  The  number  of  strategic  triangles  they  form. 

(2)  The  number  of  times  one  vertex,  resting  on 
the  main  naval  base  of  the  nation,  is  common  to  the 
aggregate  of  triangles. 

(3)  The  absence   of   foreign  naval  bases  within 
such  triangles,  or  the  distance  of  their  separation  as 



determined  by  the  number  of  intervening  lines  of 

It  is  in  consideration  of  these  principles  that  we 
will  deal  with  Japan  in  the  Pacific  subsequent  to  a 
successful  war  with  this  Republic,  to  determine 
whether  or  not  her  future  strategic  position,  inde- 
pendent of  the  economic  and  geographical  advan- 
tages, will  be  sufficiently  augmented  as  to  warrant 
a  war  with  this  Republic. 

If,  at  the  end  of  such  a  struggle,  Japan  should 
retain  empire  over  the  American  Pacific  provinces, 
we  know  of  no  war  between  single  states  so  signifi- 
cant in  its  results  and  so  basic  for  the  formation  of 
world  empire  under  the  hegemony  of  one  nation. 
By  chart  has  been  shown  graphically  what  will  be 
Japan's  position  subsequent  to  such  a  war,  and  its 
relationship  to  the  future  control  of  the  world. 
Radiating  from  Japan,  with  one  vertex  resting 
therein  and  common  to  all,  do  eight  strategic 
triangles  spread  abroad  over  the  Pacific,  while  four 
similar  triangles  with  vertices  independent  of  Japan, 
but  connected  with  the  main  vertex  resting  therein, 
surround  these  others  with  an  outward  sphere  of 

Within  these  twelve  triangles  there  is  not  to  be 
found  a  single  stronghold  belonging  to  another 
nation,  while  every  naval  base  held  by  other  powers, 
together  with  their  lines  of  intercommunication, 
would  be  subject  to  Japanese  attack  from  two  to 

1  Chart  I. 



eight  divergent  bases.  Any  foreign  fleet  on  the 
Pacific  would  always  be  open  to  attack  in  any  part 
of  the  ocean  by  the  whole  of  the  Japanese  navy. 
No  power  could  attempt  to  transfer  from  one  naval 
base  to  another,  across  Japan's  intervening  lines,  a 
fleet  less  than  the  Japanese  navy. 

Anywhere  on  the  trade  routes  of  the  Pacific 
Japan  could  fight  a  naval  battle  and  always  be 
within  three  days'  steaming  of  not  less  than  two 
divergent  bases.  Connecting  Alaska  and  Samoa 
with  Hawaii  by  submarine  cable,  the  Mikado,  within 
his  Castle  of  Yeddo,  could  at  all  times  be  in  direct 
and  simultaneous  communication,  not  only  with 
these  widely  scattered  harbors,  but  with  every 
Japanese  warship  steaming  about  over  the  Pacific. 
These  different  bases  are  so  situated,  together 
with  subordinate  isles,  that  no  Japanese  warship 
would  ever  be  without  the  sphere  of  wireless  com- 
munication with  some  one  of  them.  Should  the  Mi- 
kado before  dawn  demand,  "Where  are  my  ships  of 
war?"  the  admiral  of  the  fleet  could  lay  before  him 
the  chart  of  the  Pacific  and  by  pins  in  the  painted 
ocean  show  whither  each  torpedo-boat  and  battle- 
ship was  at  that  moment  steaming  its  way  through 
the  sea  and  the  night. 

To  such  small  space  has  science  relegated  this  vast 
sea  that  the  fleets  of  Japan  could  be  scattered  over 
it  and  yet  be  as  much  under  the  control  of  the 
commanding  admiral  in  Tokio  as  though  they  were 
a  small  fleet  within  the  vision  of  his  eye. 



Not  within  these  twelve  strategic  triangles  com- 
manding the  Pacific  can  be  found  a  spot  wherein 
Japan  could  not  concentrate  in  ten  days  seven- 
tenths  of  her  entire  navy,  free  from  colliers,  free 
from  supply  and  hospital  ships,  free  from  all  the 
dead  impedimenta  of  the  sea.  Regardless  in  what 
corner  of  the  ocean  the  rendezvous  might  be,  these 
fleets  would  at  all  times  be  within  three  days  of  one 
or  more  naval  bases.1 

By  such  a  war  Japan  would  be  placed  in  a  naval 
and  military  position  so  invulnerable  that  no  nation 
or  coalition  of  them  could  attack  her.  Calmly, 
from  this  vast  Gibraltar  of  the  ocean,  she  could  look 
down  upon  the  world  and  smile  at  its  rage  and 
trepidation — this  island  tribe  that  owns  no  heaven 
and  annoys  no  god. 

Upon  this  foundation  of  one-third  the  world, 
Japan  would  begin  the  building  of  a  new  empire; 
and  as  the  militant  capacities  of  the  nations  in  the 
West  continued  to  deteriorate  through  Hague  Con- 
ferences, the  crumbling  diseases  of  feminism,  com- 
mercialism and  socialism,  one  by  one  should  they 
go  into  the  great  tumulus  upon  which,  in  due  time, 
shall  be  raised  the  throne  of  the  Three-Toed  Dragon. 

We  know  not  lor  how  many  years  the  Occident 
has  been  muttering  to  itself  of  a  peril  that  it  has 
called  yellow.  In  the  penumbra  of  its  dreams  it 
has  seen  indistinct  shadows  lightened,  or  rather 

•Chart  I. 


made  pallid,  with  uncertain  consciousness,  in  which, 
sicklied  over  with  fear,  phantoms  have  rioted.  These 
chimeras  in  the  fear  and  dreaming  of  Western  nations 
are  what  might  be  called  probabilities,  monstrous, 
terrifying,  but  for  all  that  only  phantoms,  having 
their  origin  in  truth,  but  transferred  by  that  strange 
somnolence — the  public  mind — to  the  shadowiest 
of  realms. 

To  this  dim  region  belongs  the  Yellow  Peril. 

Ever  since  the  Occident  entered  into  close  contact 
with  the  Orient,  politically  as  well  as  commercial- 
ly, it  has  intuitively  become  cognizant  of  a  peril. 
This  intuition  has  been  as  correct  as  the  reasons 
concerning  its  origin  and  consummation  have  been 
somnolently  wrong.  In  this  misplacement  of  the 
source  of  the  Yellow  Peril,  the  Occident  has  only 
repeated  what  has  been  done  innumerable  times 
before  among  all  portions  of  mankind. 

When  the  dread  of  the  Orient  instinctively  en- 
tered and  permeated  the  consciousness  of  the  West, 
the  whole  Occident  asked: 

"Whence  will  it  come?"  The  reply,  based  quite 
naturally  on  the  old  and  popular  misconception  of 
what  constitutes  capacity  to  conquer,  laid  upon 
China  the  responsibility  of  the  Yellow  Peril  because 
of  its  immensity. 

The  world  never  learns  until  too  late  what  deter- 
mines the  militant  qualities  of  a  nation. 

True  militancy  belongs  to  primitive,  homogeneous 
peoples,  wherein  political  control  is  restricted  to  the 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

fewest  number  of  persons,  or  even  to  a  single  in- 
dividual. National  militancy  deteriorates  in  in- 
verse ratio  to  the  increasing  complexity  of  social 
and  political  organisms,  hence  the  larger  a  nation 
is  and  the  more  individualistic  its  inhabitants  be- 
come through  the  multiplicity  of  avocations  the 
less  capable  is  a  nation  to  be  a  conquering  power. 
On  account  of  this  we  invariably  find  that  the  con- 
questing  period  of  a  nation  appears  in  the  earliest 
portion  of  its  career — that  is,  when  it  first  enters 
into  the  comity  of  nations. 

The  Chinese  period  of  conquest  ended  with  Tsin- 
Chi-Hoangti,  twenty-one  centuries  ago.  The  build- 
ing of  the  great  wall  marked  its  consummation. 

The  mistake  of  the  Occident  is  an  old  error. 

If,  in  the  third  century  B.C.,  such  great  empires 
as  Persia  and  Egypt  were  somnolently  conscious  of 
threatening  peril — as  no  doubt  they  were — they 
committed  the  same  error  the  West  is  making  at 
the  present  time.  Not  one  of  them  could  imagine 
that  out  of  the  barren  mountains  of  the  Balkans, 
without  wealth  or  numbers  —  nay,  with  nothing 
other  than  beak  and  talons — a  young  gray  eagle 
would  swoop  down  and  destroy  them  as  so  many 
bleating  lambs.  Nor  any  more  did  the  empires 
of  the  seventh  century  dread  the  wild  horsemen 
in  the  barren  tenure  of  the  Arabian  Desert.  Not 
one  of  them ;  though  in  due  time  all  were  trampled 
under  hoof  by  these  same  nomads. 

Among  the  great  empires  of  the  thirteenth  cen- 


tury  not  one  was  free  from  the  dread  of  the  same 
peril  or  was  not  haunted  by  the  same  phantoms. 
Yet  neither  China  nor  India,  neither  the  empires 
of  Central  Asia  nor  the  kingdoms  of  Eastern  Eu- 
rope, could  conceive,  though  this  ill-defined  fear 
brooded  heavily  over  them,  of  any  source  of  danger 
other  than  from  those  nations  whose  immensity 
they  dreaded.  Upon  them  fell  no  terror  of  certain 
snout-faced  marauders  who  roamed  with  their  herds 
over  the  deserts  of  Gobi.  But  with  the  suddenness 
of  the  terrible  winds  that  sweep  across  Shamo  these 
herders  fell  upon  the  world  and  wagged  their  cow- 
tail  banners  in  the  faces  of  a  hundred  kings. 

In  such  a  manner,  in  the  immensity  of  China's 
shadow,  four  rocky  islands  have  been  overlooked. 

IT  is  difficult  to  make  a  just  comparison  between 
the  naval  and  military  capacity  of  one's  own 
country  and  that  of  a  nation  which,  through  circum- 
stances beyond  the  sphere  of  its  control,  has  en- 
tered into  a  struggle  for  supremacy  permitting  of 
no  consummation  except  through  a  conflict  of  arms. 
However  sincere  one's  efforts  may  be  to  free  him- 
self from  prejudice  and  exaggerated  confidence  in 
his  country's  prowess,  yet  so  innumerable  are  the 
intricacies  of  modern  warfare,  and  so  limitless  are 
the  possibilities  of  self-deception,  that,  even  in  the 
sincerest  efforts  to  be  exact,  one  is  apt  to  be  unfair 
and  his  deductions  unjust. 

Conditions  pre-eminent  in  peace  are  fondly  hoped 
to  manifest  themselves  in  war,  though  they  are  lack- 
ing in  attributes  necessary  to  the  prosecution  of  a 
modern  conflict.  Unfortunately  or  otherwise,  as 
the  case  may  be,  those  phases  of  warfare  that  are 
so  firmly  imbued  in  the  popular  mind  no  longer 
exist,  except  in  greatly  modified  forms.  In  conse- 
quence of  this,  indiscriminate  patriotism  is  almost 
always  erroneous  in  its  ideas  concerning  the  con- 
duct of  modern  war  and  the  conditions  necessary 
to  its  success. 



These  errors  in  popular  judgment  have  two  phases 
that  fit  one  into  the  other,  and  thus  complete,  under 
the  guise  of  discrimination,  their  self-beguilement. 
The  positive  factor  is  due  to  that  thoughtless  pa- 
triotism that  exaggerates  the  capacity  of  one's  own 
nation,  and  the  negative  factor  that  exaggerates 
the  deficiencies  of  the  enemy.  While  we  fasten  our 
thoughts  ever  on  victory,  we  close  our  eyes  to  the 
difficulties  of  gaining  it.  It  is  in  this  voluntary 
blindness  that  we  do  not  perceive  our  weakness  nor 
elements  of  strength  belonging  to  the  enemy.  Their 
prowess  has  among  us  no  partisans,  no  voice. 

In  individual  life  a  man  who  deceives  himself, 
whether  through  arrogance  or  ignorance,  as  to  his 
own  ability  or  capacity,  and  in  consequence  ends 
in  disaster,  is  regarded  as  a  boaster,  a  man  not  only 
unworthy  of  confidence,  but  deserving  of  no  com- 
passion. His  misfortunes  the  public  regards  com- 
placently as  being  retributive  of  his  vain-glorious- 
ness  and  failure  to  take  such  ordinary  precautions 
as  would  have  laid  bare  the  strength  of  his  competitor. 

Nations  being  but  composite  individuals,  all  that 
which  moves  or  is  part  of  an  individual,  in  a  larger 
sense,  moves  or  is  part  of  a  nation.  To  free  a  nation 
from  error  is  to  enlighten  the  individual.  And  only 
to  the  degree  that  the  individual  will  be  receptive 
of  truth  can  a  nation  be  freed  from  that  vanity 
which  ends  in  national  ruin. 

The  first  duty  a  man  owes  his  country  is  to  realize 
that  he  cannot  liquidate  his  indebtedness  to  it  by 



vain  complacency;  his  boasts  are  not  only  without 
value,  but  are  a  counterfeit  of  the  real  emotions  to 
which  he  should  give  expression.  In  the  survival 
of  nations  the  vanity  of  man  has  no  place. 

In  making  a  comparison  between  the  naval 
strength  of  Japan  and  the  United  States,  that  which 
most  commonly  does  service  is  to  compare  the 
number  and  tonnage  of  ships  belonging  to  each 
navy,  and  then,  by  no  other  means  than  subtrac- 
tion, determine  which  is  the  more  powerful.  This 
manner  of  judgment  is  common  to  man  when  all 
questions  involving  power  are  determined  by  visual 
comparison.  The  true  criterion  of  naval  supremacy 
in  this  epoch,  when  science  enters  into  every  detail 
of  naval  construction,  is  determined  according  to 
the  efficiency  of  such  construction,  supplemented 
by  scientific  direction  prior  to  and  in  battle.  To 
this  must  be  added  strategic  considerations  that 
circumscribe  or  augment  the  opportunities  of  com- 
manders, diminishing  or  increasing  their  chances  of 
victory.  Such  are  the  conditions  that  must  be  in- 
vestigated by  all  who  wish  to  arrive  at  some  just 
approximation  of  the  outcome  of  modern  war. 

In  recent  times  no  means  of  deception  are  so 
widely  employed  as  statistical  tables.  They  have 
become  in  this  age  of  calculators  a  fetich  more  po- 
tent than  the  wonder-working  charms  of  a  primi- 
tive people.  In  the  beginning  of  1904  these  tables 
made  the  Russian  navy  third,  and  the  Japanese 
least,  of  the  great  powers. 



In  a  few  hours,  one  May  afternoon,  the  Russian 
navy  ceased  to  exist. 

In  statistical  tables  to-day,  we  find  that  by  vessels 
and  tonnage  the  United  States  navy  ranks  third, 
and  that  of  Japan  fifth.  Ordinarily  this  is  as  far  as 
the  casual  observer  goes.  To  him  it  is  self-evident 
that  a  naval  power  of  the  fifth  rank  could  not  hope 
to  compete  with  one  that  is  third  in  naval  suprem- 
acy. To  determine  the  truth  or  error  of  this  be- 
lief, and  whether  or  not  the  true  elements  of  naval 
superiority  are  proportionate  to  this  catalogue  of 
vessels,  or  are  to  a  degree  lacking,  is  the  first  duty 
of  every  citizen  who  wishes  to  arrive  at  a  just  con- 

In  modern  naval  warfare  there  are  three  fight- 
ing lines,  consisting  of  battleships,  armored  cruisers, 
and  torpedo  craft.  According  to  statistical  tables 
the  United  States  is  superior  to  Japan  in  battle- 
ships, though  correspondingly  inferior  in  armored 
cruisers  and  torpedo  craft.  But  since  the  battle 
of  Tsu-Shima  a  new  type  of  battleship  has  been 
introduced  into  the  world,  that  possesses  a  fighting 
capacity  equal  to  any  three  battleships,  now  in  the 
American  navy.  While  the  American  battleships 
exceed  in  number  those  of  the  Japanese,1  yet  the 
latter  possess  nearly  thirty  per  cent,  more  big  guns.2 

1  Appendix,  Table  IV. 

8  "  It  was  the  powerful  guns  of  our  batteries  that  inflicted  their 
casualties  upon  the  Japanese,  and  it  was  with  their  large-caliber 
guns  that  they  destroyed  our  fleet." — Admiral  ROJESTVENSKY. 



The  efficiency  of  the  means  employed  in  naval 
warfare  are  supposed  to  determine  the  probabilities 
of  victory,  yet  these  chances  are  great  or  small  as 
the  commanders  are  proficient  or  inexperienced  in 
the  duties  devolving  upon  them,  each  year  becom- 
ing more  intricate,  the  strain  more  constant  and 
wearing,  so  that  the  faculties  and  strength  of  men 
commanding  these  vast  ships  endure  only  so  long 
as  their  vigor  is  unimpaired  and  their  mentality  still 
possesses  the  keen  alertness  of  youth. 

Never  have  the  gods  of  all  the  tribes  put  upon 
the  seas  such  monsters  as  man  now  sends  over 
them.  To  contemplate  them  is  to  wonder;  to 
know  them  is  to  look  up  to  these  gods  and  smile. 
That  which  is  as  soft  as  iron  belongs  in  no  way  to 
them.  Their  steel  bowels,  grinding  and  rumbling  be- 
low the  splash  of  the  sea,  are  fed  on  quarried  rock. 
Their  arteries  are  steel,  their  nerves  copper,  their 
blood  red  and  blue  flames.  With  the  prescience  of 
the  supernatural,  they  peer  into  space.  Their  voices 
scream  through  gales,  and  they  whisper  together 
over  a  thousand  miles  of  sea.  They  reach  out  and 
destroy  that  which  the  eye  of  man  cannot  perceive. 

But  all  this  cyclopean  activity  depends  upon, 
fulfils  its  purpose  or  is  worthless  as  is  active  or 
wearied  the  tiny  brain  of  a  single  man.  All  this 
terribleness  will  vanish,  returning  again  into  the 
inanimate  whenever  the  capacity  and  vigor  of  the 
guiding  mind  deteriorates  or  is  worn  down  by  the 
years  that  have  stolen  away  the  quick  grasp  of  youth. 



Because  of  this  natural  deterioration  in  man  the 
American  navy,  even  if  it  were  perfect  in  every 
other  phase  of  its  construction  and  government,  its 
present  system  of  command  would  counteract  this 
efficiency,  and  all  that  which  had  gone  to  make  up  a 
great  navy  would,  in  some  few  hours  of  an  afternoon, 
vanish.  For  in  this  nation,  captains  are  not  com- 
missioned until  they  reach  the  age  of  fifty-six,  while 
in  Japan  the  average  age  of  such  officers  is  thirty- 
eight;  a  difference  of  nearly  twenty  years.  This  is 
not  all.  While  captains  in  the  American  navy  have 
only  four  and  a  half  years  in  this  grade,  the  Japanese 
have  eight,  giving  them  twice  as  much  experience 
though  they  are  twenty  years  younger.1 

As  the  success  of  armies  depends  primarily  upon 
the  ability  of  general  officers,  so  in  the  great  naval 
engagements  of  the  future,  where  fleets  instead  of 
single  vessels  will  engage  in  battle,  success  will  de- 
pend upon  the  ability,  vigor,  and  experience  of  sea- 
going flag-officers.  In  the  American  navy  rear- 
admirals  are  not  commissioned  until  they  reach  the 
advanced  age  of  sixty,  wrhile  in  Japan  officers  receive 
this  rank  at  forty-four.  In  America,  sea-going  flag- 
officers  only  pass  one  and  a  half  years  in  this  grade, 
while  in  Japan  such  officers  are  on  duty  for  eleven 

Whatever  faults  exist  in  the  American  navy, 
the  nation  and  not  the  navy  is  responsible.  That 

1  Appendix,  Table  V,  *  Appendix,  Table  V. 



in  many  of  the  vessels  armor  does  not  exist  in  vital 
parts,1  that  the  main  armor-belt  itself  is  wrongly 
placed,2  that  the  gun-ports  are  so  large  and  the 
secondary  batteries  so  placed  as  to  expose  both 
guns  and  gun-crews  to  destruction,3  that  the  navy 
is  without  adequate  torpedo  protection,4  and  that 
the  gun-decks  are  so  low  as  to  render  useless  a 
portion  of  the  ship's  armament  under  various  con- 
ditions of  the  sea5  are  in  no  way  the  fault  of  the 
navy.  For  these  and  many  other  deficiencies  that 
relegate  the  combative  power  of  the  American  navy 
to  a  comparatively  low  degree,  the  nation  is  alone 
responsible.  By  its  indifference,  as  expressed  through 
its  legislative  representatives,  these  things  have  come 
about — to  efface,  in  due  time,  all  the  victories  of 
the  past. 

These  deficiencies,  however,  do  not  affect  the  naval 
situation  existing  between  Japan  and  this  Republic; 
conditions  governing  their  relative  naval  strength 
in  the  Pacific  are  not  confined  to  catalogues  of  ships. 
Whether  perfect  or  useless,  these  vessels  last  for  no 
great  period  of  time.  Transient,  fragile,  these  gi- 
gantic fabrications  of  man  cannot  endure  for  long. 
Their  life  is  but  a  score  of  years,  if  they  do  not  vanish 
in  the  tragedy  of  a  single  hour. 

True  naval  comparison  is,  therefore,  not  based  on 
naval  tables  nor  good  nor  poor  ships,  but  on  condi- 

1  Appendix,  Table  Via.  J  Appendix,  Table  VIb. 

•Appendix,  Table  Vic.  *  Appendix,  Table  VId. 

5  Appendix,  Table  Vie. 



tions  that  shape,  not  only  the  building  of  navies 
but  the  destinies  of  nations.  In  such  a  comparison 
alone  can  we  determine  what  naval  forces  are 
necessary  for  this  Republic  to  maintain  in  order  to 
be  superior  over  Japan  so  long  as  their  interests 
clash  in  the  Pacific.  In  modern  times,  wherein  all 
the  phases  of  warfare  are  modified  from  year  to  year 
by  science  and  invention,  there  must  be  in  the  army 
and  navy  of  every  nation  a  progress  concurrent  with 
these  changes.  The  old  idea,  still  prevalent  in  this 
Republic,  that  armies  and  navies  are  but  transitory 
expedients,  brought  into  existence  only  in  the  time 
of  war  and  put  aside  when  it  ends,  will  sooner  or 
later  plunge  the  nation  into  that  abyss  out  of  which 
few  have  corne  forth.  Now,  and  in  the  future  more 
so,  must  all  preparations  for  war  be  made  in  time 
of  peace,  even  to  the  extent  of  working  out  hy- 
pothetical campaigns  in  probable  theatres  of 
war.  Whatever  nation  neglects  these  precautions 
is  doomed  to  defeat. 

The  navy  must  be  considered  as  being  co-existent 
with  the  nation,  and  to  be  constantly  prepared  for 
war  so  long  as  the  nation  shall  endure ;  expanding  in 
size  and  efficiency  as  the  nation  expands  in  political 
greatness;  progressing  as  science  and  invention  pro- 
gress, so  that  it  is  always  ready  to  encounter  those 
old  storms  that  fall  upon  nations  out  of  clear  skies. 
In  modern  times  there  are  four  conditions  that 
demand  continuity  in  the  building  of  a  navy  and  a 
prescience  in  the  nation's  naval  policy. 



While  a  battleship  endures  less  than  a  score  of 
years,  its  usefulness  may  cease  in  a  few  months. 
Not  only  does  it  take  years  to  build  such  ships,  but 
the  facilities  for  their  construction  are  limited.  A 
half-dozen  wars  could  be  lost  and  won  before  the 
destroyed  fleets  of  a  nation,  or  those  made  useless 
through  the  development  of  naval  science,  could  be 
replaced.  The  potential  naval  strength  of  a  nation 
is  determined  not  by  the  products  of  a  single  year, 
but  by  the  term  of  years  that  marks  its  duration; 
not  by  alternating  cycles  of  renascence  and  de- 
terioration, but  by  a  continuous  policy  of  production 
and  excellence  as  determined  from  year  to  year  by 
the  increasing  political  importance  of  the  nation 
and  the  progress  in  naval  invention.  To  accomplish 
this  the  navy  must  be  removed  far  from  the  sphere 
of  politics — that  state  of  transitory  ideals,  that  ideal 
of  transitory  greatness.  But  this  nation  has  not  put 
aside  the  characteristics,  so  prominent  in  republican 
forms  of  government,  of  treating  the  army  and  navy 
as  the  expedients  of  a  struggle,  rather  than  the  per- 
manent source  of  a  nation's  safety.  If  this  policy 
were  possible  in  the  past,  it  is  no  longer  so,  and  each 
succeeding  year  diminishes  its  probabilities. 

The  present  navy,  being  the  greatest  ever  possessed 
by  this  Republic,  is  an  illustration  of  the  evils  of 
sporadic  growth  upon  the  debris  piles  of  deteriora- 
tion. Instead  of  it  being  the  result  of  a  national 
ideal,  it  was  only  gained  through  the  strenuous  ef- 
forts of  the  executive.  Should  this  administration 
«  217 


be  succeeded  by  a  non-militant  one,  then  in  less 
than  four  years  the  American  navy  will  be  the  least 
efficient  among  the  navies  of  the  great  powers. 

The  continuity  of  a  nation's  naval  policy  forms,  in 
one  phase,  a  truer  basis  for  naval  comparison  be- 
tween two  powers. 

In  Japan  the  army  and  navy  are  placed  above 
and  beyond  the  reach  of  politics.1  Ministries  may 
rise  and  fall,  but  the  military  and  naval  develop- 
ment goes  on  unhindered,  co-existent  with  the  life 
and  greatness  of  the  empire  itself.  But  in  this  Re- 
public, not  only  is  there  no  continuity  in  naval  de- 
velopment, but  no  freedom  from  political  circum- 

While  the  effective  life  of  a  battleship  is  very 
brief,  its  efficiency  may  be  so  diminished  at  any  time 
as  to  render  it  practically  obsolete.  An  example  of 
this  is  seen  in  changes  of  naval  architecture  fol- 
lowing the  Japanese  -  Russian  War,  when,  by  the 
introduction  of  the  Dreadnaught  type  of  vessel, 
the  fighting  capacity  of  a  single  ship  was  trebled. 
Whenever,  therefore,  sudden  and  radical  changes  oc- 
cur in  naval  construction,  that  nation  which  possesses 
a  flexible  naval  system,  freed  from  all  political  re- 
strictions, will  alter  its  naval  policy  in  the  shortest 
time,  and  adjust  itself  to  new  conditions  before  the 
nation  whose  naval  department  is  the  shuttlecock 

1  Changes  in  the  Japanese  cabinet  do  not  affect  the  ministers 
of  war  or  navy.  They  are  almost  as  free  from  political  in- 
fluences as  the  Mikado. 



of  contending  political  factions  can  even  realize  the 
necessity  of  such  a  departure.  It  is  due  to  this  that 
the  Japanese  navy  is  so  superior  in  modern  fighting 
capacity  to  that  of  the  United  States.1 

Japan  constructs  a  twenty -thousand -ton  battle- 
ship of  the  new  type  in  two  years,  and  an  armored 
cruiser  in  less  time.  In  the  United  States  it  has  re- 
quired over  five  years  to  build  a  sixteen-thousand-ton 
battleship,  and  five  years  and  two  months  to  build 
an  armored  cruiser.  In  1909  Japan  will  have  four 
of  these  new  battleships  and  the  United  States  none ; 
in  1911  Japan  will  have  eight  and  this  nation  two. 
This  ratio  will  continue  so  long  as  the  American  navy 
remains  subject  to  public  indifference  and  political 
control :  in  one  administration  or  Congress,  sporadic 
in  energy  but  obsolete  in  construction;  in  another, 
dormant,  decadent,  forgotten. 

We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  deter- 
minate factor  in  naval  warfare  wherein  is  to  be  found 
the  true  comparison  of  naval  strength — the  strategic. 
No  nation's  naval  power  is  constant  in  its  relation 
to  all  countries.  The  efficiency  of  a  fleet  decreases 
or  is  augmented  as  the  distance  from  its  main  base 
to  the  theatre  of  war  is  lengthened  or  diminished. 
The  area  of  naval  efficiency  is  determined  by  the 
multiplicity,  dispersion,  and  efficiency  of  its  naval 
bases.  Without  these  depots  a  navy  decreases  in 
efficiency  as  it  increases  in  size. 

1  Appendix,  Table  IV. 


We  have,  in  the  previous  chapter,1  made  clear  the 
strategic  possibilities  of  the  Pacific  and  Japan's  re- 
lationship to  them  as  well  as  the  commanding  po- 
sition she  already  possesses.  The  strategic  situa- 
tion, concretely,  is  that  the  entire  Japanese  naval 
power,  not  alone  her  fleets,  but  her  navy  yards,  docks, 
arsenals,  people,  and  resources  are  situated  in  the 
strategic  centre  of  the  Pacific,  while  the  naval  bases 
and  naval  resources  of  the  United  States  are  in  the 
Atlantic  Ocean,  seventeen  thousand  miles  from  the 
sphere  of  this  approaching  struggle.  The  larger 
the  American  navy  becomes  under  these  conditions 
the  less  capable  is  it  to  wage  war  in  the  Pacific. 

To  overcome  these  difficulties  must  be  the  first 
consideration  of  this  Republic;  hence  it  is  the  pri- 
mordial basis  of  naval  comparison  between  the  two 
nations.  In  the  previous  chapter  was  made  apparent 
what  this  nation  must  accomplish  in  order  to  main- 
tain a  fleet  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  viz.,  the  establish- 
ment of  naval  bases  in  the  Philippines,  Hawaii, 
Alaska,  Washington,  Oregon,  and  California,  to- 
gether with  their  complete  protection  against  land 
attack,  and  the  maintenance  in  the  Pacific  of  fleets 
equal  to  the  entire  navy  of  Japan.  None  of  these 
things  exist,  even  in  an  embryonic  state,  and,  instead 
of  preparation  being  made  to  remedy  them,  active 
opposition  is  manifest  throughout  the  Republic. 
Unless  this  is  done  in  time  of  peace  Japan  will  ac- 




complish  in  war  what  has  been  shown  to  be  her 

In  the  succeeding  chapters  will  be  shown,  step  by 
step,  the  ultimate  conquest  of  the  Pacific,  and  the 
elimination  of  this  Republic  from  its  government 
and  its  destinies  in  a  manner  no  different  from  the 
fate  of  China  and  Russia. 

Were  the  American  navy  twice  its  tonnage,  twice 
the  number  of  vessels,  all  other  conditions  remaining 
the  same,  it  would  affect  in  no  way  nor  in  any  degree 
the  culmination  of  this  approaching  struggle.  The 
conquest  of  the  Pacific  is  beyond  the  ton  weight  of 
steel  or  the  old,  old  catalogue  of  ships. 


NATIONS,  especially  republics,  oftentimes  go  to 
extremes  in  the  advocacy  of  some  popular 
measure  that  for  the  time  being  finds  favor  with 
the  masses.  This  has  been  true  during  the  last  few 
years  in  the  struggle  to  gain  a  navy  commensurate 
with  the  political  development  of  the  Republic. 
The  advocates  of  naval  expansion  have,  however, 
given  a  wrong  impression  to  the  public,  not  as  to 
the  necessity  of  a  navy,  but  as  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  enterprises  that  are  beyond  its  sphere. 

A  nation  without  a  navy  proportionate  to  its 
political  responsibilities  will  soon  be  deprived  of 
its  power  beyond  the  sea;  but  a  country  that  risks 
its  entire  dependence  upon  a  navy  places  itself  in 
a  position,  not  only  to  lose  the  navy  but  its  insular 
possessions,  and,  suffering  defeat  within  its  boun- 
daries, be  deprived  of  world  significance. 

Neither  now  nor  in  the  future  will  international 
conflicts  be  determined  by  naval  engagements.  In 
some  instances  naval  victories  may  produce  con- 
ditions that  will  tend  to  hasten  the  conclusion  of 
a  war,  but  such  a  state  of  national  weakness  is  prob- 
lematical. Only  those  who  overlook  the  natural 



laws  governing  international  struggles  fail  to  com- 
prehend that  victory  or  defeat  is  relative  to  the 
power  or  weakness  of  a  nation  as  a  whole. 

To  affect,  to  cripple,  or  destroy  a  nation  in  war- 
fare can  only  be  done  by  injuring  to  that  degree  its 
power  of  government,  its  resources,  and  its  ability 
to  defend  itself  against  the  enforcement  of  hostile 
demands.  If  the  entire  German  navy  were  sunk 
in  the  North  Sea,  England  could  get  no  nearer 
Berlin  than  she  is  to-day,  and  the  demands  that  she 
might  then  make  upon  the  German  Empire  could 
no  more  be  enforced  than  at  any  time  prior  to  the 
destruction  of  that  nation's  navy.  The  multiplicity 
of  the  arteries  of  modern  trade  and  interchange 
prevents  the  possibility  of  blockade. 

If  the  entire  American  navy  should  suddenly  be 
destroyed  in  a  storm  or  war,  it  would  have  no  effect 
whatsoever  upon  the  government  of  the  Republic, 
upon  its  resources  or  power.  As  all  wars  have  been,  so 
in  the  future  will  they  be,  determined  by  land  warfare. 

Naval  engagements,  being  remote  from  a  nation, 
affect  it  only  as  a  single  battle.  The  number  of  men 
destroyed  is,  compared  to  the  nation,  insignificant. 
Neither  the  political  constitution  of  the  country, 
nor  means  to  wage  war,  nor  the  belligerent  attitude 
of  the  people  are  affected.  When  a  nation's  navy 
is  destroyed  it  will  then  assume  a  land  defence,  and 
only  subsequent  to  the  defeat  of  its  armies,  the  pass- 
ing of  its  territory  and  resources  into  the  hands  of 
an  enemy,  will  it  consider  surrender. 



The  navy  is  but  a  portion  of  the  military  forces  of 
a  nation,  and  was  originally  composed  of  soldiers. 
In  recent  years  it  has  the  appearance  of  being  a 
separate  institution,  but  to  consider  it  as  such  is  to 
mistake  the  essential  characteristics  of  warfare.  A 
navy  to-day  is  more  dependent  upon  the  land  forces 
of  a  nation  than  heretofore. 

Navies  are  not  self-sustaining  in  any  degree  what- 
soever. Nothing  that  is  necessary  for  their  main- 
tenance can  be  gotten  by  them  out  of  the  sea.  The 
vast  theatre  of  war,  where  their  campaigns  are  made 
and  battles  fought,  is  as  barren  as  the  desert.  In 
consequence,  naval  bases  are  as  necessary  as  fleets 
in  every  sea  where  nations  have  established  or  ex- 
pect to  extend  their  suzerainty. 

As  we  have  shown  in  a  previous  chapter  and  by 
chart,1  every  naval  base  is  the  centre  of  a  naval 
sphere  of  activity,  the  radii  of  which  are  determined 
by  the  steaming  capacity  of  the  fleets  based  upon  it. 

The  value  of  naval  bases  diminishes  as  the  square 
of  the  distance  between  the  extremes  of  their  radii 

A  nation  that  expects  to  be  supreme  in  any  ocean 
must  be  governed  by  the  principle  that  the  distance 
between  its  naval  bases  must  never  exceed  the  sum 
of  the  radii  of  any  two  of  them. 

The  security  of  naval  bases  rests  fundamentally 
with  their  land  defence.  To  depend  upon  the  navy 

1  Chart  I. 


to  protect  its  own  bases  in  all  emergencies  is  to  re- 
duce naval  and  military  science  to  absurdity.  To 
attempt  the  protection  of  naval  bases  by  permanent 
batteries  alone  is  only  to  be  ignorant  of  the  changes 
modern  means  of  transportation  have  made  in  re- 
gard to  the  value  of  harbor  defences.  If  once  the 
enemy  gains  temporary  command  of  the  sea,  and 
at  the  same  times  possesses  adequate  transport 
fleets,  it  will  be  able  to  seize  every  naval  base  by 
land  attack,  unless  prevented  by  mobile  armies  in 
their  rear.  Modern  harbor  fortifications  consist  of 
series  of  detached  batteries,  and  their  only  defence 
rests  on  armies  equal  in  size  and  efficiency  to  any 
that  an  enemy  may  land  adjacent  to  or  distant  from 
the  harbors  they  intend  to  capture. 

For  the  United  States  to  lose  temporary  posses- 
sion of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  as  will  necessarily  be  the 
case,  owing  to  the  complete  lack  of  protected  naval 
bases  and  a  navy  sufficiently  great  to  overcome  the 
natural  strategic  difficulties  of  a  naval  war  with 
Japan,  means,  as  we  will  hereafter  show,  that  it 
could  not  in  the  same  war  undertake  a  second  naval 
enterprise  in  this  sea.  War  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan  will  be  upon  land.  Armies  rather 
than  navies  will  constitute  from  beginning  to  end 
the  determinate  factors  in  this  approaching  strug- 

To  make  a  just  comparison  between  the  Japanese 
and  American  armies,  their  military  systems  in 
general,  as  well  as  their  potential  military  power,  is, 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

in  some  respects,  a  difficult  undertaking.  Patriot- 
ism on  the  one  hand  and  prejudice  on  the  other  are 
apt  to  circumscribe  facts,  though  every  effort  has 
been  made  to  avoid  partisanship  as  well  as  an- 
tipathy. It  is  due  to  this  cold  exactitude  of  truth 
that  there  may  come  into  our  work  another  bitter- 
ness more  sombre  and  foreboding  than  has  here- 
tofore been  expressed. 

The  worth  of  armies  is  not  measured  by  their 
magnitude,  but  by  the  perfection  of  their  con- 
struction, by  the  spirit  that  inspires  them,  and  by 
the  skill  displayed  in  their  use. 

The  capacity  of  armies  is  not  constant  in  all 
theatres  of  war  nor  against  all  nations.  The  maxi- 
mum military  strength  Germany  could  put  into  the 
field  against  China  would  be  much  less  than  she 
could  place  in  New  Jersey  or  against  the  frontiers  of 
Austria  and  France.  As  in  naval  comparison,  it  is 
erroneous  to  say  that  one  nation  is  first  in  military 
power  and  another  sixth  or  seventh.  In  armies, 
as  in  naval  forces,  generalizations  are  not  permissible 
if  a  just  comparison  of  strength  between  two  na- 
tions is  sought. 

The  armies  of  two  combatants  must  be  considered 
intrinsically,  comparatively,  then  in  relation  to  the 
theatre  of  war  and  the  strategic  conditions  extant. 
The  strategic  position  of  one  power  may  be  so 
favorable,  as  to  require  an  excessive  increase  of  force 
on  the  part  of  the  other  in  order  to  overcome  nat- 
ural impediments.  Again,  that  which  appears  in 



peace  to  be  an  obstacle,  oftentimes  in  war  becomes 
an  actual  aid. 

The  first  consideration  must  be  given  to  the 
intrinsic  merits  or  deficiencies  of  the  two  armies. 
This  comparison  in  modern  times,  while  not  exact, 
is  possible  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  the  past. 
And  as  science  enters  more  fully  into  the  construc- 
tion and  employment  of  armies,  the  more  must  their 
training  be  confined  to  the  time  of  peace  and  the 
longer  must  that  training  be  carried  on.  To  the 
degree  of  its  thoroughness  or  superficiality,  to  its 
approximation  of  war  conditions  and  actualities, 
are  we  able  to  form,  in  times  of  peace,  an  estimation 
of  an  army's  capacity  in  war. 

The  force  that  Japan  could  almost  immediately 
place  in  the  field  exceeds  a  million  and  a  quarter  of 
men,1  all  of  whom  have  had  three  years'  training  in 
the  regular  army  and  in  specific  branches  of  service. 
Over  eight  hundred  thousand  have  had  the  addi- 
tional experience  of  from  one  year  to  a  year  and  a 
half  on  the  battlefields  of  Manchuria.  The  officers 
of  these  forces  are  technically  trained  in  military 
science  and  in  all  the  strange  emergencies  of  actual 

In  the  struggle  with  Russia  the  efficiency  of  the 
Japanese  forces  exceeded,  to  the  most  minute  de- 
tails, that  of  any  army  which  has  heretofore  taken 

"The  Japanese  put  into  the  field  against  us  troops  of  various 
categories  to  the  number  of  1,500,000 — or  more  than  three 
times  the  estimate  of  our  general  staff." — KUROPATKIN. 



the  field.  This  effectiveness  is  due  primarily 
to  the  fact  that  the  armies  of  modern  Japan 
were  not  organized  until  after  the  Franco-Prussian 

Moreover,  there  were  in  Japan  none  of  those  prej- 
udiced associations  that  have  prevented,  from  time 
to  time,  the  reorganization  of  national  armies, 
The  character  of  the  Japanese  people,  in  addition, 
permitted  the  development  of  German  militarism 
to  a  high  degree.  It  was  only  necessary  to  congeal 
the  feudal  system  of  old  Japan  into  the  modern 
feudalism  of  Germany,  while  in  the  Mikado  was  re- 
tained the  first  attribute  of  a  military  nation — 
absolute  centralization  of  power.1  In  all  phases  of 
national  life  Japan  is  pregnant  with  the  spirit  of 
militarism.  The  religion  of  the  nation  is  militant, 
and  the  empire  is  ridged  with  Hills  of  Kudan,  within 
whose  temples  are  enshrined  the  spirits  of  those  who 
have  gone  down  in  battle.  Their  social  organism 
is  based  upon  supremacy  of  the  samurai ;  the  trades- 
man ranks  below  the  toiler  of  the  soil  and  sea.  The 
national  ideal  is  the  bushido,  the  lists  of  the  armed 
knight,  the  way  of  the  knightly  man. 

The  American  army  in  time  of  peace  is  limited  by 
Congress  to  one  hundred  thousand  men,  but  public 
indifference  and  prejudice  against  military  activity 
has  reduced  this  force  to  less  than  fifty  thousand. 

1 "  The  strength  of  Japan  was  in  the  complete  union  of  her 
people,  army,  and  government,  and  it  was  this  union  that  gave 
her  the  victory." — KUROPATKIN. 



While  Japan  in  modern  military  development  came 
into  existence  subsequent  to  the  Franco-Prussian 
War,  the  United  States,  in  the  same  sense,  came  into 
being  prior  to  the  Napoleonic  struggles,  and  the 
American  military  system  of  to-day  was  the  system 
of  Europe  one  hundred  and  fifty  years  ago ;  and  there 
has  been,  not  only  a  lack  of  development,  but  in 
many  respects  deterioration.  The  regular  army  as 
now  constructed  and  stationed  could  not  mobilize 
on  the  Pacific  coast,  in  event  of  war  with  Japan,  a 
field  force  of  twenty  thousand  men,  while  six  hun- 
dred thousand  are  necessary. 

In  the  regular  army  and  militia  of  the  United 
States,  the  essentials  of  military  organization  on  a 
war  basis  are  absent.  No  staffs  exist;  no  organiza- 
tion of  units ;  no  plans  for  mobilization ;  no  means  of 
transportation  or  caring  for  large  bodies  of  troops; 
no  military  equipment  nor  means  to  produce  it. 
While  Japan  has  over  fifty  thousand  scientifically 
trained  military  officers,  the  United  States  has  less 
than  four  thousand.  A  war  with  Japan,  necessitat- 
ing the  mobilization  of  a  force  equal  to  that  which 
Japan  could  put  in  the  field,  would  result  in  placing 
the  American  armies  under  the  command  of  officers, 
ninety-two  per  cent,  of  whom  would  be,  not  only 
wholly  ignorant  of  the  science  of  war,  but,  being 
appointed  through  political  preference,  would  repre- 
sent only  an  inferior  quality  of  incapacity.1  Were  it 

1  Appendix,  Table  Villa. 


possible  for  the  rank  and  file  of  the  volunteer  forces 
to  be  as  efficient  as  the  Japanese  line,  they  would 
only  be  led  to  disaster  and  slaughter  through  the 
incompetence  of  their  civilian  officers. 

The  efficiency  of  every  army  is  determined  by  the 
efficiency  of  its  corps  of  officers.  Though  self- 
evident,  it  is  not  fully  understood  that  in  great 
wars  the  genius  and  knowledge,  the  ability  and 
experience  of  general  officers  determine  more  than 
any  other  factor  the  success  or  failure  of  campaigns. 
Owing  to  the  American  system,  there  would  not  be, 
in  event  of  war,  a  single  American  officer  who  has 
ever  handled,  in  peace  or  war,  a  corps  of  troops. 
Japanese  generals,  on  the  other  hand,  have  fed, 
marched,  cared  for,  placed  on  the  field  of  battle, 
supplied  with  food  and  ammunition,  manoeuvred, 
and  fought  several  army  corps  simultaneously  with 
science  and  exactitude. 

Success  in  military  operations  depends  primarily 
upon  the  excess  of  rapidity  that  one  army  has  over 
another  in  reaching  a  theatre  of  war  and  moving 
therein.  As  the  theatre  of  war  increases  in  distance 
from  the  main  bases  of  the  combatants  and  extends 
in  area,  armies  become  more  dependent  upon  the 
rapidity  and  capacity  of  means  of  transportation. 
As  an  army  is  limited  or  retarded  in  gaining  strategic 
positions  in  a  theatre  of  war,  its  worth  is  decreased 
accordingly.  If  a  theatre  of  war  is  trans-oceanic, 
and  the  means  of  transportation  limited,  then  a 
great  army  at  home  dwindles  down  to  the  size  of  a 



single  contingent,  as  determined  by  the  capacity  of 
the  transport  fleet  per  voyage, 

Modern  means  of  transportation  and  communica- 
tion, while  shrinking  in  a  practical  sense  the  size 
of  the  world,  have  to  a  corresponding  degree  in- 
creased the  area  of  modern  and  future  warfare.  It 
has  become  necessary  for  all  nations  having  isolated 
possessions  to  defend,  or  a  vast  area  of  continental 
territory  to  protect,  to  provide  in  times  of  peace 
adequate  means  of  transportation. 

If,  at  the  present  time,  a  state  of  war  existed  be- 
tween this  Republic  and  another  country  which 
necessitated  the  transportation  of  one  hundred 
thousand  troops  to  the  Philippines,  and  to  this  end 
the  United  States  should  utilize  the  eight  American 
trans-Pacific  steamers  that  constitute  the  entire 
American  merchant  marine  in  the  Pacific,  it  would 
require  two  years  to  transport  this  number  of  men. 
To  oppose  their  landing,  a  force  no  larger  than  the 
capacity  of  the  transports  per  voyage  would  be 
necessary.  The  value  of  the  American  army  for 
use  in  transoceanic  warfare  is  determined  in  one 
phase  by  the  capacity  of  its  means  of  transportation. 
The  complete  absence  of  these  means  was  recently 
made  clear  to  the  Republic  when  it  witnessed  that 
melancholy  and  foreboding  spectacle  of  sixteen 
American  battleships  convoyed  by  twenty -eight 
vessels  flying  a  foreign  flag,  without  which  they 
could  not  have  steamed  beyond  the  sphere  of 
their  Atlantic  bases,  and  the  journey  to  the 



Pacific  would  have  been  but  an  idle  specula- 

Japan,  being  an  Island  Empire,  was  forced  to 
realize  early  in  her  association  with  the  world  as  a 
whole  that  her  political  sphere  would  remain  cir- 
cumscribed to  her  islands  so  long  as  she  was  unable 
to  move  freely  over  the  seas.  This  necessity  has 
developed,  under  governmental  inspiration  and  con- 
trol, a  system  of  merchant  marine,  which  in  time 
of  war  passes,  as  conditions  necessitate,  under  direct 
control  of  the  government.  The  Japanese  trans- 
port fleets  consist  of  a  hundred  steamers,  ranging 
from  one  thousand  to  fourteen  thousand  tons  each.1 
On  these  fleets  can  be  transported  at  one  time  two 
hundred  thousand  men,  together  with  their  entire 
equipment.  These  vessels,  leaving  the  ports  of 
Japan,  would  be  able  to  reach  the  Philippines  in 
five  days;  Hawaii  in  fourteen;  the  coast  of  Cali- 
fornia in  twenty- two  days;  the  coasts  of  Alaska, 
Washington,  and  Oregon  in  less  than  twenty. 

We  have,  in  the  first  part  of  this  work,2  shown  the 
worthlessness  of  volunteers  in  modern  warfare,  and 
the  inefficiency  of  the  American  volunteers  as  dem- 
onstrated in  the  past  wars  of  the  nation.  We  will 
now  consider  the  regular  army  of  the  United  States, 
in  order  to  determine  whether  or  not  it  can  be 
utilized  in  a  war  with  Japan  as  a  nucleus  upon 
which  to  build  an  army  of  suitable  proportions  in 

» Appendix,  Table  VII. 

1  See  Book  I,  chap,  iv;  Appendix,  Table  VIII. 


the  course  of  two  or  three  years.  In  this  considera- 
tion we  will,  by  the  exemplification  of  permanent 
peace  conditions,  show  the  actual  state  in  which 
each  branch  of  the  army  exists,  so  that  each  for 
himself  may  judge  of  its  efficiency  or  inadequacy. 

In  an  international  war  the  harbor  and  coast 
fortifications  are  supposed  to  be  the  first  line  of  a 
nation's  defence,  if  the  enemy  has  command  of  the 
sea.  In  Alaska,  Hawaii,  Samoa,  and  the  Philip- 
pines there  are  no  such  fortifications.  On  the 
Pacific  coast,  San  Diego,  San  Francisco,  the  Colum- 
bia River,  and  Puget  Sound  depend  upon  their  forts 
for  protection,  with  a  serenity  that,  in  light  of  their 
defencelessness  and  incapacity,  is  but  a  grave  ex- 
ample of  public  indifference  and  ignorance  concern- 
ing military  affairs.  The  cry  for  more  fortifications 
that  from  time  to  time  goes  up  from  different  parts 
of  the  nation  is,  in  its  true  significance,  nothing  other 
than  the  evil  banshee  of  this  Republic :  the  shirking 
of  military  duties,  and  laying  upon  the  inanimate  in- 
struments of  warfare  the  responsibility  of  this 
nation's  safety. 

The  coast  defences  of  the  United  States  consist  of 
sixty-seven  forts,  defending  twenty-eight  harbors. 
In  December,  1906,  Congress  was  informed  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  that  of  the  batteries  then  con- 
structed two  hundred  and  sixty-eight  were  out  of 
commission,  and  only  one  hundred  and  twenty-four 
in  commission.  This  means  that  of  the  eleven 
hundred  guns  emplaced  only  three  hundred  and 
16  233 


ninety  could  be  brought  into  action.  To  fully  man 
these  sixty-seven  forts  requires  sixteen  hundred  and 
thirty-four  officers,  forty  thousand  six  hundred  and 
seventy-five  men.  There  are  now  available  only 
three  hundred  and  fifty-seven  officers  and  ten  thou- 
sand seven  hundred  men — not  enough  to  keep  the 
guns  or  machinery  from  rusting. 

The  coast  artillery  is  one  of  the  most  highly  spe- 
cialized corps  in  the  army,  and  requires  men  of 
superior  intelligence  and  training.  To  fill  their  ranks 
with  civilians  recruited  after  a  war  is  begun  would 
be  the  same  as  detailing  a  salesman  to  make  a 
topographical  survey,  or  a  tinsmith  to  complete  a 
work  of  electrical  engineering. 

The  Regular  Army  of  the  United  States,  inclusive 
of  all  branches  of  the  service,  is  more  than  thirty 
per  cent,  below  the  minimum  required  by  law,  show- 
ing that  it  is  not  the  fault  of  the  government  so 
much  as  it  is  public  contempt  for  military  enterprise 
that  is  responsible  for  the  depleted  condition  of  the 
American  army,  not  only  numerically,  but  in  the 
sense  of  vigor  and  esprit  de  corps. 

In  the  grade  of  second-lieutenant  the  army,  even 
in  its  depleted  condition,  is  almost  thirty-eight  per 
cent,  short.  In  the  Coast  Artillery,  thirty  per  cent, 
of  the  companies  are  without  captains;  sixty- three 
per  cent,  without  the  prescribed  number  of  lieu- 
tenants. In  the  Field  Artillery,  comprising  thirty 
batteries,  twenty-two  of  them  are  without  the  pre- 
scribed number  of  officers.  Some  batteries  are  re- 



duced  to  two  guns  and  forty  men.  The  infantry  is 
in  no  better  condition.  In  the  Eleventh  Regiment 
we  find  seven  privates  and  four  non-commissioned 
officers  constituting  a  battalion. 

It  was  said  long  ago  by  Marshal  St.  Cyr  that  every 
army  is  made  up  of  three  kinds  of  soldiers:  one- 
third  naturally  brave,  one-third  naturally  cowards, 
the  other  third  capable  of  being  made  brave  by 
good  officers  and  stern  discipline.  If,  however,  the 
proper  officers  are  lacking  or  discipline  is  inadequate, 
the  middle  third  naturally  gravitates  to  the  coward- 
ly third.  Examples  of  this  have  been  seen  on  many 
an  American  field  of  battle.  Instead  of  this  serving 
as  a  warning,  the  present  military  organization  of 
the  Republic  shows,  in  time  of  peace,  the  total 
absence  of  the  very  conditions  that  not  only  Mar- 
shal St.  Cyr  but  the  experience  of  the  whole  world 
has  shown  to  be  necessary  in  the  organization  and 
conduct  of  armies.1 

To  judge,  in  time  of  peace,  the  worth  of  an  army 
in  warfare  will  oftentimes  prove  erroneous.  It  is 
only  possible  to  judge  the  respective  merits  of  na- 
tional armaments,  military  systems  and  the  numeri- 
cal strength  of  the  forces.  By  such  comparisons 
one  may  come  to  reasonable  conclusions  as  to  the 
probabilities  of  victory.  But,  in  addition,  there 
must  be  considered  the  militancy  of  the  race  or 
nation,  upon  which,  more  than  any  other  factor, 

1  Appendix,  Table  IX. 


depends  the  success  or  failure  of  military  works. 
This  is  by  no  means  an  intangible  something  that 
the  vicissitudes  of  war  alone  develops.  The  pres- 
ence or  lack  of  it  can  be  determined  quantitatively, 
and  to  a  degree  qualitatively,  in  all  nationalities 
prior  to  war.  The  presence  or  absence  of  this  ability 
is,  in  peace,  determined  by  the  attitude  of  the  na- 
tion as  a  whole  toward  military  activity,  and  by  the 
relative  position  that  men  in  the  army  and  in  civil 
life  bear  to  society. 

When  the  ideal  of  a  nation,  its  religion,  its  aspira- 
tions, national  and  individual,  are  militant,  as  in 
Japan,  then  one  can  expect  to  find  militancy  de- 
veloped to  a  high  degree.  In  this  country,  how- 
ever, there  exists  not  only  individual  prejudice 
against  military  ideals,  but  public  antipathy;  the 
antagonism  of  politicians,  newspapers,  churches, 
colleges,  labor  unions,  theorists,  and  organized 
societies.  They  combat  the  military  spirit  as  if  it 
were  a  public  evil  and  a  national  crime.  Under 
these  conditions  it  is  impossible  to  find  the  spirit 
of  militancy  other  than  in  a  most  debased  form, 
and  this,  terrible  as  is  its  significance,  has  come  to 
be  the  normal  condition  of  the  Republic. 

To  judge  the  discipline,  morale,  and  fighting  ca- 
pacity of  troops,  their  loyalty  and  self-sacrifice,  is 
possible  in  two  ways:  during  active  service,  by 
cowardice  and  desertion;  in  peace,  by  disobedience 
and  desertion.  The  Ten  Commandments  of  a  sol- 
dier's honor  are  all  broken  in  the  one  act  of  de- 



sertion.  By  the  lack  of  or  prevalency  of  this 
military  crime  are  we  able  to  judge  the  degree  that 
national  non-militancy  and  antipathy  to  military 
ideals  have  on  the  soldier.  The  deserter  is  the 
product  of  civil  life,  not  of  militant  institutions. 

In  Japan  desertion  is  unknown. 

In  the  United  States  during  1906  there  occurred 
in  the  national  army  of  only  sixty  thousand  men, 
sixty-two  hundred  and  eighty  desertions.1 

Whenever  a  recognizable  deterioration  exists  in 
some  portion  of  the  government,  instead  of  meet- 
ing this  condition  frankly  and  undertaking  in  a  just 
and  reasonable  manner  its  renascence,  the  nation 
endeavors  by  substitution  to  evade  responsibility. 
With  war  near  at  hand,  public  evasion  is  found  in 
the  formation  of  shooting  or  rifle  clubs,  under  the 
delusion  that  to  shoot  constitutes  the  sole  duty  of 
a  soldier  and  is  the  source  of  all  military  success. 
The  fatal  error  of  this  belief  is  shown  in  a  single 
comparison  of  the  internal  economy  of  the  Japanese 
and  American  armies,  demonstrating  that  in  those 
phases  of  military  activity  least  considered  rests  not 
only  an  army's  efficiency  but  existence.  To  shoot 
is  less  important  than  to  march ;  to  shoot  accurately 
less  important  than  to  obey  implicitly;  to  kill  less 
important  than  to  survive. 

The  energy  of  an  army,  or  its  fighting  capacity, 
depends  primarily  upon  the  physical  vigor  of  the 

1  Appendix,  Table  VHIb. 

men  that  compose  it.  A  body  of  men  to  fight  and 
march  and  endure  the  hardships  of  war  must  be  as 
physically  perfect  as  possible.  A  sick  man  entails 
a  greater  loss  than  a  man  killed  on  the  field,  so  that 
the  ability  of  an  army  to  conquer  decreases  geo- 
metrically as  sickness  and  mortality  increase  in 
excessive  ratio  over  the  number  killed  in  battle. 

In  the  American  Civil  War  more  than  four  men 
died  from  preventable  sickness  to  every  one  killed.1 
In  the  Spanish-American  War  fourteen  men  died  of 
disease  to  one  on  the  battle-field.2  In  the  Japanese 
army  during  the  Russian  War  four  deaths  resulted 
from  bullets  to  one  from  sickness.3 

In  a  war  between  Japan  and  the  United  States, 
should  the  ratio  of  deaths  in  the  American  army 
remain  the  same  as  during  the  Civil  War,  while  in 
the  Japanese  forces  the  ratio  of  the  Russian  War 
should  continue,  the  result  would  be  that  for  every 
ten  thousand  American  soldiers  killed  on  the  field 
more  than  forty  thousand  would  die  from  prevent- 
able sickness;  while  for  every  ten  thousand  Japan- 
ese killed  only  twenty-five  hundred  would  die  from 
disease.  Should  the  total  deaths  on  the  battle- 
field during  the  war  amount  to  fifty  thousand  for 
each  nation,  the  American  casualties  from  disease 
alone  would  be  more  than  two  hundred  thousand, 
while  the  Japanese  losses  would  only  amount  to 
twelve  thousand  five  hundred.  Should  the  Spanish- 

1  Appendix,  Table  Xa.  2  Appendix,  Table  Xb. 

3  Appendix,  Table  Xc. 



American  War  form  the  true  basis  for  comparison, 
then  the  total  American  losses  from  disease  would 
amount  to  seven  hundred  thousand,  as  against 
twelve  thousand  five  hundred  Japanese. 


WHENEVER  a  nation's  attitude  toward  war  is 
evasive,  its  conduct  indecisive  and  its  prepa- 
ration an  indifferent,  orderless  assembling  of  forces, 
it  prepares  for  defeat. 

Preparation  for  war  must  be  definite  in  purpose, 
specific  in  application.  There  is  no  uncertainty  in 
determining  a  nation's  probable  adversaries  within 
such  periods  of  time  as  to  permit  preparedness, 
the  adaptation  of  armaments  to  specific  purposes 
and  defined  theatres  of  war. 

The  objective  of  military  activity  must  determine 
the  character  of  its  preparation.  But  there  can 
be  no  adaptation  of  military  means  to  a  definite 
end  when  this  preparation  is  purposeless  and  the 
government  of  it  nebulous  and  vain.  A  nation's 
military  preparedness  cannot  be  constant  nor  apply 
equally  to  all  countries,  but  must  vary  with  each 
combatant,  and  must  be  determined  by  the  strategic 
advantages  or  difficulties  extant.  The  character  of 
military  preparation  is  not  identical  in  any  two  wars 
where  exist  chronological,  racial  or  topographical 

Whenever  a  nation  denies  the  basic  and  evolu- 


tionary  character  of  warfare  in  the  development 
and  expansion  of  nationalities,  rigid  military  sys- 
tems come  into  being.  This  rigidity  in  military 
science  is  an  anomaly  that  has  time  and  again 
brought  about  the  defeat  and  eventual  dissolution 
of  nations. 

The  evolution  of  warfare  is  constant  in  cause  and 
effect,  whether  we  consider  the  time  and  phalanxes 
of  Alexander,  the  legions  of  Cassar,  or  the  changes 
in  armament  and  tactics  that  were  introduced  by 
Charles  XII.,  Frederick  the  Great,  Napoleon,  Schorn- 
horst,  Von  Moltke,  or  Yamagata.  The  successes  of 
these  captains  were  made  certain  by  the  application 
of  new  means  and  methods  of  warfare. 

No  phase  of  national  activity  demands  so  much 
flexibility  in  administration  and  development  as  the 
military  and  naval  departments;  no  part  of  the 
government  tends  more  quickly  to  deterioration  if 
once  they  become  subject  to  fixed  and  unalterable 
systems.  Not  only  must  all  preparation  for  war 
be  flexible  as  regards  armament  and  training,  but 
also  capable  of  instant  change,  as  the  probabilities 
of  war  shift  from  one  theatre  of  combat  to  another. 

Conditions  governing  military  preparedness  in  a 
conflict  with  Mexico  have  nothing  to  do  with  factors 
controlling  military  preparations  for  a  war  with 
Germany.  Moreover,  the  purposes  of  the  enemy  in 
making  war,  his  armaments,  objective  theatres  of 
war  and  innumerable  other  conditions  must  deter- 
mine, in  variant  gradations,  concurrent  changes  in 



this  nation's  preparations;  these  must  be  approxi- 
mated and  prepared  for  in  times  of  peace. 

Whenever  preparation  for  war  is  regarded  only  as 
an  expedient  applicable  to  abnormal  conditions, 
and  is  postponed  to  the  beginning  of  hostilities, 
then  the  nation,  in  modern  times,  is  plunged  into 
a  struggle  that  shall  terminate  only  in  destruc- 

The  chances  of  success  in  modern  warfare  are 
proportionate  to  the  rapidity  with  which  the  military 
and  naval  power  of  a  nation  can  adapt  itself  to  new 
conditions  and  diverse  theatres  of  war.  When  spe- 
cific preparation  against  a  known  enemy  and  in 
a  predetermined  theatre  of  war  is  lacking,  though 
general  preparedness  has  not  been  neglected,  the 
difficulties  of  conducting  the  war  are  diminished 
only  in  a  small  degree.  In  some  instances  unfore- 
seen conditions  will  prove  so  restrictive  that  war 
cannot  be  carried  on  in  the  enemy's  principal  theatre 
of  war,  though  the  nation  is  possessed  of  both  armies 
and  navies.  Governed  by  these  facts,  it  must  be 
ascertained  what  preparation  this  nation  has  made 
for  conducting  a  war  against  Japan  before  the  con- 
flict itself  can  be  considered. 

The  theatre  of  this  war,  as  a  whole,  will  be  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  divisible  into  six  spheres  of  combat: 
the  Philippines,  Hawaii,  Alaska,  Washington,  Ore- 
gon, and  California.  The  salient  characteristic  that 
forms  the  determinate  factor  in  the  conduct  and 
conclusion  of  this  conflict  is  found  in  the  vast  dis- 



tances  that  must  be  traversed  by  the  armies  and 
fleets  of  both  nations. 

In  this  approaching  war,  as  in  all  international 
combats,  the  possession  of  strategic  positions  con- 
stitutes the  main  struggle  of  both  nations,  since  it 
is  in  the  permanent  control  of  these  that  are  to  be 
found  those  elements  of  military  and  naval  power 
that  will  determine  the  eventual  consummation  of 
the  war.  The  strategic  positions  forming  the  de- 
terminate factors  in  a  war  between  Japan  and  this 
Republic  are  entirely  American,  and  if  they  were 
defended  to  the  extent  that  an  attack  on  them  was 
doubtful  of  success,  then  the  probabilities  of  war 
would  be  remote.  But  these  territories  are  naked 
of  defence,  and  because  of  this  nakedness  they  con- 
stitute an  irresistible  inducement  to  the  ambitions 
of  a  martial  race. 

The  conditions  that  determine  the  seizure  and 
control  of  the  American  Pacific  possessions  apply  to 
this  Republic  as  much  as  they  do  to  Japan.  They 
equalize  both  nations'  opportunities  so  long  as 
Alaska,  the  Pacific  coast,  Hawaii,  Samoa,  and  the 
Philippines  are  not  defended  prior  to  the  beginning 
of  hostilities.  Their  subsequent  control,  whether 
by  Japan  or  this  Republic,  will  be  determined  by 
which  nation  first  occupies  them  in  force  and  makes 
secure  their  possession. 

The  seizure  and  control  of  these  territories  are 
determined  equally  to  both  nations  by  three  con- 
ditions : 



(1)  Temporary  naval  supremacy  in  the  Pacific. 

(2)  Rapid  mobilization  of  trained  armies. 

(3)  Possession  of  efficient  means  of  transporta- 

The  disinclination  of  this  Republic  to  render  ade- 
quate military  and  naval  protection  to  its  posses- 
sions in  the  Pacific  gives  to  Japan  not  only  temporary 
command  of  the  entire  ocean,  but  time  enough  for 
the  temporary  character  of  its  control  to  pass  into 
permanency.  Unless  the  United  States  establishes 
sufficient  naval  bases  in  its  four  quarters  of  the 
Pacific,  making  them  militarily  secure  against  land 
attack,  and  maintains  in  the  Pacific  fleets  as  much 
superior  to  the  entire  navy  of  Japan  as  adverse 
strategic  conditions  demand,  the  United  States  will 
lose  in  the  beginning  what  she  will  never  be  able 
to  regain  during  the  continuation  of  the  war — the 
entire  American  littoral  on  the  Pacific. 

The  seizure  and  control  of  the  Pacific  does  not 
alone  depend  upon  naval  supremacy.  So  vast  is 
this  ocean,  and  so  widely  separated  are  the  differ- 
ent American  possessions,  that  the  military  defence 
of  them  is  of  primary  importance.  The  efficiency 
of  navies  and  the  sphere  of  their  combatability  is 
determined  not  only  by  widely  spaced  bases,  but 
by  their  security  from  attack.  Port  Arthur  was 
only  impregnable  to  ships  of  war.  This  is  true  of 
all  naval  bases,  if  the  command  of  the  sea  is  lost 
to  the  extent  of  allowing  the  enemy  an  opportunity 
of  transporting  troops  and  making  a  land  attack. 



Temporary  possession  of  the  sea  by  the  enemy 
must  always  be  considered  in  military  calculations 
as  not  only  possible  but  probable.  When  it  occurs, 
then  all  territories,  harbors,  and  their  fortifications 
are  exposed  to  land  attack.  Their  protection  de- 
pends upon  mobile  armies  sufficient  in  themselves 
to  repulse  any  force  the  enemy  is  capable  of  landing 
— not  in  specific  harbors,  but  on  any  portion  of  the 

A  war  between  Japan  and  the  United  States  will 
be  determined  not  by  naval  but  land  battles.  The 
rapidity  of  mobilization  and  celerity  with  which 
trained  armies  are  placed  in  the  field  at  the  begin- 
ning of  hostilities  compose  the  primary  factors  in 
securing  and  making  permanent  military  command 
over  these  possessions. 

Under  the  present  military  system  this  Republic 
could  not  mobilize  in  any  one  place  a  field  army  of 
nineteen  thousand  regular  soldiers  in  the  same 
period  of  time  that  Japan  could  assemble,  ready 
to  take  the  field,  half  a  million  veteran  troops.  For 
the  United  States  to  enlist,  equip  and  train  to  the 
same  degree  of  efficiency  a  similar  force  would  re- 
quire not  less  than  three  years. 

As  the  determinate  character  of  this  theatre  of 
war  is  its  vastness,  the  possession  of  means  to  trans- 
port armies  and  to  transfer  them  from  one  place 
to  another  constitutes  the  most  vital  element  in 
determining  the  issue  of  the  conflict.  The  move- 
ment of  armies,  their  mobility  or  inertia,  will  be,  in 


THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

this  war,  dependent  wholly  upon  the  efficiency  of 
their  means  of  transportation.  If  Japan  were  with- 
out sea  transports  equal  to  the  needs  of  her  armies, 
the  Pacific  coast  and  the  American  provinces  in 
the  Pacific  would  be  beyond  the  sphere  of  Japanese 
enterprise.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  United  States 
possessed  a  standing  army  of  two  million  men,  but 
no  other  means  of  military  transportation  than 
exist  at  the  present  time,  this  Republic  could  not 
conduct  a  single  campaign  beyond  the  frontiers  of 
the  Union.  Unfortunately,  the  United  States  does 
not  possess  a  field  army  of  even  fifty  thousand  men, 
while  Japan  has  such  complete  means  of  oceanic 
transportation  that  she  can  move  her  vast  armies 
to  any  portion  of  the  Pacific  with  greater  ease  than 
Napoleon  moved  similar  armies  from  Paris  across 
the  river  Elbe  or  beyond  the  Danube,  or  Grant 
across  the  theatre  of  war  during  the  American  Civil 

This  Republic  is  without  means  of  military  trans- 
portation. In  the  Spanish  -  American  War  two 
months  elapsed  before  transports  could  be  gotten 
together  sufficient  to  embark  a  single  army  corps, 
though  Havana  lies  only  three  days  distant  from 
the  main  centre  of  American  commerce.  In  the 
Russian  War  Japanese  armies  had  landed  and  were 
marching  on  the  Asian  continent  eight  days  after 
the  declaration  of  war.  In  1907,  nearly  ten  years 
after  the  Spanish  War,  the  American  government 
was  obliged  to  charter  foreign  vessels  to  transport 



six  thousand  troops  from  the  mainland  to  Cuba. 
The  Japanese  government,  on  the  other  hand,  pos- 
sesses sufficient  transportation  facilities  to  carry  in 
a  single  voyage,  if  necessary,  more  than  two  hundred 
thousand  troops.1 

In  the  United  States  there  is  no  nucleus  upon 
which,  in  the  time  of  war,  a  system  of  military 
transports  can  be  created  in  the  Pacific  or  Atlantic. 
At  the  present  time  so  devoid  is  this  Republic  of 
trans-oceanic  shipping  that  ninety-one  per  cent,  of 
the  entire  American  trade  is  carried  on  foreign  vessels. 

The  strategic  harbors  in  the  Alaskan  peninsula, 
commanding  the  North  Pacific,  and  Samoa,  capable 
of  controlling  the  southern  portion  of  the  ocean, 
are  equidistant  from  Japan  and  San  Francisco. 
Undefended,  they  necessitate  neither  naval  nor  mili- 
tary effort  to  secure  them,  for  they  belong  to  the 
nation  that  controls  the  ocean  at  large.  But  mid- 
way between  these,  likewise  undefended,  are  the 
Hawaiian  Islands,  the  portal  through  which  Japan 
expects  to  gain  the  grail  of  her  Genro.2  For  two 
decades  has  she  planned  and  warred  toward  this 
end.  There  has  been  no  hesitancy  nor  doubt  nor 
delay.  Without  hurry,  calmly,  with  the  inexorable 
certitude  of  a  glacier,  Japan  has  moved  toward  this 
predetermined  point.  At  the  conclusion  of  the 
Russian  War  her  plans  for  taking  possession  of 
these  islands  assumed  a  positive  phase. 

'Appendix,  Table  VII.  'The  Elder  Statesmen. 



If  this  Republic  had  created  at  any  time  a  great 
naval  and  military  base  in  Hawaii,  Japan's  oppor- 
tunity of  seizing  the  islands  would  have  been 
lessened  if  not  prohibited;  and  so  long  as  these 
islands  formed  an  invulnerable  American  base,  the 
mainland  of  the  Republic  would  be  removed  from 
the  sphere  of  military  enterprise.  While  the  estab- 
lishment of  American  naval  and  military  power  in 
the  Pacific  or  Hawaii  has  not  been  attempted,  yet 
Japan  has  prepared  for  this  eventuality  in  so  effective 
a  manner  that,  notwithstanding  what  the  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  may  be  in  the  future, 
these  islands  can  be  seized  from  within  and  con- 
verted into  a  Japanese  naval  and  military  base  so 
quickly  that  they  will  be  impregnable  to  the  power 
of  this  Republic,  regardless  of  what  it  may  be  on  the 

The  tenure  of  any  territory  is  determined  primarily 
by  military  supremacy.  Only  when  the  attacking 
forces  exceed  on  land  those  of  the  defence,  or  when 
a  naval  blockade  assumes  the  character  of  a  siege, 
does  this  tenure  become  insecure.  If  the  military 
occupation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  is  in  sufficient 
force,  whether  by  the  United  States  or  Japan,  they 
could  not  be  gained  or  regained  by  naval  attack. 
The  control  of  these  islands  is  a  military  and  not 
a  naval  problem. 

Japanese  immigration  into  Hawaii  has  been  polit- 
ical rather  than  economic,  and  is  divided  into  three  dis- 
tinct political  decades,  as  determined  by  two  factors: 



(1)  American  Pacific  Expansion: 

(a)  The  establishment  of  the   Hawaiian 

(b)  The  annexation  of  Hawaii. 

(c)  The  conquest  of  the  Philippines. 

(2)  Japanese  Political  Development: 

(a)  Protest  of  Japan  against  annexation 
of  Hawaii. 

(b)  Japanese  victory  over  China. 

(c)  Japanese  victory  over  Russia. 

(d)  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance. 

In  the  first  political  decade,  1884-1896,  there 
occurred : 

(1)  The  overthrow  of  the   Hawaiian  monarchy 
and  the  establishment  of  an  American  republic. 

(2)  Japan's  protest  against  annexation. 

(3)  Japan's  victory  over  China;    the  elimination 
of  that  nation   from  the   Pacific,   and  the  begin- 
ning of  Japan's  political  development  as  a  Pacific 

Simultaneous  with  these  events  the  Japanese 
population  in  Hawaii  increased  from  116  in  1884, 
to  22,329  in  1896. 

In  the  second  political  decade,  1896-1900,  there 
occurred : 

(1)  The  annexation  of  Hawaii. 

(2)  The  conquest  of  the  Philippines. 

(3)  The  development  of  the  Japanese  army  and 

Simultaneous    with    these    events   the    Japanese 
17  249 


population  increased  from  22,329  in  1896,  to  61,115 
in  1900.* 

In  the  third  political  decade,  1900-1908,  there 
occurred : 

(1)  Japan's  victory  over  Russia,  the  elimination 
of  that  nation  in  the  Pacific,  and  Japan's  increased 
development  as  a  Pacific  power. 

(2)  The    Anglo- Japanese   Alliance,    and   Japan's 
advent  as  a  world  power. 

(3)  Unprecedented  development  of  the  Japanese 
army  and  navy. 

Simultaneous  with  these  events,  Japanese  immi- 
gration into  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  from  1900  to 
1908,  has  been  65,708.  The  departures  during  this 
period  were  42,313.  The  military  unfit  have  in  this 
manner  been  supplanted  by  the  veterans  of  a  great 
war,  and  the  military  occupation  of  Hawaii  tenta- 
tively accomplished.2 

In  these  islands  at  the  present  time  the  number 
of  Japanese  who  have  completed  their  active  term 
of  service  in  the  imperial  armies,  a  part  of  whom 
are  veterans  of  the  Russian  War,  exceeds  the  en- 
tire field  army  of  the  United  States.  Within  twen- 
ty-four hours  after  a  declaration  of  war  the  sol- 
itary American  battalion  that  stands  guard  over 
these  islands  will  disappear.3  As  Hawaiian  sover- 
eignty passed  forever  in  a  single  day,  so  shall  this 

1  Total  population  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  1900,  was  154,001. 

2  Appendix,  Table  XI. 

3  Twelve  officers  and  209  men. 



Republic  be  put  aside  in  the  same  manner  and  in 
no  longer  period  of  time. 

The  seizure  of  the  Philippines  constitutes  an  en- 
tirely different  problem  from  that  of  Hawaii,  and 
belongs  to  the  sphere  of  military  operations.  In  a 
military  sense,  the  Philippines  are  closer  to  Japan 
than  were  the  shores  of  Manchuria  in  the  Russian 
War.  There  are  no  Port  Arthurs,  with  guarded 
fleets  to  threaten  the  transportation  of  her  troops; 
no  armies  of  a  quarter  of  a  million  men  to  oppose 
their  landing;  no  rigorous  winters;  no  tempestuous 
waters,  such  as  swirl  and  break  over  the  Yellow 
Sea;  no  storm-girded  shores  over  whose  billows 
and  in  the  teeth  of  ice-laden  gales  landings  must 
be  made  by  lighters;  no  Liao-Yangs  nor  Mukdens 
with  five  hundred  thousand  men  to  drive  back; 
no  wide  plains  to  cross  in  parched  heat  or  blizzards  ; 
no  half-frozen  rivers  to  swim;  no  mountain-sides 
to  clamber  up,  honeycombed  with  hidden  mines;  no 
abysses  nor  labyrinths;  only  a  solitary  division  of 
troops  must  be  overcome  on  these  undefended  islands. 

The  conquest  of  these  islands  by  Japan  will  be 
less  of  a  military  undertaking  than  was  the  seizure 
of  Cuba  by  the  United  States;  for  while  Santiago 
de  Cuba  did  not  fall  until  nearly  three  months  after 
the  declaration  of  war,  Manila  will  be  forced  to 
surrender  in  less  than  three  weeks.  Otherwise  the 
occupation  of  Cuba  portrays  with  reasonable  exact- 
itude the  manner  in  which  the  Philippines  will  be 
taken  over  by  Japan. 



No  naval  force,  unless  equal  in  combative  ability 
to  the  entire  Japanese  navy,  and  based  on  the  Phil- 
ippines at  the  beginning  of  hostilities,  could  have 
any  appreciable  effect  on  the  invasion  of  these  isl- 
ands. With  the  American  navy  no  larger  than  at 
present,  and  the  Philippines  devoid  of  naval  bases, 
t.his  manner  and  degree  of  defence  is  recognized 
as  impossible.  Should  there  be  a  division  of  the 
American  navy,  the  fate  of  the  warships  in  Philip- 
pine waters  would  be  but  a  repetition  of  Cervera's 
disaster,  unless  the  land  forces  on  Luzon  were 
sufficient  to  prevent  Manila  from  sharing  the  fate 
of  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

Harbor  defences  in  the  Philippines,  unless  they 
form  the  base  of  a  fleet  strong  enough  to  prevent 
the  transportation  of  the  enemy's  troops,  or  are  in 
turn  defended  by  mobile  armies  of  sufficient  strength 
to  prevent  their  investment,  will  prove  of  no  more 
defensive  value  than  Morro  Castle  in  the  defence  of 
Cuba.  Port  Arthur  has  again  demonstrated  the 
vulnerability  of  permanent  fortifications  and  the 
old  fallacy  of  their  making.  These  stone  castles  of 
nations  are  but  the  dream  castles  of  their  vanity. 
Chimeras  alone  stand  guard  upon  their  bastions, 
simulacra  alone  throng  their  casements. 

The  fortification  of  Manila  or  Subig  Bay,  or  any 
other  port,  will  not  prevent  nor  retard  the  seizure 
of  the  islands  by  Japan,  if  other  elements  necessary 
to  their  defence  are  wanting.  As  the  conquest  of 
Cuba  was  accomplished  by  landing  forces  distant 





from  any  fortified  port,  so  will  the  Philippines  fall. 
Lingayan  Gulf  on  the  north  coast  of  Luzon,  or 
Polillo  Bight  on  the  east  coast,  will  form  the  Guanta- 
namo  Bays  of  the  Japanese. 

The  conquest  of  the  Philippines  is  no  complex 
military  problem,  but  is,  on  the  other  hand,  so  simple 
and  direct  that  a  few  words  will  make  it  apparent. 
The  American  forces  defending  these  islands  do 
not  exceed  fourteen  thousand,  plus  five  thousand 
native  troops,  all  of  whom  are  based  on  Manila. 
Japan,  by  landing  simultaneously  one  column  of 
twenty  thousand  men  at  Dagupan  (Chart  II)  and 
another  column  of  the  same  size  at  Polillo  Bight, 
would,  strategically,  render  the  American  position 
untenable.  These  points  of  debarkation  are  al- 
most equidistant  from  Manila,  and  are  connected 
with  it  by  military  roads,  while  a  railroad  also  con- 
nects Dagupan  with  the  capital. 

The  impossibility  of  defending  Manila  with  the 
force  now  stationed  on  the  islands  is  seen  (Fig.  2, 
Chart  II)  in  the  strategic  advantages  inherent  in 
Japan's  convergent  attack.  These  two  columns, 
more  than  double  the  strength  of  the  American 
force,  converge  on  Manila  at  right  angles.  Advanc- 
ing at  equal  speed,  they  remain  at  all  times  equi- 
distant from  the  American  position.  Should  the 
American  force  advance  to  meet  either  column,  the 
unattacked  column,  being  as  close  to  Manila  as  the 
American  force,  could  throw  itself  in  between  (Fig. 
3).  The  Americans,  separated  from  their  base  by 



an  army  equal  to  their  own  irj  strength,  and  facing 
a  second  army  also  as  large,  would  be  in  a  position 
wherein  their  capitulation  could  alone  prevent  their 
complete  destruction. 

If  the  American  forces,  on  the  other  hand,  should 
remain  behind  their  lines  at  Manila,  they  would,  in 
two  weeks  after  the  declaration  of  war,  be  sur- 
rounded by  overwhelming  numbers.  The  lines  about 
Manila,  as  was  demonstrated  during  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  are  incapable  of  prolonged  defence. 
An  aggressive  enemy  in  control  of  the  surrounding 
country  can  render  them  untenable  in  a  short  period 
of  time. 

With  the  occupation  of  the  Philippines  by  Japan, 
one-fourth  of  the  American  army,  which  means  one 
fourth  of  the  trained  military  men  of  the  Republic, 
would  be  eliminated  from  any  further  participation 
in  the  war;  while  not  again  could  an  American  fleet, 
regardless  of  its  size,  enter  the  Asiatic  seas  during 
the  continuation  of  this  conflict. 

If  the  American  forces  should  be  increased  prior 
to  the  war,  and  no  other  military  efforts  made  tow- 
ard a  general  defence  of  the  Philippines,  it  would  only 
result  in  increasing  proportionately  the  size  of  the 
enemy's  advancing  columns.  The  military  and 
strategic  conditions  would  not  be  altered  nor  the 
inevitable  end  retarded. 

The  defence  of  the  Philippines  belongs,  not  alone 
to  an  army  or  navy  or  fortified  harbors,  but  to 
an  intelligent  combination  of  them  all.  This  de- 



fence  cannot  be  relegated  to  those  expedients  that 
are  alone  consequent  upon  sudden  war,  but  must 
be  inherent  in  the  national  policy  of  the  Republic 
and  the  military  preparations  of  prior  years.  It 
cannot  be  left  to  the  shifts  of  unforeseen  combat, 
but  must  be  predetermined  by  existent  conditions 
and  such  works  as  the  knowledge  and  labor  of  man 
may  evolve  out  of  the  Science  of  War. 


WHILE  the  seizure  of  Hawaii  and  the  Philip- 
pines includes,  by  the  mere  fact  of  their  posses- 
sion, all  other  insular  territories  of  this  Republic, 
as  well  as  Alaska,  and  the  naval  supremacy  of  the 
Pacific,  yet  their  occupancy  is  only  incidental  to 
Japan's  main  objective.  In  other  words,  the  pos- 
session of  the  Pacific  coast  would  have  the  same  ef- 
fect in  establishing  Japanese  supremacy  over  these 
territories  as  would  their  direct  seizure.  As  a  game 
of  chess  is  won  by  position,  so,  in  this  approaching 
conflict,  the  king's  square  toward  which  Japan 
moves  is  the  Pacific  coast.  That  Japan  will  in  the 
beginning  of  the  war  take  possession  of  these  insular 
territories  is  manifest,  because  their  occupation  will 
cost  her  no  appreciable  effort  nor  detract  in  any 
degree  from  the  naval  and  military  power  necessary 
for  the  conquest  of  the  mainland.  The  occupancy 
of  these  territories  will  be  relegated  to  the  second 
line  of  reserves,  fleets  of  protected  cruisers  and 
second-class  battle-ships,  leaving  the  principal  naval 
and  military  forces  intact. 

While  Japan  is  occupying  Hawaii  and  the  Philip- 
pines a  fleet  of  transports  carrying  one  hundred 



thousand  men,1  convoyed  by  battleships,  armored 
cruisers,  and  torpedo  craft,  makes  its  way  across  the 
Pacific.  Steaming  at  ten  knots  an  hour,  this  fleet 
will  reach  the  Pacific  coast  within  five  or  possibly 
four  weeks  after  the  declaration  of  war.  Then 
somewhere  on  fifteen  hundred  miles  of  sea-coast 
will  these  armies  be  debarked  and  the  invasion  of 
the  United  States  begun. 

The  principal  consideration  that  now  concerns  this 
Republic  is  the  defence  of  the  Pacific  coast,  for  once 
it  passes  under  the  military  sovereignty  of  Japan 
the  Pacific  and  its  possessions  are  not  alone  lost,  but 
the  fairest  and  richest  portion  of  the  Union.  If 
Japan  once  gains  control  of  Washington,  Oregon 
and  California,  these  states  will  not  only  be  segregat- 
ed from  the  rest  of  the  Union  by  her  armies,  but  by 
uninhabitable  deserts  that  moat  their  eastern  fron- 
tiers and  mountains  that  rampart  them.  No  number 
of  men  nor  amount  of  treasure,  as  we  will  hereafter 
show,  can  bring  about  their  restoration.  The  de- 
fence, therefore,  of  the  Pacific  coast  depends  solely 
upon  the  power  of  the  Republic  to  prevent  Japan 
from  gaining  a  foothold.  To  rely  upon  the  un- 
tried hope  of  reconquering  these  coast  states  is  but 
the  slothful  procrastination  of  that  evasion  and 
national  vanity  now  so  rampant  in  the  Republic. 

Primarily,  the  defence  of  the  Pacific  coast  belongs 
to  a  navy.  But  so  long  as  the  necessary  naval  ex- 
Appendix,  Table  VII. 



pansion  of  the  Republic  remains  circumscribed  by 
venality  and  ignorance,  as  well  as  public  indif- 
ference, it  is  impossible  to  foresee  the  time  when  the 
Pacific  coast  will  be  defended  by  a  navy  powerful 
enough  to  prevent  invasion  by  Japan.  So  long  as 
it  continues  to  be  the  policy  of  this  nation  to  main- 
tain a  navy  in  its  present  proportion  to  the  navies 
of  other  powers,  then  that  navy,  as  has  been  shown, 
must  remain  united  in  one  ocean ;  and,  as  the  Atlantic 
constitutes  the  most  vital  naval  sphere  of  the  Re- 
public, it  will  be  necessary  to  continue  it  in  that  sea. 

When  Japan  declares  war,  one  of  two  naval  con- 
ditions will  be  existent:  either  the  American  navy 
will  be  divided  between  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic,  or 
the  whole  of  it  will  be  in  the  latter  sea.  Either  con- 
dition will  insure  instant  Japanese  naval  supremacy. 
A  division  of  the  American  navy  means  the  destruc- 
tion of  those  portions  in  the  Pacific ;  while  the  fleets 
in  the  Atlantic  will  have  no  effect  upon  the  conflict, 
whether  they  constitute  the  remaining  portion  or  the 
entire  navy. 

In  the  time  of  peace,  under  the  most  favorable  cir- 
cumstances, it  required  four  months  for  an  American 
fleet  to  pass  from  the  Atlantic  bases  to  the  Calif ornian 
coast.  But  unfortunately  there  are  many  condi- 
tions in  the  time  of  war  that  would  curtail,  hinder 
or  prohibit  this  transference. 

During  hostilities  the  fleets  of  this  nation  can 
make  no  use  of  South  American  ports,  as  was  recently 
the  case  in  the  transference  of  the  battleship  fleet 


to  the  Pacific.  International  laws  prohibit  bellig- 
erents from  sending  more  than  three  warships  into 
a  neutral  port  at  one  time.  They  cannot  remain 
longer  than  twenty-four  hours  and  cannot  take  on 
men,  munitions  nor  supplies  other  than  enough  coal 
to  proceed  to  the  next  port.  The  same  ships  cannot 
again  enter  that  port  within  a  space  of  three 
months.  These  prohibitions  force  the  American 
navy  in  transit  to  depend  entirely  upon  auxiliary 
ships  for  their  sustenance  and  coal. 

We  have  now  come  upon  this  strange  paradox: 
that  the  mobility  or  war  value  of  the  Atlantic  fleets 
decreases  in  inverse  ratio  to  their  increase  in  number 
whenever  the  theatre  of  war  is  in  the  Pacific.  The 
size  of  the  American  navy,  even,  at  this  time,  pro- 
hibits its  transference  to  the  Pacific  in  time  of  war. 
The  recent  cruise  of  sixteen  ships  necessitated  the 
chartering  of  twenty-nine  foreign  transports,  without 
which  they  could  not  have  left  the  Atlantic.  When 
this  fleet  is  augmented  by  the  remainder  of  the 
navy,  the  number  of  transports  must  be  increased 
not  only  proportionately  to  the  increase  of  warships, 
but  by  such  additional  numbers  as  is  necessitated 
by  this  nation's  inability  to  use  neutral  ports.  But 
in  the  time  of  war  belligerents  cannot  charter  neutral 
vessels  —  a  prohibition  that  deprives  this  Republic 
of  the  means  upon  which  any  extended  movement 
of  the  navy  must  depend. 

Whenever  the  naval  defence  of  a  nation  or  any 
portion  of  its  territory  is  lacking,  or  when  there  is  a 



measurable  equality  between  the  navies  of  the  bellig- 
erents, the  main  defence  of  their  respective  posses- 
sions must  be  relegated  to  their  military  forces. 
Only  when  the  naval  superiority  of  one  nation  over 
another  is  so  positive  as  to  prohibit  the  hazard  of 
battle  can  it  be  said  that  that  nation  is  in  a  position 
to  neglect  with  impunity  its  military  forces  and 
l^nd  defences. 

In  a  war  with  Japan  the  defence  of  the  Pacific 
coast  concerns  the  military  forces  of  the  Republic 
rather  than  the  navy,  even  if  the  policy  of  this 
government  did  not  prevent  the  maintenance  of 
adequate  naval  forces  in  the  Pacific.  Under  pres- 
ent conditions  the  defence  of  Washington,  Oregon 
and  California  falls  upon  the  army  as  completely  as 
though  not  a  single  American  battleship  existed. 
Notwithstanding  this  fact,  we  find  that  the  military 
defence  of  the  Pacific  coast  has  been  as  completely 
neglected  as  the  naval. 

The  defence  of  Washington,  Oregon  and  Califor- 
nia against  invasion  by  Japan  presents  three  obvious 
characteristics : 

(1)  The  long  extent  of  sea-coast  constitutes  three 
spheres  of  defence  that  are  so  widely  separated  as 
to  be  wholly  independent  of  one  another.     Their 
forces  cannot  be  shifted  from  one  theatre  of  war  to 
another,  and  they  must  maintain  separate  lines  of 
communication  with  the  Eastern  States. 

(2)  The  short  period  of  time  with  which  Japan  is 
able  to  transport  her  armies  to  this  continent — 



two  hundred  thousand  men  in  four  weeks,  a  half- 
million  in  four  months,  and  more  than  a  million  in 
ten  months — necessitates  in  this  Republic  a  corre- 
sponding degree  of  preparedness  and  rapidity  of 

(3)  Within  one  month  after  the  declaration  of 
war  this  Republic  must  place,  in  each  of  the  three 
defensive  spheres  of  the  Pacific  coast,  armies  that 
are  capable  of  giving  battle  to  the  maximum  num- 
ber of  troops  that  Japan  can  transport  in  a  single 
voyage.  This  is  known  to  be  in  excess  of  two 
hundred  thousand  men.  If  the  defence  is  restricted 
to  any  one  portion  of  the  coast,  it  will  only  have 
the  effect  of  diverting  the  attack  to  one  or  both  of 
the  others. 

At  the  present  time  there  is  not  in  any  one  of 
these  defensive  spheres  a  full  regiment  of  regular 
infantry  nor  two  regiments  of  militia;  while  in  the 
whole  of  the  Union  are  not  to  be  found  ten  thousand 
infantry  of  the  Federal  army. 

During  the  Spanish  War  a  call  for  volunteers  was 
issued  a  few  days  following  the  declaration  of  war, 
but  not  until  after  four  months  had  two  hundred 
and  sixteen  thousand  men  been  enlisted,  assigned, 
and  their  instruction  begun.  At  the  end  of  the 
war  the\-  were  partially  equipped,  and  were  acquir- 
ing the  rudiments  of  camp-life. 

The  first  defence  of  the  Pacific  coast  will  fall  upon 
such  portions  of  the  United  States  Army  as  are 
available,  which,  under  the  present  military  system 



and  necessities,  will  never  exceed  thirty  thousand 
men.  In  addition  to  this  force  it  is  possible  that 
sixty  thousand  state  militia  x  may  be  available  for 
immediate  service,  or  ninety  thousand  troops  and 
one  hundred  and  fifty  guns  in  all.  These  forces  are 
scattered  over  the  entire  Union.  They  must  be 
gathered  together,  equipped  and  brigaded,  as  well 
as  innumerable  other  contingencies  met  and  ad- 
justed. When  this  is  done  they  must  be  trans- 
ported by  rail  over  a  distance  that  is  practically 
greater  than  that  which  separates  the  Golden  Gate 
from  the  Inland  Sea  of  Japan. 

We  have  heretofore  made  clear  that  distance,  in 
a  military  sense,  is  never  measured  by  miles,  but  by 
the  rapidity  and  capacity  of  the  means  of  trans- 
portation. The  efficiency  or  lack  of  these  means 
correspondingly  decrease  or  prolong  the  intervening 
spaces  over'  which  armies  and  their  supplies  must 

The  Pacific  coast  has  not  a  single  point  upon 
which  the  railroads  crossing  this  continent  con- 
verge. The  roads  that  enter  Washington  and 
Oregon  have  no  relation  with  those  that  go  to 
California.  They  start  from  a  different  base  and 
traverse  another  region.  In  a  war  on  the  Pacific 
coast,  troops  cannot  be  despatched  to  southern 

1  This  is  67  per  cent,  of  the  organized  militia.  But  in  the 
Spanish  War  it  was  proven  conclusively  that  only  40  per  cent, 
of  the  militia  could  be  counted  on  to  enter  the  service.  Should 
this  continue,  then  only  42,000  militia  could  be  depended  upon. 



California  by  the  Great  Northern  or  Northern  Pacific 
or  the  Oregon  Short  Line.  Neither  can  troops  be 
sent  into  Washington  and  Oregon  by  the  Southern 
Pacific  or  Santa  Fe.  The  Pacific  coast  is,  in  a  mil- 
itary sense,  restricted  to  the  maximum  of  two  lines 
of  railway. 

Troops  for  Washington  and  Oregon  must  be  gath- 
ered from  the  various  parts  of  the  Union,  together 
with  their  supplies,  and  taken,  in  all  probability, 
to  the  vicinity  of  St.  Paul,  which  would  form  the 
main  base  of  all  armies  destined  for  those  states. 
Similarly  other  and  distinct  bases  must  be  taken 
for  troops  directed  to  southern  and  central  Cali- 

The  transportation  of  great  bodies  of  troops  to 
the  Pacific  coast,  with  their  vast  amount  of  sup- 
plies and  equipment,  constitutes  a  more  serious 
undertaking  than  confronted  Russia  in  the  Japanese 
War.  Russia  possessed  two  manifest  advantages 
denied  the  United  States: 

(1)  She   owned   the   Siberian   Railroad   and   its 

(2)  It  traversed  a  region  uninhabited  or  possessed 
of  a  thinly  scattered  population,  more  or  less  prim- 
itive  in   its   civilization,    and   in   consequence  not 
dependent    upon   the    railroad    for    sustenance    or 

When,  however,  the  civilization  of  a  country  be- 
comes highly  developed  and  complex,  as  in  this 
nation,  the  interdependence  of  man  is  increased 



accordingly.  There  is  scarcely  to  be  found  in  the 
Republic  an  independent  and  self-sustaining  com- 
munity. Every  farmer  and  town  and  county  in  the 
western  portions  of  the  United  States  is  dependent 
upon  railroads,  not  only  for  their  supplies,  but  for 
their  funds  with  which  to  buy  the  necessities  of 

The  distance  from  the  Mississippi  Valley  to  the 
Pacific  coast  is  two  thousand  miles,  and  upon  the 
few  lines  that  traverse  these  Western  States  live  a 
people  so  dependent  upon  them  that  they  could  not 
continue  their  livelihood  if  deprived  of  these  means 
of  communication.  They  must  not  only  receive 
supplies,  but  their  grain,  wool,  cattle,  ores,  timber 
and  other  products  must  be  shipped  to  Eastern 
markets  that  they  may  purchase  the  means  of  pro- 
duction as  well  as  the  needs  of  daily  existence.  This 
traffic  the  government  cannot  stop,  and  it  is  the  con- 
tinuance of  it  during  war  that  will  make  the  trans- 
portation of  troops  and  their  supplies  to  the  Pacific 
coast  a  more  difficult  problem  than  confronted 

In  the  beginning  of  the  war  Japan  possesses  an- 
other advantage  that  is  completely  denied  this  Re- 
public. By  her  vast  fleets,  her  armies  are  moved 
in  great  units  and  are  restricted  to  no  portion  of  the 
coast.  The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  can 
only  transport  by  train-loads.  While  Japan  can 
land  over  two  hundred  thousand  men  on  the  Pacific 
coast  in  less  than  four  weeks,  it  is  apparent  that,  even 



if  this  Republic  had  that  number  of  men  under  arms 
prior  to  the  declaration  of  war,  it  would  take  con- 
siderably longer  than  four  weeks  to  mobilize  them 
in  a  single  theatre  of  war  on  the  Pacific  coast. 

In  a  military  sense  Japan  is  one-third  closer  to 
Washington,  Oregon  and  California  than  the  military 
power  of  the  United  States,  and  will  remain  so  until 
all  transcontinental  railways  are  double- tracked,  one 
track  reverting  to  the  government  in  the  event  of 

We  will  not  consider  the  time  it  will  take  to  ac- 
complish this  mobilization,  organization,  equipment 
and  transportation  of  so  many  widely  scattered 
units  which  constitute  the  American  forces,  but 
will  pass  on  to  the  consideration  of  their  destination. 
There  are  two  alternatives: 

(1)  The  mobilization  of  all  forces,  regulars  and 
militia,  in  camps  of  instruction  wherein  they  are  to 
constitute  the  nucleus  of  an  army  of  a  million  men; 
allowing  the  Japanese  to  take  possession  of  the 
coast  without  opposition. 

(2)  To  rush  these  thirty  thousand  regulars  and 
sixty  or  forty  thousand  militia  to  the  coast  and  dis- 
pute the  landing  of  the  Japanese. 

We  do  not  believe  that  the  first  alternative  would 
be  entertained  by  the  Republic  at  large.  Rather 
would  there  surge  over  the  entire  land  one  thought, 
echoed  on  all  sides  by  a  single  cry:  On  to  the  coast! 

To  what  portion  of  the  coast? 

If  they  were  seat  to  southern  California,  the 
is  265 


central  part  of  the  state,  Oregon  and  Washington 
would  still  remain  defenceless,  as  if  these  troops  had 
never  been  mobilized.  If  they  were  sent  to  San 
Francisco,  the  same  conditions  would  still  hold  in 
Washington,  Oregon  and  southern  California.  If 
mobilized  on  Puget  Sound,  then  all  to  the  southward 
would  be  without  protection.  It  is  evident,  more- 
over, that  there  can  be  no  division  of  this  force. 
To  place  thirty  thousand  men  in  each  of  these  three 
spheres  of  defence  would  be  to  sacrifice  the  whole 
in  detail,  without  even  the  ordeal  of  battle  or  delay 
of  invasion. 

The  economic  interests  of  central  California  ap- 
proximate those  of  the  south  and  north  combined, 
while  the  strategic  value  is  infinitely  greater.  The 
San  Francisco  peninsula  is,  moreover,  the  only 
position  in  which  seventy  to  ninety  thousand  men 
might  hold  out  against  the  great  armies  of  Japan  for 
any  length  of  time.  If  San  Francisco  could  be  held 
permanently,  and  communication  kept  open  with 
the  East,  the  Republic  might,  by  accumulating  its 
military  resources  at  that  point,  move  in  due  time 
against  the  Japanese  forces  in  southern  California 
or  those  in  Washington  and  Oregon.  These  con- 
siderations should,  in  the  aggregate,  influence  the 
government  as  well  as  popular  opinion  in  con- 
centrating the  existent  military  forces  on  the  San 
Francisco  peninsula  immediately  subsequent  to  the 
declaration  of  war.  However  disastrous  it  might 
prove  to  leave  unprotected  the  northern  and 



southern  coasts,  San  Francisco  constitutes,  never- 
theless, the  true  point  of  concentration  under  the 
military  conditions  now  extant  in  this  Republic. 

Japan's  invasion  of  Washington  and  Oregon,  the 
conditions  that  circumscribe  it  and  the  manner  of 
its  accomplishment  constitutes  the  simplest  of 
military  problems.  The  mouth  of  the  Columbia 
River  is  defended  by  three  forts.  These  fortifica- 
tions are  the  entire  defence  of  the  state  of  Oregon 
against  invasion,  yet  the  combined  power  of  all  their 
guns  is  less  than  that  of  the  guns  on  a  single  Japanese 

This  is  not  all. 

To  man  these  solitary  guns  requires  sixty-seven 
officers,  fourteen  hundred  and  forty-six  men.  Ac- 
cording to  the  Secretary  of  War,  there  are  now 
available  in  these  forts  but  ten  officers  and  two 
hundred  and  forty-six  men,  which  means  that  five- 
sixths  of  the  guns  emplaced  could  not  be  used.  If 
these  fortifications  were  not  only  not  lacking  in  guns 
and  men,  but  were,  on  the  other  hand,  a  hundredfold 
more  powerful,  they  would  still  have  no  more  re- 
tarding effect  upon  the  invasion  of  Oregon  than  if 
they  did  not  exist,  as  will,  later  on,  become  apparent. 

The  defence  of  the  state  of  Washington  is  relegated 
to  three  forts  on  the  upper  reaches  of  Puget  Sound. 
These  fortifications  are  in  a  more  impoverished  con- 
dition and  state  of  unpreparedness  than  those  on 
the  Columbia.  While  one  hundred  and  twenty-nine 
officers,  thirty -one  hundred  and  eighty  men  are 



necessary  to  man  the  guns  already  emplaced,  there 
are,  according  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  only  twenty- 
seven  officers,  nine  hundred  and  two  men  available, 
which  means  that  four-fifths  of  these  guns  could  not 
be  served. 

As  a  defence  against  invasion  the  fortifications  on 
Puget  Sound  are  as  valueless  as  those  on  the  Colum- 
bia, and  for  the  same  reason,  that  they  are  remote 
from  any  possible  base  for  invasion  that  could  be 
selected  by  Japan  in  the  debarkation  of  her  first 
expedition.  This  landing  will  occur  (Chart  III)  in 
Gray's  and  Willapa  Harbors.  Should  these  harbor 
entrances  be  mined,  then  debarkation  will  be  on 
the  open  beaches  between  the  bays,  or  north  of  the 
entrance  to  Gray's  Harbor. 

The  first  objective  of  the  Japanese  armies  will  not 
be  the  cities  on  Puget  Sound  nor  Portland  nor  the 
cities  on  the  Columbia,  but  will  be  directed  toward 
Chehalis  and  Centralia,  two  small  towns  fifty-seven 
miles  eastward.  These  places,  four  miles  apart, 
constitute  the  strategic  centre  of  both  states,  whether 
in  relation  to  a  defending  force  or  invading  armies. 
By  schedule  time  Gray's  Harbor  and  Willapa  Har- 
bor are  but  three  hours  westward;  Seattle  three 
hours  to  the  north;  Portland  three  hours  and  forty- 
five  minutes  to  the  south;  the  fortifications  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Columbia  seven  hours  and  a  quarter; 
the  fortifications  commanding  the  entrance  to  Puget 
Sound  five  hours  and  a  half;  Tacoma  two  hours; 
Olympia,  the  capital  of  the  state,  one  hour  and 


t-t  u-j  sj 

III  T: 


twenty-five  minutes;  the  United  States  Navy  Yard 
at  Bremerton,  four  hours.  Should  it  be  necessary 
to  march  to  any  of  these  places,  they  could  be  made 
in  as  many  days  as  hours  are  given  in  the  railroad 

Within  seven  hours  by  rail  of  this  centre  is  to  be 
found  fifty-eight  per  cent,  of  the  entire  population 
of  Oregon,  while  sixty-one  per  cent,  of  the  entire 
population  of  Washington  is  within  six  hours.  This 
strategic  centre,  midway  between  the  centres  of 
population  in  Oregon  and  Washington,  is  on  and 
commands  the  only  line  of  railroad  that  traverses 
these  states  north  and  south.  Within  three  hours 
of  this  centre  are  eight  land-locked  and  deep-water 
harbors — two  on  the  south,  two  to  the  west,  and  four 
on  the  north,  together  with  ship-yards  and  naval 

Portland,  forming  the  right  centre  of  the  Japanese 
position,  is  connected  with  eastern  Oregon  and 
Washington  by  the  Columbia  River  and  two  parallel 
lines  of  railway.  Seattle  and  Everett,  forming  the 
Japanese  left  centre,  are  connected  with  eastern 
Washington  and  Oregon  by  three  parallel  lines  of 

The  full  significance  inherent  in  the  seizure  of  this 
strategic  centre  is  only  realized  when  the  results  are 
viewed  in  the  concrete.  No  opposition  against  the 
landing  of  Japanese  armies  is  possible  unless  the 
American  forces  are  equal  in  numbers  and  efficiency, 
and  are,  moreover,  in  occupation  of  this  position  in 



less  than  four  weeks  subsequent  to  the  declaration 
of  war.  The  forts  at  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia 
and  on  Puget  Sound  possess  no  defensive  value 
whatever  when  concerned  with  the  invasion  of 
these  states.1  The  cities  which  they  are  supposed 
to  protect  will  be  occupied  by  the  Japanese  without 
the  invading  forces  coming  within  fifty  or  a  hundred 
miles  of  either  fortification.  As  Portland  and  the 
cities  on  Puget  Sound  are  possessed  by  the  Japanese, 
these  ports  will  pass  into  their  control  without  the 
firing  of  a  shot. 

By  this  single  movement  Japan  not  alone  possesses 
these  states  in  a  military  sense,  but  economically 
and  politically  as  well.  She  commands  all  lines  of 
communication,  all  harbors,  and  practically  the  en- 
tire personal  wealth  of  a  territory  that  is  larger  and 
richer  than  the  Japanese  Empire.  By  the  occupa- 
tion of  this  position  she  segregates  and  dominates  the 
inhabitants,  controls  them  and  their  activities,  their 
productions  and  industries,  to  a  degree  of  unity  and 
absolutism  now  unknown  in  this  Republic.  With 
the  seizure  and  fortification  of  the  Bitter  Root  Moun- 
tains east  of  Spokane,  together  with  the  Blue  Moun- 
tains in  eastern  Oregon,2  the  dominion  of  Japan  over 
these  two  American  states  becomes  complete. 

»  See  Chart  III.  •  See  Chart  IV. 



To  Seattle  and 
fuget  Sound 

To  Central 

To  Walla  W, 
and  Columbia  R 




U>ngitudell9-  West       from    IIS-      Greenwich     1 


AS  the  defencelessness  of  Washington  and  Oregon 
is  due  primarily  to  the  failure  on  the  part  of 
this  Republic  to  recognize  the  changes  that  modern 
science  and  invention  have  brought  about  in  in- 
creasing the  possibilities  of  invasion,  and  in  altering 
to  a  corresponding  degree  the  manner  and  means 
of  defending  seaboard  states,  so  is  the  undefended 
condition  of  southern  California  due  to  the  same 
general  reasons. 

These  two  localities,  forming  the  extreme  flanks 
of  the  Pacific  coast,  are  equally  remote  from  the 
main  centres  of  the  Republic,  separated  therefrom 
by  deserts  and  mountain  -  chains.  And  while  the 
forts  of  the  north  are  without  value,  not  only  on 
account  of  their  worthlessness,  but  because  of  their 
remoteness  from  any  avenue  of  invasion,  southern 
California  is  without  even  the  delusive  dependence 
of  such  fortifications. 

We  have  shown  how  simple,  and  yet  how  deci- 
sive, is  the  conquest  of  Washington  and  Oregon,  how 
quickly  it  can  be  accomplished  by  Japan  without 
even  the  probability  of  a  battle ;  yet  the  seizure  of 
southern  California  presents  less  difficulties  than  are 
to  be  found  in  the  Northern  States. 



Southern  California  is  less  in  area  than  one-half 
of  the  state  of  Oregon,  but  of  this  area  three-fourths 
belong  to  deserts  and  mountains,  while  only  a  por- 
tion of  the  remaining  one-fourth  is  inhabited.  The 
cities  and  cultivated  areas  are  all  adjacent  to  the 
sea,  so  that  over  ninety  per  cent,  of  the  entire 
population  dwells  within  thirty  miles  of  the  ocean, 
while  94.25  per  cent,  of  the  total  wealth  lies  within 
this  same  distance  of  the  sea.1 

The  seizure  of  southern  California  is  simplified 
by  an  increased  concentration  of  wealth  and  popu- 
lation in  a  single  seaboard  county,  where  is  to  be 
found  two-thirds  of  the  entire  population  of  this 
territory  and  more  than  two-thirds  of  its  wealth. 
This  delimitation  of  the  strategic  area  is  finally  re- 
duced to  the  environs  of  a  single  city,  so  that  the 
conquest  of  the  southern  flank  of  the  Pacific  coast 
is  relegated  to  and  depends  upon  the  seizure  of  the 
city  of  Los  Angeles.  Within  this  city  alone  is  to 
be  found  more  than  half  of  the  entire  population 
and  wealth  of  southern  California.  It  constitutes 
the  political,  economic  and  railroad  centre  of  this 
entire  territory.  All  other  cities,  communities  and 
industries  are  dependent  upon  it.  If  every  city  in 
this  region  except  Los  Angeles  were  seized  by  the 
enemy,  southern  California  would  still  remain, 
militarily,  politically  and  economically  a  part  of 
the  Republic;  but  if  Los  Angeles  passed  into  pos- 

1  Chart  V. 


session  of  an  invading  force,  the  whole  of  southern 
California  would  fall  though  not  another  blow  were 
struck.  There  is  not  a  city  nor  community  in  this 
region  that  can  exist  for  any  portion  of  time  after 
Los  Angeles  is  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  though 
no  hostile  demonstrations  were  made  against  them. 
There  is  not  a  town,  nor  even  a  rural  community,  that 
is  self-dependent  nor  interdependent,  but  are,  as  a 
whole,  suburban  to  Los  Angeles. 

San  Diego  in  a  military  sense,  politically  and 
economically,  is  without  relative  importance.  This 
city,  as  all  other  towns  in  southern  California,  is 
but  a  distant  suburb  of  Los  Angeles,  connected  to 
it  by  a  single  strand  of  railway.  With  the  severance 
of  this  artery  of  trade,  whether  it  occurs  a  mile 
north  of  San  Diego  or  at  Los  Angeles,  one  hundred 
and  twenty-seven  miles  distant,  is  immaterial — the 
fate  of  that  city  is  the  same.  With  the  enemy  in 
control  of  the  ocean,  the  isolation  of  San  Diego  is 
complete.  Like  ancient  Carthage,  it  is  built  where 
the  sea  and  desert  meet.  Westward  is  the  ocean; 
eastward,  southward  and  northeastward,  just  be- 
yond its  environs,  reclaimed  from  the  deserts,  rise 
hillsides  as  barren  as  those  that  are  beyond  the 
Valley  of  the  Tombs. 

The  single  line  of  railroad,  which  is  this  city's 
means  of  communication,  runs  northward  along 
the  coast  for  a  distance  of  seventy-four  miles,  within 
four  hundred  to  nine  hundred  yards  of  tide-water. 
Thus  a  single  vessel  can  blockade  this  city  by  land 



and  by  sea.  So  complete  is  the  geographical  and 
strategic  isolation  of  San  Diego  that  a  rampart  of 
Gibraltars  would  not  increase  its  military  signifi- 
cance nor  add  a  single  element  to  the  defence  of 
southern  California.  Its  capitulation  will  be  brought 
about  by  ignoring  its  existence.  This,  under  simi- 
lar conditions,  has  happened  many  times  before  in 
the  wars  of  man. 

Though  Los  Angeles  constitutes,  as  will  be  seen, 
the  single  strategic  point  upon  which  depends  the 
security  of  southern  California,  no  effort,  up  to 
the  present  time,  has  been  made  to  render  it  secure 
from  attack.  One  regiment  can  now  occupy  the 
city  with  impunity.  The  only  effort  made  toward 
its  defence  has  been  the  advocacy  of  fortifying 
Point  Fermin  at  the  entrance  of  San  Pedro  Harbor. 
This  proposal  but  demonstrates  that  to  which  we 
have  already  called  attention,  the  prevailing  igno- 
rance concerning  modern  warfare. 

We  have  heretofore  shown  the  general  state  of 
deterioration  inherent  in  the  existent  fortifications 
of  the  Republic,  together  with  the  depleted  condi- 
tion of  the  Coast  Artillery,  a  state  of  decadence  that 
has  resulted  in  rendering  useless  four-fifths  of  the 
guns  already  emplaced.  Until  there  is  a  complete 
reorganization  of  the  Republic's  military  system, 
it  is  not  only  useless  to  construct  new  fortifications, 
but  in  so  doing  the  nation  is  involved  in  new  dangers 
to  which  we  have  already  called  attention. 

Fortifications  for  the  entrance  of  San  Pedro  Har- 


bor  possess  no  intrinsic  or  relative  importance  as 
regards  the  defence  of  Los  Angeles.  They  belong, 
not  to  the  land  defences  of  this  region,  but  to  the 
naval,  and  their  erection  presupposes  the  presence 
of  an  active  fleet  in  these  waters.  San  Pedro  may 
be  made  a  naval  base,  but  beyond  that  it  possesses 
no  defensive  value  whatsoever.  The  purpose  of 
such  fortifications  are  specific — the  defence  of  the 
harbor  itself,  or  a  fleet  based  upon  it.  The  sphere 
of  actual  defence  belonging  to  such  fortifications  is 
determined  by  a  semicircle,  the  radii  of  which  are 
the  effective  range  of  their  guns.  Modern  harbor 
fortifications  are  not  self  -  defensive.  Their  pro- 
tection depends  upon  either  a  fleet  of  sufficient 
strength  to  prevent  the  transportation  and  landing 
of  the  enemy's  forces,  or  mobile  armies  able  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  gaining  a  foothold  on  any 
portion  of  the  coast,  whether  adjacent  to  or  distant 
from  the  fortifications  to  be  attacked. 

We  have  already  shown  the  impossibility  of  naval 
defence  for  the  Pacific  coast  whenever  the  American 
navy  is  in  the  Atlantic  prior  to  the  beginning  of 
hostilities,  or  whenever  the  American  fleets  in  the 
Pacific  are  inferior  to  the  entire  Japanese  navy. 
The  fortification  of  San  Pedro  presupposes  a  navy 
many  times  larger  than  at  present;  the  size  of  the 
fleets  in  the  Pacific,  and  their  efficiency,  being  deter- 
mined by  Japanese  naval  development. 

Fortifications  at  San  Pedro,  without  a  fleet  rela- 
tively as  strong  as  that  of  the  enemy,  are  useless. 



As  Los  Angeles  is  the  objective  point,  landings  will 
be  made  upon  the  closest  available  seaboard.  And 
in  a  military  sense  San  Pedro  is  twice  as  far  from 
Los  Angeles  as  Santa  Monica  Bay.1  This  harbor, 
moreover,  is  so  contracted  that  the  danger  of  sub- 
marine mines  and  torpedoes  would,  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, prohibit  its  utilization  by  the  Japanese 
until  the  harbor  itself  and  the  surrounding  country 
passed  into  their  control.  Santa  Monica  Bay,  on 
the  other  hand,  gives  a  free  seaboard  of  over  twenty 
miles  in  extent — adjacent  to  the  environs  of  Los 

So  long  as  this  city  forms  the  objective  of  in- 
vading armies  their  forces  will  not,  under  any  cii- 
cumstances,  land  within  twenty  miles  of  San 
Pedro  Harbor,  and  the  forts  at  that  point  must,  re- 
gardless of  their  strength,  capitulate  whenever  Los 
Angeles  is  seized.  To  hold  these  proposed  fortifica- 
tions against  a  land  attack  would  require  as  great  an 
army  as  might,  in  the  beginning,  delay  the  in- 
vasion of  southern  California.  Once  an  enemy 
gains  the  shores  of  Santa  Monica  Bay,  San  Pedro 
must,  owing  to  the  peculiar  topographical  features 
of  the  peninsula,  either  fall  to  an  inferior  force  or  be 
defended  on  a  continuous  front  of  a  number  of 

Extending  across  the  San  Pedro  peninsula  almost 
east  and  west  is  a  range  of  barren  hills,  similar  to 

1  Fig.  2,  Chart  VI. 


those  north  of  Port  Arthur,  with  an  irregular  crest 
exceeding  a  thousand  feet  in  height  and  nearly 
twelve  miles  in  length.1  Sixteen  hundred  yards 
north  of  the  proposed  fortifications  the  contour 
rises  to  two  hundred  and  eighty  feet ;  at  three  thou- 
sand yards  the  elevation  is  five  hundred  feet;  at 
five  thousand  yards  the  elevation  increases  to  nine 
hundred  feet;  while  at  six  thousand  five  hundred 
yards  is  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  fourteen  hundred  feet 
above  the  proposed  batteries.  This  ridge  continues 
westward  to  Santa  Monica  Bay,  so  that  any  attack 
upon  the  forts  defending  San  Pedro  would  be  by 
that  bay,  the  enemy  moving  eastward  and  occupy- 
ing this  range  of  hills.  Once  these  heights  are  seized 
the  harbor  and  forts  would  be  rendered  untenable. 
The  base  of  an  attack  on  San  Pedro  is  identical  with 
that  of  an  advance  on  Los  Angeles — the  Bay  of 
Santa  Monica. 

As  the  whole  of  southern  California  will  pass  into 
the  hands  of  an  invading  force  once  Los  Angeles  is 
occupied,  all  means  employed  for  the  defence  of 
this  region  must  be  directed  toward  the  security  of 
this  city,  its  environs  and  communications. 

So  extensive  is  the  seaboard  by  which  Los  Angeles 
can  be  attacked,  and  so  close  is  the  city  to  the  sea, 
that  the  only  means — once  command  of  the  sea  is 
lost — which  can  insure  it  from  capture  is  to  pre- 
pare before  war  systematically  and  thoroughly  such 

'Chart  VI. 

means  for  the  defence  of  the  entire  seaboard  by  mo- 
bile armies  as  modern  warfare  demands.  Isolated 
fortifications,  small  and  inefficient  forces,  will  not 
only  not  hinder  nor  even  delay  the  conquest  of  this 
region  a  single  day,  but  will,  on  the  other  hand,  re- 
sult in  useless  destruction  of  life  and  devastation  of 
the  country. 

We  have  called  attention  to  the  brevity  of  modern 
wars  in  general  and  naval  movements  in  particular; 
how,  within  a  few  weeks  after  war  is  declared,  con- 
current with  the  seizure  of  the  Philippines,  Hawaii, 
and  Alaska,  will  the  conquest  of  Washington  and 
Oregon  be  consummated.  In  the  same  manner 
and  within  three  months  after  hostilities  have  been 
begun  other  armies  will  land  upon  the  seaboard  of 
southern  California. 

The  question  that  now  rises  naturally  in  the 
thoughts  of  the  reader  is,  What  will  the  United  States 
be  doing  during  these  three  months  ?  Instantly  the 
mind  is  crowded,  not  alone  with  the  speculations  of 
victory,  but  with  the  vague  grandeur  of  a  nation's 
hope.  The  Old  Lamp  is  rubbed  and  vast  armies  are 
suddenly  mobilized;  armaments  are  brought  out  of 
hidden  recesses;  great  generals  are  made  in  the 
twinkling  of  an  eye ;  then  winged,  these  legions  take 
their  flight  across  the  mountains  and  deserts  of  the 
West.  But  what  will  actually  take  place  in  the  Re- 
public after  war  is  declared  is  so  well  known  as  to 
make  it  unnecessary  to  again  refer  to  the  confusion, 
ignorance,  peculation  and  complete  lack  of  every 



form  of  military  preparation,  armaments,  supplies, 
or  means  of  securing  them. 

To  conduct  a  war  on  the  Pacific  coast  against  the 
forces  of  Japan,  this  Republic  is  at  present  less  pre- 
pared and  less  capable  than  it  has  ever  been  prior 
to  any  war  undertaken  by  it  in  the  past.  Due  to 
the  scorn  of  consequence,  to  the  vanity  of  ignorance 
and  indifference  toward  military  preparation,  no 
force  can  be  placed  on  the  seaboard  of  southern  Cal- 
ifornia either  within  three  months  or  nine  months 
that  would  delay  the  advance  of  the  Japanese  armies 
a  single  day. 

Irrespective  of  armament  and  ante-bellum  prepara- 
tion, however,  we  find  other  conditions  that  would 
prevent  the  mobilization  of  an  army  in  southern 
California  capable  of  defending  it  against  invasion 
and  conquest. 

The  maximum  force  that  can  be  mobilized  in  the 
Republic  immediately  following  a  declaration  of 
war  is  less  than  one  hundred  thousand  men,  of  whom 
two-thirds  are  militia.  This  force,  made  up  of  more 
than  forty  miniature  armies,  is  scattered,  each  un- 
der separate  military  and  civil  jurisdiction,  over  the 
entire  nation.  By  the  time  these  heterogeneous  ele- 
ments are  gathered  together,  organized  into  prop- 
er military  units  and  made  ready  for  transportation 
to  the  front,  the  states  of  Washington  and  Oregon 
will  have  been  invaded  and  their  conquest  made 
complete  by  a  vastly  superior  force. 

At  this  stage  the  nation  is  brought  face  to  face 



with  the  weakness  inherent  in  republican  forms  of 
government  during  war — the  supremacy  of  popular 
control  over  military  movements.  With  the  seizure 
of  the  Philippines,  Hawaii  and  Alaska,  the  excite- 
ment and  clangor  in  the  nation  would  be  very  great ; 
but  with  the  invasion  and  conquest  of  two  states 
forming  an  integral  part  of  the  Union,  the  tide  of 
patriotism  and  of  wrath  would  well  still  higher,  and 
the  populace  would  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less 
than  an  immediate  advance  against  the  Japanese. 
Being  ignorant  or  indifferent  as  to  the  military 
efficiency  of  Japan  or  what  even  constitutes  it,  vain 
in  their  valor  and  in  the  victories  of  the  past,  the 
entire  country,  from  the  most  remote  hamlet  to  the 
Congress  of  the  nation,  would  urge  the  diversion  of 
the  mobilized  forces  against  the  Japanese  occupying 
Washington  and  Oregon. 

Whether  popular  demand  would  succeed  in  divert- 
ing the  American  forces  in  the  direction  of  thes3 
states  or  not  is  immaterial  as  far  as  the  present 
strategic  situation  is  concerned,  for  it  is  certain  that 
they  would  not  be  turned  to  the  extreme  southern 
flank  of  the  Pacific  coast,  placing  them  in  a  posi- 
tion almost  as  remote  from  the  invading  armies 
as  if  they  had  not  been  moved  west  of  the  Mississippi, 
still  leaving  the  whole  coast,  except  a  small  area, 
exposed  to  invasion.  If  popular  opinion  did  not 
prevail  or  the  forces  were  not  retained  in  the  East, 
the  only  point  upon  which  they  could  concentrate, 
as  stated  before,  would  be  San  Francisco.  If  mobi- 



lized  there  prior  to  the  invasion  of  southern  Cali- 
fornia, this  flank  would  still  remain  defenceless,  in- 
asmuch as  these  forces  could  not  move  five  hundred 
miles  to  the  southward  without  diverting  the 
Japanese  attack  upon  San  Francisco  and  exposing 
the  most  strategic  point  on  the  Pacific  coast  to 
capture.  This  would  permit  the  union  of  the 
Japanese  armies  seizing  San  Francisco  with  those 
occupying  Washington  and  Oregon,  relegating  the 
American  position  to  an  extreme  and  strategically 
unimportant  flank. 

The  probabilities  of  the  American  armies  being 
directed  against  the  Japanese  forces  in  Washington 
and  Oregon  through  the  force  of  popular  agitation 
presents  this  apparently  anomalous  condition,  that 
the  larger  the  American  armies  are  at  the  time  of 
invasion — regardless  of  what  portion  of  the  coast 
it  may  be — the  more  certain  are  these  forces  to  be 
directed  against  that  point.  Two  factors  determine 

(r)  The  numerical  equality  or  superiority  of  the 
first  Japanese  expedition  over  the  entire  American 
land  forces,  preventing  an  American  army  of  corre- 
sponding strength  from  being  sent  against  it  simul- 
taneously with  the  despatch  of  similar  forces 
against  other  probable  points  of  invasion. 

(2)  The  power  of  popular  opinion  to  direct  the 
available  military  establishment  against  the  in- 
vading forces,  regardless  of  the  general  military 
situation  or  strategic  considerations. 

x«  281 

THE      VALOR      OF      IGNORANCE 

Japan,  to  make  this  condition  constant,  needs 
but  to  have  the  strength  of  her  first  column  pro- 
portionate to  that  of  the  entire  American  forces, 
which  would  be  relatively  small  as  regards  her 
military  establishment,  even  if  the  American  stand- 
ing army  were  five  times  its  present  size.  So  long 
as  the  existent  military  system  continues  in  the 
Republic  there  can  be  no  adequate  defence  of  any 
single  portion  of  the  Pacific  coast  within  a  year 
after  a  declaration  of  war,  nor  the  three  spheres 
within  as  many  years. 

Three  or  four  months  after  war  is  declared  will 
find  Japan  in  occupation  of  all  insular  possessions, 
Washington  and  Oregon  with  an  American  army 
of  less  than  one  hundred  thousand  men  either 
assembling  in  the  East,  moving  against  the  Japanese 
in  the  North  or  concentrating  at  San  Francisco. 

Japan,  landing  an  army  on  the  shores  of  southern 
California  at  this  time,  would  occupy,  without  op- 
position, the  strategic  centre  of  this  region  on  the 
following  day,  and  the  conquest  of  southern  Cali- 
fornia would  be,  in  a  practical  sense,  complete. 

We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  most 
important  phase  of  the  military  occupancy  of  south- 
ern California  by  Japan.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  intrinsic  worth  of  this  region,  neither  its  economic 
nor  political  significance,  but  appertains  alone  to  its 
strategic  value,  its  necessity  for  and  capacity  of 
defence  against  subsequent  efforts  on  the  part  of 
this  Republic  to  reconquer  the  Pacific  States. 



There  are  only  three  avenues  by  which  armies 
can  gain  entrance  to  the  Pacific  coast  from  the 
eastern  portion  of  the  United  States,  and  southern 
California  constitutes  one  of  these  avenues,  hence 
the  possession  of  this  region  early  in  the  war  is 
essential  to  Japanese  control  and  security. 

The  conformation  of  this  section1  is  peculiarly 
adapted  to  effective  defence  from  the  Pacific  side. 
The  sea-coast  from  Mexico  to  Point  Conception  is  an 
elongated,  irregular  crescent,  and  with  but  isolated 
exceptions — as  the  valley  holding  the  towns  and 
orange  orchards  of  San  Bernardino,  Riverside  and 
Redlands — the  inhabitable  area  follows  the  sea- 
line  and  extends  back  but  a  comparatively  few  miles. 
North  and  eastward  of  this  oasis  region  are  four 
principal  mountain  ranges:  the  San  Jacinto,  San 
Bernardino,  San  Gabriel  and  Tehachapi,  with  the 
crest  -  line  ranging  from  five  to  eleven  thousand 
feet.  Beyond  these  mountains  are  deserts,  lava 
beds  and  Valleys  of  Death. 

Entrance  into  southern  California  is  gained  by 
three  passes — the  San  Jacinto,  Cajon  and  Saugus, 
while  access  to  the  San  Joaquin  Valley  and  central 
California  is  by  the  Tehachapi.  It  is  in  control  of 
these  passes  that  determines  Japanese  supremacy 
on  the  southern  flank  of  the  Pacific  coast,  and  it  is 
in  their  adaptability  to  defence  that  determines  the 
true  strategic  value  of  southern  California  to  the 

1  Chart  VII. 


Los  Angeles  forms  the  main  centre  of  these  three 
passes,1  and  lies  within  three  hours  by  rail  of  each 
of  them,  while  San  Bernardino,  forming  the  im- 
mediate base  of  forces  defending  Cajon  and  San 
Jacinto  passes,  is  within  one  hour  by  rail  of  both 

The  mountain-chains  encompassing  the  inhabited 
regions  of  southern  California  might  be  compared 
to  a  great  wall  thousands  of  feet  in  height,  within 
whose  enclosures  are  those  fertile  regions  which 
have  made  the  name  of  this  state  synonymous  with 
all  that  is  abundant  in  nature.  These  mountains, 
rugged  and  inaccessible  to  armies  from  the  desert 
side,  form  an  impregnable  barrier  except  by  the 
three  gateways  mentioned. 

Standing  upon  Mt.  San  Gorgonio  or  San  Antonio 
one  can  look  westward  and  southward  down  upon 
an  endless  succession  of  cultivated  fields,  towns  and 
hamlets,  orchards,  vineyards  and  orange  groves; 
upon  wealth  amounting  to  hundreds  of  millions; 
upon  as  fair  and  luxuriant  a  region  as  is  ever  given 
man  to  contemplate;  a  region  wherein  shall  be 
based  the  Japanese  forces  defending  these  passes. 
To  the  north  and  east  across  the  top  of  this  moun- 
tain-wall are  forests,  innumerable  streams,  and  abun- 
dance of  forage.  But  suddenly  at  the  outward  rim  all 
vegetation  ceases ;  there  is  a  drop — the  desert  begins. 

The  Mojave  is  not  a  desert  in  the  ordinary  sense 

» Chart  VII. 


of  the  word,  but  a  region  with  all  the  characteristics 
of  other  lands,  only  here  Nature  is  dead  or  in  the 
last  struggle  against  death.  Its  hills  are  volcanic 
scoria  and  cinders,  its  plains  bleak  with  red  dust;  its 
meadows  covered  with  a  desiccated  and  seared  vege- 
tation; its  springs,  sweet  with  arsenic,  are  rimmed, 
not  by  verdure,  but  with  the  bones  of  beast  and 
man.  Its  gaunt  forests  of  yucca  bristle  and  twist 
in  its  winds  and  brazen  gloom.  Its  mountains, 
abrupt  and  bare  as  sun-dried  skulls,  are  broken 
with  canons  that  are  furnaces  and  gorges  that  are 
catacombs.  Man  has  taken  cognizance  of  this 
deadness  in  his  nomenclature.  There  are  Coffin 
Mountains,  Funeral  Ranges,  Death  Valleys,  Dead 
Men's  Canons,  dead  beds  of  lava,  dead  lakes,  and 
dead  seas.  All  here  is  dead.  This  is  the  ossuary  of 
Nature;  yet  American  armies  must  traverse  it  and 
be  based  upon  it  whenever  they  undertake  to  regain 
southern  California.  To  attack  these  fortified  places 
from  the  desert  side  is  a  military  undertaking 
pregnant  with  greater  difficulties  than  any  ever 
attempted  in  all  the  wars  of  the  world.1 

The  value  of  Japan's  strategic  position  in  southern 
California  is  not  alone  determined  by  the  limited 
area  of  the  inhabitable  region  and  its  adjacency  to 
the  sea,  nor  the  concentration  into  a  single  sea-board 
county  of  two-thirds  of  its  wealth  and  population, 
but  is  due  to  the  strategic  advantages  afforded  by 

1  Appendix,  Table  XII. 

the  location  of  the  Cajon,  San  Jacinto,  and  Saugus 
passes,  their  proximity  to  Los  Angeles  and  to  one  an- 
other, the  shortness  of  their  interior  lines,  and  the 
location  of  their  fortified  positions  in  mountains  not 
only  inaccessible  to  armies  from  the  east,  but,  while 
their  redans  point  out  upon  a  desert,  their  rear  rests 
immediately  upon  one  of  the  most  fertile  sections  of 
the  Republic. 

The  strategic  position  of  the  American  forces  at- 
tacking these  passes  presents  the  reverse  of  these 
conditions.  While  the  Japanese  fortifications  are 
built  among  and  enclose  an  abundance  of  resources 
of  every  kind,  the  American  armies  must  attack 
these  positions  with  forces  resting  upon  a  desert  that 
is  not  only  without  resources,  but  is  without  water 
sufficient  to  supply  a  single  regiment  within  striking 
distance  of  these  passes. 

If  an  attempt  were  made  to  force  the  San  Jacinto 
Pass,  the  nearest  water  adequate  for  the  needs  of  an 
army  is  in  the  Imperial  Valley,  one  hundred  and 
thirty  miles  distant.  If  the  Cajon  were  to  be  at- 
tacked, the  nearest  water  available  for  the  use  of 
an  army  is  the  Colorado  River,  two  hundred  and 
twenty  miles  distant.  If  an  attempt  were  made  to 
force  the  Tehachapi,  the  nearest  water-supply  is  two 
hundred  and  sixty  miles  away. 

In  modern  warfare  the  increased  effective  use  of 
gun-fire  gives  forces  established  in  semi-permament 
fortifications  the  advantage  to  the  extent  that  the 
attacking  force  must  be  several  times  stronger,  ac- 



cording  to  the  character  of  the  defences  and  the 
efficiency  of  the  troops  manning  them.  Considering 
the  opposing  forces  equally  efficient,  there  would  be 
to  every  hundred  thousand  Japanese  a  minimum 
force  of  several  hundred  thousand  Americans.  But 
the  Japanese  would  possess  still  another  strategic 
advantage  that  would  increase  this  disproportion  to 
an  almost  exaggerated  degree.  Their  interior  lines, 
connecting  these  passes  and  uniting  them  on  the 
main  base  at  Los  Angeles,  are  so  contracted  that 
a  small  force  can  accomplish,  on  account  of  the 
rapidity  of  transportation,  what  would  otherwise 
require  a  great  army. 

For  the  Japanese  to  transfer  a  train  of  troops  or 
munitions  from  Cajon  to  the  San  Jacinto  Pass  would 
require  but  two  hours,  while  a  change  on  the  same 
front  by  the  attacking  forces  would  necessitate 
several  days.  Only  forty-odd  miles  separate  the 
Japanese  forces  defending  the  Cajon  from  those 
in  the  San  Jacinto,  while  nearly  fourteen  hundred 
miles  must  be  traversed  by  the  American  forces  in 
changing  from  one  front  to  the  other. 

This  shortness  of  the  Japanese  lines  and  the 
excessive  length  of  the  American  would  of  necessity 
restrict  the  main  attack  to  one  pass.  Neither  the 
Saugus  Canon  nor  the  Tehachapi  could  be  attacked 
with  the  enemy  in  possession  of  the  Cajon  unless  the 
American  forces  were -vast  enough  to  mask  Cajon 
while  attempting  to  force  these  positions.  But  the 
desert  not  only  minimizes  the  number  of  troops 



resting  upon  it,  but  these  two  latter  passes  are  of 
secondary  importance,  their  value  and  possession 
being  determined  entirely  by  the  control  of  the 
Cajon  and  the  San  Jacinto.  Hence  the  reconquest 
of  southern  California  will  be  by  one  or  both  of 
these  main  passes. 

If  the  American  advance  is  directed  against  San 
Jacinto,  not  only  must  they  make  their  assaults  on 
fortified  positions  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles  from 
water,  but  their  communications  with  the  first  base 
of  supply  would  be  restricted  to  a  single  line  of  desert 
railway  one  thousand  miles  long.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  main  advance  is  directed  against  the  Ca- 
jon, the  American  forces  would  have  two  lines  of  rail- 
way. This  advantage  of  increased  means  of  com- 
munication is,  however,  nullified  by  the  fact  that  the 
nearest  available  water  supply  sufficient  for  a  sin- 
gle brigade  is  two  hundred  and  twenty  miles  distant. 

Such  are  the  conditions  that  render  southern 
California  impregnable  against  attack  once  these 
passes  are  fortified  and  held  in  force.  No  fortitude, 
no  vastness  of  numbers,  no  amount  of  patriotism, 
no  human  ingenuity  can  overcome  these  inaccessible 
ramparts  and  desert  glacis  once  an  enemy  militarily 
as  efficient  as  the  Japanese  occupies  the  three  gate- 
ways through  which  alone  armies  may  pass. 

In  a  later  chapter  we  will  show  how  other  condi- 
tions increase — if  it  were  possible — the  impregna- 
bility of  this  position  to  such  a  degree  that  not 
even  the  contemplation  of  an  attack  is  possible. 


THE  duration  and  causes  of  war  are  never  con- 
stant, although  the  factors  that  determine  the 
length  or  brevity  of  wars  are  invariable  in  their 
application.     These  determinate  conditions  may,  in 
modern  wars,  be  divided  into  three  general  principles : 

(1)  Whenever  the  state  of  military  preparedness 
among  nations   is  proportionately   developed   and 
continues  constant  in  peace,  ensuing  wars  are  me- 
dium in  duration  and  minimum  in  destruction  of 
life  and  property. 

(2)  Whenever  the  state  of  military  unprepared- 
ness  among  nations  is  proportionately  the  same  in 
peace,   ensuing  wars  are  longest  in  duration  and 
maximum  in  destruction  of  life  and  property. 

(3)  Whenever  the  state  of  military  preparedness 
is  highly  developed  in  one  nation  and  lacking  in 
another,  ensuing  wars  are  short  in  duration  and  one- 
sided in  destruction  of  life  and  property. 

As  the  art  of  war  passes  from  the  brutish  valor 
of  the  individual  to  the  calm,  angerless  domain  of 
science,  the  more  absolute  becomes  the  application 
of  these  principles  in  the  consummation  of  modern 



The  relative  state  of  preparedness  for  war  in 
Japan  and  the  United  States  is  such  that,  unless 
there  is  an  immediate  military  renascence  in  this 
Republic,  the  approaching  struggle  will  be  rele- 
gated to  that  class  of  conflicts  exemplified  in  the 
Chinese- Japanese  War  of  1894,  the  Franco-Prussian 
War  of  1870,  the  German-Austrian  War  of  1866, 
and  the  Japanese-Russian  War  of  1904,  the  deter- 
minate conditions  of  which  are  the  inherent  factors 
of  the  third  principle. 

In  a  war  with  Japan  there  are  other  conditions  of 
preparedness  that  will  augment  the  rapidity  of  her 
conquest — viz.,  the  movement  of  her  troops  and 
naval  forces  to  positions  adjacent  to  the  theatre 
of  war  prior  to  a  formal  declaration  of  hostili- 

This  initiative  is  characteristic  of  Japanese  mili- 
tary activity;  and  though  naturally  condemned  in 
this  Republic  on  account  of  military  unprepared- 
ness,  the  initiation  of  war  without  the  formality  of 
a  declaration  does  not  alone  adhere  to  Japan.  Of 
the  hundred  and  twenty  wars  that  were  fought  in 
the  Occident  between  1790  and  1870,  one  hundred 
and  ten  were  begun  without  notification.  A  formal 
declaration  of  war  is  not  other  than  a  survival  of 
the  age  of  chivalry,  when  challenges  were  sent  cere- 
moniously by  a  herald  to  the  camp  of  the  enemy. 
All  such  formality  in  modern  conflicts  has  been 
and  is  considered  by  nations  prepared  for  war  as 
superfluous.  Only  those  countries  unprepared  groan 



at  such  activity,  and  the  overpowering  advantage 
this  initiative  gives  to  their  adversaries. 

It  will  therefore  be  found  that  the  rapidity  of 
Japanese  movements  against  the  possessions  of  the 
United  States  will  be  greater  than  we  have  in  this 
work  set  down. 

In  considering  the  seizure  of  this  nation's  insular 
possessions,  as  well  as  Washington,  Oregon  and 
southern  California,  we  have  minimized  the  mili- 
tary efficiency  of  the  Japanese  and  the  capacity  of 
their  transportation.  By  this  minimization  we  have 
increased  unduly  the  defensive  capacity  of  the  Re- 
public. Yet  we  are  forced  to  witness,  in  spite  of 
this,  its  complete  and  utter  helplessness. 

There  now  remains  but  the  seizure  of  San  Francisco 
to  bring  about  the  final  dissolution  of  American 
power  upon  the  Pacific  and  complete  the  victory 
of  Japan.  That  the  seizure  of  San  Francisco  would 
occur  earlier  in  the  war  than  we  state  is  admit- 
ted by  all  strategicians  conversant  with  conditions. 
But  in  order  to  permit  the  maximum  defence  pos- 
sible to  San  Francisco  under  present  military  condi- 
tions, we  have  postponed  any  attack  until  the  entire 
available  military  forces  of  the  Republic  have  been 
concentrated  in  its  immediate  vicinity  —  an  im- 
probable, if  not  impossible,  mobilization  as  regards 

San  Francisco  is  the  most  important  point  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  commercially,  politically  and  strateg- 
ically. Its  proximity  to  the  Central  Pacific,  to- 



gether  with  its  great  harbor,  makes  it  the  centre 
of  American  Pacific  trade. 

From  the  standpoint  of  naval  strategy,  San 
Francisco  is  the  most  essential  position  on  the 
Pacific  littoral.  With  the  enemy  in  control  of  this 
bay,  in  addition  to  the  territories  already  con- 
sidered, no  American  fleet,  regardless  of  its  size 
and  efficiency,  could  enter  upon  the  Pacific  so  long 
as  war  continued.  San  Francisco  Bay  is  the  main 
naval  base  of  the  Republic  on  the  Pacific,  and  with 
its  loss  all  hope  of  regaining  naval  control  over 
this  ocean  will  be  gone  forever. 

Militarily  its  strategic  importance  also  exceeds 
that  of  any  other  locality  of  the  Pacific  slope.  Mid- 
way between  the  northern  and  southern  flanks  of 
the  coast,  it  makes  them  both,  when  in  possession 
of  an  enemy,  vulnerable  to  a  rear  attack.  It  not 
only  divides  the  enemy's  forces  occupying  these  ter- 
ritories, but  by  holding  this  position  their  union 
is  made  impossible.  San  Francisco,  commanding 
the  San  Joaquin,  Sacramento  and  Santa  Clara  Val- 
leys, controls  the  whole  of  central  and  northern 
California  to  nearly  the  same  degree  as  Los  Angeles 
dominates  southern  California.  Once  San  Francisco 
Bay  is  seized  by  the  Japanese,  this  entire  region 
passes  into  their  hands. 

Should  Japan  occupy  in  force  both  flanks  of  the 
coast,  as  we  have  heretofore  described,  and  the 
United  States  should  retain  command  of  San  Fran- 
cisco and  its  lines  of  communication  with  the  East, 



this  nation  would  still  be  possessed  of  a  position 
strategically  equal  to  that  of  Japan,  provided: 

(1)  That  the  military  establishment  of  the  Re- 
public permitted  the  immediate  mobilization  in  the 
environs  of  San  Francisco  Bay  of  armies  capable  of 
defending  it  against  attack. 

(2)  That  additional  military  forces  existed  in  the 
Republic   adequate   in  numbers  and  efficiency  to 
counterbalance  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  Japan 
to   gain   a   preponderance  of   strength  north  and 
south  of  this  locality. 

If  these  conditions,  determined  by  ante-bellum 
preparation,  were  possible,  then  the  American  posi- 
tion, piercing  the  Japanese  centre  and  segregating 
their  flanks,  would  equalize  the  strategic  situation 
and  permit  the  consummation  of  the  war  to  be  deter- 
mined by  battles.  But,  unfortunately,  the  issuance 
of  these  problematical  combats  concerns  us  in  no 
way,  for  we  are  forced  to  deal  alone  with  facts,  not 
fancies  nor  hopes  nor  delusions. 

It  is  generally  believed  that  the  defences  of  San 
Francisco  are  not  only  effective,  but  are  particularly 
well  adapted  to  ward  off  any  attack  that  may  be 
made  upon  it;  the  truth,  however,  is  that  this  city, 
under  existent  military  conditions,  is  defenceless. 
And  so  long  as  the  armies  of  this  Republic  are  so 
inadequate  as  to  relegate  the  defence  of  San  Francisco 
to  the  peninsula  on  which  it  is  situated  its  capitula- 
tion will  be  without  even  the  trial  of  battle. 

The  defence  of  San  Francisco  does  not  depend 


upon  holding  fortified  positions,  but  in  maintain- 
ing military  control  of  the  entire  region  surrounding 
San  Francisco  Bay.  Because  of  its  peculiar  situa- 
tion, the  weakness  of  this  city  is  strategic  and  not 
tactical,  and  its  fate  depends  upon  the  issuance  of 
battles  fought  many  miles  from  its  present  fortifica- 

The  existing  defences  of  San  Francisco  are  re- 
stricted to  several  forts  commanding  the  entrance 
to  the  bay.  These  forts,  situated  partly  on  the 
north  side  of  the  channel  and  partly  on  the  south, 
are  neither  self-protective  nor  inter-protective  from 
any  attack  except  naval.  To  man  them  and  serve 
the  guns  already  emplaced  requires  one  hundred  and 
seventy  -  five  officers,  and  forty  -  two  hundred  and 
sixty-two  men.  But  there  are  available  only  forty- 
two  officers  and  fourteen  hundred  men.  Due  to 
this  depletion,  two-thirds  of  the  guns  cannot  be 
served  while  the  fire-power  of  the  remaining  one- 
third  is  less  than  that  of  two  Japanese  battleships. 

The  general  public  does  not  comprehend  the 
limitations  of  permanent  fortifications  in  modern 
warfare.  They  not  only  do  not  force  an  attack, 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  serve  to  divert  the  direction 
of  the  enemy's  advance.  This  freedom  of  move- 
ment and  attack  was  at  one  time  restricted  to  small 
bodies  of  troops  in  the  nature  of  raids,  the  general 
advance  or  occupation  first  necessitating  the  naval 
seizure  of  fortified  harbors.  But  modern  means  of 
sea  transportation  have  changed  this,  and  raids  or 



landings  upon  sequestered  shores  are  now  possible 
to  armies  of  two  hundred  thousand  men. 

There  are,  however,  other  factors  inherent  in 
modern  warfare  that  serve  to  prevent  the  naval 
seizure  of  any  harbor  regardless  of  its  fortifica- 
tions : 

(r)  The  development  and  extensive  use  of  sub- 
marine mines. 

(2)  The  increased  effective  range  of  torpedoes. 

These  two  means  of  marine  warfare  alone  prohibit 
the  naval  occupancy  of  any  land-locked  harbor  until 
the  surrounding  territory  has  been  possessed.  The 
defence  or  seizure  of  San  Francisco  is  unaffected 
by  its  harbor  fortifications,  as  no  Japanese  fleet 
would  approach  the  Golden  Gate  until  the  bay  and 
its  entire  environs  were  in  possession  of  their  armies. 

The  defence  of  San  Francisco  is  only  insured  by 
the  use  of  mobile  armies,  and  is  concerned  with  three 
distinct  theatres  of  action,  separate  from  its  present 
system  of  fortifications: 

(1)  The  defence  of  the  San  Francisco  peninsula. 

(2)  The  defence  of  the  Sausalito  peninsula. 

(3)  The  defence  of  its  inland  lines  of  communi- 

To  defend  the  San  Francisco  peninsula  belongs  to 
an  army  stationed,  not  on  the  peninsula,  but  in  the 
Santa  Clara  Valley,  fifty  miles  southward.  This 
position  also  shields  the  inland  lines  south  and  east 
of  the  bay.  Whichever  combatant  gains  command 
of  this  valley  is  in  a  position  to  attack  or  hold  the 



San  Francisco  peninsula  and  seize  or  command  all 
southern  lines  of  communication. 

To  defend  the  Sausalito  peninsula,  on  the  other 
hand,  belongs  to  an  army  stationed,  not  adjacent 
to  forts  Barry  and  Baker,  but  fifty  miles  northward 
in  the  county  of  Sonoma.  Whichever  combatant 
gains  control  of  this  region  is  also  so  strategically 
placed  as  to  attack  or  hold  the  Sausalito  peninsula 
and  to  seize  or  command  the  northern  lines  of 

The  mobilization  of  American  forces  in  the  vicinity 
of  San  Francisco  must  be  for  the  defence  of  the  entire 
territory  adjacent  to  the  bay,  since  no  one  part  can 
be  defended  to  the  exclusion  of  the  others.  The 
topographical  features  of  this  region  are  such  that 
its  inherent  strategic  difficulties  cannot  be  overcome 
except  by  the  operation  of  two  quasi-independent 
forces ;  one  restricted  to  operations  north  of  the  bay 
and  the  other  to  the  south.  If  these  armies  are  not 
self-sustaining,  nor  in  size  adequate  to  the  defence 
of  their  respective  theatres  of  action,  they  become 
as  a  whole  incapable  of  effective  defence  of  San 
Francisco.  Should  the  Japanese  column  moving 
northward  from  Monterey  Bay  be  materially  larger 
than  the  American  forces  in  the  Santa  Clara  Valley, 
it  will  either  necessitate  this  army's  reinforcement 
from  the  forces  defending  the  northern  shores  of  the 
bay,  or  its  retirement  in  that  direction,  or  the  de- 

1  Chart  VIII. 

•  296 


k-*   "i 

Oo/d«i  Go*  e 

San  Fran 


struction  in  detail  of  both  forces.  If  reinforced,  then 
the  north  shores  of  the  bay  and  San  Francisco 
would  be  open  to  attack  by  the  Japanese  column 
advancing  southward  from  Bodega.  If  the  southern 
army,  on  the  other  hand,  retired  north,  then  the 
southern  shores  of  the  bay,  the  peninsula,  and  city 
of  San  Francisco  would  be  undefended. 

Reversing  this  hypothesis  so  as  to  deal  with  the 
Japanese  column  advancing  east  and  south  from 
Bodega,  we  have  practically  the  same  conditions 
in  Sonoma,  and  so  north  of  the  bay,  as  existed 
southward : 

(1)  Reinforcements  drawn  from  the  Santa  Clara 
Valley,  exposing  that  region  to  attack  by  the  Japa- 
nese column  advancing  northward  from  Monterey 
and  leaving  San  Francisco  open  to  capture,  or 

(2)  Retirement  to  the  south  or  east  shores,  leaving 
Sausalito    open  to  seizure  and  San  Francisco  to 

(3)  The  destruction  of  both  forces  in  detail. 
The  security,  therefore,  of  the  American  position 

rests  on  the  superiority  of  both  armies  over  the 
Japanese  columns  advancing  simultaneously  north 
and  south.1 

Under  present  military  conditions  the  maximum 
number  of  troops  that  this  Republic,  by  denuding 
every  fort  and  post  in  the  nation,  and  by  utilizing 
the  available  militia,  can  mobilize  in  the  vicinity  of 


1  Chart  VIII. 


San  Francisco  in  five  months  after  hostilities  have 
been  begun  is  less  than  one  hundred  thousand,  two- 
thirds  being  state  militia. 

In  this  entire  force  neither  the  regular  infantry 
nor  cavalry  would  exceed  twelve  thousand  men, 
while  the  field  artillery  would  consist  of  less  than 
four  regiments.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the 
size  and  elements  composing  this  army  would  pre- 
vent any  division  of  it  into  the  two  independent 
forces  mentioned:  one  in  Sonoma  County,  fifty 
miles  north  of  San  Francisco,  and  the  other  fifty 
miles  southward  in  Santa  Clara.  Moreover,  the 
smallness  of  this  force  would  not  only  forbid  its 
separation  into  two  independent  theatres  of  action, 
but  would  prohibit  its  giving  battle  to  a  numerically 
superior  enemy  upon  a  field  that  did  not  provide 
protection  to  its  contracted  flanks. 

The  specific  raison  d'etre  of  this  army  is  the  de- 
fence of  San  Francisco,  and  if  it  is  not  possessed  of 
numerical  equality  to  either  act  on  the  offensive  or, 
separated,  to  remain  on  the  defensive,  there  is  but 
one  alternative — the  selection  of  a  single  main  de- 
fensive position.  This  main  position  cannot  be 
north  of  the  bay  nor  east  nor  southeast  without 
leaving  open  to  attack  the  objective  point  of  the 
enemy — the  city  and  peninsula  of  San  Francisco. 
This  leaves  but  two  positions  to  select  from — the 
San  Francisco  Peninsula  or  the  Santa  Clara  Valley. 
While  this  latter  locality  constitutes  the  true  de- 
fence of  San  Francisco  from  an  attack  by  armies 



landing  on  the  southern  coast,  the  smallness  of  the 
American  force  prevents  it  from  taking  a  position 
where  it  can  be  flanked  at  will  and  cut  off  from  its 
base  by  armies  numerically  superior.  This  consider- 
ation, therefore,  relegates  the  army  to  its  final  main 
position  south  of  San  Francisco,  with  lines  thrown 
across  the  peninsula,  one  flank  resting  on  the  shores 
of  the  Pacific  and  the  other  on  San  Francisco  Bay. 

That,  which  most  vitally  concerns  a  beleaguered 
city  and  the  armies  defending  it  is  the  water  supply. 
In  former  ages  this  was  usually  found  within  the 
environs  of  the  city  itself  in  the  shape  of  wells  and 
cisterns;  but  in  modern  times,  especially  in  the 
United  States,  the  sources  of  a  city's  water  supply 
are  generally  situated  at  some  distance  from  it. 
Whenever  this  is  the  case  the  main  line  of  defence 
must  always  include  the  city's  water-works  and 

The  sources  of  the  water  supply  of  San  Fran- 
cisco are  in  the  San  Mateo  Mountains,  between  thirty 
and  forty  miles  to  the  south,  consisting  principally 
of  the  San  Mateo  Creek,  Alameda  Creek,  Pilarcitos 
Creek,  and  Crystal  Springs  Lake.  There  are  three 
reservoirs:  the  Pilarcitos,  thirty-two  miles  from 
San  Francisco,  holding  one  billion  gallons  of  water; 
the  San  Andreas  reservoir,  with  a  capacity  of  six 
billion  gallons,  and  the  Crystal  Springs  reservoir, 
storing  nineteen  billion  gallons.  If  these  reservoirs 
and  watershed  fall  into  possession  of  the  enemy, 
San  Francisco  must  capitulate. 



To  protect  the  Andreas  and  Pilarcitos  reservoirs, 
consisting  of  less  than  a  third  of  the  water  supply, 
the  line  of  defence  must  extend  across  the  peninsula 
south  of  these  reservoirs,  a  distance,  as  determined 
by  the  contours  of  probable  fortified  positions,  of 
nearly  thirty  miles  of  front.  The  centre  of  this  line 
would  be  thirty-five  miles  from  San  Francisco.  If 
the  entire  water  supply  were  to  be  protected,  the 
line  of  fortified  positions  and  intrenchments  would 
have  to  extend  across  the  peninsula,  south  of  the 
Crystal  Springs  Lake,  which  would  greatly  lengthen 
the  line  as  the  peninsula  widens  toward  its  base.1 

The  difficulties  of  defending  this  peninsula  at  such 
a  distance  from  San  Francisco  by  a  limited  and  in- 
experienced force  are  very  great.  The  east  side  of 
the  peninsula  consists  of  a  very  narrow  valley  run- 
ning parallel  with  the  San  Francisco  Bay  on  the 
east  and  the  mountains  on  the  west.  The  eastern 
and  lower  slopes  of  these  mountains  consist  of  roll- 
ing hills  with  contours  free  from  woods,  except 
scattering  oak  and  thickets  in  the  ravines.  But 
higher  up,  on  the  top  of  the  ridges  and  on  the  west- 
ern slopes,  the  contours  are  broken,  irregular  and 
rugged.  They  are  covered  with  a  dense  chaparral, 
heavy  thickets  of  scrub  and  poison  oak,  redwood 
and  manzanita. 

The  American  lines,  as  a  whole,  must  be  con- 
structed at  right  angles  to  the  ridges  and  contours 

1  Chart  IX. 


of  these  mountains.  And  with  the  exception  of 
the  narrow  valley  along  the  bay  and  rolling  east 
slopes,  the  rugged,  thicket-masked  character  of  this 
peninsula  deprives  the  defence  of  those  essential 
advantages  that  modern  weapons  give  to  intrenched 

Outside  of  the  valley  hills  there  are  no  slopes  with 
bare  glacis  such  as  make  possible  the  defence  of  an 
intrenched  army.  There  are  no  wide  zones  of  fire 
which  the  veldt  and  kopjes  of  South  Africa  gave 
to  the  Boers,  rendering  possible  the  maximum  ef- 
fectiveness of  modern  armaments.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  these  mountains,  except  on  the  east  slopes, 
it  is  rare  to  find  exposed  fronts  of  a  few  hundred 
yards.  Declivities  and  thickets  in  endless  succession 
so  cut  up  and  screen  the  topography  that  modern 
artillery  would  be  comparatively  useless  and  the 
effect  of  infantry  fire  reduced  to  a  minimum.  The 
defenders,  their  positions  being  known,  will  be  in 
many  respects  at  a  greater  disadvantage  than  the 
attacking  forces.  In  the  assaults  and  repulses  that 
must  characterize  the  fighting  in  these  mountains, 
discipline  will  constitute  the  necessary  element  of 

The  defence  of  San  Francisco  is  not,  however,  re- 
stricted to  such  lines  as  may  be  thrown  across  the 
peninsula  south  of  the  city,  but  is  subject  to  bom- 
bardment whenever  the  enemy  gains  possession 
of  the  Sausalito  peninsula.  So,  in  considering  the 
final  intrenched  defence  of  San  Francisco,  the  lines 



thrown  across  the  northern  peninsula  must  be  con- 
sidered of  not  less  importance  than  the  lines  south 
of  the  city. 

Forts  Barry  and  Baker,  situated  at  the  extrem- 
ity of  the  peninsula,  are  in  themselves  defenceless 
against  a  land  attack.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
they  are  backed  by  a  continuous  series  of  ascending 
heights  (see  diagram) ,  until  Mt.  Tamalpais  is  reached 
at  the  northern  end  of  the  peninsula.  The  last 
defence  of  San  Francisco  from  the  north  cannot  be 
made  south  of  a  line  running  westward  from  a  point 
east  of  the  town  of  San  Rafael,  across  the  north  end 
of  the  peninsula,  to  the  ocean.  This  line  is  approxi- 
mately from  twelve  to  fifteen  miles  in  length,  and, 
should  the  Japanese  break  through  it,  San  Francisco 
is  doomed.1 

We  have  now  considered  the  conditions  governing 
the  final  defence  of  San  Francisco,  by  no  means  the 
true  one,  but  the  only  one  that  is  possible  so  long 
as  the  indifference  of  this  nation  restricts  its  im- 
mediate defence  to  less  than  a  hundred  thousand 
men,  composed  principally  of  undisciplined  militia 
under  the  command  of  political  appointees,  or  rele- 
gates it  to  forts  that  are  useless. 

As  one-fourth  of  the  Regular  Army  is  lost  in  the 
seizure  of  the  Philippines,  these  seventy  to  ninety 
thousand  men  would  constitute  the  entire  available 
military  establishment  of  the  Republic,  and  yet,  ir- 

1  Charts  X  and  XI. 


respective  of  its  heterogeneity  and  military  worth- 
lessness,  this  force  is  so  inadequate  in  numbers  that 
the  only  position  it  can  occupy  for  the  defence 
of  San  Francisco,  without  meeting  destruction  on 
an  open  field  of  battle,  is  the  one  just  considered — 
the  last  line  of  intrenched  defence.  This  means — 
as  must  every  defence  of  San  Francisco — a  division 
north  and  south  of  the  bay: 

(1)  Across  the  base  of  the  Sausalito  peninsula, 
with  a  front  of  nearly  fifteen  miles. 

(2)  Adjacent  to  the  base  of  the  San  Francisco 
peninsula,  with  a  front  exceeding  thirty  miles. 

This  is  an  aggregate  of  approximately  forty-five 
miles  of  front  to  be  defended  by  less  than  three  di- 
visions of  regular  troops  and  three  corps  of  militia. 
A  defence  of  such  a  length  of  front  against  superior 
forces  for  any  length  of  time  is  manifestly  im- 
possible, even  if  the  positions  were  contiguous.  In 
this  case,  however,  one-third  of  the  line  bears  no 
more  relationship  to  the  other  two-thirds,  and  vice 
versa,  than  if  they  were  one- third  in  Oregon  and 
two-thirds  in  southern  California.1 

Japan,  after  seizing  the  American  insuiar  posses- 
sions, Washington,  Oregon  and  southern  California, 
can,  within  five  months  after  war  is  declared,  land 
simultaneously  at  Monterey  and  Bodega  bays  a 
total  force  exceeding  one  hundred  and  seventy 
thousand  veteran  troops.  Debarking  fifty  thousand 

1  Chart  VIII. 


at  or  above  Bodega  Bay,  from  three  to  five  days' 
march  north  of  the  Sausalito  defences,  and  the 
balance  at  Monterey  Bay,  six  days'  march  south 
of  the  American  defences  across  the  San  Francisco 
peninsula,  the  Japanese  have  the  alternative  of 
five  strategic  moves  to  bring  about  the  seizure  or 
capitulation  of  the  American  forces,  together  with 
San  Francisco  and  central  California. 

The  southern  Japanese  army  of  one  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand  men  move  north  and  front  the 
American  lines  across  the  San  Francisco  peninsula 
simultaneously  as  the  northern  Japanese  army  of 
fifty  thousand  move  south  and  front  the  American 
force  extending  westward  from  San  Rafael.  Al- 
lowing two  thousand  men  per  mile  in  the  defensive 
works,  the  American  forces  would  approximate  sev- 
enty thousand  on  the  south  line  and  thirty  thou- 
sand on  the  north.  The  Japanese  could: 

(1)  Simultaneously  attack  both  positions — on  the 
north,  fifty  thousand  Japanese  regulars  against  less 
than  ten  thousand  American  regulars  and  twenty 
thousand  militia  on  lines  fifteen  miles  in  extent;  on 
the  south,  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  Japan- 
ese regulars  against  less  than  twenty-five  thousand 
American  regulars  and  forty-five  thousand  militia 
on  lines  over  thirty  miles  in  extent. 

(2)  Leaving  a  sufficient  force  before  the  American 
north  line,  so  as  to  prevent  any  aggressive  action 
and  to  take  advantage  of  any  retrograde  movement, 
the  balance  of  the  northern  Japanese  army  to  re- 



inforce  the  southern  army  by  Point  Costa,  Oak- 
land, and  Niles,  their  combined  forces  assaulting  the 
American  defences  on  the  south.1 

(3)  Leaving  a  sufficient  force  before  the  American 
southern  lines,  so  as  to  prevent  any  aggressive  action 
and  to  take  advantage  of  any  retrograde  movement, 
the  balance  of  the  southern  army  to  reinforce  the 
northern  army,  their  combined  forces  assaulting  the 
American  north  line.     In  this  movement  the  Japan- 
ese would  have  one  hundred  thousand  regulars  to 
ten  thousand  American  regulars  and  twenty  thou- 
sand militia.     American  defeat  would  give  the  Sau- 
salito  peninsula  into   the  hands  of  the  Japanese 
and  expose  the  city  of  San  Francisco  to  a  more 
complete   destruction  by  bombardment  than  was 
recently  brought  about  by  earthquake  and  fire.2 

(4)  The  Japanese  northern  army  remaining  before 
the  American  north  line,  and  the  southern  Japanese 
army,  with  the  exception  of  one  corps,  remaining 
before  the  south  lines.     This  detached  corps,  with 
siege  batteries  to  occupy  Oakland  and  vicinity;  and, 
if  the  Oakland  Mole  has  been  destroyed,  to  seize 
Goat   Island   under   cover   of   batteries   placed   on 
Point  Gibbon.     Establishing  batteries  on  Goat  Isl- 
and, the  entire  city  is  again  exposed  to  destruction 
by  bombardment.8 

(5)  The  Japanese  northern  army  to  remain  before 
the  American  north  lines,  with  the  exception  of  one 

1  Chart  VIII.  •  Chart  XI.  »  Chart  XI. 



division.  The  southern  Japanese  army  to  remain 
before  the  American  south  lines,  except  two  corps. 
One  corps  to  occupy  the  east  shores  of  the  bay, 
one  flank  joining  the  left  flank  of  the  northern  army 
at  Vallejo  Junction,  the  other  forming  a  junction 
with  the  right  flank  of  the  southern  army  at  Alviso, 
thus  completely  surrounding  the  bay  and  cutting 
off  all  American  communications.  The  second  corps 
to  occupy  the  Sacramento  Valley,  one  division  at 
Sacramento  and  the  other  at  Stockton.  The  de- 
tached division  from  the  northern  army  to  move 
eastward  over  the  Union  Pacific  and  establish  a 
fortified  position  in  the  Truckee  Valley  on  the  east 
slopes  of  the  Sierras,  thus  completing  the  isolation 
of  California  and  the  Pacific  coast. 

The  destruction  and  demoralization  consequent 
upon  the  recent  earthquake  and  fire  shows  that  if 
San  Francisco  were  bombarded  from  either  Goat 
Island  or  Sausalito  that  it  would  be  destroyed  within 
a  single  day.  But  whatever  course  the  Japanese 
pursue,  whether  by  battle,  by  bombardment  or  by 
seizure,  San  Francisco  will  be  forced  to  capitulate 
within  a  fortnight  after  its  investment  is  completed, 
though  defended  by  the  entire  military  establish- 
ment of  the  Republic. 

The  inevitable  consummation  that  follows  the  in- 
vestment of  San  Francisco  becomes  apparent  in  the 
utter  helplessness  of  the  Republic.  In  the  entire 
nation  is  not  another  regiment  of  regular  troops; 
no  generals,  no  corporals.  Not  months,  but  years, 



must  elapse  before  armies  equal  to  the  Japanese 
are  able  to  pass  in  parade.  These  must  then  make 
their  way  over  deserts  such  as  no  armies  have  ever 
heretofore  crossed ;  scale  the  intrenched  and  stupen- 
dous heights  that  form  the  redoubts  of  the  desert 
moats;  attempting,  in  the  valor  of  their  ignorance, 
the  militarily  impossible;  turning  mountain-gorges 
into  the  ossuaries  of  their  dead,  and  burdening  the 
desert  winds  with  the  spirits  of  their  slain.  The  re- 
pulsed and  distracted  forces  to  scatter,  as  heretofore, 
dissension  throughout  the  Union,  brood  rebellions, 
class  and  sectional  insurrections,  until  this  heteroge- 
neous Republic,  in  its  principles,  shall  disintegrate, 
and  again  into  the  palm  of  re-established  monarchy 
pay  the  toll  of  its  vanity  and  its  scorn. 




governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  be- 
ing  desirous  of  replacing  the  agreement  concluded 
between  them  on  January  30,  1902,  by  fresh  stipulations, 
have  agreed  upon  the  following  articles,  which  have  for 
their  object: 

A.  The  consolidation  and  maintenance  of  general  peace 
in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India. 

B.  The  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of  all 
the  powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  and  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of 
all  nations  in  China. 

C.  The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights  of  the  high 
contracting  parties  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  of 
India,  and  defence  of  their  special  interests  in  the  said 

ARTICLE  I. — It  is  agreed  that  whenever  in  the  opinion 
of  either  Great  Britian  or  Japan  any  of  the  rights  and 
interests  referred  to  in  the  preamble  to  this  agreement 
are  in  jeopardy,  the  two  governments  will  communicate 
with  one  another  fully  and  frankly,  and  will  consider 



in  common  the  measures  which  should  be  taken  to  safe- 
guard those  menaced  rights  or  interests. 

ARTICLE  II. — Should  either  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  be  involved  in  war  in  defence  of  its  territorial 
rights  or  special  interests,  the  other  party  will  at  once 
come  to  the  assistance  of  its  ally,  and  both  parties  will 
conduct  a  war  in  common  and  make  peace  in  mutual 
agreement  with  any  power  or  powers  involved  in  such 

ARTICLE  III. — Japan,  possessing  paramount  political, 
military  and  economic  interests  in  Korea,  Great  Britain 
recognizes  Japan's  right  to  take  such  measures  for  the 
guidance,  control  and  protection  of  Korea  as  she  may 
deem  proper  and  necessary  to  safeguard  and  advance 
those  interests,  providing  the  measures  so  taken  are  not 
contrary  to  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the 
commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations. 

ARTICLE  IV. — Great  Britain  having  a  special  interest 
in  all  that  concerns  the  security  of  the  Indian  frontier, 
Japan  recognizes  her  right  to  take  such  measures  in  the 
proximity  of  that  frontier  as  she  may  find  necessary  for 
the  safeguarding  of  her  Indian  possessions. 

ARTICLE  V. — The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that 
neither  will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter  into  a 
separate  arrangement  with  another  power  to  the  prej- 
udice of  the  objects  described  in  the  preamble. 

ARTICLE  VI. — As  regards  the  present  war  between 
Japan  and  Russia,  Great  Britain  will  continue  to  main- 
tain strict  neutrality  unless  some  other  power  or  powers 
join  in  hostilities  against  Japan,  in  which  case  Great 
Britain  will  come  to  the  assistance  of  Japan,  will  conduct 
war  in  common,  and  will  make  peace  in  mutual  agree- 
ment with  Japan. 

ARTICLE  VII. — The  conditions  under  which  armed  as- 
sistance shall  be  offered  by  either  power  to  the  other  in 


the  circumstances  mentioned  in  the  present  agreement, 
and  the  means  by  which  such  assistance  shall  be  made 
available,  will  be  arranged  by  the  naval  and  military  au- 
thorities of  the  high  contracting  parties,  who  will  from 
time  to  time  consult  one  another  fully  and  freely  on  all 
questions  of  mutual  interest. 

ARTICLE  VIII. — The  present  agreement  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  the  provisions  of  Article  VI,  and  come  into  effect 
immediately  after  the  date  of  signature  and  remain  in 
force  for  ten  years  from  that  date.  In  case  neither  of 
the  parties  shall  have  been  notified  twelve  months  before 
the  expiration  of  the  said  ten  years  of  an  intention  of 
terminating  it,  it  shall  remain  binding  until  the  expira- 
tion of  one  year  from  the  day  on  which  either  of  the 
parties  shall  have  renounced  it ;  but  if,  when  the  date  for 
the  expiration  arrives,  either  ally  is  actually  engaged  in 
war,  the  alliance  shall  ipso  facto  continue  until  peace 
shall  be  concluded. 

Signed,  August  12,  1905,  by  Lord  Lansdowne,  on  behalf 
of  Great  Britain,  and  by  Baron  Hayashi,  on  behalf  of 


THE  first  expression  of  anti- Japanese  sentiment  did 
not  occur  until  1900,  when  a  mass-meeting  was  held 
in  San  Francisco. 

In  1904,  at  the  twenty-fourth  annual  session  of  the 
American  Federation  of  Labor  (2,500,000  members),  res- 
olutions were  passed  to  permanently  exclude  the  Japan- 
ese from  the  United  States  and  its  insular  territories. 
These  resolutions  were  reaffirmed  at  the  annual  sessions 
in  1905  and  1906.  During  1905,  twelve  great  national 
conventions  endorsed  and  adopted  the  same  resolutions, 
as  did  539  other  organizations,  comprising  civic,  frater- 
nal, political  and  labor  associations. 

In  1906  the  Japanese- Korean  Exclusion  League  was 
organized.  The  membership  of  this  league  in  California 
numbers  about  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand, 
composed  as  follows: 

Labor  bodies 169 

Fraternal  societies 18 

Civic  bodies 12 

Benevolent  societies 3 

Political  and  military 3 

Total 232 

This  number  does  not  include  branch  leagues,  with 
their  affiliated  organizations,  outside  of  San  Francisco. 

In  1908  there  was  established,  in  general  convention, 
the  Asiatic  Exclusion  League  of  North  America,  the 



outgrowth  of  the  Japanese- Korean  Exclusion  League  of 
1906.  This  league  has  branches  in  all  of  the  Western 

The  demands  of  this  league  are  expressed  in  their 
following  Memorial  to  Congress,  and  is  expressive  of  the 
general  sentiment  in  the  West  to  act,  on  this  question, 
in  direct  contravention  of  treaty  stipulations: 


The  first  annual  convention  of  the  Asiatic  Exclusion 
League  of  North  America,  in  regular  session,  Seattle, 
Washington,  February,  1908,  do  hereby  most  respect- 

REQUEST,  The  immediate  passage  of  a  law  which  will 
exclude,  absolutely  and  emphatically,  all  Asiatics  from 
the  mainland  and  insular  possessions  of  the  United  States, 
and  your  memorialists  do  hereby  emphatically 

PROTEST,  Against  the  administrative  and  executive  offi- 
cers of  the  United  States  entering  into  any  agreement 
which  will  permit  the  ruler  of  any  foreign  country  to 
make  stipulations  as  to  what  class  of  persons  and  in 
what  numbers  shall  leave  said  foreign  country  for  the 
purpose  of  immigrating  to  the  United  States'  and  your 

DECLARE,  That  any  such  agreement  with  a  foreign 
power  is  a  subversion  of  the  traditions  and  policies  of  the 
United  States,  and  a  betrayal  of  the  rights  of  American 
citizens.  Your  memorialists  further 

PROTEST,  Against  the  employment  of  Asiatics  on  board 
vessels  flying  the  American  flag,  to  the  exclusion  of 
American  seamen,  and  in  violation  of  American  law; 
therefore,  your  memorialists  pray  for  the  speedy  enact- 
ment of  a  law  which  will  prohibit  the  employment  of 
Asiatics  upon  all  vessels  flying  the  American  flag,  or  in 


any  branch  or  department  of  the  public  service.  Your 
memorialists  again  emphatically 

PROTEST,  Against  the  continuance  of  Asiatic  immigra- 
tion upon  the  exalted  grounds  of  American  patriotism, 
for  the  reasons: 

FIRST,  That  these  Asiatics  come  to  the  United  States 
entirely  ignorant  of  our  sentiments  of  nativity  and  pa- 
triotism, and  utterly  unfit  and  incapable  of  discharg- 
ing the  duties  of  American  citizenship. 

SECOND,  The  introducton  of  this  incongruous  and  non- 
assimilable  element  into  our  national  life  will  inevita- 
bly impair  and  degrade,  if  not  effectually  destroy,  our 
cherished  institutions  and  our  American  life. 

THIRD,  These  Asiatics  are  alien  to  our  ideas  of  patri- 
otism, morality,  loyalty  and  the  highest  conceptions  of 
Christian  civilization. 

FOURTH,  Their  presence  here  is  a  degrading  and  con- 
taminating influence  to  the  best  phases  of  American  life. 

FIFTH,  With  their  low  standard  of  living,  immoral  sur- 
roundings and  cheap  labor,  they  constitute  a  formidable 
and  fierce  competition  against  our  American  system,  the 
pride  and  glory  of  our  civilization,  and  unless  prohibited 
by  effective  legislation  will  result  in  the  irreparable  de- 
terioration of  American  labor. 

SIXTH,  The  living  in  our  midst  of  a  large  body  of 
Asiatics,  the  greatest  number  of  whom  are  armed,  loyal 
to  their  governments,  entertaining  feelings  of  distrust, 
if  not  of  hostility,  to  our  people,  without  any  allegiance 
to  our  government  or  our  institutions,  not  sustaining 
American  life  in  times  of  peace,  and  ever  ready  to  re- 
spond to  the  cause  of  their  own  nations  in  times  of  war, 
make  these  Asiatics  an  appalling  menace  to  the  Ameri- 
can Republic,  the  splendid  achievements  wrought  by  the 
strong  arms  and  loyal  hearts  of  Caucasian  toilers,  patri- 
ots and  heroes  in  every  walk  of  life. 


Senator  Lodge,  in  commenting  upon  this  movement 
to  exclude  the  Japanese  from  the  United  States,  in  a 
speech  given  at  Boston,  said: 

"Such  a  movement  of  people  as  this  is,  in  itself,  a 
historic  event  of  great  magnitude,  deserving  the  most 
careful  consideration;  but  what  we  are  concerned  with 
is  its  effect  upon  and  its  meaning  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States  and  the  future  of  our  country,"  etc. 

Careful  investigation  shows  that  on  the  Pacific  slope 
the  people  are  not  only  anti- Japanese  in  sentiment  as 
regards  economic  competition,  but  they  are  becoming 
more  subject  to  racial  antipathies.  They  may,  in  regard 
to  Japanese  immigration  and  naturalization,  be  divided 
into  four  classes, 

8  per  cent,  of  whom  are  pro-Japanese 

22  "        "       "        "         "  indifferent 

30  "        "      "       "         "  hostile 

40  "        "      "       "         "  belligerently  hostile 


THE  first  official  act  directed  toward  the  exclusion 
of  the  Japanese  from  the  United  States  was  that  of 
Governor  Henry  T.  Gage,  in  his  biennial  message  to  the 
Legislature  of  California  in  1900.  Pursuant  to  his  sugges- 
tions, a  joint  resolution  was  adopted  by  the  Legislature 
and  forwarded  to  the  National  Congress  in  which  the 
exclusion  of  the  Japanese  was  urged.  Concurrent  resolu- 
tions were  again  adopted  by  the  California  Legislature 
on  March  22,  1905,  and  by  unanimous  vote  both  the 
Senate  and  the  Assembly  declared  that  "unrestricted 
Japanese  immigration  is  a  menace  to  the  state." 

A  similar  resolution  was  unanimously  adopted  by  the 
Senate  and  Assembly  of  the  Nevada  Legislature.  Since 
that  time,  over  the  entire  Pacific  Slope,  like  action  has 
been  taken  in  state,  county  and  municipal  bodies, 
culminating  in  the  act  of  the  San  Francisco  Board  of 
Education  in  excluding  the  Japanese  from  the  public 
schools,  and  which  so  nearly  caused  serious  internation- 
al complications.  While  these  acts  are  clearly  contrary 
to  all  treaty  stipulations,  yet  the  California  Supreme 
Court  declared  them  constitutional,  thus  showing  the 
difficulties  of  maintaining  just  and  peaceful  relationship 
with  foreign  powers  when  the  popular  sentiment  of  the 
state  is  opposed  to  the  policy  of  the  Federal  Government. 

In  reply  to  President  Roosevelt's  message  to  Con- 
gress, December,  1906,  relative  to  the  Japanese  trouble, 
Governor  Pardee  addressed  a  message  to  the  California 



Legislature,  January,  1907,  expressing,  in  part,  the  senti- 
ment of  the  people  as  follows: 

"  It  is  safe  to  say  that  the  President,  when  he  penned 
that  portion  of  his  annual  message  in  which  he  referred 
to  the  treatment  of  the  Japanese  in  the  San  Francisco 
schools,  was  not  aware  of  the  conditions  on  this  coast, 
especially  in  California.  .  .  .  The  President  does  not  un- 
derstand the  racial  differences  between  the  Japanese 
and  Chinese  and  people  of  Caucasian  blood.  .  .  .  Our 
laws  and  customs  regard  intermarriage  with  them  mis- 
cegenation. .  .  .  Were  the  racial  differences  in  civilization, 
thought,  manners  and  customs  not  inseparable  between 
these  Asiatics  and  Caucasians,  whatever  inhospitable- 
ness  our  people  might  show  toward  them  would  insen- 
sibly disappear.  ...  It  is  useless  to  expect  that  people 
with  such  different  racial  characteristics  and  such  dif- 
ferent civilization  can  ever  mix  with  our  people  and  be- 
come absorbed  into  our  body  politic.  They  cannot  be- 
come good  American  citizens ;  it  is  useless  to  attempt  to 
make  them  such." 

It  is  only  to  be  expected  that  such  popular  sentiments 
and  official  acts  would  soon  become  incorporated  in  the 
aspirations  of  the  political  parties  of  the  Pacific  Slope, 
and  in  due  time,  as  these  sentiments  merged  into  the 
politics  of  the  West,  becoming  inherent  in  a  fixed  and 
settled  policy,  they  would  be  incorporated  in  the  national 
platforms  of  the  great  political  parties.  This  has  ac- 
cordingly come  about,  showing  the  development  of  this 
sentiment  from  a  sectional  to  a  national  issue.  Sub- 
sequent to  1900,  increasing  in  number  and  intensity, 
municipal  conventions,  county  and  state  conventions 
of  all  political  parties,  and  in  all  portions  of  the  Pacific 
Slope,  have  incorporated  in  their  resolutions  declarations 
for  the  absolute  exclusion  of  Japanese.  So  thoroughly 


has  this  sentiment  permeated  the  political  fabric  of  the 
West  that  it  has  been  incorporated  into  the  platforms 
of  two  of  the  national  parties. 


Adopted  in  National  Convention,  July  28,  1908. 

We  oppose  Asiatic  immigration,  which  does  not 
amalgamate  with  our  population,  creates  race  issues  and 
un-American  conditions,  and  which  reduces  wages  and 
tends  to  lower  the  high  standard  of  living  and  the  high 
standard  of  morality  which  the  American  civilization  has 

We  demand  the  passage  of  an  exclusion  act  which 
shall  protect  American  workingmen  from  competition 
with  Asiatic  cheap  labor,  and  which  shall  protect  Amer- 
ican civilization  from  the  contamination  of  Asiatic  con- 


Adopted  in  National  Convention,  July  10,  1908. 

We  favor  full  protection,  by  both  national  and  state 
governments  within  their  respective  spheres,  of  all  for- 
eigners residing  in  the  United  States  under  treaty,  but 
we  are  opposed  to  Asiatic  immigrants  who  cannot  be 
amalgamated  with  our  population,  or  whose  presence 
among  us  would  raise  a  race  issue  and  involve  us  in 
diplomatic  controversies  with  Oriental  powers. 

In  1907,  Baron  Hayashi,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
replied  to  this  government,  relative  to  the  proposed 
Japanese  exclusion  and  anti-naturalization  legislation, 
that  the  Imperial  Government  would  continue  its  de- 
mand (in  accordance  with  treaty  stipulations)  for  the  same 


rights,  privileges  and  immunities  for  the  Japanese  going 
to  and  resident  in  the  United  States  as  are  granted  the 
aliens  of  other  nations. 


California  Legislature 
Oregon  Legislature 
Washington  Legislature 
Nevada  Legislature 
Arizona  Legislature 
Colorado  Legislature 
Wyoming  Legislature 
Idaho  Legislature 
Hawaiian  Legislature 


IT  has  been  difficult  heretofore  to  find  a  true  basis  for 
comparison  of  the  strength  of  the  various  navies. 
A  statement  of  the  total  number  of  ships  in  each  navy 
means  nothing,  because  these  ships  and  their  personnel 
vary  so  widely  as  to  make  any  such  comparison  useless. 
A  comparison  on  the  basis  of  armor  protection  is  like- 
wise worthless,  since  a  fleet  powerful  only  in  defensive 
qualities,  as  a  fleet  of  monitors,  would  be  of  no  use  under 
modern  conditions;  so  a  comparison  by  speed  is  also 
erroneous,  since  a  fleet  of  exceedingly  swift  but  mod- 
erately armed  and  armored  cruisers  would  possess  no 
combative  qualities  if  engaged  with  a  fleet  of  battle- 
ships. Moreover,  in  all  comparisons  between  ships  the 
question  must  be  considered :  War-ships  built  to-day  have 
four  times  the  fighting  value  of  those  constructed  a  few 
years  ago. 

Since  the  naval  battle  of  Tsu  Shima  new  conditions 
were  brought  to  light  that  make  possible  a  more  accurate 
comparison  between  the  fighting  qualities  of  two  fleets. 
The  victory  of  future  naval  engagements  will  go  to  the 
fleet  that  is  able  to  bring  the  greatest  number  of  heavy 
guns  within  the  shortest  line  of  battle.  In  this  com- 
parison the  guns  included  are  those  that  can  pierce 
heavy  armor  at  5000  yards:  i.  e.,  the  5o-caliber  9.2-in., 
the  45-caliber  io-in.,  the  4o-caliber  n-in.,  the  35-caliber 
i2-in.,  and  the  35-caliber  i3~in.  and  i3|-in. 

The  Japanese  battleships  built  prior  to  the  Russian 






Number  of  big  guns 





4    12- 


in.,       4  10- 

4       ' 
4       ' 
4       ' 
4       ' 
4       ' 
4       ' 
4       ' 


12         ' 




19  .  2 

20.  5 







Fuji   . 








14  ships          132  heavy  guns 




Number  of  big  guns 


New  Hampshire  



4   1  2  -inch 

4  13  ; 

4    12 
4    12     ' 
4    12     " 

4    13      ' 
4    12 
4   12 
4   13 
4    13      . 
4    12 

4     12 
8     12 

4    12 
4   12 

4    12 
4    12 
4    12      ' 
4    12     " 
4    12     " 

8     12      ' 

4    12     " 
4   12     " 
4    13     " 
























New  Jersey       


Rhode  Island  

South  Carolina  




2  4  ships             104  heavy  guns 



War  and  the  vessels  captured  from  Russia  have,  in  ac- 
cordance with  these  ideas,  been  reconstructed  and  the 
armaments  altered  so  as  to  double  their  fighting  strength. 
The  vessels  of  the  Mikasa  type,  which  have  heretofore 
carried  four  i2-in.  guns  and  fourteen  6-in.,  will  carry  four 
lo-in.  instead  of  the  6-in.  guns,  so  that  their  main  arma- 
ment will  be  brought  up  to  eight  guns  of  heavy  caliber. 
The  Russian  battleships  have  likewise  been  re-armed 
with  eight  guns  of  heavy  caliber. 

The  preceding  tables  show  the  fighting  qualities  of  the 
two  fleets. 

By  these  tables  it  is  seen  that  the  Japanese  navy,  in 
its  battleships,  possesses  nearly  thirty  per  cent,  more 
big  guns  than  the  American  navy,  while  its  battle-line 
is  only  slightly  over  one  half  as  long. 




Number  of  big  guns 







22  .  I 


0,7  CO 



0,7  co 



0,8  so 










i   io-inch 






i-z.7  co 

4  1  2  -inch 



j-z,7  co 

4   12    " 




4   12    " 




4   12    " 



4   12    "         8   io-inch 


14  cruisers 

29  heavy  guns 






Number  of  big  guns 




0,21  C 













4  io-inch 


New  York  

8,  i  so 


North  Carolina  

i  4  ,  500 

4  io-inch 


Ppnpsylvania   ........... 



South  Dakota  



Tennessee         .  .        


4  10  -inch 


Washington                  .... 




West  Virginia  



12  cruisers 

1 6  heavy  guns 


Torpedo-boat  destroyers, 

United  States 




THE  following  table  shows  the   ages  of  the  captains 
and  flag  officers,  with  their   average   years  in  the 
two  grades,   in  the  navies  of   Great   Britain,   France, 
Germany,  Japan,  and  the  United  States: 


Sea-going  flag  officers 


Average  years  in 


Average  years  in 

Great  Britain  




II  .2 












Japan.  . 

United  States  


United  States 


Flag  officers  



Captains  and  commanders  



Other  line  officers  and  engineers  



Medical  officers  



Pay  officers  



Warrant  officers  



Enlisted  men  


•7  C.3I2 


"TN  twelve  of  the  American  battleships  there  is  to 
1  be  found  in  the  after-end  of  the  superstructure  a 
section  that  is  entirely  unarmored.  Being  just  in  front 
of  the  after- turret,  this  unprotected  portion  of  some  fifty 
square  feet  exposes  the  shafts  that  pass  down  into  the 
auxiliary  magazines  of  the  vessels." 


"  In  all  the  American  battleships  the  main  armor  belt 
does  not  extend  more  than  six  inches  above  water  when 
the  vessel  is  fully  equipped  and  ready  for  sea.  It  was 
this  sunken  condition  of  the  main  armor  that  resulted  in 
the  sinking  of  so  many  Russian  warships  in  the  battle 
of  Tsu  Shima.  This  belt  of  armor  should  extend  several 
feet  above  the  water-line,  as  is  the  case  in  the  principal 
foreign  navies.  In  France  it  reaches  from  five  to  eight 
feet  above  the  water,  while  in  the  modern  British  war- 
ships it  extends  eight  feet  below  and  five  above  the 


"In  twelve  of  the  American  battleships  the  gun- 
ports  are  so  large  that  the  guns  and  gun-crews  are  ex- 
posed to  destruction.  The  turret-ports  in  the  Kearsarge 
and  the  Kentucky  are  so  large  that  a  number  of  twelve- 



inch  shells  could  enter  them  at  the  same  time.  The 
open  spaces  above  and  below  the  guns  in  these  turrets  are 
ten  feet  square.  In  some  of  the  battleships  the  broad- 
side guns  are  in  exposed  openings  as  wide  as  six  feet. 
While  foreign  navies  observe  the  principle  of  isolating 
the  guns  of  the  secondary  armament  by  pairs  in  turrets, 
or  singly  in  casements,  it  is  not  done  in  the  American 
navy,  except  the  last  five  ships.  In  the  Kearsarge  and 
Kentucky  there  are  fourteen  guns  in  one  compartment. 
A  shell  exploding  in  this  compartment  would  not  only 
put  all  of  the  guns  out  of  commission,  but  would  prob- 
ably kill  or  wound  the  one  hundred  and  forty  men 
stationed  there." 


"In  the  evolutions  of  the  Atlantic  fleet  recently  it 
was  found  that  sea-going  torpedo-boats  or  destroyers, 
when  directed  against  the  fleet  of  battleships,  could  get 
into  a  position  to  destroy  them.  To  protect  this  one 
fleet  it  was  made  apparent  at  that  time  that  it  would  be 
necessary  to  have  a  cordon  of  forty-eight  torpedo- 
destroyers  to  defend  the  fleet  from  the  destroyers  of  the 



"  As  was  shown  in  Admiral  Evans'  report  concerning 
the  cruise  of  the  battleship  fleet  to  the  Pacific,  the  low- 
ness  of  the  American  ships  affects  seriously  their  fighting 
qualities.  Three  of  the  battleships  have  their  bows 
but  eleven  feet  above  water;  two  others,  thirteen  feet. 
The  latest  battleships  have  their  bows  only  eighteen  feet 
over  the  water-line,  and  the  latest  cruiser  but  twenty. 
In  foreign  navies  modern  battleships  have  their  forward 
decks  from  twenty- two  to  twenty-eight  feet  above  water, 

lSee  Table  IV,  last  paragraph. 


while  the  forward  decks  of  armored  cruisers  are  from 
twenty-five  to  thirty-two  feet  high. 

In  a  naval  battle,  where  high  speed  is  essential,  the 
disasters  that  may  ensue  on  account  of  this  lowness  of 
the  gun-decks  are  vividly  portrayed  in  the  trial  trip  of  one 
of  the  latest  American  battleships,  the  Virginia.  Steam- 
ing at  19.04  knots,  the  bow  wave  of  solid  water  reached 
the  height  of  fifteen  feet,  while  an  impenetrable  spray 
rose  forty  feet  above  the  water  level.  This  battleship, 
with  all  her  ports  closed  by  steel  bucklers,  shipped  one 
hundred  and  twenty  tons  of  water  into  her  forward 
turret  while  making  the  trip  from  Cuba  to  Hampton 
Roads.  Had  the  ports  of  this  ship  been  open  for  action, 
immense  quantities  of  water  would  have  poured  through 
them  and  rendered  the  guns  of  the  forward  turret  useless. 
During  the  cruise  to  the  Pacific  it  was  demonstrated  that 
if  the  battleships  steamed  at  high  speed  in  a  moderate 
sea,  or  at  medium  speed  in  a  rough  sea,  the  guns  of  the 
forward  turret  could  not  be  used.  This  would  reduce, 
under  such  conditions,  the  main  armament  of  big  guns 
to  one  half,  since  two  of  the  four  heavy  guns  on  the 
American  ships  are  carried  in  the  forward  turret. 

The  broadside  guns,  constituting  the  secondary  arma- 
ment of  the  American  ships,  are  on  even  lower  gun 
decks.  In  twelve  of  the  latest  battleships — the  New 
Hampshire,  Connecticut,  Kansas,  Idaho,  Louisiana, 
Minnesota,  Vermont,  Georgia,  Mississippi,  Virginia, 
Nebraska,  New  Jersey — they  are  only  about  eleven  feet 
above  water.  In  each  of  the  new  cruisers  ten  of  the 
fourteen  medium  guns  are  at  the  same  height.  These 
guns  could  not  be  fired  to  the  windward  while  the  ships 
were  steaming  at  battle  speed  in  a  moderate  sea,  or  at 
medium  speed  in  a  rough  sea.  The  broadside  guns  of 
foreign  warships  are,  in  a  general  sense,  twice  as  high 
as  the  American,  and  in  some  instances  three  times  as  high. 




MAJOR    FLEET,  1909 


Gross  tonnage 

Troop  capacity, 
officers  and  men 

Tenyo  Maru  


4  600 

Chiyo  Maru  


4  600 


4  600 

Kanio  Maru   



Hirano  Maru  


3.  5O4 

Miyazaka  Maru  


3.  ?O4 

Atsuta  Maru  



Kitano  Maru  



Mishima  Maru   



Tango  Maru  



Hitachi  Maru  



Aki  Maru  



Shinano  Maru  


2,91  6 

lyo  Maru     


2  o6c 

Awa  Maru  



Kaga  Maru  



Wakasa  Maru  



Bingo  Maru  



Sado  Maru           



Inaba  Maru  



Kanagawa  Maru  



Hakata  Maru  


2,41  C. 

Tamba  Maru     



Kamakura  Maru   



Sanuki  Maru  



Kawachi  Maru  



Hong-Kong    Maru  



America  Maru       



Nippon  Maru  



Tosa  Maru  ,  


2,88  c. 

Nikko  Maru     



Kumano  Maru   



Ceylon  Maru  



Riojun  Maru  



Takasaki  Maru       



Wakamiya  Maru  



Kageshima  Maru   



Yetorofu  Maru         



Colombo  Maru1  



Bombay  Maru1  



40  Steamers 

Troop  capacity,  114,235 


MINOR    FLEET    NO.    I. 


Gross  tonnage 

Troop  capacity. 
officers  and  men 

Kagoshima  Maru 4,405 

Tenshin  Maru 4, 1 73 

Yeboshi  Maru 4,098 

Kasuga  Maru 3 ,820 

Yawata  Maru 3,8 1 7 

Moyori  Maru 3-773 

Shiokubi  Maru 3>75S 

Benten  Maru 3,668 

Totomi  Maru1 3,412 

Miike  Maru 3,365 

Yamaguchi  Maru 3,32 1 

Hiroshima  Maru 3,283 

Matsuyama  Maru 3>°99 

Mikawa  Maru1 2,932 

Saikio  Maru 2,904 

Kobe  Maru 2,877 

Tategami  Maru 2,703 

Takeshima  Maru 2,673 

Hakuai  Maru 2,636 

Kosai  Maru 2,63 5 

Kokura  Maru 2,596 

Yamashiro  Maru 2,581 

Chikuzen  Maru1 2,578 

Chiugo  Maru1 2,563 

Wakanoura  Maru 2,527 

Yeijo  Maru 2,506 

Omi  Maru 2,501 

Yokohama  Maru 2,373 

Niigata  Maru1 2 , 184 

Awaji  Maru1 2,045 

Santo  Maru 2,032 

Yeiko  Maru i ,966 

Sakata  Maru 1-963 

Satsuma  Maru i  ,939 

Sagami  Maru i ,934 

Chefoo  Maru i ,934 

Xagato  Maru 1,884 

Fushiki  Maru1 1,839 

Takasago  Maru i.789 

Otaru  Maru I.57I 

Hanasaki  Maru I,57° 

Kamikawa  Maru1 i  ,465 

Hirosaki  Maru1 1,460 

Genkai  Maru i  ,447 

(Continued  on  p.  330) 
aa                    339 

i, 800 
i,  680 

















i, 800 




i, 800 




i,  600 










MINOR   FLEET  NO.  i — Continued. 


Gross  tonnage 

Troop  capacity, 
officers  and  men 

Hiogo  Maru  


1,  800 

Suminoye  Maru  

1,42  C 


Higo  Maru  


1,7-7  e 

Takamatsu  Maru1  

1,33  "? 


Osumi  Maru1  

1,22  C 


Ishikari  Maru1  

1.  113 


Yechigo  Maru  



Ise  Maru  

1,2  so 


Tokachi  Maru  

I,  IIO 


Kushiro  Maru  


I  ,  IQO 

Saishu  Maru  



55  Steamers 

Troop  capacity  85,291 

1  Steamers  built  primarily  for  carrying  freight,  hence  low  troop  capacity. 

Steamers  Troop  capacity 

TOTAL,  Major  Fleet 40  114,235 

TOTAL,  Minor  Fleet  No.   i 55  85,291 

GRAND  TOTAL 95  199,526 

We  have  not  the  data  of  Minor  Fleet  No.  2. 





Gross  tonnage 

Troop  capacity, 
officers  and  men 



04  "\ 


•2  ,O3Q 



2,  CC7 


Grant  .    . 

C    CQO 






4,  -27  t 
















While  it  is  true  that  four  or  five,  or  even  more,  Japanese 
can  get  along  comfortably  in  the  same  space  that  an 
American  deems  necessary  for  one  person,  this  condition 
has  not  been  taken  advantage  of  to  a  very  marked  degree, 
as  a  comparison  of  the  American  and  Japanese  trans- 
ports, with  their  relative  troop  capacity  proportionate  to 
their  tonnage,  will  show. 

In  comparing  one  of  the  largest  American  transports, 
the  Meade,  5641  gross  tonnage  and  troop  capacity  of 
2075  officers  and  men,  with  one  of  the  Tenyo  Maru 
class  of  Japanese  transports,  of  14,000  gross  tonnage  and 
troop  capacity  of  4600  officers  and  men,  it  is  seen  that 
while  the.  American  transport  carries  one  man  to  every 
2.95  tons,  in  the  Japanese  vessel  3.04  tons  is  utilized; 
showing  that  the  American  ship  is  carrying  not  less  but 
more  troops  to  her  tonnage  than  the  Japanese. 

In  the  next  largest  class  is  the  American  transport 
Warren,  4375  gross  tonnage  and  troop  capacity  of  1292 
officers  and  men.  Comparing  this  to  the  next  largest 
Japanese  transports  of  the  Kamo  class,  8600  gross 
tonnage  and  troop  capacity  of  3594  officers  and  men,  we 
find  that  in  the  American  vessel  one  man  is  carried  to 
every  (approximately)  3.38  tons,  while  in  the  Japanese 
ship  approximately  2.4  tons  is  utilized  to  each  man; 
showing  in  this  case  that  the  Japanese  vessel  is  carrying 
more  men  to  her  tonnage  than  the  American,  though 
the  difference  is  slight. 

In  the  next  highest  class  is  the  American  transport 
Bufard,  3039  gross  tonnage  and  troop  capacity  of  1052 
officers  and  men  as  compared  to  the  Japanese  third 
largest  class  exceeding  6000  gross  tonnage.  In  this 
instance  the  American  transport  carries  one  man  to 
2.8  tons,  while  the  average  for  the  Japanese  vessels  is 
approximately  2.44  tons,  or  nearly  the  equivalent. 

In  the  Japanese  vessels  of  lower  tonnage  we  find, 


however,  that  the  tonnage  proportion  to  the  troop  ca- 
pacity grows  less,  until,  in  some  instances,  one  soldier 
is  carried  to  each  ton  or  less  of  the  gross  tonnage.  This 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  these  smaller  vessels  were  built 
almost  exclusively  for  the  use  of  Orientals,  whose  char- 
acteristics in  domicile  permit  the  maximum  passenger 
capacity  with  the  minimum  of  space  and  tonnage. 

Should  Japan  embark  on  these  two  fleets  an  average 
of  two  Japanese  to  the  space  and  tonnage  ordinarily 
deemed  necessary  for  one  American,  then  the  troop 
capacity  on  a  single  voyage  of  these  fleets  would  exceed 
three  hundred  thousand  officers  and  men,  together  with 
their  equipment  and  supplies.  That  this  would  be  eas- 
ily possible  and  would  work  no  hardship  on  the  men 
was  demonstrated  by  the  Japanese  winter-quarters  in 
Manchuria  during  the  Russian  War.  We  have,  how- 
ever, not  taken  this  possibility  into  consideration,  but 
have  given  the  troop  capacity  of  the  Japanese  vessels 
per  European  measurement. 


following    table  shows  the  number  of  officers 
1    who  were  obliged  to  leave  the  Union  Army  during 
the  Civil  War. 

Arms  of  service 























































Grand  totals  






Grand  total,  28,398 



The  resignations  tabulated  in  the  last  column  are  in 
character  very  little  removed,  if  at  all,  in  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  cases,  from  the  factors  tabulated  in  the  other 
columns.  These  resignations  were  almost  always  the 
product  of  two  conditions:  (i)  to  escape  being  discharged 
under  the  other  four  heads;  (2)  after  every  disaster  or 
defeat  great  numbers  of  resignations  were  sent  in.  Carl 
Schurz,  in  his  Memoirs,  especially  mentions  the  great 
number  of  regimental  officers  that  left  the  Union  Army 
immediately  after  the  defeat  at  Fredericksburg. 

Allowing  incompetent  officers  to  resign,  instead  of  ca- 
shiering them,  was  only  characteristic  of  official  lenien- 
cy practised  during  this  war  against  military  offenders. 
This  was  most  vividly  portrayed  relative  to  desertion, 
which  in  the  time  of  war  is  punishable  by  death,  yet  in 
this  conflict  there  occurred  nearly  two  hundred  thou- 
sand desertions  from  the  Union  Army  and  only  seven 


Within  a  short  time  after  the  defeat  at  Fredericksburg 
85,000  men  deserted.  This  fact  shows,  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent, the  actuating  motive  in  the  desertion  of  short-term 
volunteers  and  the  disasters  that  ensue  to  the  nation 
whenever  its  forces  meet  defeat  on  the  field.  See  table 
on  following  page. 

All  confederated  forms  of  government  are  only  durable 
in  prosperity  and  success;  in  disasters  the  tendency  is 
not  to  greater  cohesion  and  unity,  but  to  disintegration. 
Should  the  armies  of  this  Republic  meet  with  a  con- 
tinuous series  of  defeats,  as  characterized  the  Japanese- 
Russian  War  or  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870,  the 
probable  culmination  would  be  the  dissolution  of  the 
present  form  of  confederated  government. 





Arms  of  service 


Cavalry 2 


Infantry 3 

Total 5 


Cavalry 34 

Artillery 4 

Infantry 149 

Total 187 


Cavalry 4 

Artillery 2 

Infantry 18 

Total 24 

Grand  totals 216 

Grand  total,  190,045 

Number  of  deserters 


Enlisted  men 












While  the  Civil  War  shows,  in  its  various  activities, 
the  fallacy  of  militia  and  volunteers,  the  Spanish- Amer- 
can  War  and  Philippine  Insurrection  portray  a  progres- 
sive deterioration.  The  worthlessness  of  the  American 
military  system,  however,  does  not  alone  adhere  to  these 
late  wars,  but  has  been  co-existent  with  the  Republic 
from  its  inception,  as  the  three  following  tables,  published 
by  F.  L.  Huidekoper  in  the  North  American  Review, 







Evacuation  of  New  York  .... 
Brand  ywine  

Sept.  is, 
Sept    ii, 


Parsons'  and  Fellows'  brigades 

Camden,  S.  C  


Guilford  Court  House,  N.  C.. 
Indian    village     near     Fort 

March  15, 

Oct    22 


North  Carolina  regiment 

Darke  County,  Ohio  

Nov.  4, 

Frenchtown   and     Raisin 
River,  Mich  
Sackett's  Harbor  

Jan.  18-20, 


Winchester's  column 

French  Creek,  N.  Y  
Chrysler's  Field,  Canada  
Evacuation  of  Fort  George, 

Nov.  1-5, 
Nov.  ii, 


General  Hampton's  column 
General  Wilkinson's  column 

Burning  of  Buffalo  and  Black 
Rock    N    Y           

New  Orleans,  La  

Jan  8 

lumbia  Militia  and   Volunteers  under 
General  Winder 

Lake  Okeechobee,  Fla  


on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mississippi 

Bull  Run,  Virginia  

July  21, 


Gen.  McDowell's  entire  force  of  militia 

This  partial  list  shows  the  character  of  the  wholesale 
desertions  and  flights  up  to  the  time  of  the  Civil  War. 
Subsequent  affairs  are  too  well  known  to  necessitate  rep- 
etition. In  the  Civil  War  it  must  always  be  remem- 
bered, when  the  valorous  deeds  done  there  come  to  the 
mind,  that  in  due  time,  after  two  or  three  years'  service, 
militia  ceased  to  be  militia  and  volunteers  had  become 

Even  as  early  as  the  American  War  of  Independence, 
when  science  and  invention  had  entered  very  little  into 
the  conduct  of  war,  the  worthlessness  of  militia  and 
volunteers  was  fully  recognized  by  the  military  leaders 
of  that  period.  Washington  expressed  himself  as  follows : 

"  Regular  troops  alone  are  equal  to  the  exigencies  of 
modern  war,  as  well  for  defence  as  offence,  and  when  a 
substitute  is  attempted  it  must  prove  illusory  and 
ruinous.  No  militia  will  ever  acquire  the  habits  neces- 
sary to  resist  a  regular  force.  .  .  .  The  firmness  requisite 
for  the  real  business  of  fighting  is  only  to  be  attained 
by  a  constant  course  of  discipline  and  service.  I  have 







Jan.  i,         1781 

Jan.  34-28,  1781 
une,           1783 

June,           1812 
uly,            1812 

Oct.  19.       1812 
Oct..            1812 

Nov.,          1812 
Oct.  13,       1813 
Nov.,          1813 

Dec.,            1813 
Dec.  31,       1835 

July  16-18.  1861 

Pennsylvania   line   (6   regiments),    1300 
New  Jersey  line 
80  recruits,  joined  by  two  hundred  other 
malecontents.  marched  to  Philadelphia, 
demanded  their  pay,  and  held  Congress 
prisoner  on  June   21,    1783 

General  Hull's  militia 
i  So  Ohio  militia  of  Hull's  command 

4000  Kentucky  mounted  Tmliti^    under 
General  Hopkins 

Kentucky,    Virginia,    and   Ohio   militia 
under  Gen.  W.  H.  Harrison 

Nearly  all  the  3,000  militia  under  Gen- 
eral Dearborn 
New     York     militia     under     Generals 
Rensselaer  and  Wadsworth 
Tennessee  militia  and  volunteers 

General  McClure's  New  York  militia 
Florida    militia    and    volunteers    under 
Gov.  Call,  Clinch's  expedition 

Militia  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah 

On  the  inarch  from  Urbana, 
Ohio,  to  Detroit,  Mich  
Detroit,  Mich  

On    the  march    from     Fort 
Harrison,  Ind.,  to  the  Wa- 
bash  and  Illinois  rivers..  .  . 

En  route  to  the  rapids  of  the 

En  route  from    Plattsburg, 
N.  Y,,  to  Canada  

Battle  of  Queenstown  

Fort  Strother,  Fla  

Retreat     to     Buffalo    after 
evacuation  of  Fort  George 
Withlacoochee  River,  Fla  

Charlestown,  W.  Va  

never  yet  been  witness  to  a  single  instance  that  can 
justify  a  different  opinion,  and  it  is  most  earnestly  to  be 
wished  that  the  liberties  of  America  may  no  longer  be  trust- 
ed, in  any  material  degree,  to  so  precarious  a  dependence." 






Massachusetts  . 


April,       1812 

Denied  right  of  President  or  Congress  to 

determine  when  such  exigencies  arise  as 

to  require  railing  out  of  militia.    Claimed 
that     this  right  is  vested   in   the   com- 

manders-in-chief   of   the   militia   of   the 

several  states" 

Connecticut.  .  .  . 

Griswold  .  .  . 

April,       1812 

Substantially  the  same  contention  as  the 




Nov.  io,  1813 

Declared  that  "the  military  strength  and 

resources  of  this  state  must   be  reserved 

for  its  own  defence  and  protection  exclu- 



Chittenden  . 

Sept..       1814 

Refused  to  order  militia  to  support  Gen. 

Macomb  in  repelling  the  enemy 


Letcher.  ..  . 

\orth  Carolina. 



Magoffin.  .  . 

April,       1861 





Jackson  .... 





T  ETTER  to  the  President  of  Congress,  September 
L,  24,  1776: 

"To  place  any  dependence  upon  militia  is  assuredly 
resting  upon  a  broken  staff.  Men  just  dragged  from 
the  tender  scenes  of  domestic  life,  unaccustomed  to  the 
din  of  arms,  totally  unacquainted  with  every  kind  of 
military  skill  (which  is  followed  by  want  of  confidence 
in  themselves  when  opposed  by  troops  regularly  trained  i 
disciplined,  and  appointed,  superior  in  knowledge  and 
superior  in  arms),  are  timid  and  ready  to  fly  from  their 
own  shadows. 

"  Besides,  the  sudden  change  in  their  manner  of  living, 
particularly  in  their  lodging,  brings  on  sickness  in  many, 
impatience  in  all,  and  such  an  unconquerable  desire  of 
returning  to  their  respective  homes  that  it  not  only  pro- 
duces shameful  and  scandalous  desertions  among  them- 
selves, but  infuses  a  like  spirit  in  others.  Again,  men 
accustomed  to  unbounded  freedom  and  no  control  can- 
not brook  the  restraint  which  is  indispensably  necessary 
to  the  good  order  and  government  of  an  army,  without 
which  licentiousness  and  every  kind  of  disorder  trium- 
phantly reign.  To  bring  men  to  a  proper  degree  of  sub- 
ordination is  not  the  work  of  a  day,  a  month,  or  even  a 
year.  .  .  .  Certain  I  am  that  it  would  be  cheaper  to  keep 



fifty  thousand  or  one  hundred  thousand  in  constant  pay 
than  to  depend  upon  half  the  number  and  supply  the 
other  half  occasionally  by  militia.  The  time  the  latter 
are  in  pay  before  and  after  they  are  in  camp,  assembling 
and  marching,  the  waste  of  ammunition,  the  consump- 
tion of  stores,  which,  in  spite  of  every  resolution  or  req- 
uisition of  Congress,  they  must  be  furnished  with  or 
sent  home,  added  to  other  incidental  expenses  conse- 
quent upon  their  coming  and  conduct  in  camp,  surpass 
all  idea  and  destroy  every  kind  of  regularity  and  economy 
which  you  could  establish  among  fixed  and  settled  troops, 
and  will,  in  my  opinion,  prove,  if  the  scheme  is  adhered 
to,  the  ruin  of  our  cause." 


THE  number  of  deaths  from  disease  in  the  Ameri- 
can Civil  War  cannot  be  positively  ascertained,  on 
account  of  the  great  numbers  who  died  subsequent  to 
discharge  due  to  disability.    Careful  investigation  demon- 
strates that  an  equal,  if  not  greater,  number  died  after 
leaving  the  field  and  base  hospitals  than  died  therein. 
Deaths  from  disease  while  still  in  the  ranks: 

Officers  and  men 199,720 


The  casualties  in  the  Spanish- American  War  were  as 
follows : 

Battle  Disease 

In  the  Philippines 17  203 

In  Puerto  Rico 3  262 

In  Cuba 273  567 

In  U.  S.  camps 2649 

Total 293          3681 

The  mean  strength  of  the  American  army  during  this 
war  was  approximately  170,000.  The  number  of  ad- 
missions to  hospital  on  September  10,  1898,  was  over 
158,000,  i.  e.,  90  per  cent,  of  the  entire  force. 

These  men  were,  but  a  few  months  prior,  selected, 



after  examination  by  surgeons,  on  account  of  their  phys- 
ical perfectness,  so  that  this  vast  amount  of  disease 
and  death  was  not  due  to  the  physical  weakness  and 
incapacity  of  the  American  volunteer,  but  to  the  worth- 
lessness  of  the  military  system  of  the  Republic.  While 
only  about  38,000  men  participated  in  the  military  op- 
erations of  the  Spanish-American  War,  and  while  the 
casualties  in  battle  were  very  few,  yet  43,000  pension 
claims  have  been  issued  or  are  pending  in  the  Pension 
Office  of  the  United  States. 


A  statement  of  the  Japanese  casualties  from  disease 
by  Baron  Takaki,  Surgeon -General  (Reserve)  Imperial 
Japanese  Navy: 

"To  be  sure,  we  did  lose  men  from  disease,  but  in  all 
human  history  there  has  never  been  a  record  like  ours. 
We  established  a  record  of  four  deaths  from  bullets  to 
one  from  disease.  In  the  Spanish- American  War  four- 
teen men  died  from  preventable  sickness  to  one  man 
killed  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  following  table  gives 
a  comparison  of  the  mortality  from  disease  per  one 
thousand  men  in  the  Japanese-Chinese  War  and  the 
Japanese- Russian  War: 

Japanese-Chinese  War 

Japanese-Russian  War 

























"  While  Japan  put  into  the  field,  during  the  Russian 
War,  1,500,000  troops  of  various  categories,  the  total 
number  of  typhoid  cases  amounted  to  only  9722,  re- 
sulting in  4073  deaths.  Dysentery  cases  amounted  to 
only  7642,  resulting  in  1804  deaths." 


JAPANESE     immigration     to     the     United  States 
(mainland)    has  been  governed  by   the  same   con- 

Immigration  by  political  decades: 

1891-1900  .......................................  24,806 

1901-1905  .......................................  64,102 

1905-1906  .......................................  14,243 

1906-1907  .......................................  30,226 


During  the  last  six  years  there  have  come  to  the  United 
States  (Report  of  Bureau  of  Immigration)  90,123  Japa- 
nese male  adults. 

In  California  the  Japanese  constitute  more  than  one- 
seventh  of  the  male  adults  of  military  age  : 

Caucasian  males  of  military  age  ...................    262,694 

Japanese  males  of  military  age  ....................      45.  72  5 

In  Washington  the  Japanese  constitute  nearly  one- 
ninth  of  the  male  population  of  military  age: 

Caucasian  males  of  military  age  ...................     163,682 

Japanese  males  of  military  age  ....................       17,000 



HPHE  author  spent  nearly  seven  months  exploring, 
J,  from  a  military  view-point,  the  San  Jacinto,  San 
Bernardino,  San  Gabriel,  and  Tehachapi  mountains,  the 
Mojave  and  its  adjacent  deserts,  traversing  between 
one  and  two  thousand  miles.  The  results  are  embod- 
ied in  the  text. 








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